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Just as most of us were not always students, although sometimes it
seems that way, Professor Emeritus Christopher H. Munch was not al-
ways a professor. Before coming to the University of Denver College of
Law, he was an active Air Force lawyer for fifteen years and spent over
four years in the Far East One as chief legal counsel for the Fifth Air
Force in Korea in 1951-1952, the next three as chief legal counsel of the
Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines and six months as one of two
legal counsel with a Philippine Base Negotiating Team. During his time
in Korea and the Philippines, he was chairman of the area Air Force For-
eign Claims Commission, which reviewed and decided awards of damages
for harm to private property attributable to military activities. In the
Philippine assignment, his legal staff also participated in labor negotia-
tions with local unions, rescue and repatriation of foreign nationals, and
negotiations for temporary site usage, conducted between the U.S. Em-
bassy and the Philippine Foreign Office.
After completing his tour of duty in the Far East, Professor Munch
was assigned as the first Permanent Professor of Law and Chairman of
the Law Department at the then new Air Force Academy. While there,
among other matters, he instituted a course in International Law as part
of the International Relations major.
Professor Munch took a sabbatical leave from the Air Force Academy
in 1966 and joined the faculty of the University of Denver College of Law
as a visiting Professor of Law. The following June, he retired from the Air
Force and was appointed as a full time faculty member at DU, where he
taught for 25 years until his retirement in 1991. While he is, for all pur-
poses, a retired (Emeritus) professor, he agreed to teach full time for the
Fall Semester of 1992, at the request of the College of Law Administra-
tion. Totalling 26 years that he has taught, counselled and supported law
students at DU. During that time, he has assiduously avoided teaching
the international aspects of his subjects out of respect for the superior
scholarship and expertise of our Director of International Legal Studies,
his long time friend and colleague, Professor Ved Nanda. He attends the
lectures, receptions and other social functions sponsored by the Interna-
tional Law Society over the years. We sincerely invite him to continue to
do so.
The Denver Journal of International Law & Policy dedicates this issue to
Professor Emeritus William M. Beaney.
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Constitutions and Revolutions: The Impact
of Unification and the Constitutions of the
Five New German States on the
Amendment of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Germany
CHRISTOPH J. PARTSCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The changes in the foreign and domestic politics of Germany caused
by unification have been and will continue to be reflected in the changes
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic, also known as the Basic Law
(Grundgesetz).' The constitutions 2 and draft constitutions' of the five
new states of the Federal Republic of Germany reveal the direction that
the future Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany will take.
They also reflect the difficult history of two dictatorships and the
problems of a society in transformation towards democracy. The
Einigungsvertrag, the "Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany
and the German Democratic Republic on the Achievement of the Unity
of Germany,"" changed the present constitution of the Federal Republic
of Germany and recommended amendments to the Basic Law.' Most of
the prior changes to the Basic Law resulted from negotiations with the
* The author was legal advisor to the committee "Constitution and Law" and to vari-
ous other committees in the Parliaments of Saxony, Dresden, Federal Republic of Germany
in 1991. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. He would like
to express his gratitude to Mrs. Swetlana von Bismarck for her contributions to this article.
1. Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland of May 23, 1949 [hereinafter Basic
Law] [GGI 1949 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBt] I 1 (F.R.G.), translated in ELMAR M. HUCKO,
THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION, FOUR GERMAN CONSTITUTIONS 194-265 (1987).
2. Constitution of the State of Brandenburg, as adopted by plebiscite on June 14, 1992,
6 Gesetz-und Verordnungsblatt [GVB1] Brandenburg 121 (1992), to enter into force on Aug.
21, 1992, Landesverfassung kann in Kraft treten, DER TAGESSPIEGEL, Aug. 13, 1992 at 6;
Constitution of the Free State of Saxony, as adopted by parliament on May 26, 1992, Drs. 1/
1800, Sachsischer Landtag beschlieszt Verfassung, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
[F.A.Z.] May 27, 1992 at 1; Constitution of the State of Sachsen-Anhalt, as adopted by
parliament on July 16, 1992, 31 GVBI Sachsen-Anhalt 600 (1992).
3. Draft Constitution of the State of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern of Apr. 30, 1992, Drs.
1/20000; Draft Constitution of the State of Thuringia of Apr. 10, 1991, Drs. 1/285.
4. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratis-
chen Republik t0ber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands (Einigungsvertrag) [Treaty
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the
Achievement of the Unity of Germany], Aug. 31, 1990, BGB1 II 885; Gesetzblatt [GBI]
G.D.R. 1, 1627; Verfassungsgesetz [Verf.] art. 4., translated in 30 I.L.M. 457 (1991) [herein-
after Treaty of the Unity of Germany].
5. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, art. 4.
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four former Allied powers, illustrated by the Treaty on the Final Settle-
ment with Respect to Germany.6 The present recommendations will af-
fect the internal constitutional structure of the present united Germany.
The five states of the former German Democratic Republic entered
into extensive parliamentary and public debates on the shape of their fu-
ture state constitutions even before discussions of reunification began.7
Due to their different political orientation, the constitutions and draft
constitutions of these new states offer an intriguing spectrum of modern
constitutional thinking in Germany. As a result, they will have considera-
ble influence on the amendments to the Basic Law, which will shape the
reunited Federal Republic of Germany as a part of the European
Community.
6. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, F.D.R.-G.D.R.-U.K.-U.S.,
1990 BGBI II 1318, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1188 (1990) [hereinafter Treaty on Final
Settlement]:
Article 1
(1) The united Germany shall comprise the territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the whole of Berlin. Its exter-
nal borders shall be the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic and shall be definitive from the date the present
treaty comes into force....
(2) The united Germany and the Republic of Poland shall confirm the existing
border between them in a treaty that is binding under international law.
(3) The united Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever against other
states and shall not assert any in the future.
(4) The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic shall ensure that the constitution of the united Germany
does not contain any provision incompatible with these principles. This applies
accordingly to the provisions laid down in the preamble, the second sentence of
Article 23, and Article 146 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of
Germany.
(5) The Governments of the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America take formal note of the corresponding commitments
and declarations by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic and declare that their implementation will
confirm the definitive nature of the united Germany's borders.
Article 2
The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Demo-
cratic Republic reaffirm their declarations . . According to the constitution of
the united Germany, acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb
the peaceful relations between nations. . . are unconstitutional and a punisha-
ble offence. The Governments. . . declare that the united Germany will never
employ any of its weapons except in accordance with its constitution and the
Charter of the United Nations.
7. The committee to change the constitution, Verfassungskommission, started working
on January 16, 1992 and according to an agreement between the parties is supposed to
finish its work by March 31, 1992. Scholz und Voscherau Vorsitzende der Verfassungskom-
mission, F.A.Z., Jan. 17, 1992, at 1.
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I. GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Before 1871, the multitude of independent kingdoms, duchies, coun-
ties, and free cities that later formed Germany were unable to unite as a
nation due to their strategic position in the center of Europe. Reluctant
to abandon their statehood completely, these states preserved many of
their former rights in the Constitution of the German Empire, which left
the inclusion of a bill of rights to the state constitutions. s
Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the newly declared
democratic republic, the Republic of Weimar,' adopted a Constitution in
1919 that again reduced the power of the states, though they still retained
considerable control.'0 A bill of rights was added, 1 but the rights were
subjective' 2 and could not be vindicated by any court and could be lim-
ited by ordinary legislation. As a result, this constitution proved to be
ineffective' s to withstand the burden of an economy crippled by the four
victorious powers -of World War I in the Versailles Treaty, a worldwide
depression, and the advance of political extremism by the Communists on
the one side and the National Socialists on the other."' One of the first
victims of Germany's move toward autocratic centralization was the state
of Prussia.'6 After gaining power in 1933, Hitler's National Socialists cen-
tralized the country and immediately abolished the states.'
8. HucKo, supra note 1, at 36, 121. For a detailed description, see GORDON A. CRAIG,
GERMANY 1866 - 1945, at 38-41 (1980). Most notably, foreign policy and defense were as-
signed to the Reich.
9. Weimar, the city of the writer Johann Wolfang von Goethe, is a small town in
Thuringen where the members of the National Assembly gathered in order to avoid the
post-war turmoil of Berlin while writing the new constitution.
10. Constitution of the Weimarer Republic, arts. 5 and 12, translated in HUCKO, supra
note 1, at 149, 152; CRAIG, supra note 8, at 419; ERICH ROPER, Verfassunggebung und
Verfassungskontinuitat in den ostlichen Bundeslindern 149, 152 (1991).
11. Gerhard Anschuetz, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches vom 11, August 1919,
14 KOMMENTAR 507 (1933, reprinted 1965): arts. 109-165("Grundrechte und Grundp-
flichten") [fundamental rights and duties].
12. Id. at 506.
13. HUCKO, supra note 1, at 60.
14. HANS SCHNEIDER, HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
[Handbook of the Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany] (Josef Isensee
and Paul Kirchhoff eds.) § 3(D), at 136. In the April, 1932 presidential elections 19.4 million
votes were cast for Hindenburg, backed by democratic parties; 13.4 million for Adolf Hitler;
and 3.7 million for Ernst Thilrann, the communist leader. The 5th Reichstag (Sept. 14,
1930) comprised of 577 parlamentarians, including 107 Nazis and 77 Communists; the 6th
Reichstag (July 31, 1932) comprised of 608 parlamentarians, including 230 Nazis and 89
Comunists; and the 7th Reichstag (Nov. 6, 1932) comprised of 584 parlamentarians, and
included 196 Nazis and 100 Communists. Id. at 138.
15. On July 20, 1932, following bloody brawls between Nazis and Communists, the
Chancellor of the Reich, Franz von Papen, deposed the Prussian Government and became
it" i 'ich Commissioner. CRAIG, supra note 8, at 561.
16. On 'pril 7, 1934, Vorldiufiges Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Ltinder, the "Prelimi-
nary Law to Coordinate the Lnder" was passed, appointing commissioners for all Ldnder,
and the Gesetz iiber den Neuaufbau des Reiches, January 30, 1934 [RGB1] I, 75, HERMANN
KINDER, WERNER HILGEMANN, LAW TO RESTRUCTURE THE REICH 195. The bad results for the
1992
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After World War II, the Allied powers wished to "de-nazify" and to
democratize Germany, as well as to remove it as a strong power from the
European theater. The Allies decentralized Germany again and restored
federalism either by restoring old states1 7 or by creating new ones."8 Ten
states, Liinder,"9 were eventually established in the west to form the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, with the Basic Law of May 23rd 1949, the
Grundgesetz, as its constitutional basis.20
In the Soviet-controlled East, five states were created:2 Mecklen-
burg-Vorpommern2 2 in the North, Saxony in the South-East, Thuringia
in the South-West, Sachsen-Anhalt in the West, and Brandenburg in the
area surrounding Berlin.23 The Soviet Union forced the East German
puppet regime to abandon the newly established states and the rather
liberal Constitution of 1949, which was proven to be ineffective in consti-
tutional reality, and to return to centralism. 24 Following the reform move-
ment and the growing dissent in the Communist countries - best repre-
sented by the mass exodus of East Germans via Hungary and Austria,2 5
the demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden, and Berlin,2 and by the opening
of the Berlin Wall on November 9th 198927 - East German leaders reluc-
tantly yielded to public pressure and prepared accession to the Federal
Nazis in the last election on March 5, 1933 prompted this decision because despite consider-
able harassment, communists and democratic parties obtained 81 and 268 votes as opposed
to 288 for nazi parlamentarians. Id. at 576.
17. Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, and Baden were restored.
18. Hessen, Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), and Nordrhein-Westfahlen were created.
19. ROPER, supra note 10, at 153; their number was reduced to nine with the formation
of Baden-W(irttemberg out of two states and increased again to ten when the Saarland
joined the F.R.G. in 1957. Konrad Hesse, Grundzuege des Verfassungsrechts der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 34 MARGIN No. 92 (14th ed. 1984). In addition, West Berlin
maintained special status under Allied control.
20. HucKo, supra note 1, at 194-265. The Basic Law begins with a strong bill of rights
section outperforming its American counterpart in several aspects. For instance, with the
exception of the freedom of expression, the German Basic Law grants more rights in a less
restricted way, such as the right to privacy, the right to one's own papers, and the supervi-
sion of telephone-tapping.
21. Befehl Nr. 1 Ober die Organisation der Militarverwaltung zur Verwaltung der
sowjetischen Besatzungszone in Deutshland of June 9th, 1945 [Command number one con-
cerning the organization of the military administration to administer the Soviet occupation
zone in Germany], reprinted in v.MUnch, 285.
22. The other half of Pomerania is now in Polish territory.
23. The latter two formed the heart of Prussia, which was again abolished - this time
by the Allied powers - as an ill-conceived scapegoat for the rise of Nazism. Gesetz Nr. 46
des Kontrollrats betreffend Aufl6sung des Staates Preussen vom Feb. 25, 1947 [law number
46 of the supervising council concerning the dissolution of the state of Prussia], ABI des
Kontrollrats Nr. 14, Mar. 31, 1947, at 262, cited in ROPER, supra note 10, at 153.
24. Id. at 158.
25. Ferdinand Protzman, Thousands Swell Trek to the West by East Germans, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1989, at Al.
26. New Face, Old Politics, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1989, at 52; PHIL. INQUIRER, Oct. 8,
1989, at Al.
27. Ferdinand Protzman, Clamor in the East; East Berliners Explore Land Long For-
bidden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1989, at Al.
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Republic of Germany.2"
In joining the Federal Republic, East Germany reintroduced the
Ltinder.2 9 The Basic Law presupposes that each state has its own consti-
tution, 30 and so does the East German "Law to Reintroduce the
Ltinder."' Article 23(2) § 1 empowers the parliaments to write their own
constitutions.
After East Germany acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany on
Oct. 3, 1990,32 the obligation of the five new states to enact constitutions
derives from the Basic Law as well. All five state parliaments enacted
preliminary organizational statutes"3 and drafted constitutions of varying
stages of development, 4 and Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt and Sachsen
have enacted constitutions." The disputes surrounding these constitu-
tions and drafts have influenced the constitutional committee, which by
now has begun drafting the new Federal Constitution of Germany."6
III. CHANGES IN THE BASIC LAW
The changes to the Basic Law have either been imposed by the Al-
lies, after World War II, or were deemed necessary by the two German
states themselves to achieve unification. In order to receive the consent of
the Allied powers and to assure its neighbors of its peaceful intentions,
the two Germanies agreed on important changes of the Basic Law. The
two Germanies committed themselves to accept their borders after unifi-
cation as definitive 7 in order to limit their military forces," to finance
28. Basic Law, art. 23 formed the constitutional basis for the accession of the five new
states to the already existing Federal Republic of Germany. Article 146 suggests forming a
new German state by joining the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic
under a new constitution, but this alternative was not chosen. Burkhard Bastuck, Unity,
Law, and Freedom: Legal Aspects of the Process and Results of German Unification, 25
INT'L LAW. 251, 255 (1991).
29. Verfassungsgesetz zur Bildung von Ldndern in der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik (Landereinfiihrungsgesetz) [Law of the constitution for the formation of the lands
of the German Democratic Republic], July 22, 1990, art. 1(1), GB1 I, Nr. 51 at 995.
30. Art. 28(I) § 1, Hans D. Jarass & Bodo Pieroth, Grundgesetz fir die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, Kommentar, 370 art. 28 margin no. 1 (1989).
31. Art. 3(2) § 1; ROPER, supra note 10, at 150.
32. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, at 457. According to article 1(1), the
five new states join the Federal Republic, and according to article 1(2), the 11 Eastern and
the 12 Western districts of Berlin form the new state of Berlin.
33. For example, Gesetz zur Herstellung der Arbeitsfdhigkeit des Sachsischen
Landtags und der Sdchsischen Landesregierung (Vorschaltgesetz), Oct. 27, 1990, Sichs
GVBI, 1 (Law to Achieve the Working Capability of the Saxon Parliament).
34. Draft Constitution of the State of Brandenburg of May 5, 1991, 9 GVBI Branden-
burg 96 (1991); Draft Constitution of the Free State of Saxony of June 1991, as published
by The Committee For Constitution and Law; for Thuringia and Mecklenburg-Vorpom-
mern, see supra note 3. ROPER, supra note 10, at 151, n.7.
35. See supra note 3.
36. The committee began working on Jan. 16, 1992. Scholz und Voscherau Vorsitzende
der Verfassungskommission, F.A.Z., Jan. 17, 1992, at 1.
37. Treaty on the Final Settlement, supra note 6, art. 1.
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the withdrawal and the settlement of the Soviet military forces,39 and to
redefine the membership of a united Germany in NATO. 40 In treaties and
negotiations with Poland 4' and the new leadership in Czechoslovakia,42
Germany further sought to calm the fears and insinuations raised world-
wide at that time. 4' The international obligation to change the Basic Law
was fulfilled in article 4 of the Treaty on the Unity of Germany and was
implemented upon ratification by both German parliaments.
A. The Preamble
The preamble of the former constitution of West Germany expressed
the desire to reunite and the duty of the German people to exercise their
right to self-determination. The former preamble characterized the Basic
Law as a temporary constitution enacted for the benefit of those who
38. Id. art. 3(2). The article states the obligation to reduce the number of troops to
370,000 men. The present number is about 600,000. Robert C. Toth, U.S. and Soviets in
Accord on Cutting Arms in Europe, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990, at Al.
39. Treaty on the Final Settlement, supra note 6, art. 4(1) only states the obligation to
settle by treaty the conditions for and the duration of the presence of Soviet armed forces as
well as the conduct of their withdrawal.
40. Id. arts. 5 and 6; Volker Busse, Das certragliche Werk der deutschen Einheit und
die Anderungen von Verfassungsrecht, DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 345, 346 (1991).
41. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen iber
die Bestditigung der zwischen ihnen bestehenden Grenzen, BGB1 I 1329 (1991)(Treaty con-
cerning the Confirmation of the Boundary between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Polish Republic), Nov, 14, 1990, F.R.G.-Pol. Jochen A. Frowein, Germany Reunited, 51
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES OFFENTLIcHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [Journal of Foreign
Public Law and International Law] 333, 341 (1991).
42. Vertrag vom 27 Februar zwischen der Bundesrepublik und der Tschechischen und
Slowakischen Fbderativen Republik Uiber gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche
Zusammenarbeit, 21 BGB1 II 461 (1992)(Treaty of Good Neighborship and Friendly Coop-
eration between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic).
43. Regarding France, see Philip Jackson, Fears of Germany Rekindled in France, THE
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990 (quotes claim that more than 60% of the French are afraid of Germany).
In contrast, another source cites only 27% of the French as feeling uneasy about unification.
NORTH SPORTS FINAL EDITION, Oct. 3, 1990, at 18. Regarding Great Britain, see Thatcher
Anxious over German Domination, Congratulates Kohl, Reuters, Oct. 3, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
Regarding Israel and the Jewish Community, see Douglas Devin, A Few, Lonely Voices
Fear the New Germany, The Face of the Colossus, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 3, 1990; The New
Germany, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 3, 1990. In a very unpleasant confrontation, the World
Jewish Congress, later joined by many other Jewish Groups, attacked Chancellor Helmut
Kohl for meeting Austrian President Waldheim on March 27, 1992. Kohl retorted by dis-
closing East German documents which showed the WJC conspired with East Germany's
deposed dictator Honecker against unification - claims which the WJC pronounced as exag-
gerated by the East Germans. Kohl Criticized for Waldheim Meeting, Responds Angrily to
Major Jewish Groups, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1992 at A13.
Turkey's President Turgut Ozal joined anti-German critics and invoked Germany's
Nazi past when Germany refused to deliver weaponry that Turkey needed to fight Kurdish
separatists. Turk Cites Nazism in Attack on Bonn over Kurdish Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1992 at A6.
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were denied their right of self-determination. These declarations referred
not only to the population of the former German Democratic Republic
but also to the vast stretches of originally German territory occupied by
Poland and the Soviet Union after World War II. With the Treaty on the
Unity of Germany, the declarations pertaining to reunification and self-
determination were deleted and. substituted by the statement that the
Basic Law now applies to the whole German people. The legislature
thereby declared the process of reunification complete and relinquished
one fourth of the territory of former Germany in the borders of 1937."" In
addition, the reference to the Basic Law as a temporary constitution was
deleted.
B. Article 146
Article 146 of the new Basic Law represents the result of hasty politi-
cal negotiations rather than precise legal craftsmanship. The old article
146 stressed the temporary character of the Basic Law by promising a
general referendum on a constitution after reunification. Due to a lack of
coordination between Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Min-
ister of the Interior Wolfgang Schiuble,'9 and in order to assure support
by the opposition,' this article was not deleted from the Basic Law but
amended by a formulation parallel to that of the preamble. It states that
"the Basic Law now applies to the whole German People." As a result,
the present form of article 146 still appears to refer to the Basic Law as a
temporary constitution subject to substitution by a new constitution and
a referendum, which is arguably inconsistent with the preamble and with
the political will of the present German Government."7 The present con-
stitution, therefore, may be vulnerable to being overruled by a simple ma-
jority in a referendum or even in the German parliament.' s Two views
attempt to reconcile this inconsistency. One possibility is to subject the
amended constitution to a popular referendum, and another is to simply
disregard the possible inconsistencies in its wording.' 9
C. Articles 51(II), 135a, and 143
The changes of the Basic Law articles 51(11), 135a and 143 involve
the internal distribution of power in the federation, questions of finance,
and the time-frame for adjusting the East German body of law to that of
West Germany. Article 51(11) assures the bigger states in the Federation,
44. Henry Kamm, Anxiety Tugs at Germany's Jews, Bitterness Sears the Die-Hard
Nationalists, Sense of Mourning, Not Elation, For the Disappointed Expellees, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1990 at A10.
45. WOLFGANG SCHAUBLE, DER VERTRAG (The Treaty] 120-21 (1991).
46. Id.; Busse, supra note 40, at 345-54.
47. This is the opinion of the opposition Social Democrats. SCHAUBLE, supra note 45, at
120.
48. Busse, supra note 40, at 351, n.47e.
49. For the latter view, see Busse, supra note 40, at 352.
1992
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those comprising more than 7 million inhabitants, that the smaller states
cannot form a two-thirds majority against them in the Bundesrat, the
upper house of Germany's national legislature.50 This provision assured
passage of the Treaty of the Unity of Germany by the Bundesrat with the
required two-thirds majority.
Article 135a provides that the new Germany reserves the power to
extinguish or restrict claims against the former East German Republic
and to deny or restrict claims by victims of the actions of the Communist
regime. 1
Article 143 was changed to avoid issues that threatened to delay the
signing of the Treaty of the Unity of Germany by the two German states.
Article 143 grants a period of adjustment to the East German body of
law. 2 East German law must comply with the constitutional require-
ments of the Basic Law by December 31, 1992. This applies most impor-
tantly to East Germany's more lenient criminal law regarding abortion,
StGB article 153-155, which allows abortion once the mother has been
informed about the medical risks .5 The West German StGB article 218,
which outlaws abortion, but creates exceptions that have virtually eroded
the prohibition, was not to enter into force in the East."' Instead, the
legislature was called upon to introduce a new law. 5 The new law advo-
cated a more thorough information requirement for the mother but aban-
doned the exception-rule of StGB article 218. It was challenged before
the Constitutional Court and will not enter into force until a decision has
been rendered.58 Until then, the East German StGB articles 153-155 will
remain in force.5
The most controversial effect of article 143 is the constitutional as-
surance that it gives to article 41, which declares the brutal expropria-
tions by the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1949 irreversible. 8 When
challenged in the Constitutional Court, the German government defended
its consent to these regulations as necessary to assure the Soviet Union's
agreement to unification. 9 This view was accepted by the Constitutional
50. Id. at 350. There are four states in this category: Baden-Wuirttemberg, Bavaria,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia.
51. Id.
52. SCHAUBLE, supra note 45, at 229-50.
53. Rainer Beckmann, Zur Verfassungsmiissigkeit des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs im
Einigungsvertrag [Toward the constitutionality of abortion within the treaty], 2 M.D.R.
117, 118 (1991).
54. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, art. 9(11), in conjunction with annex
II Ch. III, matter C, para. I, Nos. 1, 4 and 5; Beckmann, supra note 53, at 118; Nomi Morris,
Tough Challenge for Germany - A Unified Abortion Law, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 1992 at
A10; Busse, supra note 40, at 351.
55. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, art. 31, para. IV §1.
56. Der Bundesrat stimmt Fristenregelung mit Beratungspflicht zu, F.A.Z., July 11,
1992 at 1; Karlsruhe setzteine knappe Frist fir Antrdge, F.A.Z., Aug. 6, 1992 at 1.
57. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, art. 34, para. 4 § 4.
58. Basic Law art. 143(111).
59. Secretary of State Kastrup in his pleadings before the federal Constitutional Court.
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Court in 1991.0 The most bizarre effect of this rule is that those members
of the German resistance movement against Hitler, whom the Nazis were
unable to expropriate in the turmoil of the last days of the war, were
subsequently expropriated by the Soviet or East German authorities as
"capitalists, fascists or aristocrats" between 1945 and 1949, and will not
be able to return to their homes. Those whose property was expropriated
by the Nazis before 1945, along with other victims of Nazism like Jewish
Germans, political opponents, and those whose property the East German
Communists expropriated after 1949, are entitled to a return of their old
property or indemnification.
The absurdity of this result of expropriation along with other factors
suggest that the East German leaders, many still imbued with Commu-
nist ideas or connected to the East German secret police,"1 succeeded in
justifying the brutal results of the Communist reign of East Germany.
6 2
This result is evidenced by the foreseeable decline of the Soviet Union as
a political force coupled with the weak proof advanced for the foreign
relations argument during the oral arguments in the Constitutional Court.
Justifying these results was in accord with West German financial experts
afraid of having to pay enormous amounts of compensation.6
IV. FUTURE CHANGES OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION
Decisive changes of the German Federal constitution will take place
within the next ten years. The German constitution will have to adapt to
the changes caused by unification,6 by the creation of the European
Judgment of Apr. 23, 1991, Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGe], 1 BvR
1170, 1174, 1175/90 (F.R.G.), reprinted in 44 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHFlrr [N.J.W.]
1597, 1598 (1991).
60. 44 N.J.W., supra note 59, at 1597.
61. Lothar de Maiziere, East Germany's first and last democratic prime minister, who
signed the Unification Treaty for East Germany, had to step down from most of his political
posts after unification due to charges that he had worked for the East German secret police,
STASI. Rolf Soderlind, East German Politician Faces New Stasi Allegations, Reuters, Feb.
16, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Current File.
62. Walter Leisner, Das Bodenreform- Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 44 N.J.W.
1569 (1991).
63. "Der Bundesfinanzminister sitzt auf einem Pulverfasz, denn es geht um viele Mil-
liarden D-Mark. Mir hat er damit zu verdanken, wenn es nicht noch teurer wird." SCHXU-
BLE, supra note 45, at 255. ("The Minister of Finance sits on a powder keg, since this is a
matter of billions of D-Mark. He should thank me if it doesn't get more expensive").
64. The Basic Law, article 5, recommends the German legislative bodies to consider
above all, but not exclusively, the following issues for amendment:
1. The inclusion of political aims into the Basic Law.
2. The application of Basic Law, article 146, and the question of a referendum
on the new constitution.
3. The strengthening of federalism with possible changes of Basic Law, article
24(I). The old German states witnessed a constant erosion of their rights due
to Federal supremacy clauses and due to the delegation of jurisdiction to the
European Community and have therefore agreed to strengthen their role
against the Federation. Eckart Klein, Der Einigungsvertrag: Verfassung-
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Community, 5 and by Germany's new role in the world.66 This article will
sprobleme und auftrage, 14 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 569, 575-76 (1991).
See also Busse, supra note 40, at 352-53. Among others the process of unifica-
tion on a European scale has led the Liinder to demand consultation and vot-
ing rights with regard to foreign relations. Bundesstaat oder Staatenbund?,
Streit iiber die aussenpolitischen Kompetenzen der Lander, F.A.Z., Mar. 21,
1992, at 4; Klein, supra, at 576.
4. The forming of a new state by joining the states of Berlin and Brandenburg.
Id.
Regarding these four points, article 5 constitutes an agreement between the major parties
rather than between the two Germanies, with the Social Democrats and the Greens in favor
of a new constitution, and the Christian Democrats and the Liberals in favor of a limited
revision. Busse, supra note 40, at 352.
65. The ratification of the Maastricht treaty is accompanied by changes of the Basic
Law. A bill to change the Basic law has been forwarded to the Bundesrat. This bill includes,
inter alia, the insertion of a new article 23 to accommodate the rights of the Liinder in a
future, more integrated European Community, and to allow and regulate the transfer of
powers from the German federal level to the EC, as a supranational entity; changes to arti-
cle 24 regarding the transfer of powers from the state level; article 28 will be changed to
allow citizens from other EC states to vote on a communal level; and article 88 will reduce
the powers of the German Federal Bank in favor of a European one. Bundesstaat oder
Staatenbund?, Streit iiber die aussenpolitischen Kompetenzen der Lander, F.A.Z., Mar. 21,
1992 at 4; Der neue Europa Artikel im Grundgesetz, Nach der Einigung Deutschlands wird
die Verfassung auf die Einheit Europas verpflichtet, F.A.Z., July 22, 1992, at 4.
A further, rather complex change of the Basic Law regards its right to asylum in article
16. As immigration control will be abolished along with custom controls at intra-EC fron-
tiers, Germany's very liberal right to asylum will have to be lowered to an EC average level.
Die Leute haben den Zirkus satt, CDU und CSU beharren auf Grundgesetztinderungen
zum Asylrecht, F.A.Z., Mar. 17, 1992 at 5.
66. This primarily concerns the question whether the German army should be allowed
to participate in UN peace keeping actions or even in combat operations, such as the actions
against Iraq. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the oppositional Social Demo-
crats have argued that the Basic Law would not permit the German army, Bundeswehr, to
participate in such actions. They cite article 87a which allows the Bundeswehr only to act in
defense of Germany or where the Basic Law contains an express provision. Many in the
Christian Democratic Union and most legal scholars, however, interpret article 87 only to
prohibit the internal use of the Bundeswehr, i.e. a prohibition to use it as a police force.
Instead, they argue, the permission and the obligation to send troops under UN command
derives from article 24(11). Nahe dran am echten Krieg, 30 DER SPIEGEL 22, 27-28 (1992);
Albrecht Randelzhofer, in Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (Theodor Maunz and Giinther
DUrig eds.), Art. 24(11), Margin no. 44, 46 and 56 (Dec. 1989 update). This question will be
clarified by the Constitutional Court in its decision on an action by the Social Democratic
Party against the participation of German Navy units in surveillance of the coasts of Yugo-
slavia. Organklage der SPD beim Verfassungsgericht eingebracht, F.A.Z., Aug. 10, 1992 at
2. For a discussion of the constitutional problems, see generally, Thomas Giegerich, German
Contribution in the Persian Gulf, 49 ZA0. R.V. 1, 38-40 (1989).
From a political point of view, due to Germany's past, a general anti-militarist attitude
in the population, Krieg, supra, and the rather contradictory demands by the international
community evidenced by the criticism of Germany for not participating in combat actions
against Iraq, and yet the condemnation for political intervention against Serbian mass mili-
tary attacks against light armed Croatian militias - attempts to change the Basic Law have
failed so far. The continued bloodshed in Bosnia and Croatia, however, will probably change
public opinion. Ian Murray, Bonn Fails to Widen Role of the Army, THE TIMEs, Jan. 17,
1992; Parteien uneins 0iber UNO-Einsitze der Bundeswehr, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan. 17,
1992, at 2; CDU-MdB Karl Lamers, Von deutscher Drflckebergerei, 12 DER SPIEGEL 22
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have to limit its scope to the changes of the constitution that have al-
ready been dealt with in the constitutions and draft constitutions of the
five new German states. The Treaty on the Unity of Germany, article 5,
among others, recommends the German legislature to include political
aims in the constitution.6 7 The recommendation of the Treaty on the
Unity of Germany will cause the political discussions that have been
fought on this subject on a state level, and which mirror the slow process
of integration of the Eastern states into a Western constitutional system,
to be repeated on the Federal level, where the problems of integration
will surface again. Therefore this article will first describe the constitu-
tional doctrine of fundamental rights and state aims in state constitu-
tions, and then will analyze its realization in the draft constitutions of the
new states, and will finally describe the analogies that can be drawn on a
Federal level.
A. State Constitutions and Fundamental Constitutional Rights
The inclusion of fundamental rights in the constitutions of the five
new states - though not essential from a legal point of view - assures
their citizens of the rights guaranteed by the Basic Law and serves as a
means of identification with the new federal state. A constitution identi-
fies the organs of a state: their creation, their relationships to each other,
their powers, and their limitations. In addition, it identifies the funda-
mental rights of its subjects.6 s The Basic Law allocates the powers to the
federal organs and guarantees fundamental rights without regard to the
federal or state level.6 9 Since the German federal tradition presupposes
(1992); FDP-MdB and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Bald werden sich die
Deutschen an Blauhelm-Einsatzen beteiligen; Marc Fisher, Germany Facing Harsher Crit-
icism, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1992, at All. Only 22% in the East and 38% in the West are in
favor of German participation in UN actions. Renate Kocher, Viel Ziindstoff fur die Verfas-
sungsdebatte, F.A.Z., Dec. 4, 1991, at 5; Minister of Defense Volker Ruhe "Das ist keine
Drohgebarde," 30 DER SPIEGEL 32, 34 (1992).
67. German constitutional law has so far differentiated between political aims, Staats-
zielen, and fundamental rights, Grundrechten. Political aims do not accord rights to an
individual but define objective standards to be met by the state. Konrad Hesse, 14 MARGIN
No. 82, at 213 (1984). The translations of Staatsziel vary: "a norm describing a goal to be
pursued by the state," Philip Kunig, The Principle of Social Justice, in THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
BASIC LAW 187, 194 n.22 (Ulrich Karpen ed. 1988); or "state objective," Eckart Klein,
Human Rights of a 3d Generation, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC LAW 72 (Ulrich Karpen ed.
1988). In contrast, fundamental rights are subjective rights of a defensive or even positive
character. Of a defensive character are the classical freedoms; of a positive character are the
institutional guarantees, for example those that give private schools a right to state support.
Basic Law art. 7. Private ownership is both, art. 14.
68. GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE [General Government Theory] 505 (3rd
ed. 1914); Peter Badura, Direkte Teilhabe oder mittelbare Demokratie, F.A.Z., Dec. 13,
1991, at 8. This is very similar to the American doctrine. THOMAS C. MARKS & JOHN F.
COOPER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-6 (1988).
69. Konrad Hesse, Grundziige des Verfassungsrecht in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
1992
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
statehood of the Lander in the fullest sense, the primary task of their
constitutions is to define the organizational powers on a state level.
When allocating these different powers, the Lander are left with a
wide margin of discretion that finds its limitations in the principle of ho-
mogeneity.". According to the principle of homogeneity, the Ldnder are
obliged to observe the republican and democratic structure based on the
rule of law, Rechtsstaatsprinzip, as well as on social justice, Sozialstaats-
prinzip.7 The principle of homogeneity excludes, for example, the possi-
bility of a state becoming a monarchy or redistributing the allocation of
power but allows it to choose different electoral systems or government
structures.7 2 The principle of homogeneity above all applies to the protec-
tion of fundamental constitutional rights, such as human rights, citizen's
rights, or institutional guarantees."2 As a result, state constitutions may
not diverge from the tenets laid out by the Basic Law but are free to
create new rights.
74
Nevertheless, fundamental rights are mainly protected by the Basic
Law, which directly applies in the Liinder,75 and which preempts conflict-
ing state law. 76 Therefore, legislatures need not enumerate fundamental
rights in the state constitutions at all. Even mere references to the Basic
Law appearing in some of the state constitutions7 7 appears to be superflu-
ous from a technical point of view.
Many Ldinder have nevertheless added fundamental rights sections
to their constitutions, which rarely confer constitutional protection to
substantial rights not already recognized by the Basic Law, including
most notably minority rights78 and social rights.79 For instance, minority
land, 17 MARGIN No. 90 (1990); THEODOR MAUNZ & REINHOLD ZIPPELIUs, DEUTSCHES STAATS-
RECHT, 115 (28 ed. 1991); Badura, supra note 68, at 8.
70. MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 115.
71. Basic Law art. 28(1) §1; MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 114; Kunig, supra
note 67, at 187, 189. A similar requirement upheld the 1949 Constitution of the G.D.R., art.
109(1) §1.
72. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1968, 24 BVerfGE 367, 390 (F.R.G.)(regarding monarchy);
Judgment of June 10, 1953, 2 BVerfGE 307, 319(regarding allocation of power); Judgment of
Oct. 23, 1951, 1 BVerfGE 14, 44 (F.R.G.)(regarding electoral systems); Judgment of July 22,
1969, 27 BVerfGE 44, 56 (F.R.G.)(regarding government structures); MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS,
supra note 69, at 116.
73. Basic Law art. 28(3); MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 115.
74. Basic Law art. 142. ; MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 115.
75. Hesse, supra note 69; MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 115.
76. Basic Law arts. 31, 142.
77. Constitution of Baden Wuirttemberg, art. 2, one of the old states; Draft-Constitu-
tion of Mecklenburg Vorpommern by D. Poetzsch-Heffter - a reference to the fundamental
rights is enviseaged in the preamble, Sven Holscheidt, Verfassungsberatungen kommen gut
voran, 32 DAS PARLAMENT [Das Parl.], Aug. 2, 1991, at 7.
78. Constitution of Schleswig Holstein, art. . .for the Danish minority; Draft-Constitu-
tion of Brandenburg of May 31, 1991, art. 26, 2 GVBI No. 9, 96 (1991) for the Sorben
(Wenden), a Slavic minority; Draft-Constitution of the Free State of Saxony of October




rights had already received a high level of protection in article 113 of the
Constitution of Weimar.80 Although social rights had not been afforded
protection, the Constitution of Weimar nevertheless included rather con-
tradictory liberal and socialist economic doctrines.8 1
The example of the state constitutions and drafts has rekindled the
discussion of minority and social rights in the Basic Law.8 2 Although the
Basic Law is unlikely to incorporate similar changes, the phrasing of old
fundamental rights in the new drafts and the inclusion of new rights and
state aims reflect the state of the German society and the changes it is
undergoing. The language pertaining to these social rights in the drafts of
the five new states is reminiscent of the past socialist regime, but it is this
transitional language that represents the present state of their popula-
tions.s The slow adoption of Western constitutional doctrine mirrors this
gradual change. In addition, the inclusion of fundamental rights helps to
integrate and to stabilize the population," still defiant of state authority
after nearly sixty years of national-socialist and communist
dictatorships."5
In addition, state constitutions with fundamental rights stress the
autonomy of the states against the federal authority and work towards
strengthening federalism. The creation of a strong identification with
the state, instead of with the Federal Republic, will be more successful in
the East due to several factors, such as historic frontiers, less exposure to
modern media or a "circling-of-the-wagons mentality" in the face of per-
ceived Western hegemony.8 7 Confirming this trend, the reallocation of
powers between the states and the federal institutions has been specifi-
cally mentioned in the recommendations for an amendment of the Treaty
of the Unity of Germany. 8
79. See e.g. Draft Constitution of Brandenburg art. 26 (rights of the Sorbs), art. 29
(right to adult education), art. 47 (right to a home), art. 48 (right to work); Draft Constitu-
tion of the Free State of Saxony, art. 6a (rights of the Sorbs), art. 7 (right of a decent
living), art. 9 (rights of children). According to the Saxon draft, however, these rights do not
have the same force as fundamental rights.
80. OTTo KIMMINICH, DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE 492 (1970).
81. Schneider, supra note 14, §3.
82. Klein, supra note 64, at 576 (regarding minorities, i.e. the Frisian and Danish mi-
nority in the North of Germany and the Sorbs, a Slavic minority in the states of Branden-
burg and Saxony). Thomas Darnstidt, Schone Worte fUrs Volk, 11 DER SPIEGEL 82, 90
(1992). MP for the Social Democrats, Hertha Diubler-Gmelin.
83. Saxony Minister of Justice, Steffen Heitmann, Sind neue Landerverfassungen
notwendig?, F.A.Z., Mar. 21, 1992, at 4.
84. Speech of Marko Schiemann, Member of the Saxon-Parliament, at the constitution
seminar of the Konrad-Adenauer-Endowment, Sept. 12, 1991, at 3.
85. Heitmann, supra note 83, at 4.
86. MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 115.
87. Bavaria stands as the only example in the West to stress its autonomy.
88. Treaty of the Unity of Germany, supra note 4, art. 5.
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B. Constitutional Developments in the Five New States
1. Developments After the 1989 Revolution and Before
Reunification
Constitutional developments in the five new states have shown two
trends, one trying to preserve a modified version of socialism and a per-
ceived identity of East Germany, and the other preparing the five new
states for accession to the Federal Republic of Germany and its liberal
Basic Law. In the period between the opening of the Berlin Wall on No-
vember 9, 1989 and the accession to the Federal Republic on October 3,
1990, the one-party dictatorship of the SEDs9 slowly ceded its place to a
"Round Table" government, a transitional government of a motley oppo-
sition movement and of the old leaders, to be found in most countries
that abandoned communism at that time.90 The draft constitution of this
"Round Table"9 1 favored independence from the Federal Republic of
Germany and adhered to some socialist economic concepts, but it stressed
the importance of human rights.92
Fundamental rights in this draft constitution enjoy a higher level of
protection than in the Basic Law.93 In addition to increased social rights,
regional Round Tables tried to find alternatives to the Basic Law's alloca-
tion of powers by reinforcing the role of parliament."' Some other draft
constitutions, such as those written by the professors of the University of
Leipzig or by the heads of certain administrative districts,95 are blatantly
89. Sozialstische Einheitspartei Deutschland, Unified Socialist Party of Germany, that
takes its name from the partially forced union between the social democratic party, SPD,
and the Communist party, KPD, on Apr. 21 1946. The dissenting social democrats were
persecuted and many of them were killed.
90. Peter Haberle, Der Entwurf der Arbeitsgruppe "Neue Verfassung der DDR" des
Runden Tisches, 39 JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS NF 319-349 (1990).
91. The transitional government rejected reenactment of the 1949 Constitution. ROPER,
supra note 10, at 150 n.4.
92. Draft Constitution of the Working-Group "New Constitution of the GDR [!]" of a
Round Table (Apr. 4, 1991), reprinted in 2 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ [Krit.J.] 226 (1990). The Draft
Constitution addresses human rights in arts. 1-40; the right to work in art. 27; the unlimited
possibility to expropriate in art. 31; the absence of employers' rights to defend against
strikes in art. 39(5) and (6); and the independence of the G.D.R. in art. 41ff. See also Ulrich
K. Preuss, Introductory Remarks Regarding Expropriations, 2 KRIT.J. 226 (1990). The his-
tory of this Draft Constitution is described in Uwe Thaysen, DAS PARL. 71, 257, 296 (1990).
93. This higher level of protection is reached by enumerating rights that the Basic Law
includes only through interpretations by the Constitutional Court, or by scholars, but it
does not specify or add any new rights not recognized by the Basic Law. An example of the
former is the right to leave the country, Draft Constitution art. 6(1), or the right to obtain
one's own data and the right to privacy, arts. 8(1) and 8(2). An example of the latter is the
prohibition to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation, Draft Constitution art. 1(2) §
2.
94. For the Draft Constitution by a Round Table in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, see
Hblscheidt, supra note 77, at 7.
95. Speech of Marko Schiemann, Member of the Saxony Parliament, before the Consti-
tution Committee of the three middle administrative districts (Bezirksverwaltungen) of
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socialist and attempt to save the old regime." In contrast, the Round Ta-
ble in Saxony decided to draft a constitution that was not only inspired
by the Basic Law but also anticipated reunification.9 7 In Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern a second draft constitution avoided conflicts on fundamen-
tal rights or economic theories by limiting its scope to an organizational
statute.98 Only the revised form of the Saxon draft constitution and the
drafts in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern survived to be considered by the
state parliaments elected in the fall of 1990. This might be welcomed as a
slow but steady retreat of the old regime and its ideologies or as a victory
for the West German constitutional doctrine. On the other hand, the de-
velopment of alternatives or ameliorations was neglected in favor of
rather hasty, Basic Law-oriented draftsmanship. 9
As in the elections to the parliaments of the five new states, the
sometimes Utopian grass roots optimism of the civil rights movements
did not find a majority and their drafts were discarded. On the Federal
Level, this development was mirrored by the fate of an alternative consti-
tution'0 0 presented to the public by a motley group of left-wing and green
prominent citizens from the West and the East. This constitution at-
tempted to transform society into a peaceful ecological society with a
grass root-based government.' 0' Its phrasing and content evoked the com-
munist past of some of its authors, including the writer Christa Wolf.' 2
However, only a few of the proposals made by the group have been intro-
duced into the discussion of the committee to change the constitution.'
0 3
2. Constitutional Developments in the Parliaments
Since the 1990 parliamentary elections in the five new states, proce-
dural rules such as the composition of the constitutional committees and
voting requirements have gained importance. Constitutional committees
were established in all five new states, although only Brandenburg cre-
ated its committee through legislation.'
In Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia, the committees are com-
Dresden, Leipzig and Chemnitz, Apr. 18, 1990.
96. Id.
97. Concluding Remarks to the First Gohrisch Draft Constitution (1990).
98. Verfassung fir Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Draft by von Mutius and Starck (Apr.
1991), reprinted in KOMMISSIONS-DRUCKSACHE 15 (June 5, 1991).
99. Jiirgen Schwabe, Anmerkungen zum Verfassungshandwerk, 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
RECHTSPOLITIK 361-363 (1991).
100. See Volker Zastrow, Schone Ideen, Vorschlage eines "Kuratoriums" zur Grundge-
setzreform, F.A.Z., Jan. 15, 1992 at 10.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The oppositional SPD still favors a referendum. Zastrow, supra note 100, at 10.
The ruling CDU, especially the Eastern CDU, ranks amending the constitution as a low
priority in the face of daily problems. Interview with Stefan Heitman, Minister of Justice of
Saxony, reprinted in GiInter Bannas, Ein langer Wunschzettel, F.A.Z., Oct. 16, 1991, at 14.
104. 4th Draft Constitution of Brandenburg 26 (1991).
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posed of members of the parliament in proportion to their representation.
Legal experts also participate in their sessions. Following the distribution
of seats in Brandenburg, fifteen members of parliament and fifteen non-
parliamentarians, representing various social groups and nominated by
the parties, serve on the committee.'0 5 In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
eleven parliamentarians are accompanied by four experts nominated by
the four parties represented in parliament; four experts from the civil
rights movement not represented in parliament; one representative from
the government; and legal advisors who do not vote.1"' The composition
of the committees will be decisive features of the constitutions. Admitting
representatives to these committees without any democratic legitimation
may be in deference to the role civil rights movements played in the
peaceful revolution in Mecklenburg. However, neither the civil rights
groups nor the social groups represent the population to be governed by
the constitution.
10 7
A point of dispute is whether to enact the constitutions by plebiscite
or by vote in parliament. In addition, the parliaments must decide
whether the vote should be on one constitution, on alternative constitu-
tions, or even on each proposed article. This issue has been given wide-
spread media attention, especially by the newspapers that are still domi-
nated by socialists who hope to score points on such popular issues as the
right to work. 10 8 The major parties have avoided taking a clear position in
order to maintain their bargaining positions.
From a legal point of view, the parliaments have been given the pow-
ers of the pouvoir constituant, free to adopt a constitution.'0 9 Some have
argued that reintroducing the Lander under the Basic Law reintroduced
the former constitutions as well. 10 The parliaments would then have to
conform to the former law, requiring in Saxony, for example, a two-thirds
majority to create a new constitution."' The Saxon constitution was fi-
nally adopted by a two-thirds majority vote in parliament with the con-
sent of the oppositional Social Democratic Party."'
.105. Holscheidt, supra note 77, at 7.
106. Christian Starck, Verfassungsgebung in den neuen Landern, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
GESETZGEBUNG 1, 8 (1992); H6lscheidt, supra note 77, at 7.
107. In Brandenburg the constitutional committee has now decided to continue its
work without its non-parliamentarians. Die CDU will die Verfassung mittragen, F.A.Z.,
Dec. 21, 1991, at 4.
108. Interview with Professor Karl-Heinz Schbnburg, reprinted in Die grosse Furcht
der Unternehmer vor sozialen Rechten, Brandenburgs Verfassungsentwurf geht diese
Woche ins Landtagsplenum, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Dec. 17, 1991, at 5. Neues Deutschland
is the former party paper of the SED, formerly the ruling socialist party. In Saxony, the
PDS attempted to force parliament by plebiscite to have a plebiscite on the constitution. 10
Informationsdienst PDS (May 19, 1992).
109. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Speech Given at a Seminar of the Konrad Adenauer-Stif-
tung in Berlin, Sept. 9, 1991 (not published).
110. ROPER, supra note 10, at 168.
111. Id. at 168; 1947 Constitution of Saxony, art. 92(2).
112. Slichsischer Landtag beschlieszt die Verfassung, F.A.Z., May 27, 1992, at 1.
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From a political point of view, given the distrust of authorities in the
East and given that the constitutions of the five new states are supposed
to have an integrating effect immediately, a plebiscite on alternative con-
stitutions should be permitted. However, a plebiscite may cause embar-
rassment due to absenteeism of a population preoccupied with adapting
to Western economic standards.1 3 In Brandenburg, the legislators dared
to submit their constitution to a plebiscite, but although the constitution
was accepted by an overwhelming majority, voter turnout was below
50%.114
The deadlines of the constitutions had to be postponed several times.
Brandenburg designated October 15, 1991 for the second and third ses-
sions in parliament, but eventually had to postpone the sessions following
heavy criticism of its draft. 15 Thuringia set the end of 1992 as the final
date for its constitution.' The other states have made informal commit-
ments that had to be postponed. For example, Saxony's informal time
schedule was similar to Brandenburg's,1 but even the sessions of the
constitutional committee have been interrupted due to procedural dis-
putes over the admission of legal advisors.
Similar problems occurred at the Federal level. The most important
issue will be whether Basic Law article 146, or other concerns, require a
general referendum on the final draft or on the amendments of the con-
stitution."' Procedural problems arose even before the constitutional
committee convened for the first time."' The ruling Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) attempted to dissociate the time frame for the committee's
final report from the year of general Federal elections in 1994 in order to
prevent the oppositional SPD and other parties from utilizing populist
constitutional issues. 20 The problem of advisors and special interest
groups also reappeared as Members of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag
requested to be included in the deliberations.' 2'
113. Kocher, supra note 66, at 5. Prior to reunification, only 14% of the West German
population was in favor of a reform of the Basic Law. After reunification, the upheavals in
the East, and the ensuing debate on immigration policy in Western Europe, 26% of the
West German and 58% of the East German population favored reform.
114. Id.
115. DER TAGESSP1EGEL, Sept. 17, 1991, at 7; F.A.Z., Dec. 19, 1991, at 5.
116. Thuringer Landtag Drucksache 1/285 1 (Apr. 10, 1991) (referring to art. 18(2) of
the Preliminary Constitution).
117. Radio Interview with Christoph Partsch, Legal Advisor in the Parliament of the
Free State of Saxony, on Sachsen Radio, July 1991.
118. Darnsttidt, supra note 82, at 82, 90, and 93.
119. Uneinigkeit uber den Zeitplan der Verfassungskommission, F.A.Z., Nov. 8, 1991,
at 2.
120. Id.; Darnstddt, supra note 82, at 82, 90.
121. Id.; Vogel fordert mehr direkte Demokratie, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan. 17, 1992,
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3. Selected Aspects of the Contents of the State Constitutions
a. Plebiscites
The drafters of the Basic Law witnessed the constant threat to par-
liamentarism posed by the disapproval of its constituency in the Weimar
Republic, 1 22 so they incorporated purely indirect democracy into their
document.12 In contrast, the new states have all incorporated various
forms of plebiscites into their draft constitutions in an attempt to enable
democratic participation by an electorate that has little experience in
democratic politics. The Western state constitutions also included plebis-
citarian elements, but they proved to be prohibitive in constitutional real-
ity. 24 In accordance with growing criticism in the West, especially by en-
vironmentalists and the parties of the left, 2 and in an attempt to mark a
difference with the old regime, all the draft constitutions contain varying
elements of direct democracy.
The constitution of conservatively-ruled Saxony 2 ' permits citizens to
demand that parliament enact a statute by collecting 40,000 signatures.'2 7
Should parliament refuse or neglect to enact the statute, a minimum of
450,000 signatures is necessary to initiate a referendum. 28 In the final
draft, the CDU proposed, as a bargaining chip, a requirement that at
least 50%(!) of the eligible votes would be necessary to pass a referen-
dum. 129 This nearly prohibitive obstacle was dropped, and instead the
number to initiate a referendum was raised from 200,000 to 450,000.2 ° In
addition, the Saxon draft constitution proposes that a referendum may be
initiated by one-third of the members of parliament on a statute already
voted on, but not yet promulgated. 3 '
In Brandenburg, governed by a coalition of the Social Democrats and
the Eastern Green Party, only 20,000 signatures are needed to demand
that parliament enact a statute,'3 2 and initiating a referendum requires
only 80,000 signatures. 33 An affirmative vote by at least one quarter of
122. CRAIG, supra note 8, at 416-17.
123. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, Citizens' Participation in State Functioning, in RIGHTS,
INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 159-
60, 169 (Christian Starck ed., 1987).
124. Graf Vitzthum, supra note 123, at 171-72.
125. Id.
126. In Saxony, the center-right CDU forms the government alone.
127. Constitution of the Free State of Saxony, art. 71(1).
128. Id., art. 72(2).
129. Id., art. 72(5). The Gohrischer draft demanded a majority of at least one-third of
the eligible votes; the SPD, the oppositional Social Democratic party, demanded a majority
of at least one-fifth; the PDS, the party succeeding the formerly ruling communist SED,
proposed a simple majority of the votes.
130. Compare Draft Constitution art. 72(5) with Constitution art. 72(2).
131. Constitution of the Free State of Saxony, art. 73.
132. Constitution of the State of Brandenburg, art. 76(1).
133. Id., art. 77(3).
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the eligible votes is sufficient to pass the act.13 1 In addition, the Branden-
burg constitution permits 150,000 signatures to demand enactment of a
statute, 200,000 signatures to initiate a referendum, and a two-thirds ma-
jority of at least half of the eligible voters to dissolve parliament. 3 5
Although the states differ in population, 3 6 the rift between the re-
quirements of the two states is apparent. While the obstacles to a plebi-
scite were shifted to an earlier stage in the Saxon constitution, Branden-
burg entrusts a mere one quarter of its electorate to bypass the legislative
mechanism of its otherwise representative democracy. To grant a fraction
of the population considerable influence appears to be dangerous in a so-
ciety that has found it easier to adapt to Western materialism than to
Western democratic thinking.' 37 But even in Saxony, the communist PDS
lost no time and had no difficulty in obtaining the required 40,000 signa-
tures to demand a referendum. 138 Especially in a time of economic recon-
struction, the population in the five new states tends to cherish such "ad-
vantages of the old system" as the alleged absence of unemployment and
the availability of kindergartens.139 In addition, a rather quixotic voting
pattern by the citizenry in the five new states 4" undermines confidence
that the Eastern population will master the responsibilities of direct de-
mocracy. For example, the PDS is apparently the only party with confi-
dence of obtaining the required votes from its still well organized sup-




Finally, some plebiscitarian characteristics in the state constitutions
might conflict with the Basic Law and, therefore, might be considered
unconstitutional. Article 2(4) of the Brandenburg constitution, for exam-
ple, puts legislation by plebiscite on equal ground with legislation by par-
liament. The Basic Law, however, interpreted in accord with the principle
of homogeneity, gives priority to a representative democracy at the state
level, while accepting certain forms of plebiscites.142 State law that deci-
sively alters the distribution of powers is unconstitutional."' 3 To give
134. Id., art. 78(2).
135. Id., arts. 76(1), 77(3), 78(2). The numbers in the draft constitution had been
slightly lower, 100,000 and 150,000. Draft Constitution arts. 78(1), 79(3).
136. Saxony has 3.71 million citizens; Brandenburg has 1.95 million; Saxony-Anhalt has
2.23 million. Starck, supra note 106, at 17.
137. Kocher, supra note 66, at 5.
138. They obtained 47,037 signatures. Kein Volksentscheid zu Sachsens Verfassung,
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, May 26, 1992.
139. Id. A similar development can be witnessed in other countries recently liberated
from Communism, such as Poland. Many Poles Now See '81 Martial Law as Justified, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, at A8.
140. Compare the smooth voting patterns in the Western state to the rather abrupt and
incoherent changes in the Eastern states. Kocher, supra note 66, at 5.
141. Alternate Draft Constitution of the Free State of Saxony, art. 72(5), proposed by
the PDS and the Eastern Green Party.
142. Jarass & Pieroth, supra note 30, at 370.
143. MAUNZ & ZIPPELIUS, supra note 69, at 114, 438.
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plebiscites equal effect would reduce the parliament's power decisively
and transform Brandenburg into a direct democracy. As a result, Bran-
denburg constitution article 2(4) might be declared unconstitutional by
the court. In addition, the Brandenburg constitution grants plebiscitarian
rights to foreigners and stateless persons as well. 14 4 This would clearly
conflict with the present Basic Law.'"
On the Federal level, these developments began to take shape when
the Social Democratic Party demanded more elements of direct democ-
racy in the new constitution.'" Opponents argue that plebiscites on a fed-
eral level would allow minorities to take advantage of absenteeism and
push through populist or even minority views. 47 The shift of power from
the states to the Federal level has decreased resistance to plebiscites on
the state level. However, such resistance remains strong at the Federal
level, rendering the implementation of plebiscites at the Federal level
improbable.
b. Fundamental Rights and Political Aims
The constitutions in the five new states attempt to mix traditional
and newly developed fundamental rights with political aims. Fundamen-
tal rights, Grundrechte, are subjective rights of a defensive or even posi-
tive character,"' 8 while political aims, Staatsziele, do not accord rights to
an individual but define objective standards to be met by the state. 9
Except for one of the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern draft constitutions, all
of the new states have chosen to include fundamental rights sections sim-
ilar to that of the Basic Law in order to stress the rights East Germans
are now able to enjoy. Careless rewording of Basic Law articles in the
state constitutions and blind copying of negligent formulations in the Ba-
sic Law are possible disadvantages of this practice. 5 ' Some of the new
144. Peter J. Winters, Keine grundslitzliche Immunitait, Brandenburgs Verfassung-
sentwurf, F.A.Z., Dec. 19, 1991, at 4. The draft constitution left this open to interpretation
since it did not define "citizens," jede Birgerin und jeder Birger, as entitled to start a
plebiscite in article 78(1) or to vote in article 23(1). Schwabe, supra note 99, at 363. The
Constitution in article 76(1) uses Einwohner, resident, and article 22(1) uses Burger as well.
145. Judgment of Oct. 31, 1990, 80 BVerfGe 37-59, 60-81 (decision of the Constitutional
Court on voting rights of foreigners on the community level in Hamburg and Schleswig-
Holstein).
146. Vogel fordertmehr direkte Demokratie, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan. 17, 1992, at 2.
147. Zastrow, supra note 100, at 10; Badura, supra note 68, at 8.
148. The classical freedoms are defensive by nature, and the institutional guarantees
that give private schools a right to state support, for example, are positive. Basic Law art. 7.
Private ownership is both, art. 14.
149. Hesse, supra note 67, at 213.
150. Schwabe, supra note 99, at 362, 363. For an example of careless rewording, see
Saxon draft constitution art. 7(6), which reduces the state's duty to observe a political airm
by profuse definition; Brandenburg draft constitution arts. 23(1) and 78(1) do not define the
legal term citizen and use it differently, jede Btirgerin as opposed to simply BUrgerin. Fo,
an example of careless copying, see Saxon draft constitution art. 17(1), which copies thE
unfortunate wording of Basic Law art. 3(1) ("..vor dem Gesetz gleich") that appears to ex.
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states have decided to delete fundamental rights that have been implied
into the Basic Law by the Constitutional Court.'5 1 These clarifications
appear to help avoid misconceptions about the existence of such rights.
52
Unfortunately, other unwritten fundamental rights that may be even
more important to East Germans, such as the right to leave the country,
have also been left out.153
The principle of homogeneity permits states to grant additional, or
more extensive fundamental rights, and some of the new states have cho-
sen to do so. 15 Brandenburg's draft created a variety of new fundamental
rights, such as the right to social security, to a home, to work, 5 5 to politi-
cal participation,' to education for adults, 157 and to co-determination in
factories. 58 Several of these rights are remnants of the old East German
concept of socialism, though the population and the politicians are slow
to admit that the advantages from these rights are non-existent. 15 For
instance, the right of political participation is ill-defined and superflu-
ous,'6 0 and the general right to social security is already included in the
Sozialstaatsprinzip, the principle of social justice.1"' The right to co-de-
termination is forwarded by the Social Democratic Party on a federal
clude the legislature from the principle of equality. The same equivocal definition is found
in Brandenburg draft constitution article 13. The Round Table draft article 2 had replaced
law, Gesetz, by public authority, offentliche Gewalt.
151. For example, the right to privacy, allgemeines Persiinlichkeitsrecht, developed
from Basic Law arts. 1 and 2. Judgment of June 3, 1980 54 BVerfGE 148, 153, 208, 217;
Judgment of Feb. 8, 1983 63 BVerfGE 131, 142. The extent of this right is difficult to phrase
in an article. Part of the right to privacy, the unwritten right to one's own papers, Recht auf
informationelle Selbstbestimmung, was developed in Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, 65
BVerfGE 1, and has been included in Brandenburg draft article 12 and Saxon draft article
32.
152. Rita and Frank Taubenfeld, Problems of Designing Stable Democracies, 24 INT'L
LAW. 689, 706, 707 (1990). The authors arrive at the curious conclusion that there is no right
to privacy in the Federal Republic, only the right to one's papers, even though both rights
are implied. Cf. 54 BVerfGE 148, 153 and 65 BVerfGE 1.
153. The Round-Table draft article 6(1) specifically provided for this right.
154. Whereas Basic Law article 8 extends the right to assemble only to Germans, Bran-
denburg draft article 24(1) and Saxon draft article 22 extend this right to everyone.
155. Brandenburg Draft Constitution arts. 45, 47 and 48.
156. Id., art. 22.
157. Id., art. 29. Article 36 even grants a right to vacations for professional, cultural or
political education for adults.
158. Id., art. 50.
159. For a description of the old communist attitude towards social rights as a tool to
combat capitalism and towards constitutions as a mere description of a transitional phase in
society, see Karl-Heinz Schonburg, Die grosse Furcht der Unternehmer vor sozialen
Rechten, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Dec. 17, 1991, at 5. In the Eastern states, 90% of the popula-
tion would like to have a right to a home, 83% a right to a place in kindergarten, 85% a
right to work. K6cher, supra note 66, at 5.
160. Such a right is included in the Allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit, the general freedom
to act, which is a right interpreted into the Basic Law article 2(1). Judgment of Jan. 16,
1957, 6 BVerfGE 32, 36.
161. See generally Kunig, supra note 67, at 187-204.
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level,' 62 but the right is already included in federal statutory law to a
reduced degree. 6 3 The final Brandenburg constitution attenuated the
rigor of these rights by ambiguous wording that could be interpreted as
merely defining state aims."" The Saxon constitution attempts to accom-
modate similar demands from its electorate with western constitutional
doctrine by a slightly confused phrasing referring to some of these social
rights as political aims."6 5
Some of the social rights incorporated in the state constitutions in-
fringe on federal constitutional law and, therefore, must be considered
unconstitutional. For example, Brandenburg draft constitution article 51
prohibited the lockout of workers, a subject matter that is Federal con-
current legislation. 6 The final constitution does not contain lockout
provisions.
On the Federal level, demands for including social rights have resur-
faced in the constitutional committee.16 7 Brandenburg's Social Democrats
have retreated from rhetoric appealing to a population still imbued with
socialism, and they now lean toward opinions more consistent with West-
ern constitutional doctrine. Nevertheless, the effects of their promises lin-
ger on. 6 s Those who support the inclusion of social rights in the constitu-
tion remain unimpressed by the economic effects of those rights and the
collapse of socialism." The state draft constitutions demonstrate that
some inclusion as political aims might be considered. However, this will
depend on whether the new Federal constitution will be subjected to a
public referendum. In that case, the doctrinal difference between political
aims and fundamental rights should be stressed in order to avoid a dilu-
tion of the normative force of the latter.1 70 In addition, the question
162. DAS GRUNDSATZPAPIER FOR DEN SPD VORSTAND, ZUR VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN
STAATES [ The Basic Paper of the Executive Board of the SPD, Regarding the Constitution
of a German State], reprinted in 26 RECHT UND POLITIK 207, 212 (1990) [hereinafter Basic
Papers of the SPD].
163. Judgment of Mar. 1, 1979, 50 BVerfGE 290.
164. See art. 45(1) (right to social security); art. 47(1) (right to a home); art. 48(1) (right
to work); art. 21(1) (right to political participation); art. 29(1) (right to education); art. 50
(right to co-determination).
165. For example, article 7 bears the title, "Decent Living Conditions as a Staatsziel,"
and recognizes the right to work, art. 7(1), and the right to a decent residence, art. 7(1), as
political aims.
166. Basic Law art. 74.
167. Gunter Bannas, Dem Verfassungsausschuss stehen zahe Beratungen bevor,
F.A.Z., Oct. 16, 1991, at 14.
168. Opinion of the Liberal Party, FDP, F.A.Z., Dec. 19, 1991, at 5.
169. Ninety percent in the East and sixty-six percent in the West favor a right to a
home; eighty-three percent in the East and sixty-six percent in the West favor a right to
kindergarten; eighty-five percent in the East and forty-nine percent in the West favor a
right to work. K6cher, supra note 66, at 5.
170. Basic Papers of the SPD, supra note 166, at 208. Inconsistent with this demand,
the Brandenburg constitution enumerates ambiguously worded articles under the heading
"2nd Main Chapter: Rights and Political Aims."
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whether the Basic Law should remain neutral on economic issues171 will
be resolved when social rights or the prohibition of lock outs are for-
warded again.
17 1
Similarly the inclusion in the state constitutions of environmental
protections'7 3 will influence the shaping of the Federal constitution. In
addition, private interest groups like animal rights and ecological move-
ments have proposed to include such interests as "co-creationship" or the
"preservation of the natural resources of life" as political aims.' 74 As a
result, the constitutional committee no longer disputes inclusion of some
protection of the environment as a state aim in the Federal
constitution.
75
In addition, the new states' drafts reveal trends that will enrich the
discussion on the amendments of the Basic Law. The attention that the
state constitutions give to minorities and foreigners1 7 6 will probably result
in a change of standing for foreigners in the Basic Law as well.'17 Families
and children may also benefit from the attention given to them in the
state constitutions.'
7 8
Moreover, real or perceived shortcomings of the Basic Law will be
open to discussion again. For instance, the Basic Law's conditional prohi-
bition of private primary schools, 7 9 an "un-liberal" and "un-dogmatic"
171. Judgment of Mar. 1, 1979, 50 BVerfGE 290, 336; Hesse, supra note 67, at no. 22
(Das Grundgesetz liszt bestimmte Fragen, etwa solche der Wirtschaftsverfassung bewuszt
offen, um hier freier Auseinandersetzung und Gestaltung Raum zu lassen) [The Basic Law
leaves open certain questions, for example, that of constitutional guidelines for the econ-
omy, with the intention of enabling free discussion and modelling]; Volker Krning, Kern-
fragen der Verfassungsreform, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 161, 162 (1991).
172. Hartmut Kliemt, Im Wettlauf der Gruppenwiinsche, Die verletzlichen Chancen
ffir eine gute Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Demokratie, Das Grundgesetz der
Bundesrepublik hat sich bewahrt, F.A.Z., Feb. 1, 1992, at 15.
173. E.g. Brandenburg art. 39; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern draft art. 10; Saxony art. 10;
Saxony-Anhalt art. 35; Thuringia draft art. 19.
174. Tierschuitzer fordern "mitgeschdpfiichkeit als Staatsziel, F.A.Z., Feb. 26, 1992, at
1; Darnstiidt, supra note 82, at 90.
175. Bannas, supra note 167, at 14. All parties in the FRG now agree to include such a
political aim. BERLINER MORGENPOST, Nov. 17, 1991, at 4.
176. See e.g. Brandenburg draft art. 26 (Sorbs), art. 24 (the right to assemble applies to
foreigners as well), and art. 23 (might include foreigners, though unconstitutional under the
present Basic Law); Saxon draft art. 6, 6a (Sorbs and other minorities), art. 22 (the right to
assemble applies to foreigners as well). The Basic Law grants the right to assemble only to
German citizens, art. 8, and the right of foreigners to assemble is guaranteed by art. 2,
Allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit, but can be limited by legislation.
177. At the same time, the very liberal right of asylum will probably be reduced. Sixty-
seven percent in the East and seventy-four percent in the West are in favor of such a reduc-
tion. Kbcher, supra note 66, at 5.
178. E.g. Brandenburg art. 27 (protection of marriage, family, unmarried hetero- or ho-
mosexual couples, and single parents), art. 28 (rights of children); Saxony art. 9 (protection
of children as a political aim). The Basic Law protects the institutions of marriage and
family, art. 6(1). Children are protected by arts. 1-19 but not specifically. Illegitimate chil-
dren have a right to equal treatment in accordance with art. 6(5).
179. Art. 7(5).
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remnant of anti-elitist thought after World War II, will be open for dis-
cussion. Although the state drafts decline to explicitly allow private pri-
mary schools, most treat private schools benevolently.8 0
Surprisingly, neither the state constitutions nor the constitutional
committee at the federal level attempt to reform or to reformulate the
ambiguous wording of the Basic Law.' 8'
4. Alternative Concepts of a Constitution: The Case of the State of
Brandenburg.'8 2
Brandenburg's draft constitution differed most from those of the
other states as well as from the present Basic Law. It revealed a different,
but interesting, concept of society, including proposals from the opposi-
tion parties at the Federal level. Brandenburg's draft constitution - and
many of the dissenting opinions in other state draft constitutions - ap-
peared to come close to violating federal law in order to put pressure on
the process of amending the Basic Law."8 3 This was, therefore, both a
constitutional and a political challenge.'84
The Brandenburg draft demonstrates the gradual transition from
communist constitutional doctrine to that of a modern, liberal democratic
society more than any other state constitution. Communist constitutional
doctrine perceives constitutions as a momentary description of the state
of progress of a society towards socialism.' 6 Such a constitution tends to
portray the relations between its citizens and towards the state more or
less truthfully' and puts little emphasis on fundamental rights.18 7 . The
Brandenburg draft heavily emphasized fundamental rights, but many of
its articles still tended to reorganize society as a whole and to educate its
citizens. For example, Brandenburg draft article 13(2) stated that every-
180. Anxious to invite private schools to oppose their state schools, which are still dom-
inated by the teachers of the old regime, Brandenburg and Saxony have given private
schools a right to be admitted.
181. Schwabe, supra note 99, at 362.
182. Brandenburg is governed by the Social Democratic Party and the Eastern Green
Party. As a result, it is the only Eastern state not ruled by the CDU or a coalition of the
CDU and the FDP. Its premier, Manfred Stolpe, SPD, has been accused of cooperating with
the former Secret Police, STASI, but so far has refused to step down. Rolf Soderlind, East
German Politician Faces New Stasi Allegations, Reuters, Feb. 16, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current file. The oppositional CDU so far has not succeeded in plac-
ing a convincing opposition leader in Brandenburg. Lothar de Maiziere renounced his post
as party leader after similar allegations were made as against Stolpe. Id.
183. Land ohne Geheimdienst, 34 DER SPIEGEL 50, 50-53, Aug. 19, 1991; Professor Josef
Isensee, quoted in Sind neue Lnderverfassungen notwendig?, F.A.Z., Mar. 21, 1992, at 4.
184. CDU Member of the Brandenburg Parliament Blechinger, quoted in Sind neue
Lnderverfassungen notwendig?, F.A.Z., Mar. 21, 1992 at 4.
185. Schonburg, supra note 159, at 5.
186. Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 152, at 706 n.28, at 707 n.30.
187. The fundamental rights contained in the Constitution of the German Democratic
Republic, although superficially impressive in number, were merely declarative and were not
enforceable as subjective rights.
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one owed everyone else recognition as equals, but the extent of this third-
party norm appeared questionable. 188 The adopted constitution did not
include this article. Another example of social organization is Constitu-
tion article 46, which imposes an affirmative duty upon everyone to de-
fend others from imminent attack, pursuant to the laws.' 9 Both of these
norms attempt to educate the Brandenburg citizens rather than to pro-
tect them against the state. In addition, the inclusion of various social
rights, such as the right to work, to a home, or to a place in kindergarten,
contributes to the idealistic, if not utopian, character of the constitution.
Burdening the constitution with policy formulations furthers the
misconception of the role of a constitution. To achieve the new social
norms, the Brandenburg draft exhorted political action. Article 9(2) as-
sured that the state would abolish criminal punishment for abortion dur-
ing the first trimester of pregnancy. Draft article 2(6) stated confusingly
that Brandenburg would assert its already existing rights in the federa-
tion.'9 0 Article 12(3) asserted that Brandenburg would not accept an in-
telligence service working against subversive activities as a reaction to the
formerly omnipotent and omnipresent Eastern secret service, Staats-
sicherheitsdienst, the Stasi.'9 Neither of these draft articles were
adopted into the final constitution.
Although the Brandenburg draft constitution was hailed as the most
progressive German constitution by some,' 92 it failed to distinguish suffi-
ciently between fundamental rights and political aims.'8 3 The lack of any
distinction between fundamental rights and political aims in the Bran-
denburg draft constitution further undermined its credibility. Oblivious
to economic and social conditions, the social rights may not have been
fulfilled. The disenchantment resulting from a constitution that makes
more promises than it can keep might be detrimental to fundamental
rights as well.
Furthermore, some norms in the draft constitution conflicted with
the present Basic Law and contributed to a lack of credibility because
188. Schwabe, supra note 99, at 363; Christian Starck, Constitutional Definition and
Protection of Rights and Freedoms, in RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 19, 47 (Christian Starck ed. 1987).
189. According to the law, everyone must help out when there are accidents, catastro-
phes, and emergency hardships.
190. Critics have called it a comical article. Schwabe, supra note 99, at 363.
191. Stephen Kinzer, Germans will see Stasi Files, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at A6;
Ralf Georg Reuth, Es wird manche uberraschungen geben, die Akteneinsicht in der Gauck-
Behorde, F.A.Z., Dec. 27, 1991, at 5.
192. Minister of Interior Ziel (SPD), quoted in, F.A.Z., Dec. 19, 1991; Gustav Just
(SPD), Head of the Constitution Commission, quoted in, 34 DER SPIEGEL 50, Aug. 19, 1991.
193. The heading for Brandenburg draft articles 5-56 is "Fundamental Rights and Po-
litical Aims," with no further distinction regarding the character of each article. Saxony's
draft, to a lesser degree, suffers from the same confusion. For instance, it has different arti-
cle headings, but phrases fundamental rights and political aims in a confusingly similar
fashion. See e.g. arts. 7, 9.
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they may have been unenforceable. The provision in the Brandenburg
draft banning a secret service conflicted with the Basic Law because the
article violated the principle of the "defendant democracy."""4
The assurance of cultural autonomy for Sorbs 19 5 beyond state borders
is controversial at best and tarnishes the otherwise remarkable protection
of minorities in the constitution. 19' Also, the anti-nuclear and anti-mili-
tary stance" 7 conflicts with federal jurisdiction on this subject matter. It
should be added, however, that some constitutions in the western states,
introduced shortly after World War II, also contain social rights," '9 such
as the prohibition of lock outs, that have been interpreted by the courts
as having no force. Nevertheless, including daily politics and utopian
strategies in a constitution dilutes its normative force.
Finally, a constitution hindering the ability of a democratically
elected government to act will defray its credibility. The Saxon draft con-
stitution's dissenting opinions featured a number of institutions that
would have slowed or thwarted decision making. The citizens commis-
sioner, Biirgerbeauftragter, was supposed to represent the citizens against
the government. 9 If the government did not follow the recommendations
of the commissioner, a committee had to be formed to resolve the con-
flict.2 0 0 Similar types of commissioners have been envisaged to ensure
human rights, the protection of the environment, equal rights, and the
affairs of foreigners.2 ' These commissioners have been branded as parlia-
mentarian escapism or as rulers without a majority. 0 2 Even more prob-
194. The concept of a defendant democracy was introduced as a reaction against the
Weimar Constitution's neutral stand against its own enemies. The concept gives the Consti-
tutional Court, among others, the power to eliminate parties opposed to democracy. Basic
Law art. 21(2). In addition, basic rights can be forfeited. Basic Law art. 18. Ginther Dirig,
An Introduction to the Basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany, in THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIc RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF
THE BASIC LAW 11, 15-16 (Ulrich Karpen ed. 1988).
This article was taken out of the final draft of the constitution. Winters, supra note
144, at 4.
195. Brandenburg Constitution art, 25(2).
196. Saxon constitution art. 6(a) is similar but excludes the controversial language.
197. Article 39(9) states that Brandenburg will attempt not to accept nuclear arms on
its territory. Equally ripe for conflict was draft article 56, which stated that Brandenburg
would abolish lifelong confinement in prison and would grant participatory rights to in-
mates, a subject matter of federal jurisdiction. Brandenburg constitution article 54 no longer
contains such a provision.
198. Uwe Thaysen, Verfassungsrechtliches Licht im Osten?, DER TAGESSPIEGEL, May
27, 1992, at 7.
199. Art. 53 (Dissenting opinion of the Social Democratic Party).
200. Art. 53(a)(5).
201. Art. 53 (Dissenting opinion of the Green Party and the PDS).
202. Thaysen, supra note 199, at 7 (Dietrich Rauschning at the Hearings of the Saxon
parliament, June 15, 1991). However, similar types of commissioners exist in many states for
the protection of the right to one's own papers and for the protection of soldiers on the
federal level. Basic Law art. 45(b). These federal commissioners are justified by the diffi-
culty of the executive to control use the right of one's own papers against itself and with the
problematic position of soldiers when defending their rights against their superiors.
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lematic are committees formed to resolve conflicts in which the political
parties are not represented according to their strength.2 03 A senate-like
institution, representing communities, 20 4 would certainly slow down legis-
lation, as would a committee to assess the impact of new technologies on
nature and society.20 5 Although some of these institutions might help de-
- crease the growing alienation between the politicians and their electorate,
they may lead to a growing immobility of the parliament or to the rule of
a minority even more dangerous to the credibility of a democratic consti-
tution. Nevertheless, faced with the necessity to achieve a two-thirds ma-
jority for the constitution, Brandenburg's ruling politicians had to dress
down most of their controversial demands.06
V. CONCLUSION
The reunification of Germany has led to important changes in the
country as well as in the German Federal Constitution. Germany once
again had to pay a very high price for starting World War I, and its
constitution now reflects the end of this development. Contradictory ex-
pectations from Germany's neighbors regarding its participation in inter-
national military actions find their parallel in the constitutional debate
on such actions. At the same time, Germany prepares for further integra-
tion into the European Community.
With regard to internal politics, the controversies about the draft
constitutions of the five new states have shown a deep concern for attain-
ing a very high level of fundamental rights as well as a high level of social
rights. The former concern originates from a deep distrust of government
and is easily comprehensible in light of East Germany's recent history.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the rest of the East European coun-
tries have shown far less concern and readiness to master their past
through constitutional safeguards. The concern about social security
shows a contradictory dependance on government by a population that
had been forced to renounce individualism and entrepreneurship.
On the federal level, these conflicting messages now have to be taken
into account when amending the Basic Law. The new amended German
Federal Constitution will stress the importance of preserving the environ-
ment, and of creating an economy with a strong sense of social justice and
perhaps with more elements of direct democracy. However, sudden or ab-
rupt changes in the German constitutional system will not occur because
a two-thirds majority is needed to pass any of the amendments." 7 Given
203. Art. 49(a)(2) (Dissenting opinion by the SPD, the Green Party and the PDS).
204. Art. 3(a) (Dissenting opinion of the Green Party; See Zum Landtagsentwurf der
Verfassung des Freistaates Sachsen, DIE GEMEINDEKAMMER, Dresden, June 18, 1991.
205. Art. 47(a) (Dissenting opinion of the SPD).
206. Sind neue Landerverfassungen notwendig?, F.A.Z., Mar. 21, 1992 at 4; Beratungen
in Potsdam 0ber die Landesverassung ffir Brandenburg, F.A.Z., Mar. 3, 1992, at 4.
207. Basic Law art. 79(2); Andreas Thewalt, Schon jetzt Iisst der Wahikampf griissen,
BERLINER MORGENPOST, Nov. 17, 1991, at 4.
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the present distribution of power, the Christian Democrats and the Liber-
als in government are far from reaching such a majority with the Social
Democrats, the Green Party and the PDS. The conflicts over the new
Federal constitution have shown, however, that both sides are willing to
compromise. The integration of the Eastern and Western parts of Ger-
many will have to be achieved by reaching a common economic level. 208
Nevertheless, the debate over amendments to the Basic Law kindled by
the draft constitutions in the five new states will also have an integrating
effect on the reunited Germany.
208. Krbning, supra note 171, at 165.
VOL. 21:1
A Unified Concept of Population Transfer
CHRISTOPHER M. GOEBEL*
Population transfer is an issue arising often in areas of ethnic ten-
sion, from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Western Sahara,
Tibet, Cyprus, and beyond. There are two forms of human population
transfer: removals and settlements. Generally, commentators in interna-
tional law have yet to discuss the two together as a single category of
population transfer. In discussing the prospects for such a broad treat-
ment, this article is a first to compare and contrast international law's
application to removals and settlements.
I. INTRODUCTION
International attention is focusing on uprooted people, especially
where there are tensions of ethnic proportions. The Red Cross spent a
significant proportion of its budget aiding what it called "displaced peo-
ple," removed en masse from their abodes. Ethnic cleansing, a term used
by the Serbs, was a process of population transfer aimed at removing the
non-Serbian population from large areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina.2 The
large-scale Jewish settlements into the Israeli-occupied Arab territories
continue to receive publicity. Theoretically speaking, why not take these
and other mass removals or settlements of people, and examine them
under a single category, called population transfer?
Recent discussions at the United Nations and elsewhere, led by
human rights activists, have hinted at such a unified treatment of popula-
tion transfer, in an effort to focus attention on "stateless people" faced
with either removal from an area or settlement into one.3 A conference in
1992 deliberated on situations occurring in what were called "sovereign
* J.D. 1991, Harvard University. Associate, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosk. Ear-
lier draft presented at the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization [hereinafter
"UNPO"], Conference on Human Rights Dimension of Population Transfer, Tallinn, Esto-
nia, January 11-13, 1992. The author expresses gratitude for comments on earlier drafts by
Henry Steiner, Michael van Walt van Praag, and John Quigley. Support also came from
Marc Granowitter and Christa Meindersma.
1. International Committee of the Red Cross, statement at the 48th Session of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (Feb. 19, 1992). These operations were in Africa, Latin
America, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, which reflects the broad scope of the problem.
2. Congressional Committee Print, Ethnic Cleaning at 5.
3. Just in the last two years, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities [hereinafter "U.N. Sub-Commission"] has begun to adopt
resolutions covering both forms of movement under the single category of population trans-
fer. See "The Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer Including the Implantation
of Settlers and Settlements," U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/17; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1991/21.
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states" (e.g. Poland, claiming to have experienced principally large-scale
removals in the form of expulsions by Hitler and Stalin), as well as coun-
tries "occupied" now or at some point in recent time (e.g. Western Sa-
hara, The Baltics, East Timor and Tibet, by massive settlements princi-
pally, plus removals), "nations without a state" (e.g. Kurdistan,
principally by removals), the lands of "indigenous peoples" (e.g.
Aboriginals of Australia and Chakmas of the Chittagong Hills Tracts, by
settlements and removals) and the lands of "ethnic minorities" (e.g. Al-
banians in Kosova, principally by removals), and others.4 This approach
toward removals would take into account situations ranging from the
more traditionally recognized expulsion of a minority from a country, to
the forced or forcible resettlement of a significant number of indigenous
people for a dam project. Settlements would include those occurring on a
large scale both across U.N.-recognized borders and internally. In any
event population transfer, however defined, should not be confused with
refugee movements' nor normal migration on an individual basis for eco-
nomic reasons.6 For years now, some in the policy-making community
have mingled population transfer's two forms.7 Despite such discussions,
commentators on international law traditionally have not followed suit.'
4. Report of the U.N.P.O. Conference on Human Rights Division of Population Trans-
fer (D. Goldberg, Rapporteur) (published by U.N.P.O., the Hague, 1992) [hereinafter
U.N.P.O. Conference Report].
5. Though when refugee movements are large, such a distinction becomes difficult. Ref-
ugees are defined as moving freely out of their own political motivation. RICHARD PLENDER,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 393 (2d ed. 1988); Resolution on Asylum, 1950, Institute of
International Law at its Bath Session, art. 1, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp., 15 (1951). In contrast,
settlers and removed people in the context of this paper, rather than being motivated by a
personal, individual desire for political asylum, are treated as a group phenomenon whereby
planning and implementation of the movement, and the ultimate motivation, belongs to
governments. It is often difficult to tell whether a refugee moves freely. One difference is
that refugee movement always occurs across international frontiers, whereas population
transfer can also occur within them. Regarding the Kurdish people, the period before the
Second Persian Gulf War saw movements that were population transfer, the removal of
people caused in part by Iraqi government's use of poison gas, see Minority Rights Group,
The Kurds: Massacre by Gas (1989); Middle East Watch, Human Rights in Iraq (Jan.,
1990), whereas flows post-Second Gulf War, involve refugee flows. For example, the
landmark UN Security Council Resolution 688, adopted by the Security Council at its
298nd meeting, addressed refugees. U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
6. Regarding migration, see generally PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW, supra
note 5. See also Myron Weiner, Security, Stability and International Migration (Dec. 5-6,
1991) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Conference on the Impact of International
Migration on the Security and Stability of States, Center for International Studies, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology) (differentiates between normal migration and population
movement with substantial government involvement).
7. See, e.g., T. Scudder & E. Colson, From Welfare to Development: A Conceptual
Framework for the Analysis of Dislocated People, in INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION AND RESET-
TLEMENT 267 (1982).
8. Existing literature such as Israel Shahak, A History of the Concept of 'Transfer' in
Zionism, 18 J. PALESTINE STUD. 22, n.3 (1989), and Alfred M. De Zayas, International Law
and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HARV. INT'L L. REV. 207 (1975) [hereinafter Law and
Transfers], treats population transfer as principally the removal of people, whereas other
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Besides a handful of scholars, including those recognized herein, few have
published lately on a form of population transfer. A unique aspect of this
paper is that, while examining a broad conception of transfer, it does
compare removals and settlements under applicable international law
from World War II onward. Indeed, to some extent population transfers
must be examined on a case-by-case basis; rather than doing so, this pa-
per serves as an overview of issues.
In the context of this paper, as a basic rule, transfers of both sorts
are meant to have in common the element of moving a large numbers of
people, in relative rather than absolute terms,9 and state involvement or
acquiescence in the movement. The specific people involved can be cate-
gorized as either removed people or settlers, and in the latter case original
inhabitants of the area receiving settlers. From there, analysis becomes
more difficult. Forced removals, in specific circumstances, have been ad-
judged crimes against humanity. Settlements as well as removals, under
certain restrictions, have violated doctrines of humanitarian law. Discrep-
ancies exist between the two types of transfer, along such doctrinal lines,
but also whether the element of consent is a criteria proper to population
transfer.'0 The extent to which those differences resolve themselves and
the two types of transfer collapse into a broad, yet coherent category of
treatment will depend on the future development of international law to-
wards, not only the practices themselves, but their effects on all those
affected by population transfer.
II. THE PRACTICE OF POPULATION TRANSFER
A. Population Transfer as a Crime Against Humanity and Possible
Extensions
The mass removal of citizens across internationally recognized bor-
ders of a state, is called mass deportations or expulsions. Transfers, such
as those at the hands of Nazi Germany, violate the Nuremberg principles
and constitute war crimes or any crimes against humanity in times of
writings touch on "settlements" as an isolated phenonmenon as compared with removals.
See, e.g., Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories
Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44 (1990).
9. Cf. U.N.P.O. Conference Report, supra note 4, at 7 ("Should numbers be part of
the definition, or should the definition focus on the rational and intention involved in the
transfer?"). The Report proposed a unified definition of "population transfer": "the move-
ment of large numbers of people, either into or away from a certain territory, with state
involvement or acquiescence of government and without the free and informed consent of
the people being moved or the people into whose territory they are being moved." Id. (em-
phasis added). That definition turns on the element of consent. Also, it raises the issue of
territorial definition, treated herein.
10. The U.N. Sub-Commission was "[cJoncerned that the movement of people is often
achieved either without free and informed consent of those people being moved or without
the consent of those people into whose territory they are being moved." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1990/17, supra note 3. See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3.
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international', and, it has been argued, civil war."
The expulsion of masses of non-Serbs from eastern Croatia across
front lines, by bus and other methods, was accomplished through coer-
cion, including threats, violence and discrimination.' 3 Similarly, in Bos-
nia, the deportation or mass displacement of people in order to create
ethnically pure areas was an important strategy to Serbia.' 4 These expul-
sions contributed to a substantial number of the masses of non-Serbs who
exited Bosnia.' 5 Occurring during international war, these expulsions
could surely be adjudged crimes against humanity. Had they occurred
earlier, before the international community reconized the independence
of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation would have been
deemed civil war with the front lines inside national boundaries.'" The
coercive tactics of "ethnic purification' '1 7 allegedly used by the militia
would not change with the varying classification of the war. It would be
arbitrary to use crimes against humanity to draw a strong distinction be-
tween international and civil war.
As seen through the nature of the above examples, the treatment,
under international law, of removals of people depends on whether the
transfer occurred during belligerency. Yet, out of belligerency and into
peacetime, mass expulsions across borders of citizens,' or aliens who were
in the originating territory lawfully such as Asians from Uganda,' 9 are
11. Agreement for the Prosecutioni and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 39 AM. J. INT'L. L., Supp. 257, 260 (1945), arts. 6(b)-(c)
Aug. 8, 1945 [hereinafter "Major War Criminal Agreement"]; Nuremberg Indictment, Count
3, §§ B, J; See Alfred M. De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L., 234,
235-36 [hereinafter De Zayas, Forced Resettlement]; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21,
supra note 3. This should be distinguished from deportations on an individual basis.
Lapidoth, Expulsion of Civilians from Areas under Israeli Control in 1967, 2 EUR. J. INT'L
L., No. 1, 97, 102-04 (1991) (it is inconclusive whether deportation of individuals, as opposed
to en masse, has been prohibited under customary international law). U.N. General Assem-
bly Resolution 95 (1) of December 11, 1946, gave expression to the general applicability of
the Nuremberg principles. 20PPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 616-19 (7th ed., 1952). But see
J. STONE, No PEACE No WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 17 (1969).
12. Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 221.
13. See Human Rights Watch, War Crimes and Bosnia-Herzegovina, at 75-81.
14. See id. at 71. See also John F. Burns, Bosnian Strife Cuts Old Bridges of Trust,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at A-8 (noting that although forced deportations have also been
carried out by Muslim Slavs against Serbians, the process appears to have been more sys-
tematic on the part of the Serbs).
15. Human Rights Watch, supra note 13, at 199. (categorizing as an international
armed conflict involving two states, Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.)
16. For an analysis of the conflict in former Yugoslavia as a civil war, see generally,
Charles Lewis Nier, III, Note, The Yugoslavia Civil War: An Analysis of the Applicability
of the Laws of War Governing Non-International Armed Conflict in the Modern World, 10
DICK. J. INT'L L. 303 (1992).
17. Burns, supra note 14.
18. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Protocol 4, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, came into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
19. See Richard Plender, The Ugandan Crisis and the Right of Expulsion Under In-
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circumscribed closely by human rights law. 0 This is due to any presence
of discriminatory or racist characteristics in the expulsions.
2 '
Of course, not all governments undertaking removals across interna-
tional borders lack concern for those being removed. Some are motivated
by the desire as a sovereign to "save" a threatened minority abroad by
"inviting" it into its territory. An example has been where an element of
exchange is involved, like the 1922-23 swap of Greeks and Turks.22 In
such cases, despite any state benevolency, jurists have focused on more
than just the attitude of the state. The perspective of the transferees
counts, too. The Institut de Droit International, in its 1952 session, ex-
pressed concern for those being removed, especially as to whether their
movement is voluntary.
23
The argument has been forwarded that crimes against humanity
should apply to the removal of people outside of armed conflict that
starts and finishes within the territory of a state. It relies on the analogy
to apartheid in South Africa. 24 Relocation of millions of blacks to artifi-
cially created homelands in the land-locked interior of the country, an
effort by zonation programs of the development branch of the govern-
ment, met sufficient international condemnation to be considered cen-
sured under customary international law. Part of the government's action
in transferring the people was racism and discrimination. Yet, other mas-
sive removals within borders, such as have occurred in Guatemala,25 East
ternational Law, 9 INT'L COMM. JURISTS, REV. 19, 27-30 (1972).
20. See PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW, supra note 5, at 474 n.174, 477; R.C.
Chhangani, Notes and Comments, Expulsion of Uganda Asians and International Law, 12
INDIAN J. INT'L L. 400, 402, 405-07 (1972); Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 244-45.
21. According to the U.N. Sub-Commission, "the practice of population transfer [refer-
ring to both removals and settlements] is discriminatory in its application and . . . inher-
ently leads to widespread and systematic discrimination." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21,
supra note 3.
22. See Alfred M. De Zayas, A Historical Survey of Twentieth Century Expulsions,
REFUGEES IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR 15, 17-20 (A. Bramwell, ed., 1988)[hereinafter De
Zayas, Historical Survey].
23. 44 Annuaire 138 (1952) (Sienna Session of 1952). See also PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION LAW, supra note 5, at 474. During the Nuremberg trials, it was recognized that
the government's motive for transfer could go beyond ill-treatment of those transferred. An
individual could escape liability if he was motivated by military necessity. De Zayas, Forced
Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236. Writing about removals, De Zayas says, "most transfers
of population are not likely to be voluntary." Alfred M. De Zayas, The Legality of Mass
Population Transfers: The German Experience 1945-48, 12 E. EUR. Q. 1, 6 (1978)[hereinaf-
ter German Experience].
24. German Experience, supra note 23, at 253; De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra
note 11, at 236. But see Lapidoth, supra note 11, at 104 (drafters of the Nuremberg Charter
may have considered mass deportations for forced labor and extermination).
25. See Philip, The Maya of Guatemala (Minority Rights Group Report No. 62, 1989);
Counterinsurgency and the Development Pole Strategy in Guatemala, 12 CULTURAL SUR-
VIVAL Q. 3 (1988); The Indians of Guatemala: Problems and Prospects for Social and Eco-
nomic Reconstruction (Cultural Survival, Fall, 1987); Witness to Genocide (Survival Inter-
national, 1983); Guatemalan Refugees Now Threatened by Relocation (Survival
International Urgent Action Bulletin, 1984).
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Timor, 26 Australia,27 Brazil,2" Egypt, Argentina and Paraguay, 29 have not
met with the same degree of international disapproval. At least in the last
five instances, relatively without belligerency in the sense of armed con-
flict, some deference may have been given to governments' motivation for
development. 30 Still, if, as in South Africa, the effect on those being
moved rises to the level of systematic racial discrimination, any large
scale population transfer may violate customary international law.
3 1
At least one international body has treated removal within borders
with disapproval. The invasion of Cyprus by Turkish troops in 1974 re-
sulted in the widespread eviction and population transfer of over 170,000
Greek Cypriots from their homes in the northern part of Cyprus. In Cy-
prus v. Turkey, the European Commission on Human Rights discussed
population transfer "The Commission . . .considers that the transporta-
tion of Greek Cypriots to other places, in particular the forcible excur-
sions within the territory controlled by the Turkish army, and the depor-
tation of Greek Cypriots ... constitute an interference with their private
life." 2 The Commission thus linked a form of population transfer, the
removal of people, to the right to private life. This right is related to the
right to security of persons. Because the Commission saw forced transpor-
26. See JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S INDIG-
ENOUS PEOPLES 142 (1987); F. HIORTH, TIMOR PAST AND PRESENT 61 (1985); Steven Erlanger,
East Timor, Reopened by Indonesia, Remains a Sad and Terrifying Place, N. Y. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 1990, at 18.
27. See Minority Rights Group, Aboriginal Australians, Report No. 35 (1988)(in
Queensland, mining policies effectively destroyed some of the economic and social basis of
Aboriginal traditional lifestyle and involved large-scale removals).
28. See Minority Rights Group, What Future for the Amerindians of South America,
Report No. 15 (1977). The Sobradinho Dam project resettled about 60,000 urban and rural
people. Michael Cerna, Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects (World Bank
Technical Paper No. 80, 1988).
29. See Cerna, supra note 28. In Egypt dam projects have removed and resettled at
least 170,000 people; in the border between Argentina and Paraguay, submersion projects
have removed some 45,000. Id.
30. If there is sufficient public interest for the transfer and proper compensation to-
wards those being moved, these factors should play into the determination of the transfer's
permissibility. Claire Palley, Population Transfer and International Law 3 (draft paper
presented at the UNPO Conference).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§702 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS]:
"A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or
condones (a) genocide... (f) systematic racial discrimination,. . or (g) a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." Accord Barcelona Traction,
Light & Power Co., Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32. See also International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, art. 5(d)(i),(ii), 660 U.N.T.S.
195 [hereinafter "Discrimination Convention"], which prohibits racial discrimination within
the borders of a state, occurring in conjunction with limitations on freedom of movement
and residence; Palley, supra note 30, at 4. See infra note 88 for further discussion of free-
dom of movement.
32. Cyprus v. Turkey, Cases 6780/74 and 6950/75, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. REP. 72-74




tation as an infringement of the right to private life, the case sets a prece-
dent regarding the use of force to transfer populations, Thus, emphasiz-
ing voluntariness.
Most importantly, in terms of any division between transfers across
borders and those only within, the language in Cyprus v. Turkey distin-
guished between removal within the boundaries of the territory controlled
by the Turkish army, and forced removals across borders. The Commis-
sion condemned both transfers. This invites greater scrutiny towards re-
movals occurring, like in northern Cyprus, under some belligerent condi-
tions, such as military occupation, even though only within state borders.
In brief conclusion about removals: Belligerency has been present in
situations highly condemned under international law, though this con-
straint is reduced by the presence of systematic racial discrimination, as
in Uganda or South Africa. Voluntariness is an important issue to remov-
als. In order to invoke crimes against humanity, the blatant lack of volun-
tariness in the victims of World War-II era transfers is key. Furthermore,
the issue of voluntariness has some importance regardless of the state's
intention.
B. Population Transfer Under Humanitarian Law
The Baltic States, Cyprus, East Timor, the West Bank, Tibet, the
Western Sahara, and Eritrea have been or are locations of the other form
of population transfer: settlements.3" These movements, unlike some ex-
pulsions, have never been formally adjudged crimes against humanity.
Because these situations have been sites of military occupations, the set-
tlements of the occupants' people has raised the issue of humanitarian
law, the part of international law which emphasizes the protection of the
individual not only during and following belligerency, but, according to
some scholars, also during peacetime occupations. 4
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War presents one of the clearest ex-
amples of positive international law governing population transfer. It
states:
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies .... Individual or
mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to
that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited regardless
of their motive. 5
33. Palley, supra note 30, at 5. For the only situations not documented elsewhere in
this article, see Minority Rights Group, Eritrea and Tigray, Report No. 5, at 4-14 (1983);
International Federation for the Protection of Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic and Other Mi-
norities, Comm. H.R., 43rd Sess., Agenda item 8, 1991.
34. See infra note 53.
35. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, 12 Aug. 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
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Furthermore, the Geneva Convention may outlaw population transfers
into occupied lands, not only during hostilities but afterwards until a final
political settlement has been reached in those lands. 6 Protocol I to the
Geneva Convention states that the Geneva Convention applies to "armed
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of
self determination as enshrined by the Charter of the United Nations,"3 7
and contains language similar to article 49.
These provisions dictate that, but for certain specific exceptions, set-
tlements in an occupied territory contravene international law. While
forced or forcible movement is illegal under these codes,3" an important
issue is that of voluntary movement. On the one hand, the voluntary na-
ture of an act should not be interpreted to legalize what would otherwise
be considered a violation of an international standard;39 especially if the
movement involves the purposes and effects, on both those transferred
and original inhabitants, that the Geneva Convention was crafted to pre-
vent.4 0 On the other hand, there are legal difficulties inherent in defining
"voluntary." In this regard, it should be pointed out that most settle-
ments, if not forced, are facilitated by government actions. Once such tool
is incentives, like increased industrialization in the area targeted for
transfer as occurred in Soviet-occupied Estonia and Latvia.4 1 Even if vol-
untary settlement on an individual basis were permissible under article
49, the settlement programs of the 1980s and 1990s, especially the ambi-
tious ones like those of the Indonesian 4' and Chinese43 governments, must
Geneva Convention].
36. See id. arts. 1, 2, 4, 17, 47, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 3518, 3520, 3530, 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at
287, 288, 290, 300, 318.
37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 1,
para. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
38. Cf. De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236 (regarding the other form
of transfer, removals: "The clear prohibition of forced resettlement in time of war has been
codified.")
39. The UN Sub-Commission has recognized the link between the right to security of
persons and the issue of population transfer, broadly defined. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1990/L.60, supra note 3; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/28, supra note 3. In other contexts
involving that right, the consent of an individual does not legitimize violations of an inter-
national norm. See Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 115, 120-124 (Theodore Meron ed. 1984) (explaining the right to
life norm).
40. Roberts, supra note 8, at 84.
41. See Romauld J. Misiunas, The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings for Sov-
ereignty, in THE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY 214 (Lubomyr
Hajda & Mark Bessinger eds. 1990). See also V. PURINA & J. JANSEVICS, LATVIJAS PSR
SOCIALISTISTIKA DARBA DALISANAS SISTEMA [THE SOCIALISTIC DIVISION OF LABOR SYSTEM IN
THE LATVIAN S.S.R.] 48 (1978); U.N. GAOR, Comm. H.R., 48th Sess., Agenda Item 12,
(1992) (Statement of the Estonian Delegation, Feb. 26, 1992). Cf. GEOFFREY A. HOSKING,
THE FIRST SOCIALIST SOCIETY: A HIS'TORY FROM WITHIN 399 (1st ed. 1985).
42. See generally MARIEL O'rTEN, TRANSMIGRASI: MYTHES AND REALITIES, INDONESIAN
RESETTLEMENT POLICY, 1965-1986 (1986).
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be examined to determine whether they meet the criteria of "voluntary"
settlements on an individual basis.
In the case of settlements, these difficulties about voluntariness lead,
to the question of whether consent should be relevant at all to a broad
concept of population transfer. Yet, in the instance of removals, volunta-
riness is of paramount concern. Comparing these to settlements, the dif-
ferent weight put on voluntariness will have to be reconciled for the two
categories of transfers to be collapsed satisfactorily into a single category
for legal treatment.
Just as national security might motivate governments to remove mi-
norities through expulsion,"" civilian settlements across the internation-
ally recognized borders of a state are sometimes claimed to be necessary
for the security of the transferring power and, therefore, essential to that
power in order to preserve public order and safety.45 For example, control
of the regions at the borders of Indonesian-dominated lands has been said
to have an explicit strategic objective that depends on settlements.'
In the Israeli Supreme Court's most important decision on popula-
tion transfer, Beth-El,'47 Justice Witkon sustained a prior opinion that the
fact that requisitioned lands are intended for Jewish civilian settlements
does not deprive such requisitioning of its security character. 4' In addi-
tion, although no terrorist activity actually took place, Justice Witkon re-
fused to distinguish the present case from one in which it had occurred.' 9
Those stances, regarding control of border regions, have in common the
use of civilians to gain control of other civilians, i.e. original inhabitants
and their areas. Even if population transfer were intended for national
security purposes, settlements can cause conflicts among people that set-
43. See HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES & THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, THE
LONG MARCH: CHINESE SETTLERS AND CHINESE POLICIES IN EASTERN TIBET 5-9 (1991) [here-
inafter Tibet Report]; ASIA WATCH, MERCILESS REPRESSION: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN TIBET
15 (1990); Sechin Jagchid, Discrimination Against Minorities in China, in HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE STUDIES 389, 401-02 (Willem A. Veenhoven, ed. 1975); 134 Cong. Rec. 15,500, 15,501-02
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 1988) (China trip report by Sen. Leahy); Note, Human Rights in Tibet:
An Emerging Foreign Policy Issue, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 193 (1992)(China has been at-
tempting since 1983 to dilute the Tibetan identity by transferring numerous Han Chinese
into Tibet). While the note adds in a footnote 25 that "[wihether the Chinese are intention-
ally transferring Han into Tibet is a matter of complex debate," id. at 196. See infra, text
accompanying notes 115 and 119 for other issues on the transfer that are important.
44. See DeZayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236.
45. Roberts, supra note 8, at 84.
46. Budiardjo, The Politics of Transmigration, 16 THE ECOLOGIST No. 2/3, at 111 (1986)
(as related in 1985 by the then Indonesian transmigration [i.e., resettlement] minister).
47. H.C. 606/78, Ayub v. Minister of Defense 33(2) PISKEI DIN 113 summarized in 9
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979) [hereinafter Beth-El].
48. Id. at 340.
49. Id. at 339. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 186 (1957). Cf. H.C.
302/72 Sheikh Suleiman Abu Hilu v. Israel 27(2) PISKEM DIN 169 summarized in 5 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 384 (1975) (Court unanimously upheld arguments that steps taken were neces-
sary due to the terrorist activities and acts of sabotage which in fact took place in the area).
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tlements may only exacerbate security problems.50
The issue of control over civilians points to the viewpoint of original
inhabitants. Though voluntariness or consent from the settlers' perspec-
tive is a confused, inconclusive subject, it might gain significance, as fur-
ther explained below, 1 regarding how others are affected by the
settlements.
National security arguments may lead to attempts to suspend human
rights. Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights52 permits states in urgent circumstances to suspend or breach the
right to liberty and security of the person, a right which may be affected
by population transfer. Such derogation, however, has little relevance, if
any, when settlements are undertaken by a government in order to
change the demographic structure or the political, cultural, religious and
other characteristics of the original inhabitants in the receiving area.53
The permanent nature of such changes means that population transfer
should never be justified on temporary grounds necessary for derogation.
This is true where transfer occurs during prolonged occupations. Pro-
longed occupations have received some attention as a distinct category,
having the characteristic of "belligerency ending. ' 5 4 The main conven-
tions relating to military occupations, including the Geneva Convention
and 1907 Hague Regulations 5 provide no meaningful variation in the
rules because of the length of an occupation 6 and, indeed, may cover not
50. See generally Marcus Colchester, The Social Dimensions of Government Sponsored
Migration and Involuntary Resettlement: Policies and Practice, (1986) (unpublished manu-
script prepared for the Independent Commission on Inter-national Humanitarian Issues in
Geneva)(available through author of present article). In the context of the occupied Arab
territories, Roberts and, Falk & Weston, lend support for two points: first, settlements are
almost never necessary for genuine military or security purposes and do not, in fact, serve
any such purpose; second, even if justified for military needs, the transfer still constitutes a
violation of rules of international law. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 84; Richard A. Falk &
Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West
Bank and Gaza: in Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L. J. 129, 147-48 (1991). Cf.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 107.
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4(1), adopted Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 [hereinafter Political Covenant].
53. The U.N. Sub-Commission was "[d]isturbed by reports concerning the implantation
of settlers and settlements in certain countries, including particular occupied territories,
with the aim to changing the demographic structure and the political, cultural, religious,
and other characteristics of the countries concerned." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/17,
supra note 3; see also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3. Derogation, generally,
is "extremely troublesome from the human rights viewpoint." Lillich, supra note 39, at 120.
54. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 51-53. Cf. Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142.
55. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annexed Reg-
ulations, signed Oct. 18, 1907, § 3, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 CONSOL. T.S. 277, 295-97 [hereinafter
Hague Regulations].
56. The exception is the "one year after" provision of article 6, paragraph 3 of the
Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention, supra note 35, art. 6, para. 3, at 3522, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 292. However, this provision is of little importance. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 55-56;
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only belligerent occupations but, also situations in which the belligerency
has subsided.5 7 Moreover, in peacetime the rights of the occupant dimin-
ish markedly as compared with those of a belligerent occupation. Where
population transfer extends from belligerent to prolonged occupation and
then into peacetime, the occupier may assert relatively fewer rights. That,
again, brings into doubt the "temporariness" justification mentioned
above.
Yet Justice Landau, concurring in Beth-El, supported the Israeli set-
tlements against this obvious doubt, saying that the hope that a political
solution someday will be reached justifies population transfer.59 Regard-
ing any particular occupation, Israeli or otherwise, even if one were satis-
fied that the Hague Regulations, and not the Geneva Convention, were in
effect,"0 article 43 of the Hague Regulations limits the freedom of the oc-
cupier to undertake population transfer, especially in extended or peace-
time occupation." Though many of the above cited sources have devel-
oped around the occupied Arab territories, it bears mentioning that the
Chinese and Indonesian governments see Tibet and East Timor, respec-
tively, as important military zones.62 Even if these were legitimate gov-
ernmental interests related to national security during peacetime, the
governments would not automatically gain free discretion to undertake
population transfer.
Should conventional law, including the relatively lenient Hague Reg-
ulations, be applicable, that discretion must include reference to the hu-
COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA CONVENTION RELA-
TIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN THE TIME OF WAR 22 (Jean S. Pictet ed.
1958); MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 57, 59 (1982).
57. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 52; Adam Roberts, What is Military Occupation?, 55
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 249, 253 (1984). But see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL
STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 43 (1987). "[T]here are, in fact, so many situa-
tions in which the applicability of the Geneva Conventions .. .has been denied that the
common practice has been rejection of the law, rather than its formal recognition and imple-
mentation." Id.
58. C. Lleewellyn Jones, Military Occupation of Alien Territory in Time of Peace, 9
GROTIUS Soc'y TRANSACTIONS 149, 159-60 (1923). See also Roberts, supra note 57, at 273-79.
Where military necessity exists, an occupying government has "considerable discretion."
Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 138. But military necessity generally ends when belliger-
ency stops.
59. Beth-El, supra note 47, at 392.
60. See Yoram Dinstein, The Judgment in the Matter of Pitchat Rafiah, 3 TEL AViV
UNIV. L. REV. 934 (Hebrew, 1973).
61. See Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142 (a duty is imposed upon the occupant
vis-a-vis the original inhabitants). Cf. H.C. 337/71, Christian Society for the Holy Places v.
Minister of Defense, 26(1) PISKEI DIN 574, summarized in 2 ISR. Y. B. HUM. RTs. 354, 355
(1972).
62. Regarding East Timor, see BURGER, supra note 26, at 142-43; Budiardjo,-supra note
46, at 111; See Generally FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSON, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF
GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND CASE STUDIES 378-83 (1990). Concerning Tibet, see TiET REPORT,
supra note 43, at 2-4; What McMahon Wrought, THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 1987, at 59.
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manitarian concerns of all individuals affected by population transfer."
The needs of both the settlers and original inhabitants who are affected
become particularly relevant as an occupation moves through the stages,
from belligerent, to prolonged, and into peacetime.
If prolonged and even peacetime occupations are reasons for continu-
ing prohibition of settlements, that is a sign that the positive law prohib-
iting settlements is moving away from any necessity for belligerency."
This may be compared to cases of removals, where any presence of racism
and discrimination may be pushing any prohibition, based on either posi-
tive or normative law, away from the need for belligerency.
C. Population Transfer Under Principles Regarding Colonialism
The practice of population transfer is also part and parcel of coloni-
alism. One case of population transfer into territory that has been "colo-
nized", according to the formal U.N. regime, is the Western Sahara. 5 The
Moroccan takeover of this area was marked by clear tactics including the
settlement of over 200,000 Moroccans as well as removal by "brutal tac-
tics" of some groups of original inhabitants in the area."' The Western
Sahara situation was before the International Court of Justice." The con-
nection of population transfer to colonialism is patently clear. Condemna-
tions of colonialism came from the ICJ," and subsequently the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly 9  and noted experts. 0  In situations of traditional
63. Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human
Rights, 8 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 104, 111-12 (1978); Falk & Weston, supra note 50, at 142.
64. The literature on prolonged occupations has not addressed population transfer in
its other forms.
65. See generally VIRGINIA THOMPSON & RICHARD ADLOFF, THE WESTERN SAHARANS:
BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT (1980); DAVID LYNN PRICE, THE WESTERN SAHARA (The Washing-
ton Papers, vol. 7, no. 63 1979).
66. CLAUDE BONTEMS, LA GUERRA DU SAHARA OCCIDENTAL [THE WAR OF THE WESTERN
SAHARA] 72 (1984). See also JOHN DAMIS, CONFLICT IN NORTHWEST AFRICA: THE WESTERN
SAHARA DISPUTE 61-69 (1983). Although the brutality of Moroccan forces is well known and
documented, it should be noted that not all of the population movement was forced by the
Moroccans. Some of it was encouraged by the Polisario Front, a pro-independence move-
ment, in face of the invasion. Id. at 72.
67. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). See THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 65,
at 167.
68. The ICJ declined to declare the Western Sahara "terra nullius" but also failed to
declare the territory Moroccan or Mauritaurian. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at para. 162.
The Western Sahara case does not discuss population transfer directly, the opinion is im-
portant nonetheless for the connection it makes between self-determination and colonialism.
See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at para. 162; See also Self-Determination: The Cases of
Fiji, New Caledonia, and the Western Sahara, 82 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 429, 439-42,
(Michael P. Malloy, ed. 1988). From this connection it is arguable that population transfer
effects the right to self-determination. See Id. at 443 (discussing this possible effect). But
see DAMIS, supra note 66, at 60 (positing that the Court's decision was essentially political).
69. See DAMIS, supra note 66, at 94, citing U.N. Doc. A/35/595 (1980), also referring to
the right of the Sahrawi population to self-determination.
70. See, e.g., The Right to Self-Determination, Implementation of United Nations Res-
olutions, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1, para. 69 (1980).
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colonialism, a nexus has been established between the use of force and its
effect on a people's identity."1 As a reuslt, the U.N. acted.
D. Some Limits on Jurisprudence and Positive Law
Western Sahara and its aftermath may be contrasted with situations
of indigenous groups, such as the Chakmas of the Chittagong Hills
Tracts, or various sparsely inhabited Amazonian provinces of Bolivia,
Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. These face what most
consider to be settlements by ethnically distinct, dominating groups en-
couraged or even forced by U.N. recognized governments. 72 The above-
mentioned nexus between force and peoples' identity may exist even in
these situations of transfer.7 In contrast to the Western Sahara and other
situations of traditional colonialism, however, these settlements have oc-
curred within the governments' U.N. recognized borders. At issue is the
possible constraint of article 2.7 of the U.N. Charter, which states that
"[niothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State. ' 4 Like situations of removals solely within do-
mestic frontiers,7 5 the concurrent presence, of systematic discrimination,
genocide, 76 or gross and persistent violations of human rights77 counte-
nances article 2.7. So does the moral pressure of publicists like Theodoro-
poulos who recognizes colonialism outside the traditional U.N. definition.
He asserts that South Africa is the chief paradigm of "settler colonial-
71. The U.N. General Assembly, in the context of colonialism, noted that "the use of
force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable
rights and of the principles of non-intervention." Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/5217, Supp. No. 28, at 121
(1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. The prohibition on the use of force
is also now a rule of customary international law. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., at 98-101.
72. See Hurst Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L.
649, 668 n.71 (1988) (approximately 300,000 Bengalis were settled in the Tracts from 1978-
88); Written statement submitted by The Nordic Saamic Council et al. at the U.N. Sub-
Comm., 43rd Sess. Item 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/NGO/3. Colchester, supra note
50, at 12 (regarding the other regions)
73. See Hannum, supra note 72, at 668; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3.
74. U.N. CHARTER, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (1969). The U.N. Sub-
Commission has not limited its concern to settlements occurring across international fron-
tiers. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/17, supra note 3; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21,
supra note 3.
75. See, e.g., supra, text accompanying note 24 (example of South Africa).
76. See discussion infra III.B.2.
77. See RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 31, § 702. U.N. resolutions di-
rectly or indirectly authorize the U.N. Sub-Commission to undertake studies or working
groups to address consistent patterns of extreme human rights violations, even though they
occur within the borders of a given state. Admittedly, international bodies today do not
emphasize de-colonization. For example, the U.N. did not oppose apartheid under the pre-
text of decolonization. Therefore, any law on settlements within domestic frontiers will de-
velop apart from traditional colonialism.
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ism. ''7 8 The South African government undertook removals, through zo-
nation, in order to clear the way for accomplishment of the other form of
population transfer: settlements.7 '9 These started as well as finished
within the boundaries of that state.
For settlements as well as removals occurring in such territorial lim-
its, prohibition would be more meaningful if the prohibition came from
positive law in a rule explicitly about transfer. Then they would be less
sensitive to issues defining territory. The following issues point to the
conclusion, based on a limited analysis, that removals within interna-
tional frontiers are closer to benefitting from concrete law, such as the
Geneva Convention and doctrines on crimes against humanity, than are
settlements.
The only positive law directly prohibiting settlements comes from
the Geneva Convention. The definition of territory covered by the laws is
crucial. Whether an occupation is belligerent or peaceful, the territory
must be under some form of occupation."s It is true that Protocol I, also
addressing transfers, applies beyond situations of military occupation, 1
but its language prohibiting transfer still refers strictly to transfer into or
out of areas under occupation. These two instruments also refer to remov-
als, which are somewhat constrained by the need for occupation.8 2 Re-
movals, unlike settlements, have fallen subject to crimes against human-
ity. Related commentary shows that, in general, prohibitions on removals
may be less constrained by the very idea of territorial definition. For ex-
ample, there is the view espoused by some scholars, such as Palley, that it
was just as "unlawful" for the Allies after World War II to deport
Germans en masse as it was for the Germans to do so to others during
that War.8 3 Upon further examination such a view may implicate, e.g., the
deportation of Germans from Sudetenland, even though this area was not
78. C. THEODOROPOULOS, COLONIALISM AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPO-
RARY THEORY OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 65 (1988). Theodoro-
poulos writes of "settler colonialism," calling it "colonialism" where restrictions are "im-
posed on a colonial people by a colonial power existing geographically not apart from its
colony but instead within the colonial territory." Id. Cf. A. JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD 18
(1986) (Whether a state enjoys exclusive power over a territory is not a precise criteria for
determining what constitutes a colonial territory). Today, the U.N. does not emphasize de-
colonization; for example, de-colonization was not the pretext for U.N. efforts against
apartheid.
79. Colchester, supra note 50, at 20.
80. Unlike removals, massive and permanent settlements across borders of states, ex-
cluding repatriation of refugees, are a policy implemented uniquely into areas experiencing
prolonged occupations. Settlements, as defined in this paper, almost never occur anymore
from one sovereign state to another. See Hucker, Migration and Resettlement Under Inter-
national Law, in The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare 338-9 (R. MacDon-
ald et. al. eds. 1978).
81. See supra text accompanying note 35. Note, few states have ratified.
82. See Lapidoth, supra note 11, at 98-99.
83. Palley, supra note 30, at 17. See generally De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note
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technically "occupied" by the responsible transferors. 4 Furthermore,
there is the argument, buttressed by the analogy to the situation in ex-
Yugoslavia, that crimes against humanity also apply to removals during
civil war within international frontiers.8 5
Referring to these last such removals, more authoritatively than the
opinion of scholars, is the Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conven-
tion, which applies to armed conflicts with or without an international
character. 8 Protocol II restricts population transfer, through article 17 in
the form of removals but not settlements. This exclusivity further sup-
ports the above comparison.8 7 The comparison is reinforced by reference
to international deliberations. Turkey v. Cyprus condemned removals
that, while occurring in an area technically under occupation, started and
ended there.88 By contrast, settlements starting and ending within a terri-
tory under occupation have not fallen subject to comparable concerted
deliberations. Thus as the above analysis-though limited in
scope-indicates, there may be some imbalance in a comparison of ex-
isting law about the two sorts of transfers when they occur within fron-
tiers. Any imbalance may be overcome by future developments in inter-
national law towards dealing with the effects of population transfer.
III. THE EFFECTS OF POPULATION TRANSFER
Along with the actual movement of people, an adequate recognition
of the effects of population transfer is important, even though these ef-
fects may be less detectable than the movement itself.8 Discrepancies
under international law may exist between the two forms of population
transfer, for example the question of territorial status. If the effects of
any population transfer rise to the level of gross and consistent violations
of international human rights, that may be a violation of customary inter-
84. Also regarding state practices, the definition of a territory as "occupied" is key for
settlements.
85. De Zayas, Law and Transfers, supra note 8, at 221. See supra note 13 and accom-
panying text.
86. Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977) [hereinafter Proto-
col Ill. Protocol II supplements Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, which applies "in the
case of armed conflict not of an international character," by extending it to inter-state con-
flicts where signatories are capable of carrying out "sustained and concerted military opera-
tions." Id. at art. 1.
87. Article 17 reads: "The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered
for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative
military reasons so demand." See International Committee of the Red Cross, statement at
the 48th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, at 3, Feb. 1992.
88. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
89. The fact that "[p]eople and socio-cultural systems respond to forced relocation in
predictable ways," Scudder & Colson, supra note 7, at 267, suggests some hope for the es-
tablishment of international norms recognizing any costly and disruptive results from popu-
lation transfer.
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national law, though not necessarily codified per se to refer directly to
population transfer.
A. Effects on Those Being Moved: Freedom of Movement and Other
Rights
In modern times, the most significant limitations on a state's right to
control the movement of people is based not on principles of economic
interdependence, but on rules designed to protect human rights. 90 Article
13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each State.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.
The right to freedom of movement, an essential part of the right to
personal liberty,"' is most likely part of customary international law.93
Emphasis of that status is the inclusion of freedom of movement in the
Discrimination Convention.94 Yet, despite any special status for freedom
of movement, international law has yet to prescribe a satisfactory frame-
work for movement involved in modern population transfer.
As the issue of voluntariness is more complicated in cases of settle-
ments than removals, so goes freedom of movement. The Universal Dec-
laration, article 13, refers to movement both within and across a state's
internationally recognized borders. 95 Settlers moving across borders un-
questionably have the right to leave their country. That raises a threshold
question: are settlers freely leaving their country? A government will
have varying levels of participation in population transfer: it will sponsor
90. PLENDER, supra note 5, at 62.
91. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)[hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
92. Lillich, supra note 39, at 189; cf. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/1990/17, supra note 3;
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3 (freedom of movement and security of per-
sons in conjunction with population transfer).
93. Rapporteur's Report by Fausto Pocar, Vice-Chairman of the Human Rights Com-
mittee, at the European Workshop on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Past-
Present-Future, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/89/1, at 101 (1988); Daniel Turack, A Brief Review of
the Provisions in Recent Agreements Concerning Freedom of Movement Issues in the Mod-
ern World, 11 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 95, 95-96 (Winter 1979); cf. Lillich, supra note 39, at
151 (rights to transnational movement "seem well-established in conventional and perhaps
even customary international human rights law"). But see id. for the position that the right
to internal movement, distinct from movement across borders, is not part of customary in-
ternational law. Lillich's reasoning, however, is based on the weak evidence that internal
exile, such as that practiced by the former Soviet Union, was not universally condemned.
94. See Turack, supra note 93, at 96.
95. The latter movement refers to the right to leave and to return to a country. The
Universal Declaration grants both citizens and'aliens the right to leave any country but
limits the right to return, of course, to citizens of that country. Article 12(1) and (2) of the
Political Covenant also allows both citizens and aliens the right to leave, but subjects the
right to article 12(3).
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settlers, for example financially, or encourage their movement, possibly
without any financial support. In either situation, the degree to which
settlers are informed about all aspects of their transfer, including their
destination, affects whether they are consenting thereto in an informed
manner. If uninformed, they are not voluntarily, or freely, leaving the
country. 6 The Discrimination Convention prohibits the use of racially
discriminatory measures restricting the individual's right to leave or re-
turn to his or her country. After the population transfer has taken place,
settlers who move across borders have the right to return to their home
land, should they so choose."
Population transfer within a state's recognized borders can violate
the right to internal movement. Under the Universal Declaration, the
right to free internal movement is inextricably linked to the right to
choose one's residence.9 Depending on the specifics involved, govern-
ments may violate them both by removing people from their residences
due to, or as part of, transfer across as well as within a country's
borders. 99
Although containing similar language as the Universal Declaration,
the Political Covenant is qualified by its article 12(3), which permits re-
strictions on the right to internal movement if such restrictions "are pro-
vided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (or-
dre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others. . . ." These restrictions may come into play in situations of eco-
nomic development causing massive forced removals. 100 Limits on govern-
mental abuse include article 12(3) provisions that such exceptions be
96. That poses further problems for the transferring government as well as settlers,
when the latter, facing rough conditions, choose to return to the country of origin. A govern-
ment might not have an adequate infrastructure to aid them, as equally in their return as in
their original movement. For example, settlers from the central islands .of Indonesia report-
edly have not been adequately informed of conditions in the outer, Indonesian dominated
islands. See generally Ria, Transmigrasi Bedol Desa: Indonesian Island Village Resettle-
ment from Wonogiri to Bengkulu, 26 BULL. OF INDONESIAN EcON. STUD. No. 1, 48 (April
1990); World Bank Rep. No. 5597-IND, in Indonesia Rep.-Hum. Rts. Supp. No. 10 (Aug.
1985).
97. The motivations of the sponsoring or encouraging governments, to create perma-
nent change in an occupied area, cast doubts on the existence of a meaningful right to re-
turn. See, e.g., Mansour, L'emigration des juifs sovietiques et le processus de paix israelo-
palestinien [The immigration of Soviet Jews and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process], LA
POLITIQUE ETRANGIkRE 329 (July 1990).
98. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration mentions both rights.
99. Given the absolute character of the right to free movement, people should enjoy
that same right whether or not they are classified as citizens of the state whose government
is undertaking population transfer. A possible objection is that the Discrimination Conven-
tion fails to prohibit general discrimination against aliens by states based on nationality,
citizenship, and exclusions as between citizens and non-citizens. See arts. 1, 2 & 3.
100. Cf De Zayas, Forced Resettlement, supra note 11, at 236. Without mentioning
whether states may properly derogate from the relevant provision of the Political Covenant,
De Zayas writes that forced resettlement is "incompatible" with the freedom of movement
provisions in both the Universal Declaration and the Political Covenant.
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"necessary" and "consistent with other rights recognized in the present
Covenant," and that exceptions for ordre public require specific, factual
justifications of a compelling state interest. Regarding removals, then, one
can make a distinction-extremely preliminary, only-between such
transfers in Egypt, Paraguay and Argentina, which may have some devel-
opment rationale, and cases like East Timor and Guatemala, which seem
to feature relatively less.
Cases of internal dislocation, or removal, occur in situations of inter-
state or civil war where masses of dislocated people suffer due directly to
armed conflict. At the time of writing, in Bosnia, deals involving Serbs
and Croats were reported towards carving Bosnia into "communal protec-
torates," '' where the comparison to zonation in South Africa is vivid.
This threatened thousands of Bosnian Muslims, whose coalition had tried
to preserve a multi-religious community,. with displacement or removal
within borders. 2 The extent to which those who caused any transfer vio-
lated international law depends on a balancing of the right to internal
free movement, backed by the Protocol II'0 3-doubtfully customary
law' 04 -prohibiting dislocation related to conflict; and the Political Cove-
nant's derogations and restrictions on the right to free movement, permis-
sible for state parties signatories.
Conflicts may arise between different aspects of the right to freedom
of movement. Although part of customary international law, the rights to
leave and to return to a country are "difficult if not impossible to imple-
ment." 5 They become difficult in the context of population transfer, be-
cause they might conflict with the right to internal movement. Unless
consistent with article 12(3) of the Political Covenant, settlers entering
neighboring lands cannot force original inhabitants, against their will, to
be removed; as a logical extension, settlers cannot force original inhabi-
tants into exile.'0 6 Should original inhabitants go into exile, they must
enjoy the right to return. Furthermore, they have both the right to choose
their residence and the right to security of persons.
1 0 7
The conflict that settlement across borders poses with the right to
free internal movement takes on an added complication in cases of pro-
longed military occupation. There might be an element of conflict be-
tween humanitarian and human rights law. The Universal Declaration
101. Lean on Croatia, Too, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 14, 1992, at 8.
102. See Human Rights Watch, at 13; See also Burns, supra note 14. For treatment of
removals occurring across international frontiers, see supra text accompanying notes 12.
103. See supra Section II.D.
104. See Palley, supra note 30, at 7 (Few states have signed Protocol II).
105. Lillich, supra note 39, at 151.
106. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration states that "No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."
107. The right to security of persons is given more concrete meaning by the guarantees
against arbitrary arrest and detention, and against interference with one's privacy, family,




guarantees original inhabitants the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state, but article 78, paragraph 1 of
the Geneva Convention provides: "If the Occupying Power considers it
necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures con-
cerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned
residence or internment."' ° A case-by-case analysis of population trans-
fer during prolonged occupation, where an occupant transfers its own
people into the occupied territory and these people in turn obstruct the
movement of original inhabitants, may turn on an assessment of "impera-
tive reasons of security" given by the occupant.
Where such arguments fail, there is a clear connection between set-
tlements and the violation of human rights, stemming from the right to
free internal movement. Nevertheless, as in the preceding paragraph the
violation does not occur to settlers' rights, but to original inhabitants'.
The infringement is a by-product, though an important one, of transfer;
whereas in cases of isolated, massive removals the infringement on this
right may be more part and parcel of the actual population transfer be-
cause those to whom it occurs more likely are the actual transferees. At
least where gross and persistent such violations would support the perme-
ability of internationally recognized frontiers for U.N. or other attention,
this supports the above-mentioned possibility that removals as a general
rule may more easily overcome any limitations of territorial definition.
Yet case-by-case analysis may prove otherwise. In any event, further de-
velopments in human rights are important, if a broad concept of popula-
tion transfer is to move even further away from the requirement of bellig-
erency that originates from crimes against humanity and humanitarian
law.
B. Effects on Original Inhabitants
1. Effects of Population Transfer on Self-Determination
The voluntariness or consent of original inhabitants is important for
more than just freedom of movement. For example, when a transfer pol-
icy, such as settlements, is motivated by a desire to control original in-
habitants, the perspective of these people becomes relevant: did they ac-
cept to receive settlers?
Take original inhabitants to whom self-determination applies, 9 and
108. Geneva Convention, supra note 35, art. 78, para. 1.
109. The right, or principle, of self-determination in contemporary international law is
still to a large extent unclear in its precise scope and content. See generally Thurer, Self-
determination, in Encyclopedia Pub. Int'l L. Instalment 8, 470 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1975).
The author of the present article does not intend to express an opinion on such scope and
content, but rather, for purpose of discussion, assumes that self-determination applies to
original inhabitants in question. See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1, supra note
70, at para. 7 (self-determination pertains "to all peoples and nations, and ... a prerequi-
site of the enjoyment of all the rights and freedoms of the individual"); but see HURST
HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CON-
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who are also faced with population transfer. One historical example oc-
curred after World War II. The original inhabitants of Germany received
Germans removed from Poland and Czechoslovakia by these countries'
governments. De Zayas is of the opinion that these population transfers
were illegal in international law because the legitimate sovereign, the re-
ceiving state, had not consented to receive them.110
By virtue of self-determination's applicability, the original inhabi-
tants on the receiving end must have had unique identifiable characteris-
tics, including race or ethnicity, language, religion, culture, tradition and
history, which set them apart from their neighbors. Original inhabitants
may not be like Germany, a well-established sovereign; instead the self-
determination of original inhabitants may be as an ethnic minority, indig-
enous people, nation without a state, or territory under occupation. In
such an event, it is more likely that population transfer will endanger the
above special characteristics than in the instance of a sovereign state."'
Any group to which self-determination applies should have the op-
portunity to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development .. ."'' When their land
is subject to an occupying or otherwise alien power's population transfer,
original inhabitants may be stripped of the opportunity to determine
their status and to pursue their development and, thus, denied in overt
ways their access to self-determination. In the case of settlements, the
denial might occur when administrators and settlers of an occupying or
FLICTING RIGHTS 41 (1990) (Most countries either have not specifically addressed the right to
self-determination, or have done so in such general terms that nothing is added to an under-
standing of its content).
110. De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note 22, at 18.
111. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3; Colchester, supra note 50, at
4. Third World countries often "view themselves as unrepresented and disfavored in the
development of international law," Mose L. Floyd, Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait Sparks Migra-
tion into Jordan: A Third World Nation Copes With the Administrative Nightmare of a
Refugee Population, 5 G'TOWN IMMIG. L. J. 57, 65 (1991), and thus without as much protec-
tion from international law. Minorities, indigenous, and other "stateless" groups have
greater reason to view themselves as unrepresented, disfavored, and unprotected. Cf.
P.J.I.M. de Waart, Statehood and International Protection of Peoples in Armed Conflicts
in the 'Brave New World': Palestine as a U.N. Source of Concern, 5 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 3, 24
(Feb., 1992) (concern expressed over the U.N. protecting the right to self-determination of a
stateless group against a state's discrimination based on race, creed, or color).
112. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960), Preamble, para. 2.
See also Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 71, at 121. The International Cove-
nant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter Economic Covenant], imposes the
obligation on states to "promote the realization of the right of self-determination" and to
"respect that right." Relevant to self-determination is whether people are distinct and have
a capacity for self-management and ". . . a common desire to establish an entity capable of
functioning to ensure a common future." Right to Self-Determination, supra note 70, at
para. 56. For other elements relevant to self-determination, see generally Hannum, supra
note 109, at 27-49.
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dominating power flood into the land of a distinct people, i.e. original
inhabitants, and appropriate for themselves superior positions in differ-
ent aspects of society.'
1 3
The problem becomes more acute and troublesome if alien superior-
ity resulted in subjugation, domination and exploitation of the original
inhabitants, which effects have been denounced as contrary to the U.N.
Charter and as constituting denials of fundamental human rights." 4 In
his writings about the other form of transfer, removals, at the level of
sovereign or occupied states, De Zayas has recognized the economic risks
of exploitation. He believes that in addition to being willing to receive
masses of expelled people, a state must also be economically capable of
doing so."" "In addition, the social and cultural adequacy of the receiving
state ought to be considered,""' 6 thereby referring to political domination
and social subjugation. But slow to be recognized is that these same ef-
fects may play out in cases of settlements, and that may happen even
where the unit of self-determination being affected is not an occupied
state. If the sheer scale of a population transfer causes original inhabi-
tants to become a minority in their own homeland, that dampens the pos-
sibility that they will ever realize self-determination." 7
International law's taking account of such effects will depend on res-
olution of the dilemma over how to measure respect for a country's do-
mestic jurisdiction. For the future, the key factor may be whether and
how original inhabitants in areas flooded by settlers, originating and end-
ing within U.N.-recognized borders, are recognized as being accorded and
then realizing self-determination. Developments in rights of indigenous
peoples and related land rights are also relevant,"' but these have come
113. That reasoning applies in cases of military occupation, see Eide, Human Rights in
a Pluralistic World, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION IN SPACE AND TIME 23, 42 (UNESCO,
1990) (those under military occupation are entitled to express self-determination), but such
a denial is also possible in cases of outside domination that do not involve military occupa-
tion. A people's right to "enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and re-
sources," provided for in articles 1 and 25 of the Economic Covenant, might be jeapordized.
That Covenant also states, in the same article referring to self-determination, "In no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." Furthermore, a transferring
government might violate original inhabitants' right to an adequate standard of living, in
article 11 of the Economic Covenant, by restricting their freedom of movement. See U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/17, supra note 3; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3
(all above rights mentioned in conjunction with population transfer).
114. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 70.
115. De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note 22, at 3. He adds: "The arrival of millions
of expellees in a country already incapable to feed itself necessarily leads to chaos, both for
the native population of the receiving state and for the arriving expellees" (emphasis
added). Id.
116. Id. Cf. VERNON VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, ETHNICITY, AND DISCRIMINATION 76
(1985) (effect on political processes of mixing societies deeply divided along cultural lines).
117. See Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 105, 109 (Jan. 1976) (effects of diluting and dispersing a minority).
118. For example, as land rights relate to self-determination. For a discussion of the
relationship between self-determination, land and indigenous rights, see generally Hannum,
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slowly. In the revised text of the Draft Universal Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the right to self-determination was in-
cluded in only a compromising manner." ' In what has been considered as
a bedrock convention on indigenous rights, there are provisions dealing
with removals identified in the Draft as "forcible relocation," and these
are "weak.""'2 The possibility was mentioned that there may be some im-
balance in a comparison of positive law about the two sorts of transfers
when they occur within frontiers. Depending on future developments in
indigenous rights, settlements may make up some of that differential.
Self-determination does not always imply total independence from
outside groups, but it does give those to whom it applies some control
over their own destiny.'2 ' Logically, settlements across or within interna-
tional frontiers may prevent a distinct group from determining its own
status and development particularly when the influx to them is un-
wanted. Therefore, self-determination, should it apply to original inhabi-
tants faced with population transfer, brings into play the element of con-
sent. Self-determination would thereby plug a gap that existed between
removals and settlements by virtue of the relatively greater pertinence to
removals of other concepts of consent. Shifting attention, in cases of set-
tlements, away from governmental motives for transfers and towards the
point of view of those directly affected is not inconsistent with existing
treatment of the more traditionally recognized form of transfer, removals.
For removals, it was recognized that, in addition to the motives of any
supra note 72, at 670-77. In his article A Historical Survey of Twentieth Century Expul-
sions, De Zayas makes the connection between land rights, respect therefore, and humane
approaches to the problem of population transfer. However, his examples, which are remov-
als and not settlements, occur across international frontiers. Nevertheless, he opines that
the gradual public sensitization to the "right of peoples to their native soil," and that "the
best and most human solution [to problems caused by population transfer] would be the
increased permeability of national frontiers." De Zayas, Historical Survey, supra note 22, at
33-34. See also id. at 23; De Zayas, German Experience, supra note 23, at 5-6 ("The broad
authority of sovereign states to pursue legitimate ends [through population transfer] should
not be exercised to the detriment of a people's right to inhabit their native soil.").
119. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42, Annex II. Only minor changes were introduced
for the 1991 session.
120. Hannum, supra note 72, at 72, citing to International Labour Organization Con-
vention No. 107 concerning the protection and integration of indigenous and other tribal
and semi-tribal populations in independent countries, art. 12, reprinted in 1 Study of the
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7
& Adds.1-4 (1986) (Jose R. Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur), 96, 100, originally released
as E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2 Add. 1, 63, 67.
121. Van Dyke, supra note 116, at 221 ("an exercise of self-determination does not nec-
essarily mean that the choice will be for independence. One of the potential choices is for
autonomy within the framework of the state and given reasonableness on both sides this is
the choice, or compromise that will be made."); Peter Malanczuk, The Kurdish Crisis and
Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. No. 2, 114,
124 (1991) ("sufficient degree of autonomy within the existing state structure"); United Na-
tions Seminar on the Effects of Racism and Racial Discrimination on the Social and Eco-
nomic Relations Between Indigenous Peoples and States, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/22 (self-
determination may only imply "self-development").
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government, the perspective of those affected-in particular, their volun-
tariness-counted also. In addition, where it can be shown that the gov-
ernmental motivations, racism and discrimination, condemned under re-
movals, exists also for governments undertaking settlements, will lend
more support for a broad concept of population transfer.
2. Effect of Population Transfer on Rights Regarding Genocide
There has been concern that people subjected to massive population
transfer, either by facing settlers or by themselves being removed, have
been threatened with genocide.' 22 For instance, in Indonesian-ruled East
Timor population transfer occurred in both forms, and, due to inhumane
conditions imposed, genocide happened concurrently.' 23 The. U.N. has
adopted the following definition of genocide, through the Genocide Con-
vention: "Genocide means any of the following acts committed with in-
tent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such," then names several specific acts.2"
"The right of peoples to physical existence corresponds to the prohi-
bition of genocide." 12 5 In focusing, therefore, on the effects of population
transfer on the right to existence, at least two issues arise. One is the
distinction between genocide and ethnocide. The latter is a sub-category
of the former. Yet, "[tihe suppression of a culture, a language, a religion,
and so on is a phenomenon that is analytically different from the physical
extermination of a group."126 Concern over genocide in the sense of mass
death applies to relatively few cases of population transfer. The meaning
of ethnocide, which might also coincide with denial of self-determination,
is proper in situations of population transfer.2 7
122. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/21, supra note 3; DeZayas, Forced Resettle-
ment, supra note 11, at 236 (expressed concern over genocide for removals, but not for
settlements). For some concern expressed over genocide for settlements as well as removals,
which the author of the present article cannot confirm as actual genocide, see CHITTAGONG
HILL TRACTS COMMISSION, LIFE IS NOT OURS: LAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CHITTAGONG
HILL TRACTS, BANGLADESH (May, 1991); The Chittagong Hill Tracts, INTERNATIONAL WORK-
ING GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS [IWGIA] NEWSLETTER No. 1 (July/Aug., 1991); They
Are Now Burning Village After Village: Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, IWGIA
Doc. No. 51 (W. Mey ed. Dec. 1984).
123. See CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 379. See also Erlanger, supra note 26
(100,000 to 200,000 East Timorese died from 1974 to 1980); Budiardjo, supra note 46
(200,000 died); F. HIORTH, TIMOR PAST AND PRESENT 61 (1985) (in 1975, an estimated
650,000 East Timorese lived on the island).
124. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signature Dec. 9, 1949, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Those acts include: "(a) Killing members of the
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e)
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." Id. Cf. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 31, § 702.
125. Dinstein, supra note 117, at 105.
126. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 23.
127. Distinctions between ethnocide and genocide are de-emphasized by focusing on
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A second issue important to the relationship between population
transfer and the right to existence is intent. "[T]he essence of genocide is
not the actual destruction of a group-in our case, a people-but the in-
tent to destroy it as such." 2 ' This implies that if a group, for example a
"people" however defined, is destroyed, but no intent to destroy existed,
then no genocide occurred. Conversely, one individual murder would ful-
fill this definition of genocide if the act was designed to further the ex-
tinction of a people.
The situation of the Kurds after the Second Gulf War involved popu-
lation transfer in the form of massive removal.' 9 Payam Akhavan be-
lieves the requisite intent existed, stating that "it was not in question
that the deliberate policy of the Iraqi authorities had resulted in condi-
tions which were so extreme as to cause the mass exodus of Kurds to
neighboring States." ' Given that the receiving end was "inhospitable re-
gions where their survival may be threatened," Akhavan recommends
that the International Court of Justice give an advisory opinion on
whether this constitutes " 'deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in part' within
the meaning of the Genocide Convention. '1 31 A positive response would
mean genocide occurred, and could not be overlooked by those who cite
to Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.1 3' Depending on such a judgement,
removals could cause genocide.
Depending upon circumstances, the governmental intent required to
raise an act to genocidal level may vary. For example, a high degree of
centralized authority and quasi-bureaucratic organization in the govern-
ment, like that of Iraq, has not always been required. According to Chalk
and Jonassohn, an exception has been "when the victim group is numeri-
cally small." They give as an example the phenomenon of population
existence rather than extermination, a constructive, preventative approach to the subject.
Some causes are common to both forms, one of which is discrimination. For example, pre-
vention of discrimination would remove religious intolerance, described by a U.N. Sub-Com-
mission study as "one of the decisive causes of genocide." The Genocide Study, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub. 2/416, cited in WARWICK McKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 121 (1983).
128. N. ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTIONs, as quoted in Dinstein, supra note 117,
at 105.
129. Some of the international discussion of post-second Gulf War Kurdistan was in
terms of refugees rather than forced transfer. See, e.g., Security Council Resolution 688,
supra note 5.
130. Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention Through the Advisory
Opinion Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. No. 8/9, 297
(1991).
131. Id. at 297-98.
132. Akhavan states that "given its status as a 'crime against humanity,' an inference
that genocide exists would definitely put into question the proposition that the matter is
one 'essentially within the jurisdiction' of Iraq." Id. at 298. See also Leslie Gelb, The




transfer, "such as the indigenous tribes wiped out by colonizing set-
tlers."' 3 Settlements would be a possible cause of genocide. One need
think no further than the Indonesian presence in East Timor.
In summary about genocide: governmental participation in popula-
tion transfer might take the form of force, as in the case of some remov-
als. Or it might take the form of encouragement or sponsorship, as in the
example of some settlements. Although containing less obvious intent, the
latter involvement needs to be examined even further through concerted
case study for the extent to which it may raise the results on those af-
fected by the movement to the level of genocide. Like voluntariness or
consent, and freedom of movement arguments, legal reasoning regarding
genocide is more obvious to cases of removal, but may apply also to set-
tlements. Relatively blind to issues of the permeability of frontiers, while
not requiring a state of belligerency, the concept of genocide is crucial to
any broad concept of population transfer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law on genocide, like self-determination, refers to groups rather
than individuals. Any development of the consciousness of international
law towards collectiveness is important to a wholistic legal approach to-
wards uprooted people.134 Given the varying constraints along the lines of
belligerency and territorial definitions, as well as other differences be-
tween removals and settlements mentioned above, international law is
distant from treating removals and settlements as one category per se. A
broad treatment should be pursued, however, especially where the moti-
vations and effects of both types may be egregious. Some of what were
called variances or differences may be just noise, coming from the law on
population transfer being undeveloped and, thus, somewhat confusing.
The coherent legal study of population transfer will gain speed as the
realization grows that it is "inaccurate to use the passive voice to describe
much of the world's population flows.'
3
1
133. CHALK & JONASSOHN, supra note 62, at 28.
134. Should a wide concept of population transfer take hold, a legal regime that relies
on rights, especially those of groups, will avoid confusing legal categories. As shown by the
cumbersome distinction between pre-and post- Second Gulf War movements of Kurds, it
might be difficult to divide refugee flow as a more individual phenomenon from any accept-
able, broad definition of massive population transfer. Cf. Palley, supra note 30, at 3 n.2.
135. Weiner, supra note 6, at 7.
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The Polluter-Pays Principle has been accepted by the majority of in-
dustrialized nations as the mechanism for controlling global pollution.'
This principle charges the polluter, not society as a whole, for abating the
cost of pollution prevention and control.
2
Last spring, the Wall Street Journal published an article titled
GATT Report Says Trade Liberalization will Aid Global Environment
Protection.4 According to this report,6 further reduction of protectionist
measures in all likelihood will lead to "a substantial increase in global
environmental quality .. .even if no new environmental policies were
introduced."6
This paper examines the use of proposed GATT rules 7 as a means for
reducing global pollution to enhance overall environmental quality. In
other words, do the international rules for trade incorporate the Polluter-
Pays Principle to reduce environmental degradation? This article begins
by giving a general background of both the Polluter-Pays Principle and
GATT. A discussion of the role of the Polluter-Pays Principle in interna-
tional rules of trade follows. The article concludes with recommendations
for incorporating the Principle into GATT to achieve its claim that more
liberalized trade will lead to an overall increase in global environmental
quality.
* Assistant Professor, University of Houston - Downtown
1. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted this
Principle for achieving sustainable development without environmental harm. For a discus-
sion of the OECD and the Polluter-Pays Principle, see part II-A of this paper. For an in-
depth discussion of how nations have adopted this principle, see Ursula Kettlewell, The
Answer to Global Pollution? A Critical Examination of the Problems and Potential of the
Polluter-Pays Principle, 3 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 429 (1992).
2. Gregory Wetstone & Armin Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution: The Search
for an International Response, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 89, 96 (1984).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A12, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT]; see infra sec. II-B for a general discussion of GATT.
4. Bob Davis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1992, at A2, col. 3.
5. This report, titled Trade and the Environment is a study conducted by the Secreta-
riat of the Geneva-based GATT, [hereinafter The Study]; see 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
310 (1992).
6. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
7. Currently the eighth round of trade negotiations called the Uruguay Round is taking
place to further liberalize the international rules of trade. See infra. part III-B for a discus-
sion of the proposed provisions.
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II. THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE AND GATT - BACKGROUND
A. The Polluter-Pays Principle
The Polluter-Pays Principle was initially devised by economists to
maximize resource allocation.' Since then, most industrial nations have
recognized the value of the Principle as a pollution abatement device.9 In
1972, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)'0 endorsed the use of the Polluter-Pays Principle to further its
goals." The OECD defined the Principle as follows:
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention
and control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmen-
tal resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and in-
vestment is the so-called "Polluter-Pays-Principle." This Principle
means that the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the
above mentioned measures decided by public authorities to ensure
that the environment is in an acceptable state.'2 In other words, the
cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of goods and
services which cause pollution in production and or consumption.
Such measures should not be accomplished by subsidies that would
create significant distortions in international trade and investment.'
3
Therefore, the application of the Polluter-Pays Principle requires the in-
ternalization of all production costs including external costs, 4 "that is,
8. See STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EcONOMICS (Ingo Walter ed. 1976).
9. See Wetstone & Rosencranz, supra note 2, at 96.
10. The OECD was organized in 1960 to promote policies designed:
(1) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a
rising standard of living in member countries, while maintaining financial sta-
bility, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;
(2) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-mem-
ber countries in the process of economic development; and
(3) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-dis-
criminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.
The western industrialized nations, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and
Turkey are members of this organization and they produce the majority of
world trade. OECD, COMPENSATION FOR POLLUTION DAMAGE, inside front cover
(1981).
11. Id.
12. Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD Doc. ENV (73)
32 (Final) of January 21, 1974, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 238, 239 (1975) [hereinafter Note on
the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle]. The OECD defines an acceptable state
as that state decided by the public authorities which "implies that through a collective
choice and with respect to the limited information available, the advantage of a further
reduction in the residual social damage involved is considered as being smaller than the
social cost of further prevention and control." In other words, the "acceptable state" is de-
fined by a government as the level of pollution tolerated as acceptable.
13. OECD, Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Envi-
ronmental Policies, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1172 (1972) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Guid-
ing Principles].
14. Jean Philippe Barde, National and International Policy alternatives for Environ-
mental Control and Their Economic Implications, in Studies In International Environmen-
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damage caused by pollution."' 5
However, the OECD recognized that in order for the Principle to
work, it must be uniformly applied by all nations. This, in the opinion of
the OECD, can only be accomplished "through the adoption of a common
basis for Member countries' environmental policies."' 6 But, recognizing
that such harmonization of policies and standards does not exist, the
OECD encouraged its members to strive toward this goal in order "to
avoid the unjustified disruption of international trade patterns and of the
international allocation of resources which may arise from diversity of na-
tional environmental standards.'
7
The OECD recommended the implementation of the Polluter-Pays
Principle through a variety of means such as direct or indirect regulation,
taxes, permits, product and process standards, and pollution charges.' 8
The OECD also recommended the use of economic instruments to add
"more flexibility, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the design and en-
forcement of pollution control measures' 9 to aid in a more consistent
application of the Polluter-Pays Principle.
2 0
In summary, the Polluter-Pays Principle as been advanced as the
means to abate and control pollution. In other words, if polluters bear the
cost of pollution prevention and control, market failure and distortions of
trade will be avoided, while at the same time national environmental
goals will be realized.
2'
tal Economics 138 (Ingo Walter ed. 1976). External costs, or externalities, refer to costs
associated with the use of a resource that is not reflected in the product price. For example,
discharging production waste into a river is an external cost because clean-up of the pollu-
tion in the river caused by the waste is not borne by the producer but by future users. This
constitutes improper cost allocation which will result in overproduction resulting in a misal-
location of resources and - in the opinion of many economists - ultimately will lead to "mar-
ket failure." See ORRIS C. HERFINDAHL & ALLEN V. KNEESE, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT;
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO SOME PROBLEMS IN USING LAND, WATER, AND AIR 7 (1965). It is
the opinion of these economists that if such "market failure" is not corrected, it will lead to
all types of pollution.
15. Pollution is defined by economists as a misallocation of resources due to improper
product pricing. See Kenneth R. Reed, Economic Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Ap-
plying Theory to Practice, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 513-14 (1970).
16. Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays-Principle, OECD
Doc. C (74) 223 (1974), reprinted in INT'L PROTECTION ENV'T 313 (1975).
17. Guiding Principles, supra note 13, at 1173.
18. Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, supra note 12, at 239.
19. OECD Council Regulation on the Use of Economic Instruments in Environmental
Policy, adopted Jan. 31, 1991, reprinted in 14(2) INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) No. 5, sec. 2, at
23 (1991).
20. Id. Examples.of such economic instruments are, amongst others, emission charges
or taxes, marketable permits, deposit-refund systems, and some forms of financial assistance
consistent with the Principle.
21. See Kettlewell, supra note 1, for an in-depth analysis of the Polluter-Pays Principle
and problems associated with its implementation.
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B. GATT
1. Creation of GATT
Unlike the Polluter-Pays Principle, the international rules of trade
were not developed to maximize resource allocation and avoid distortions
in trade. Instead, these rules were advanced to maximize the free flow of
trade in order to increase the general economic standard of living of the
global community.
In 1946, the leaders of the world community determined an interna-
tional trade organization was needed to oversee international trade and
prevent the reoccurrence of conditions,2 which, in their opinion, were
partially responsible for the Second World War.2" The Economic and So-
cial Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations met to draft a charter for
an international trade organization (ITO).2 4 This charter consisted of
three parts, the first dealing with the ITO, and the other two parts with
the multilateral trade agreements for tariff reductions. However, the U.S.
Congress failed to approve the Charter, and as a result the ITO never
came into existence.2" The multilateral trade agreements (part 2 and 3 of
the Charter), on the other hand, were adopted under separate trade au-
thority26 and became known as GATT.2 7
The goals and objectives of these agreements were enunciated in its
Preamble:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic en-
deavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the re-
sources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of
goods, . . ."
In order to accomplish these goals of economic prosperity and growth, the
22. John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institutions, 18
BROOKLYN J. OF INT'L L. 11, 16 (1992).
23. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 31 (1990)[hereinafter THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]. Protectionist
measures such as quota-type restrictions adopted by the United States and other industrial-
ized nations prevented the free flow of international trade.
24. 1 UN ESCOR Res. 13, U.N. DOC. E/22 (1946).
25. THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 23, at 34.
26. The President of the United States was delegated statutory authority to negotiate
multilateral tariff reduction agreements. An Act to Extend the Authority of the President
Under sec. 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and for Other Purposes, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 59
Stat. 410, (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. secs. 1351-1366 (1945).
27. GATT, supra note 3. Twenty-four nations initially signed these agreements in 1947.
GATT was adopted in the U.S. through the Protocol of Provisional Application PPA. See
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 23, at 35.
28. GATT, supra note 3, Preamble, 55 U.N.T.S. at 194. reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 21 (John H. Barton & Bart S. Fisher eds.
1986) [hereinafter TRADE AND INVESTMENT].
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parties agreed to enter into "reciprocal and mutually advantageous ar-
rangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other bar-
riers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in inter-
national commerce. 2 0 These arrangements became by far the most
important multilateral agreements governing international trade.3"
2. Organization of GATT
GATT is not considered a self-executing treaty,3" and all multilateral
decisions are made by the CONTRACTING PARTIES3 2 in accordance with the
provisions of Article XXV. However, even though GATT was conceived
as an agreement, not an organization, over the years it has taken on the
characteristics of both.3
The CONTRACTING PARTIES are still the source of the primary deci-
sions made by GATT. Each contracting party is a member of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES which meet once a year. Decisions are normally made
by consensus, even though each contracting party has one vote. 4 How-
ever, since 1960 the majority of the work of the Contracting Parties has
been carried out by the GATT Council. 5 It meets monthly and oversees
all the work of the various GATT working parties, committees and
panels.
3. GATT Rules which Govern Trade
The work which is carried out by these various groups is governed by
the rules contained in the original agreements on tariffs and trade, and
subsequent rounds of trade negotiations.3 " These rules are based on two
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Patterson, International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solutions, 21
ENVTL. L. REP. (BNA) 10599 (Oct. 1991).
31. Georg M. Berrisch, The Establishment of New Law Through Subsequent Practice
in GATT, 16 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497, 500 (1991). However, the author states that
two recent judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Community, which first
declared GATT not to be a treaty, indicated a change in its position.
32. CONTRACTING PARTIES refers to actions taken by the contracting parties jointly and
not by a governing body like the ITO which was never created. See GATT, supra note 3,
art. XXV. 55 U.N.T.S. at 272.
33. Youri Devuyst, GATT Customs Union Provisions and the Uruguay Round: The
European Community Experience, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 15, 16 (Feb. 1992).
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id. Council membership consists of those contracting parties who wish to partici-
pate. The Council was created in the 16th Session of GATT (1960) GATT Doc. SR. 16/11,
at 160 (1960).
36. Seven negotiating rounds have been successfully completed, with the eighth round
currently in progress. See Jackson, supra note 22, at 11. Each round generally lasts four
years, except for the last two rounds which have taken longer. The Tokyo Round lasted five
years, and the Uruguay Round has been in progress since 1986. See Judith H. Bello & Alan
F. Holmer, Recent Developments -U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 19: The Uruguay
Round: Where Are We? 25 INr'L LAW. 723, 724 (1991). GATT is primarily used as a forum
for trade negotiations. Over 100 nations are now members and over 200 separate multilat-
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primary principles, (1) non-discrimination (MFN)3 7 and (2) trade barrier
reductions,3 8 to further the goals and objectives of GATT. Therefore, by
extending like treatment to like products of trading partners and prohib-
iting import surcharges for the protection of domestic industry, 9 trade is
liberalized to the extent of negotiated tariffs.
In addition to these tariff concessions, GATT also tries to eliminate
or reduce non-tariff barriers, such as quantitative restrictions, 0 subsi-
dies,"' and dumping of domestic goods on foreign markets,42 in order to
promote fair trade. The Tokyo Round was most successful in accomplish-
ing some of these reductions."'
However, GATT grants a number of exemptions from its provisions
to permit a contracting party to protect superior national interests. 4
GATT also provides a waiver procedure where any contracting party can
be excused from a GATT obligation if two-thirds of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES approve. 45 The question is whether the provisions as a whole or
the exemptions advance the goal of the Polluter-Pays Principle - to re-
duce global pollution?
III. THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE AND GATT - INTERPRETATION
Environmental protection was not an issue when GATT came into
eral agreements make up the GATT legal system. See Hauser, Proposal for a Multilateral
Agreement on Free Market Access (Mafma), 25 J. WORLD TRADE 76, 79 (Oct. 1991).
37. GATT, supra note 3, art. I, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196. General Most-Favoured-nation
Treatment (MFN). This provision requires non-discriminatory treatment of all GATT con-
tracting parties regarding the importation and exportation of all goods and transfer of pay-
ments. For example, this would prohibit one nation from giving preferential treatment to
one or more of its GATT trading partners without extending that same treatment to all
other GATT members.
38. GATT, supra note 3, art. II, § 4, 55 U.N.T.S. at 200. This article extends domestic
protection of domestic products to imported foreign goods through negotiated tariffs. It re-
quires that "[no contracting party shall alter its method of determining dutiable value or of
converting currencies so as to impair the value of any of the concessions provided for in the
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement."
39. Jackson, supra note 22, at 40.
40. GATT, supra note 3, art. XI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224.
41. GATT, supra note 3, art. XVI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 250.
42. GATT, supra note 3, art. VI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 212.
43. The Tokyo Round was opened in September, 1973 at a meeting of the Ministers in
Tokyo. The meeting was open to GATT members and non-GATT members. 102-countries
participated in the negotiations. The Tokyo Round lasted more than five years with many
delays resulting from economic uncertainty, political conditions, and legislative processes.
The Round was opened for signature on April 12, 1979. See TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra
note 28, at 152. During this round not only traditional tariff reductions were negotiated, but
codes "on the use of subsidies and countervailing measures, antidumping standards, and
government procurement" were adopted. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 724.
44. GATT, supra note 3, 55 U.N.T.S. art. XII at 228, art. XVIII-B, at 252. Article XII
and XVIII-B provide for economic exceptions to safeguard its balance of payments; Article
XIX permits a protection against import surges; Article XX permits a nation to uphold its
public policies; and Article XXI permits an exception for essential security interests.
45. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXV, 55 U.N.T.S. at 272.
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being. Rules for trade liberalization were drafted without considering
their environmental effects. It was not until the early seventies that the
global community became interested in environmental issues. The Decla-
ration on the Human Environment" was adopted at the U.N. Conference
on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972. It enun-
ciated the principle of state responsibility 7 and liability' s for extraterrito-
rial environmental harm.
These principles were interpreted by the OECD to mean that each
State has a general obligation of diligence to protect the environment.' 9
Therefore:
A State must constantly have available adequate legal and physical
means for ensuring normal compliance with its international obliga-
tions [and] . .. it must equip itself, notably where protection of the
environment is concerned, with the laws and administrative regula-
tions, in both the civil and criminal fields, necessary to achieve this
end. 0
Since the Declaration on the Human Environment, many nations, in-
cluding the U.S., have adopted a variety of environmental regulations to
carry out the mandate of the Declaration."' Environmental awareness
continues to grow, and with such serious threats as global warming and
ozone depletion constantly in the public eye, it is no longer possible to
negotiate liberalized trade agreements without considering their environ-
mental effects.
A. Interpretation and Implementation of GATT Rules
Over the past 45 years many trade disputes have been negotiated.
However, only recently have they involved environmental claims. These
disputes generally involve Article XX exemptions which permit nations
to pursue their own domestic policies relating to safety, health, and the
46. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, at 7, U.N. Doc.A/Conf. 48/14
(1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). This Declaration was the product of the U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment which convened in Stockholm, Sweden in June,
1972.
47. Id. at 1420, Principle 21.
48. Id. Principle 22.
49. Observations on the Concept of the International Responsibility of States in Rela-
tion to the Protection of the Environment, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION
380, 382 (1977) [hereinafter LEGAL ASPECTS]. For an in-depth discussion of state responsibil-
ity for environmental harm, see Kettlewell, supra note 1, at 437-445.
50. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 49, at 384.
51. For example, some of the environmental laws passed by the United States are:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7401 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 7612, Pub. L. No. 101-549
(1990); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C § 2601 (1976); and Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(1980).
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conservation of exhaustible natural resources.2 The outcome of two of
these disputes indicates that GATT not only fails to accept the Principle,
but also prevents its application if the result would restrict trade.
1. The Superfund Excise Tax Dispute
In 1988, GATT was given an opportunity to determine whether it
recognized the Polluter-Pays Principle in its interpretation of interna-
tional rules of trade. The dispute involved two excise taxes imposed by
the United States. 3 The first involved an 11.7 cents per barrel petroleum
tax on foreign oil, as opposed to the 8.2 cents domestic tax. The panel
had no difficulty in finding that this differential violated the national
treatment provision of Article 111(2) and the United States was asked to
reduce that tax. 4 The other excise tax imposed a tax on certain "down-
stream chemicals equivalent to the tax they would have borne had their
inputs been sold in the United States. ' 55 In this case, the panel had a
much more difficult time reaching its conclusion.
The EC and Canada objected to the tax arguing that the pollution
created in the production of these chemicals occurred in the producing
country, not the U.S. Therefore, they should not be taxed upon entry into
the U.S. They also argued that chemicals produced in the U.S., but ex-
ported, should not be exempt from the tax, since the pollution occurred
in the U.S. The EC pointed out that these, "tax adjustments departed
from the principles adopted by the OECD Council in 1972... In particu-
lar from the Polluter-Pays Principle which meant that the polluter should
bear the costs of measures decided by public authorities to ensure that
the environment was in an acceptable state."5 "
The EC further argued that the border adjustment was not necessary
52. GATT, supra note 3, art. XX (b) & (g), 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. Article XX more specif-
ically states that:
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of measures: (b) necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health; . . . (g) relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunc-
tion with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
53. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
United States Superfund Excise Taxes [adopted June 17, 1987], B.I.S.D., 34th Supp. (Ge-
neva: GATT, June 1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1596 (1988) [hereinafter Superfund Tax].
Disputes are normally resolved through panels. For an in depth discussion of GATT dispute
settlement procedures see Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and
Beyond, 18 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 32, 52-65 (1992), and Horlick, The US-Canada FTA and
GATT Disputes Settlement Procedures, 26 J. OF WORLD TRADE 5 (1992).
54. Superfund Tax, supra note 53, at 1597. This provision states in part that "[tihe
products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be subject directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other inter-
nal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products."
55. Id. at 1596.
56. Id. at 1607 (emphasis added).
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to offset any unfair advantage of the foreign producer, because, in accor-
dance with the Polluter-Pays Principle, the producer probably would
have paid pollution charges or taxes in the producing country. 57 There-
fore, the border adjustment actually places the foreign producer at a dis-
advantage because the producer must pay pollution charges twice. The
EC charged that "[wihat the United States was in fact doing under the
label of border tax adjustments was to ask foreign producers to help de-
fray the costs of cleaning up the environment for the United States
industries.
' '6 8
The United States, on the other hand, argued "that the Polluter-
Pays Principle had not been adopted by the Contracting Parties and it
was on the GATT provisions and not on OECD recommendations that
the Panel had to base its conclusion. ' '5 9 The United States, however,
noted that "[ejnvironmental policy principles related to trade could con-
ceivably be incorporated into the GATT legal system, but such a far-
reaching step required the cooperation of all contracting parties and
could be taken only after considerable study and discussion. '"60
The Panel, after considering all the arguments, recognized that
GATT disputes must be resolved "in light of relevant GATT provi-
sions,' 61 and held that GATT had not adopted the Polluter-Pays Princi-
ple. The panel did not examine the consistency of the revenue provisions
in the Superfund Act with the environmental objectives of that Act or
with the Polluter-Pays Principle. Instead, it found "that the tax on cer-
tain chemicals, being a tax directly imposed on products, was eligible for
border tax adjustment independent of the purpose it served."6' 2
2. The Tuna Import Restrictions Dispute
6
1
More recently, another GATT panel was given the opportunity to ex-
amine the effect of environmental regulations on trade. The United
States imposed an embargo on the importation of Mexican tuna because
it was harvested with the purse-seine method in the Eastern Tropical Pa-
cific Ocean (ETP) in violation of the United States Marine Mammal Pro-





61. Id. at 1614.
62. Id.
63. GATT: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Mexican Tuna Panel]. As of this date, the
panel report has not been adopted by the Council. Mexico and the United States are in the
process of working out the disagreement.
64. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972), as amended, notably by Pub. L. No. 100-
711, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988) and most recently by Pub. L. No. 101-627, 104 Stat. 4467 (1990)
codified in part at 16 U.S.C. 1361(f). The Act contains some specific requirements regarding
the taking of other marine mammals while harvesting yellowfin tuna in a specific region of
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with the United States failed, asked for the establishment of a GATT
panel to hear the dispute. A panel was established and approximately
twenty other nations reserved the right to be heard.65
Both parties and the intervenors presented extensive arguments.
Mexico primarily argued that the embargo violated Article XIII, quanti-
tative restrictions, and that none of the measures taken by the United
States were in compliance with GATT provisions. It asked that the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES recommend the United States bring its statutory re-
quirements under the MMPA "into conformity with its obligations under
the General Agreement.6
The United States, on the other hand, asked the Panel to make the
following findings:
(a) The measures imposed under the MMPA with respect to certain
domestic yellowfin tuna from Mexico were internal regulations affect-
ing the sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use of tuna and tuna products consistent with Article 111:4; and
(b) even if these measures are not consistent with Article III, they
were covered by the exceptions in Article XX(b) and XX(g);
7
and to reject Mexico's claim."
The Panel analyzed at length the exceptions under Article XX (b)
and (g) and noted:
"that Mexico had argued that the measures prohibiting imports of
certain yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products from Mexico im-
posed by the United States were quantitative restrictions on importa-
tion under Article XI, while the United States had argued that these
measures were internal regulations enforced at the time or point of
importation under Article 111:4 and the Note Ad Article III, namely
that the prohibition of imports of tuna and tuna products from Mex-
ico constituted an enforcement of the regulations of the MMPA relat-
ing to the harvesting of domestic tuna."6
The Panel examined Article 111:4, concluding that it "refers solely to
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, etc. of
products... that are of the same nature as those applied to the domestic
the Pacific Ocean called the ETP. They discovered that in that particular area, yellowfin
tuna will always be in the same area with dolphins. As a result, if the purse-seine nets are
used for harvesting tuna, dolphins will also be killed. To conserve dolphins, the MMPA sets
standards for the taking of yellowfin tuna and dolphins, and permits an embargo on im-
ported tuna taken in violation of these standards.
65. The nations that wanted to be heard were Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, the European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Nica-
ragua, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia and
Venezuela. See Mexican Tuna Panel, supra note 63, at 1598.
66. Id. at 1601.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1617.
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products. '"7 The Panel then noted that the MMPA applies to the har-
vesting of tuna in order to avoid the killing of dolphins, and as such does
not directly regulate the tuna as a product. Therefore, the Panel con-
cluded that the -provisions of the MMPA relating to the harvesting of
tuna are not covered by the Note Ad Article III, and thus violate GATT.
The Panel then examined the Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions. First
it found the measures under the MMPA did not meet the test of "neces-
sary" under Article XX(b), and that the measures taken under Article
XX(g) cannot be applied extraterritorially.
71
In its concluding comments, the Panel noted that GATT places few
restrictions on the enforcement of domestic environmental regulations as
long as they do not discriminate against like imported products. But, "a
contracting party may not restrict imports of a product merely because it
originates in a country with environmental policies different from its
own." 72 The panel noted that if such exceptions should be allowed under
Article XX(b) and (g), GATT should be amended or a waiver should be
granted. It recommended that "the CONTRACTING PARTIES request the
United States to bring the above measure into conformity with its obliga-
tions under the General Agreement.
'73
In summary, these two panel decisions show that GATT interpreta-
tions, so far, do not consider the Polluter-Pays Principle in their analysis
and outcome. The Superfund Tax panel clearly acknowledged that the
Polluter-Pays Principle has not been adopted by GATT. The Mexican
Tuna panel decision, however, implies that even if the Principle were rec-
ognized, it could not be applied if it resulted in restrictions on interna-
tional trade. In other words, the United States cannot prohibit the impor-
tation of products which have been produced without the benefit of
environmental regulation nor can it add a surcharge on such goods to
equalize production costs, 74 a prerequisite for a successful application of
the Polluter-Pays Principle.
B. The Uruguay Round and the Polluter-Pays Principle
These panel decisions reflect GATT rules currently in force. How-
ever, since the Mexican Tuna decision became public, much discussion
has taken place regarding the interaction of environmental issues and
trade. The attention is now focused on the Uruguay Round which is in its
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1620-21.
72. Id. at 1622. As one author noted, the difference between product and production
can by "analyzed as a conflict-of-laws rule intended to allocate jurisdiction between the
United States and Mexico. Mexico is accorded exclusive jurisdiction over domestic produc-
tion processes, while the United States is accorded jurisdiction over products physically
brought to the United States." See Trachtman, GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 142, 150-51 (1992).
73. Mexican Tuna Panel, supra note 63, at 1623.
74. See discussion infra parts III-B(3) and IV.
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last stretch of negotiations. This Round started in 1986," with a pro-
jected completion date of 1990. However, due to major differences in agri-
cultural reforms in the areas of export subsidies, internal supports, and
market access, the negotiations have stalled numerous times and have yet
to be completed."'
On December 20, 1991, GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel re-
leased, with the intent to move negotiations along, a very lengthy docu-
ment called the Uruguay Round Final Act." The text was originally la-
beled "take it or leave it," with an opportunity for comments by member
negotiating nations.7 However, since the release of this document, much
criticism has been launched against many of its provisions. For example,
a key U.S. labor advisory committee urged the United States to reject the
draft because, in the committee's opinion, it would lead to higher unem-
ployment, "undermine U.S. environmental regulations, limit the ability of
U.S. lawmakers to promote economic growth, and place U.S. industry and
workers at a competitive disadvantage." '79 Environmentalists, in particu-
lar, are concerned if the provisions are adopted "as is," since environmen-
tal laws will have to be rewritten to meet the lowest common
denominator. s
1. Environmentalist's Look at Final Act Provisions
The environmental implications of various provisions in the Final
Act have been analyzed by various groups. One such analysis was pre-
pared by Lori Wallach, an environmental attorney for a health, consumer,
and environmental advocate group called Public Citizen in Washington
D.C."' She argues that two major sections of the Final Act - Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards (SPS)8 2 and Technical Barriers to Trade
75. Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 724-25. One of the main U.S. objectives for this
Round was to include services under the GATT umbrella. Two negotiating groups were
formed. One was charged with negotiating an agreement on services to be included in
GATT, since at the present time GATT provisions only cover goods. The second group
handled the more traditional negotiating topics such as agricultural subsidies, tariff reduc-
tions, and the dispute settlement process.
76. Id. at 726.
77. The Dunkel document is G.A.T.T. Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, (Dec. 20, 1991) [herein-
after Final Act].
78. Uruguay Round Talks to Last Until Spring as U.S., EC Voice Reservations on
Draft, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No.3 at 98 (Jan. 15, 1992). 108 nations are participating in
these negotiations, and they were to report their comments by January 13, 1992.
79. Key Labor Advisory Group Urges U.S. to Reject Dunkel's Draft GATT Agreement,
9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 5 at 191 (Jan. 29, 1992). These comments were made in a
letter to U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills.
80. Wallach, Analysis of the "Final Act", PUBLIC CITIZEN (Dec. 26, 1991).
81. Id. This group was started by consumer advocate, Ralph Nader.
82. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 45, Annex A, 1. These standards are defined as any
measure applied:
- to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the con-
tracting party from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of
pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms:
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(TBT),8S will have a negative effect on our environmental, health and
consumer regulations because these provisions "promote downwards har-
monization and mandate affirmative preemption." ' I
More specifically, the SPS measures fall under GATT Article XX ex-
ceptions which can only be applied to safeguard human, animal, and
plant life from specific risks within the territory of the contracting
party.8 5 The measures include "laws, regulations, requirements and proce-
dures" including "end product criteria, processing and production meth-
ods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures ... statisti-
cal methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and
packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety."88
These measures cannot be more restrictive than the international
standards accepted by GATT8 7 , which, in the opinion of some environ-
mentalists, promotes "harmonization downward of national standards
that are higher than international standards."'  As pointed out by Ms.
- to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the con-
tracting party from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or dis-
ease-causing organisms, in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
- to protect human life or health within the territory of the contracting party
from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof
or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or
- to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the contracting party
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.
Id. (emphasis added).
83. Final Act, supra note 77 at G. 20, Annex 1, 1. A technical regulation is defined as
a "document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and produc-
tion methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is
mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging,
marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production
method."
A technical standard is defined as a
document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and re-
peated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also
include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production
method.
Id. pars. 2 (emphasis added).
"For the purpose of this Agreement standards are defined as voluntary and technical
regulations as mandatory documents." Id. para. 2, Explanatory Note.
84. Wallach, supra note 80, at 2.
85. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 36, V 1 and L. 45, Annex A, 1. See Final Act, supra
note 82 for the definition of SPS which cites examples of specific risks.
86. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 45, Annex A, 1 1.
87. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 46, Annex 1, 3. The standards for food safety are
established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission; standards for animal health and zoo-
noses are developed by the International Office of Epizootics; standards for plant health are
developed by the International Plant Protection Convention in co-operation with regional
organizations; and for other areas standards developed by other relevant international
organizations.
88. Wallach, supra note 80, at 14-15.
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Wallach, many United States standards relating to food, pesticides, addi-
tives, and contaminants are more restrictive than these international
standards. Therefore, these restrictive standards would constitute an un-
fair trade barrier under the Final Act."
Furthermore, SPS measures are to be applied "only to the extent
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, are based on
scientific principles and are not maintained against available scientific ev-
idence." 90 This provision shifts the burden of proof to the contracting
party with the more restrictive law to justify its standard, rather than
placing the burden upon the contracting party challenging that law.
Technical standards must also comply with GATT acceptable inter-
national standards, 91 unless they fit a very narrow exception.92 These in-
ternational standards "shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an un-
necessary obstacle to international trade." ' If there are no international
standards, then "technical regulations shall not be more trade restrictive
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks
non-fulfillment would create." ' But most important, "technical regula-
tions shall not be maintained if the circumstances or objectives giving rise
to their adoption no longer exist or if the changed circumstances or objec-
tives can be addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner."95
Therefore, if a nation's existing laws are stricter than acceptable
GATT standards, the Final Act mandates regulatory compliance. If a
89. Id. at 12-14.
90. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 36, 1 6.
91. Final Act, supra note 77, at G. 3, art. 2, % 2.4. The provision specifically states that
"where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their
completion is imminent, Parties shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for
their technical regulations .... (emphasis added).
92. Id. It states as follows: "except when such international standards or relevant parts
would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objec-
tives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or funda-
mental technological problems."
93. Final Act, supra note 77, at G. 3, art. 2 1 2.5.
94. Final Act, supra note 77, at G. 3, art. 2, T 2.2. Legitimate objectives are defined in
this paragraph as: "national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices;
protection of human health and safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In
assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia, available scientific
and technical information, related processing technology or intended end uses of products."
95. Final Act, supra note 77, at G. 3, art. 2, T 2.3. (emphasis added).
96. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 43, V 45. This provision states in pertinent part:
Contracting parties shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to
them to ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories, as well
as regional bodies in which relevant entities within their territories are mem-
bers, comply with the relevant provisions of this decision .... Contracting par-
ties shall ensure that they rely on the services of non-governmental entities for
implementing sanitary or phytosanitary measures only if these entities comply
with the provisions of this decision.
Id.
Final Act, G.5, art. 3, 1 3.5 contains the same provision regarding technical regulations.
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nation were to refuse and its standards were to be challenged, a GATT
panel could declare the national law incorporating those standards "to be
an unnecessary obstacle to trade."97
In summary, the provisions of the Final Act have carved out very
narrow exceptions for Article XX. If an environmental law is more re-
strictive than the GATT accepted international standard, it will be ex-
tremely difficult for a nation to meet the requirements of "the extent nec-
essary to protect . . ." and "against available scientific evidence." As a
result, the nation must either harmonize "downward" its environmental
regulations or be in violation of GATT.
2. GATT's Look at Environment and Trade
GATT, in an attempt to address some of these concerns, published a
study98 conducted by the secretariat dealing with the interaction of trade
and the environment. The Study does not directly address the proposed
provisions in the Final Act, but instead deals with policy issues in gen-
eral. The Study points out that GATT provisions do not prevent nations
from pursuing their own environmental policies, since GATT provides ex-
emptions from its obligations if the international standards "are inappro-
priate for the Parties concerned, for inter alia such reasons as ... protec-
tion for human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the
environment; fundamental climatic or other geographical factors . . .99
But, these exemptions, as pointed out in The Study, are narrowly
construed in order to prevent contracting parties from imposing "unwar-
ranted, trade-inhibiting restrictions.' '100 It argues strongly against the use
of "trade policies to influence environmental measures in other coun-
tries."' 0 ' As noted in The Study,
[w]hen the environmental problem is due to production or consump-
tion activities in another country, the GATT rules are more of a con-
straint, since they prohibit making market access dependent on
changes in the domestic policies or practices of the exporting country.
The rational for this is that to do otherwise would invite a flood of
import restrictions as countries (especially those with large markets)
either attempted to impose their own domestic environmental, eco-
"Parties are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of all provisions of
Article 2. Parties shall formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in sup-
port of the observance of the provisions of Article 2 by other than central government bod-
ies." Id.
97. Wallach, supra note 80, at 22.
98. This report, titled Trade and the Environment is a study conducted by the secre-
tariat of the GATT. 9 INT'L TRADE REP. No. 8 at (BNA) 310 (1992) [hereinafter The Study].
This study was released after the Final Act was presented to the negotiating countries. But
even though there are no direct references to sections within the Final Act, one can only
assume that the arguments were made keeping in mind the provisions of the Act.
99. Id. at 8. Article XX(b) and (g) are considered the environmental exceptions.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Id. at 1.
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nomic and social policies on other countries, or used such an attempt
as a pretext for reducing competition from imports.10
The Study recognizes that different environmental standards have
industry concerned about its competitiveness. The fear is that lower stan-
dards abroad will lead to "ecological dumping.""1 ' According to The
Study, if countries engage in unilateral actions to "offset the competitive-
ness effects of different environmental standards, or . . . [to] attempt to
force other countries to adopt domestically-favoured practices and poli-
cies, the trading system would start down a very slippery slope."104
Instead of imposing unilateral trade restrictions to enforce environ-
mental policies,'10 5 The Study urges multilateral environmental agree-
ments to resolve environmental policy issues. Should such agreements be
impossible, then the parties should seek an amendment to GATT or ob-
tain a GATT waiver. 10 6 After all, the purpose of GATT is to prevent dis-
crimination between domestic and foreign products in order to facilitate
trade, not to build protectionist walls to keep out trade.
Only in passing does The Study mention how liberalized trade will
improve overall environmental quality. The argument is made that a re-
duction in agricultural subsidies will shift agricultural production to less
developed nations which are inclined to use less chemical fertilizers and
pesticides. Based on this assumption, The Study concludes that:
Liberalizing protectionist agricultural policies in the high income
countries is therefore likely to (i) cause the world's food to be pro-
duced with fewer chemicals, which in turn would reduce chemical resi-
dues in food in the natural environment; and (ii) have at most a very
modest impact on the rate of deforestation. It would also increase the
availability of land for recreational and aesthetic uses - including the
replanting of forests - in several high income countries as marginal
farm land was taken out of production. Thus, in all likelihood there
would be a substantial increase in global environmental quality fol-
lowing agricultural trade liberalization, even if no new environmental
102. Id. at 5.
103. Ecological dumping occurs when goods are produced without the benefit of suffi-
cient environmental controls. The producer will be able to externalize some of his produc-
tion costs which results in cheaper goods. These goods, if exported to a more environmen-
tally restrictive environment, will be considered "dumped." For a more complete
explanation, see infra part IV.
104. The Study, supra note 98, at 5. However, the article does not explain what is
meant by "a very slippery slope."
105. The Mexican Tuna decision is an example. The MMPA contains a United States
environmental policy on harvesting tuna in the ETP region, and to make sure that other
nations comply with the U.S. policy, the Act permits an embargo against imported tuna
harvested contrary to the method permitted by statute. Mexico's tuna harvesting methods
did not comply, therefore the embargo was imposed.
106. In order to get a GATT waiver, the party needs the support of two-thirds of
GATT's membership - or, at the present time, 69 nations out of 103. The Study makes the
point that if an issue has wide support, then it should not be difficult to get a waiver. Id. at
6.
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policies were introduced .... 01
In summary, The Study supports the Mexican Tuna panel report by
denouncing unilateral actions to enforce environmental policies and goals.
It concludes by stating, "non-discriminatory domestic policies offer the
most efficient approach to dealing with nearly all environmental
problems. Interference with trade is seldom, if ever, the first-best way of
achieving a particular domestic environmental objective."' 0 8
C. The Conflict between GATT and the Polluter-Pays Principle
A successful application of the Polluter-Pays Principle relies in part
on harmonized environmental policies and standards. If harmonization is
lacking, then the imbalance created by one nation permitting externali-
ties in the production process can be offset by a countervailing duty.10 9
This practice would serve a dual purpose, (1) eliminate the competitive
advantage gained by the producer, and (2) encourage greater environmen-
tal harmonization.
This practice is, however, in direct conflict with GATT provisions. In
The Study, the author lists three ways in which competitiveness can be
regained. First, that the countries with lower environmental standards
harmonize up to the higher standards in the importing country. Second,
that the imports of foreign products, considered to be produced in "envi-
ronmentally dirty ways," be subjected to special duties designed to offset
the "unfair cost advantage" from the less strict standards." The final
suggestion provided that the domestic industries be given subsidies to
cover the added costs of meeting the higher standards. "1 '
The author is quick to point out that under GATT, only the first
option would be acceptable. The other two options would be in conflict
with existing GATT rules. A special duty imposed on an import from a
country with less stringent environmental laws would, first of all, violate
the Most Favored Nation Principle, and secondly, could only be imposed
after an extensive re-negotiation process."' A subsidy also violates
GATT, since subsidies in general are prohibited under rules of interna-
tional trade." 3 Furthermore, the provisions of the Final Act incorporated
the findings of the Mexican Tuna panel report, which prevent one nation
from imposing its domestic laws on other contracting parties. Therefore,
domestic laws which would prohibit the importation of goods produced in
an environmentally unsound manner (i.e. Mexican Tuna case) could not
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id. at 35.
109. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
110. The Study, supra note 98, at 17. As the author of The Study points out, this is not
a GATT acceptable method.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. GATT, supra note 3, art. XVI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 250. Article XVI provides an excep-
tion for subsidies on agricultural and other primary products.
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be enforced against contracting parties. As a result, the contracting party
would have a competitive advantage because of the lower product price.
These GATT practices will result in more, not less, pollution because
of the improper application of the Polluter-Pays Principle. Unless all pol-
luters internalize the externalities, there will be a misallocation of re-
sources, i.e. pollution, and distortion of trade. The success of the Polluter-
Pays Principle depends on proper product pricing, and until GATT
adopts the Principle as part of its international trade policy, its claim
that trade liberalization will improve environmental quality will fail.
IV. HARMONIZING GATT AND THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE
The conflict between trade and environment has been caused in part
by conflicting goals, promoting growth versus saving the environment.
The balance between economic growth and environmental enhancement
and protection was first addressed by the World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development 14 which called for "an historic transition to new
modes of environmentally sound or 'sustainable' development.""' This
concept of 'sustainable' development was defined by the Commission as
"meeting the needs and aspirations of the present and future generations
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
needs. It requires political reform, access to knowledge and resources, and
a more just and equitable distribution of wealth within and between
nations."'1 6
In 1990, the United States Environmental Protection Agency spon-
sored a workshop on sustainable development in preparation for a confer-
ence on the Action for A Common Future.' 7 The participants concluded
that all assets must be preserved for future generations, and that our
"current patterns of population and economic growth are not environ-
mentally sustainable in the long run."' 18 However, in order to achieve sus-
tainable development,
[flar-reaching changes in economic incentives are needed to ensure
that both consumers and producers face the full environmental conse-
quences of their daily choices. While information, education, and reg-
ulations are important, appropriate market signals are also necessary
to bring about widespread structural adjustment. The Polluter Pays
Principle underlies correct market signals."9
114. Strong, What Place Will the Environment Have in the Next Century - And At
What Price?, 2 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 208, 209 (1990).
115. Id. at 214.
116. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Global Change and Our Common Future, in GLOBAL
CHANGE AND OUR COMMON FUTURE 10, 12 (Ruth S. Defries & Thomas F. Malone eds., 1989).
117. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNITED STATES WORKSHOP ON THE ECONOM-
ICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: REPORT TO THE 1990 BERGEN CONFERENCE (1990) [herein-
after SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT]. This conference, which was held in Bergen, Norway, in-
volved ECE members (Eastern and Western Europe, the United States, and Canada) only.
118. Id. at 3.
119. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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Some of the changes recommended by the participants to achieve
sustainable development include the following: 2 '
1. Revise national income accounting systems to reflect the actual cost of
conversion of natural resources.'21
2. Eliminate subsidies because they are "typically fiscally burdensome, ec-
onomically inefficient, and ecologically damaging.'
22
3. Shift the tax burden to activities that deplete natural resources and/or
cause environmental harm.
4. Focus public expenditures on preventing environmental harm.122
5. Use economic instruments 4 to facilitate rational pricing of resources
to shift the burden of paying for environmental protection to producers
and consumers, thus eliminating a subsidy.
1 25
The participants recognized that these changes not only involve na-
tional but also international changes in policy. They recommended the
elimination of quantitative restrictions, tariffs, agricultural protectionism,
and other trade barriers to avoid market distortions, and the harmoniza-
tion of environmental regulations to avoid anticompetitive effects.1 26 In
other words, they recognized that, "the Polluter-Pays Principle must be
uniformly implemented in order to achieve sustainable economic and en-
vironmental development in both developed and less-developed
nations."'2 7
The Study accepts the concept of sustainable development and rec-
ognizes that its implementation depends on at least two notions, 1) assign
"values or prices to natural resources, with a view to identifying and valu-
ing the environmental effects of economic activity,' 12' and 2) to preserve
all assets for future generations.'2 9 However, the author notes that
"neither aspect of sustainable development is intrinsically linked to inter-
120. Id. at 5-9.
121. For example, the OECD found that current energy prices do not accurately reflect
production costs because the "cost" of climatic change is not included in the price. As a
result, the OECD asked that all nations expand their accounting systems to "fully reflect
environmental and natural resource conditions and trends." Once the accounting systems
reflect the proper price for all resources, a more consistent application of the Polluter-Pays
Principle will be possible. See OECD Urges "Phased Approach" in Introducing Technology
to Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 14 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 190 (Apr. 10, 1991).
122. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 117, at 6.
123. This can be accomplished by creating and enforcing environmental laws.
124. These economic instruments "include fees levied on emissions and environmen-
tally damaging activities, marketable permit systems, deposit-refund systems, and non-com-
pliance charges linked to emissions standards." SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 117,
at 9.
125. The "subsidy" is created by having the government or society as a whole absorb
the cost of pollution abatement and control instead of the producer and consumer. Once the
product price reflects the full cost of production, the subsidy is gone.
126. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 117, at 16.
127. Kettlewell, supra note 1, at 460.
128. The Study, supra note 98, at 3.
129. Id.
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national trade. '1 3 0
The argument in The Study fails to see the link between sustainable
development and international trade. In order for producers and consum-
ers "to face the full environmental consequences of their daily choices," ''
correct market signals, i.e. proper pricing, must be in place. This can only
be accomplished through a uniform application of the Polluter-Pays Prin-
ciple.1 32 If product prices do not reflect all costs for pollution abatement
and control, then market signals will be incorrect, leading to overproduc-
tion, misallocation of resources, i.e. pollution, and distortions of trade.
Therefore, liberalized trade will only result in sustainable development,
ensuring increased economic growth without environmental degradation,
if GATT adopts the Polluter-Pays Principle. As pointed out by one au-
thor "whether liberalizing international trade is a means to support sus-
tainable development is dependent on the degree to which degradation of
the environment will be reflected in [world] prices." '
Incorporating the Polluter-Pays Principle into GATT provisions is
not a difficult task. GATT Article VI and the Dumping and Subsidy
Codes provide a mechanism for price adjustments, which could be used to
insure a more uniform application of the Polluter-Pays Principle. Article
VI and the International Dum Dumping Code of 1979"s' define dumping
as introducing a product, "into the commerce of another country at less
than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from
one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in
the exporting country."' 36 If such dumping causes or threatens to cause a
"material injury to an established domestic industry" ' then GATT per-
mits the country to impose a countervailing duty equal to the difference
in price.1 37 The rules for arriving at that difference are very complex, 38
but the Dumping Code provides flexibility to accommodate "differences
in conditions and terms of sale, for the differences in taxation, and for the
other differences affecting price comparability."' 39
These provisions could easily be applied to environmental dumping,
i.e. failing to include pollution abatement and control costs in the product
130. Id.
131. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 117, at 4.
132. Id.
133. Peter A.G. Van Bergeijk, International Trade and the Environmental Challenge,
25 J. WORLD TRADE 105, 109 (1991).
134. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade, GATT, 26th Supp. BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 171
(1980) [hereinafter Dumping Code]. This Code interprets the provisions of Article VI and
provides rules for their application.
135. Id. at Part I, art. 2.
136. GATT, supra note 3, art. VI(6), 55 U.N.T.S. at 212.
137. GATT, supra note 3, art. VI(3), 55 U.N.T.S. at 212.
138. Dumping Code, supra note 134, at 171.
139. Id.
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price. In computing the price difference for environmental dumping, the
export price should include:
(1) the value of the environmental resources used in the production,
(2) the cost of the damage caused to the environment by production
of the product, and (3) in cases in which the exporter faces less costly
environmental requirements, the cost that would have been incurred
had the exporter been required to meet environmental requirements
prevailing in the importing country. 4 '
If the importing country imposes an anti-dumping duty equal to the
amount "saved" by the exporter, the Polluter-Pays Principle will be more
uniformly applied, leading to sustainable development.
Others have viewed lack of environmental protection as "trade-dis-
torting because it operates as a 'subsidy.' "'4' Such an environmental sub-
sidy could easily be addressed under GATT Article VI and the Subsidies
Code. 142 These GATT provisions generally prohibit government subsidies
on exported products,'14 and Article VI permits the imposition of a coun-
tervailing duty to offset the "bounty or subsidy determined to have been
granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export"
of any merchandise which causes or threatens "material injury to an es-
tablished domestic industry. ' 14 4 Therefore, the counterveiling duty as-
sessed by the importing country would compensate for any financial gains
resulting from the government subsidy. 4" This practice would offset the
failure of nations to internalize environmental costs, and would lead to a
more uniform application of the Polluter-Pays Principle and sustainable
development.
However, these tariff barriers to imports are not the only methods
140. Elize Patterson, International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solu-
tions, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. ( ENVT'L L. INST.) 10599, 10601-02 (Oct. 1991).
141. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 48-49 (Sey-
mour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham, eds., 1982). As pointed out by another author, "[t]he
environmental burden that is carried by American workers and business is manifest in every
single product that we produce." Ebba Dohlman, The Trade Effects of Environmental Reg-
ulation, OECD OBSERVER 28-29 (Feb.-Mar. 1990).
142. AGREEMENT ON INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLES VI, XVI, AND XXIII
OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE OF 1979, GATT, 26th Supp. BASIC IN-
STRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 56 (1980).
143. GATT, supra note 3, art. XVI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 250. However, subsidies on agricul-
tural and other primary products are exempt.
144. GATT, supra note 3, art. VI(3), 55 U.N.T.S. at 212.
145. The United States has introduced a law titled, "International Pollution Deterrence
Act of 1991" which would impose a countervailing duty on goods produced under less strin-
gent standards. The duty will equal the amount of money saved by reduced environmental
compliance. S. 984, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). This bill is based on the assumptions that:
"1) American industry pays an enormous cost in compliance with strict environmental laws;
2) to the extent that foreign competitors operate in countries with more lax standards, they
are the beneficiaries of a 'significant and unfair subsidy'; and 3) American competitiveness
suffers as a result." See Kyle E. McSlarrow, International Trade and the Environment:
Building a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL L. INST.) 10589,
10592 (Oct. 1991).
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available under GATT to incorporate the Polluter-Pays Principle into
rules of international trade. Article XX exceptions could be expanded to
include environmental protection as a legitimate domestic goal. This
would permit the application of product and process standards to im-
ported goods, thus nullifying the effect of the Mexican Tuna panel re-
port. 46 This practice would subject domestic and foreign producers to the
same standards, a pre-requisite for the uniform application of the Pol-
luter-Pays Principle. Furthermore, this expansion of Article XX would
permit the implementation of international agreements which utilize
trade restrictions to accomplish their goals.1
4 7
In summary, the conflict between trade policies and environmental
protection can be reduced through the use of the Polluter-Pays Principle.
Proper product pricing will not only permit nations to reach their envi-
ronmental goals, but will also help them achieve sustainable development
without environmental harm.
V. CONCLUSION
To regard the Polluter-Pays Principle as the panacea to global pollu-
tion would be too simplistic. A uniform application of the Principle could
reduce global pollution. However, there are so many obstacles to its uni-
form application, that the Principle, at best, can have only some effect on
reducing global pollution. The degree of its effectiveness depends on the
accurate reflection of costs in the product price.
Harmonization of standards, enforcement, and liability for resulting
harm are all unresolved issues which affect the uniform application of the
Principle. GATT can play a unique role in providing a mechanism for
harmonization and enforcement of standards. One hundred eight nations
are currently negotiating the final provisions for the Uruguay Round. If
they carefully consider the role of the Polluter-Pays Principle in achiev-
ing sustainable development, and provide for its complete implementa-
tion, then trade liberalization will result in greater environmental quality
for all mankind.
146. For example, in the Mexican Tuna case, Mexican tuna producers benefitted by
harvesting tuna with less expensive methods. If such tuna is banned by the U.S. because of
more restrictive 'U.S. laws, then Mexico has to harvest its tuna using the same method as
American producers. This will provide a "level playing field" for the American producer by
equalizing production costs.
147. International agreements such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.
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Intellectual Property Protection Through
the Berne Convention: A Matter of
Economic Survival for the Post-Soviet New
Commonwealth of Independent States
BRAD SWENSON*
Only one thing is impossible to God, to find any sense in any copy-
right law on this planet.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright laws lie at the root of a nation's culture and intellectual
climate.2 By conferring rights on expressive forms of information, copy-
right laws protect authors in a broad range of literary, artistic, and scien-
tific works.' These protections induce authors to create and disseminate
the works which shape modern society.4 Without copyright protection,
authors have little incentive to pursue their time-consuming research and
development.5 Without copyright protection, society has little chance of
* 1992 Graduate of the University of Denver College of Law. Law clerk to the Chief
Justice Edward D. Robertson, Missouri Supreme Court.
1. SAMUEL CLEMENS, MARK TWAIN'S NOTEBOOK 381 (1935 ed.)
2. See Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of The United States in International Copyright
- Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L. J. 1050 (1968) [hereinafter Ringer].
3. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988), seeks "to stimulate [the
creation of useful works] for the general public good." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
4. See generally Gary M. Ropski & Michael J. Kline, A Primer on Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights: The Basics of Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, Trade Secrets, and Related
Rights, 50 ALB. L. REv. 405 (1986) (providing a complete overview of intellectual property
law).
5. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, reh'g denied, 465
U.S. 1112 (1984) (discussing how reward motivates the creative activity of authors and
"serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius") [hereinafter
Sony].
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benefiting from the innovative ideas of its creative minds.'
In this information-based world, intellectual property has become a
fundamental business asset in the global marketplace.7 Increasing com-
puter and database technologies have made access to copyrighted materi-
als effortless. The transfer of copyrighted works across national bounda-
ries is limited only by the capacity of modern communication systems.8
As a result, the international dimension of copyright law grows every day.
As developing nations become increasingly reliant on information-
based technology they also become increasingly vulnerable to the inade-
quacies of copyright protections abroad.9 Technological advancements
have made the reproduction and expropriation of copyrighted materials,
in most cases, simple. Because the free and protected flow of information
is imperative to global economies, a unified international copyright code
is of unequaled importance.'
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works1 has emerged as the premier international convention for the pro-
tection of intellectual property. By setting minimum standards for the
protection of copyrighted materials, 2 the Berne fosters cultural exchange,
economic advancement, and the development of indigenous creativity."
The Berne Convention provides a framework by which an international
exchange of copyrighted materials may confidently occur."
To a great extent, the effectiveness of the Berne's international stan-
dards are limited only by those nations who refuse to participate." With
6. Id. at 429.
7. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: To-
ward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 274 (1991) [hereinafter Leaffer]. See
generally EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1980) [hereinafter EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON].
8. See Ringer, supra note 2, at 1050.
9. Compare Leaffer, supra note 7, at 274 (discussing the United States increasing vul-
nerability as it moves to an information based economy).
10. See Note, Berne-ing the Soviet Copyright Codes: Will the U.S.S.R. Alter Its Copy-
right Laws to Comply with the Berne Convention? 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 395 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Berne-ing the Soviet Copyright Codes].
11. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
12 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 12) 173, Additional Act and Declaration of Paris, May 4,
1896, 24 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 12) 758, Berlin Revision, Nov. 13, 1908, 1 L.N.T.S.
217, Additional Protocol of Berne, Mar. 20, 1914, 1 L.N.T.S. 243, Rome Revision, June 2,
1928, 123 L.N.T.S. 233, Brussels Revision, June 26, 1948, 331 U.N.T.S 217, Stockholm Revi-
sion, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, Paris Revision, July 24, 1971, reprinted in 4 M. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, app. 27 (1978) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
12. Minimum standards are not imposed by the Union of member nations. Minimum
standards are imposed by each member state, through its own domestic laws. Berne Con-
vention, supra note 11, at art. 36.
13. See Ringer, supra note 2; Natalio Chediak, The Progressive Development of World
Copyright Law, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 797 (1948).
14. See Ringer, supra note 2.
15. See e.g., Roger Boyes, Warsaw Pirates Plunder West's Glitzy Goodies, THE TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1991, § Overseas News (discussing the smuggling of pirated materials from Poland
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the exception of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, all
major economic powers have acceded to the Convention."6
Recent changes in the Soviet Union have sparked questions regard-
ing the opening of vast new commercial markets. 17 The recent emergence
of the new Commonwealth of Independent States poses interesting
problems for the international community.' 8 It remains unclear whether
the Commonwealth States' fledgling market economies will follow the
copyright pirating traditions of its Soviet predecessor. 9 Faced with criti-
cal developmental needs, the new Commonwealth States may be forced to
rely on the immediate and tangible benefits piracy may afford.20
Attention of the global marketplace will soon focus on the protec-
tions the new Commonwealth of Independent States can ensure for the
world's copyrighted materials. Without strong protective assurances, the
States of the new Commonwealth will, undoubtedly, face limited access to
the western technology necessary to their transition to free-market
economies.
21
Part I of this Article examines the basic provisions and development
of Soviet copyright law. In particular, it examines the Soviet perspective
on international protection for copyrighted materials. Specific emphasis is
placed on the conditions surrounding Soviet accession to the Universal
Copyright Convention (U.C.C.).
Part II of this Article will focus on recent developments in Soviet
copyright law. Specifically, it examines the intent and actions taken by
the Soviet government to accede to the Berne Convention. This Article
also reflects upon recent political developments and the present status of
Soviet copyright law as followed by the new Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States.
Part III of this Article will discuss the new Commonwealth of Inde-
into the Soviet Union).
16. For a complete list of nations participating in the Berne Convention see UNESCO,
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Berne Copyright Union, item H-2 (1987-88
Supp.).
17. These markets take on special meaning since United States copyright industries
have grown more dependant on exports for their commercial success. See Eric J. Schwartz,
Recent Developments in the Copyright Regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
38 J. COPR. Soc'Y 123 (1991) [hereinafter Schwartz].
According to recent studies, copyright industries represent 5.8% of the United States'
gross national product. See Schwartz, supra, at 125 citing Stephen E. Siwek & Harold W.
Furchtgott-Roth, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy, p. vii (Nov. 1990). Mr. Siwek's
study was prepared for the International Intellectual Property Alliance.
18. See Michael McGuire, U.S.S.R is Dead, 3 Republics Say Russia, Ukraine, By-
elorussia form New Union Slavic Leaders Vow to Ban Nuclear Arms, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9,
1991, § News, at 1, zone C, [hereinafter U.S.S.R. is Dead].
19. See Leonard A. Radlauer, The U.S.S.R. Joins the Universal Copyright Convention,
23 J. COPR. Soc'Y, 1, 29 (1973) [hereinafter Radlauer]; see also, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1959,
§2, at 3, col. 1 (citing the U.S.S.R. as one of the world's foremost pirating entities).
20. See generally Leaffer, supra note 7, at 280.
21. Id.
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pendent States' necessary adherence to the Berne Convention. Particular
emphasis will be paid to the growing problem of international piracy and
the negative effects countries with weak copyright protections suffer. The
Article will conclude with a discussion of the benefits the new Common-
wealth of Independent States can derive from joining the Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
II. SOVIET COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Domestic Developments in Soviet Copyright Law
The first embodiment of Soviet copyright law was the 1925 "Bases of
Copyright Legislation."2 2 The Bases of Copyright Legislation established
the Soviet's first comprehensive intellectual property code.2" The Bases
designated the protection of intellectual works by territory and not na-
tionality.2" Consequently, works of Soviet authors published abroad re-
ceived no protection unless a treaty for reciprocal copyright protection
existed between the U.S.S.R. and the affected foreign government.
The 1925 Bases of Copyright Legislation were revised and re-issued
in 1928. This revision represented the state of Soviet copyright law for
over three decades.25 It was not until December 8, 1961 when Soviet intel-
lectual law was again substantially modified. On that date, the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. promulgated the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation
of the Soviet Union and the Union Republics.26 On May 1, 1962 the Fun-
damentals of Civil Legislation came into force.27 The 1961 Fundamentals,
for the first time, integrated copyright law into the Soviet civil code. 28
22. See Yuri Matveev, Copyright Protection in the U.S.S.R. - The Eleventh Annual
Jean Geiringer Memorial Lecture on International Copyright Law, 20 BULL. COPR. SOC'Y
219, 221 (1973) [hereinafter Matveev]. For an in-depth review of early Soviet copyright law
see ALOIS BOHMER, COPYRIGHT IN THE U.S.S.R. AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OR TERRITO-
RIES UNDER COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT, SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH DIGEST AND PREFACE
(1960).
23. MICHAEL A. NEWCITY, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION 20-21 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter NEwcITY].
24. Section 1 of the Copyright Act of 1925 states in pertinent part: "Copyright to a
work published on the territory of the U.S.S.R. . . . or extant there as a manuscript, sketch
or in any other material form, shall belong to the author or his successor in law, regardless
of their nationality."
U.S.S.R. Copyright Act of 1925, §1, as quoted in Radlauer, supra note 19, at 11.
25. See EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 121-22.
26. Decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, On Approval of the Fun-
damentals of Civil Legislation of the Soviet Union and the Union Republics, 50 Vedomosti
SSSR, item 525 (Dec. 8, 1961).
27. Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics, reprinted
in SOVIET CIVIL LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURE 102 (Y. Sdobnikov trans. 1964) [hereinafter
1961 Fundamentals].
28. Id. arts. 96-106.
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B. Basic Provisions of Soviet Copyright Law
The Soviet Constitution granted authority to protect copyrighted
materials in Article 47:
Citizens of the U.S.S.R., in accordance with the aims of building com-
munism, are guaranteed freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic
work. This freedom is ensured by broadening scientific research, en-
couraging invention and innovation, and developing literature and the
arts... The rights of authors, inventors and innovators are protected
by the state.2
Soviet copyright law was divided into two categories, personal and
property rights. The personal rights of a Soviet creator were comprised of
five essential entitlements: 0 (1) the right to be acknowledged as the au-
thor of the works; (2) the right to publish; (3) the right to reproduce and
distribute; (4) the right to have the work protected against improper al-
terations or adaptations by others; and (5) the right to royalties for its
use under the system of compensation provided by copyright law. Owner-
ship of a copyright vested with the creator of the work.3 1
Property rights, in the traditional sense, differ from Soviet use of the
term. Under Soviet copyright law, an author's right in his work is not the
equivalent of private property.32 Consequently, an author's right is not a
primary means of ensuring a fair return on his labors. Rather, the right is
created with the primary goal of enhancing education and cultural dis-
semination." Public interest, in most cases, is paramount to the rights of
the author.
34
One particularly problematic provision to the Soviet Union's partici-
pation in an international copyright union was the 1961 Fundamentals',
article 102:"5 "Any published work may be translated into another lan-
guage without consent of the author, but must be brought to his knowl-
edge to insure respect for the integrity and spirit of the work . . .,,"
The presence of several languages and dialects within the Soviet
29. Konst. SSSR, art. 47 (1977), reprinted in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES
OF THE WORLD, U.S.S.R., Item 1, (1987 Supp.).
30. See EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 122. See also
Harold J. Berman, Rights of Foreign Authors Under Soviet Law, 7 BULL. COPR. Soc'Y 67, 74
(1959) [hereinafter Berman].
31. 1961 Fundamentals, supra note 27, arts. 97-98.
32. See EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 123.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. For a full discussion of the motivations surrounding codification of the "freedom of
translation" see Serge L. Levitsky, The New Soviet Copyright Law, 9 BULL. COPR. SOC'v
295, 303-304 (1961-62); see also Hiller B. Zobel, Copyrights, Comrades, and Capitalists: An
Inquiry into the Legal Rights of Soviet and American Authors, 8 BULL. COPR. Soc'Y 210,
216-19 (1960-1961).
36. UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, U.S.S.R., (Supp. 1963);
see Radlauer, supra note 19, at 12.
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Union (approximately 89) demanded, as a matter of practicality, that a
translation provision exist. Since few Soviet citizens could read works in
foreign languages (even languages within their own country) foreign and
domestic authors were subjected to the deleterious effects of article 102
which deemed translations not to be an infringement of copyright."s
C. International Developments in Soviet Copyright Law
After the October Revolution of 1917, the newly formed Soviet Gov-
ernment retreated into international isolationism with regard to its intel-
lectual property attitudes.3 8 International agreements for the protection
of copyrighted materials were deemed capitalistic instruments used to ex-
ploit individual authors.3 9 As a result, the Soviet Government withdrew
from all international agreements protecting copyrighted materials cre-
ated during pre-soviet history."' This isolationistic attitude would per-
vade Soviet copyright and intellectual property law for the next 50 years.
In the early 1960's the Soviet Government began to experience a sen-
sitivity to the immense growth of Western technology. 1 The desire to
keep pace with the West slowly began to find its way into Soviet foreign
policy. Rather then engage in costly domestic development, however, the
Soviets decided to pursue licenses to Western technology.'3 It quickly be-
came evident, however, that Western nations would be reluctant to ex-
change new innovations without assurances of adequate intellectual prop-
erty protections.'
3
Pressure from the international community and their desire to main-
tain competitiveness with the West, precipitated the Soviet's adherence
to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in
1965." The Paris Convention provided the Soviets with the procedures to
secure licenses to Western technology. 5 Adherence to the Paris Conven-
37. 1925 Bases of Copyright Legislation, §4, as cited in Radlauer, supra note 19, at 11.
Between 1917-1960 approximately 1 billion copies of books protected by foreign copyright
were published in the U.S.S.R. Berman, supra note 30, at 80-81.
38. NEWCITY, supra note 23, at 17-31.
39. MARK MOSIEEVICH BOGUSLAVSKY, COPYRIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERATURE AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS 64 (1979) [hereinafter
BOGUSLAVSKY].
40. Id.; see also NEWCITY, supra note 23, at 1-16.
41. See NEWCITY, supra note 23, at 38-39.
42. Id.
43. See generally Leaffer, supra note 7, at 280.
44. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat.
1372, T.S. No. 379, as revised by Act of Brussels, Dec. 14, 1900, 32 Stat. 1936, T.S. No. 411;
Act of Washington, June 2, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645, T.S. No. 579; Act of the Hague, Nov. 6,
1925, 47 Stat. 1789, T.S. No. 834; Act of London, June 2, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748, T.S. No. 941;
Act of Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931; Act of Stockholm, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1629, T.I.A.S. 1583.
45. For a discussion regarding the protections afforded by the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, see Pierre Maugue, The International Protection of In-
dustrial Designs Under the International Conventions, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 395 (1989).
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tion marked the first time the Soviet Government had willingly joined an
international agreement for the protection of intellectual property.",
Two years following their accession to the Paris Convention, on No-
vember 17, 1967, the Soviets entered into a bilateral treaty with the Hun-
garian People's Republic." Coming into force on January 1, 1968, this
agreement provided for the reciprocal protection of copyrights between
the two nations."" Each -nation was required to afford citizens of the other
nation the same copyright protections it would afford to its own citizens.
The agreement protected only the rights of authors who are U.S.S.R. or
Hungary citizens and have their permanent residences in those
countries. 9
The Soviets continued to test the waters of international copyright
protections. On December 14, 1970 the Soviets signed an agreement with
Poland concerning cultural and scientific cooperation. The agreement
called for the two nations to work toward the establishment of a system
for the protection of copyrights. 1 The agreement, however, never reached
formal treaty status.
The tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations also reflected the slow change of
Soviet attitudes toward international copyright protections. Traveling
under a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cultural Exchange Agreement, a delegation of U.S.
book publishers52 visited the Soviet Union in September 196211 and again
in October 1970.5" The objectives of the visits were to study the Soviet
publishing system and to encourage the commercial exchange of literary,
artistic, and scientific publications. 5 Attempting to achieve the produc-
tive exchange of intellectual property between the nations, U.S. delegates
raised the issue of international copyright protections on several occa-
46. See NEWCITY, supra note 23, at 39.
47. U.S.S.R.-Hungarian Convention on the Reciprocal Protection of Copyright, 30 SP
SSSR, art. 213 (1967), reprinted in A CALENDAR OF SOVIET TREATIES 1958-1973, (Robert M.
Slusser & George Ginsburgs eds., 1981).
48. For a detailed discussion of the U.S.S.R.-Hungary copyright treaty see Vaksberg,
La protection des droits en Union Sovietique, 67 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTER
141, 167-75 (1971).
49. See NEWCITY, supra note 23, at 40.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The delegation included: Curtis G. Benjamin - Chairman of the Board of McGraw
Hill Book Company and representative of the American Book Publishers Council (ABPC) &
American Test Book Institute (ATPI); Kurt Enoch - President of the New American Li-
brary; Storer B. Hunt - Chairman of the Board W. W. Norton & the Reading Development
Committee for the ABPC; M. R. Robinson - President Scholastic Book Services & the
ATPI; W.B. Wiley - President of John Wiley, Inc. and Chairman of the Joint Committee
on International Trade of the ABPC and ATPI; Robert W. Frase - Director of the Joint
Washington Office of the ABPC and ATPI.
53. Martin B. Levin, Soviet International Copyright: Dream or Nightmare?, 31 J.
C OPR. Soc'y 127, 134 (1983) [hereinafter Levin].
54. Id.
55. REPORTS OF DELEGATIONS OF U.S. BOOK PUBLISHERS VISITING THE U.S.S.R. AUGUST
20 -SEPTEMBER 17, 1962, 65 (1977) [hereinafter BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE U.S.S.R.].
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sions. 6 A concerted effort was made to demonstrate the disadvantages of
the Soviet's isolationistic position as a non-signatory to either the U.C.C.
or the Berne Convention.
57
During their 1970 visit, the U.S. delegation again encountered an im-
passe on the issue of Soviet accession to an international copyright con-
vention. 5 Yet, developments in Soviet international copyright policy sent
a positive message that productive future negotiations on the issue were
possible.59 General Secretary Brezhnev's formal statement to the 24th
Party Congress in April 1971, however, made clear that any Soviet role in
the international copyright arena would develop at a careful, Soviet con-
trolled pace: "[W]orkers in literature and art are in one of the crucial
sectors of the ideological struggle. The Party and the people have not
tolerated, and will not tolerate, attempts - no matter what their origin
- to blunt our ideological weapons, to stain our banner."
60
In early 1972, Soviet international copyright policy continued its
56. See Levin, supra note 53, at 131.
57. Id. Some of the U.S. delegations arguments in favor of Soviet participation in an
international copyright convention were as follows:
(1) Soviet books, articles, music, opera, and plays are or would be popular
in the U.S. Because of high prices charged for books and other forms of en-
tertainment in the U.S., the royalty rate when applied to these high prices
would generate a large dollar income for the Soviet publisher. Consequently,
the balance of payments in hard currency would be in the Soviet's.
(2) The Soviet Union would not have to pay back royalties because the
UCC does not require retroactive royalty payments.
(3) Dissemination of Soviet works in the English language will reach more
markets than is presently available to Soviet authors.
(4) It is unfair to deny payment to authors for translation rights and pub-
lication in a foreign country.
(5) The U.S.S.R. is the only major power not a member of either the Berne
Convention or the UCC.
Some of the Soviet's responses to the U.S. Delegation's arguments were as follows:
(1) The outflow of currency would be unbearable if the Soviets had to pay
royalties retroactively.
(2) High royalty rates would be required by the United States publishers,
thus increasing the retail price of books sold in the Soviet Union.
(3) The Soviet Union as a matter of policy makes its books available with-
out royalty payments to sister socialist republics and to the poorer underdevel-
oped nations of the world. The UCC would require the Soviet Union to charge
the high capitalist rate of royalty.
(4) Significant changes would be needed in the Soviet domestic copyright
laws.
(5) The U.S. had not provided international copyright protection during
its formative years.
BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 55, at 172-75, reprinted in Levin, supra
note 53, at 131-32.
58. See NEWCITY, supra note 23, at 41, relying on BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE U.S.S.R.,
supra note 55, at 35-38.
59. Id.
60. Leonhard, The Domestic Politics of The New Soviet Foreign Policy, 52 FOREIGN.
AFF. 61, 64 (Oct. 1973).
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growth. At that time, a reciprocal copyright protection agreement with
the People's Republic of Bulgaria was consummated.6 ' Much like the
U.S.S.R. -Hungary agreement of 1967, this agreement also provided for
the reciprocal protection of copyrights between the two nations. By late
1972, a change in Soviet attitudes toward international copyright protec-
tions had unquestionably occurred. Soviet accession to the Universal
Copyright Convention appeared to be a forthcoming and natural conse-
quence of literary and scientific development within the country.
2
D. Soviet Accession to the Universal Copyright Convention
Although accession to Universal Copyright Convention was a matter
of lengthy deliberation for the Soviets, the decision to accede came
quickly and to the surprise of many. On February 14, 1973, the Soviets
announced that, effective May 27, 1973, they would adhere to the provi-
sions of the Universal Copyright Convention." Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko deposited the formal documents of adherence6 ' at UNESCO
headquarters in Paris on February 27, 1973.5
On February 28, 1973, a decree of the President of the Supreme So-
viet amended and revised the 1961 Fundamentals to bring Soviet domes-
tic copyright law in conformance with U.C.C. requirements.6 6 The Sovi-
ets, however, unwilling to accept the 1971 Paris revisions' explicit
provisions on broadcast and performing rights," ruled that their acces-
sion to the U.C.C. would exclude adherence to the 1971 revisions.6,
Adherence to the U.C.C. marked the end of nearly sixty years of So-
viet isolationism from international copyright relations.6 6 In acceding to
61. U.S.S.R-Bulgaria Agreement on the Reciprocal Protection of Copyright, 1972, 855
U.N.T.S. 235.
62. See Matveev, supra note 22, at 219.
63. See Radlauer, supra note 19, at 1.
64. Official announcement of Soviet adherence to the Universal Copyright Convention,
reprinted in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, U.S.S.R., Item 3A,
(1987 & 1973 Supp.). See also Announcement, U.S.S.R. Joins Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, 20 BULL. COPR. Soc'Y, 1 (1973).
65. See NEWCITY, supra note 23, at 44.
66. Decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, On Making Changes in
and Additions to the Principles of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Repub-
lics, 9 Vedomosti SSSR, item 138 (Feb. 3 1973) [hereinafter 1973 Decree of the Presidium].
For an in-depth analysis of the changes made in Soviet law, see JON BAUMGARTEN, U.S.-
U.S.S.R. COPYRIGHT RELATIONS UNDER THE UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION (1973) [here-
inafter BAUMGARTEN].
67. See BAUMGARTEN, supra note 66.
68. 203 PUB. WKLY. 32, Mar. 12, 1973.
69. By 1989 the Soviets had acceded to eight additional bilateral agreements for the
protection of copyright. The Soviet Union concluded bilateral treaties with Bulgaria, 855
U.N.T.S. 235, Czechoslovakia, 161 L.T.S. 309, GDR, 1973 NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 2211, Hun-
gary, THE CALENDAR OF SOVIET TREATIES 1981, Poland, Austria, Cuba, and Sweden. See 4
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 1981-1983).
Additionally, President Ford and Chairman Brezhnev signed the Helsinki Final Act on
August 1, 1975. The agreement stated that signatory nations would agree to: "the wider use
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the U.C.C., the Soviets established copyright relations with over seventy
nations.7 Soviet accession facilitated the exchange of its copyrighted
materials and opened a previously closed window to the international
marketplace of ideas.7 ' The Soviets exclaimed the hope that accession
would unlock new perspectives in the development of international cul-
tural and scientific relationships.
7 2
The events leading to Soviet accession, however, do not reflect an
entirely idealistic endeavor on the part of the Soviet Union. 3 Arguably, a
major factor in the Soviet's accession to the U.C.C. was an exchange of
commercial advantages provided by a bilateral tax convention signed on
June 20, 1973 by U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, George P. Shultz, and
Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolai S. Patolichev.7 4
The tax convention excluded from taxable income, among other
things, royalties for the use of copyrights.75 The U.S. sought the protec-
tions afforded by the U.C.C. for its copyrighted materials in the Soviet
Union. 7' The Soviets sought concessions in the patent area and favorable
tax treatments.7 Following the Soviet's accession to the U.C.C., each na-
tion got what it bargained for.
of commercial channels and activities for applied scientific and technological research for
the transfer of achievements obtained in this field while providing information on the pro-
tection of intellectual and individual property rights."
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 73
DEP'T ST. BULL 323 (1975) reprinted in 14 ILM 1292 (1975).
70. See BAUMGARTEN, supra note 66, at 5.
71. See Levin, supra note 53, at 129.
72. See Matveev, supra note 22, at 219.
73. See Levin, supra note 53, at 140.
74. See id.
75. Convention on Matters of Taxation with Related Letters, June 20, 1973, U.S.-
U.S.S.R, art. III,.T.I.A.S. No. 8225, at 1. Article III provides in pertinent part:
1. The following categories of income derived from sources within one con-
tracting state by a resident of other contracting state shall be subject to tax
only in that other contracting state:
(a) rentals, royalties or other amounts paid as consideration for the use of
or right to use literary, artistic, and scientific works, or for the use of copy-
rights of such works, as well as the rights to inventions (patents, author's cer-
tificates), industrial designs, processes or formulae, computer programs, trade-
marks, service marks, and other similar property or rights, or for industrial,
commercial or scientific equipment, or for knowledge, experience, or skill
(know-how).
(b) gains derived from sale or exchange of any such rights or property,
whether or not the amounts realized on sale or exchange are contingent in
whole or in part, on the extent and nature of use or disposition of such rights
or property.
76. See Levin, supra note 53, at 140.
77. Id.
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1. Basic Provisions of the Universal Copyright Convention
The preamble to the Universal Copyright Convention 8 expresses the
hope that an international union for the protection of copyrights would
stimulate the creation, development, and exchange of intellectual proper-
ties amongst signatory nations.
[A] system of copyright protection appropriate to all nations of the
world and expressed in a universal convention ... will ensure respect
for the rights of the individual and encourage the development of
literature, the sciences and the arts . .. [and] will facilitate a wider
dissemination of works of the human mind and increase international
understanding. . . . 79
The U.C.C. has its foundations in the national treatment of foreign
authors. Consequently, member states must afford foreign works the
same protection afforded to domestic creations."0 Signatory nations must
also modify domestic copyright laws to conform with five minimum stan-
dards.8 1 First, each member state must provide for the "adequate and ef-
fective protection of the rights of authors and other copyright proprietors
in literary, scientific, and artistic works .... 8'
Second, foreign works will satisfy all formalities (notice, registration,
manufacture),
if from the time of first publication all the copies of the work pub-
lished with the authority of the author or other copyright proprietor
bear the symbol (c) accompanied by the name of the copyright propri-
etor and the year of first publication placed in such manner and loca-
tion as to give reasonable notice of claim of copyright.83
Third, member states must grant a minimum copyright term of
twenty-five years or the life of the author plus twenty-five years. 8'
Fourth, member states must grant exclusive publication and transla-
tion rights to the creator.8 5 After a term of seven years, however, a mem-
ber state in which a translation has not been published may obtain a
"non-exclusive license from the competent authority thereof to translate
78. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, preamble, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S.
No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132 (effective Sept. 16, 1955) (Geneva Act) revised July 24, 1971, 25
U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 (effective July 10, 1974) (Paris Act) [here-
inafter UCC]; see also 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, app. 24 (Geneva text) and app.
25 (Paris text) (1986).
79. UCC, supra note 78, at preamble.
80. Id. art. 2(1).
81. Although the U.C.C. calls for several requirements of signatory nations, the five
described herein are most important for the purposes of this Article.
82. UCC, supra note 78, art. 1.
83. Id. art. 3(1).
84. Id. art. 4(1) and art. 4(2).
85. Id. art. 5(1).
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the work into that language and publish the work so translated.""6
Finally, the U.C.C. contains a "Berne" conflict clause. This clause re-
stricts Berne Convention signatories from ignoring Berne provisions and
relying on the U.C.C. in its copyright relations with another Berne Union
member.87 The U.C.C. is administered by the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
2. Impact of Soviet Accession to Universal Copyright Convention
The February 3, 1973 Decree of the Supreme Soviet s8 amended the
1961 Fundamentals 9 to provide for minimum copyright protections re-
quired by the U.C.C. This amendment worked four basic changes into
Soviet intellectual property law.90 First, and perhaps most significantly,
the "freedom of translation" provision, article 102, was eliminated from
Soviet copyright law.91 The U.C.C. extends authors broad rights over
translations of their works.9' Arguably, the most problematic hurdle to
Soviet participation in an international copyright union had finally been
eliminated.
Second, Soviet copyright law was amended to provide for the pay-
ment of royalties for any reproduction of a foreign author's work. Article
101 of the 1961 Fundamentals states that "use of an author's work by
other persons is not permitted except on the basis of a contract with the
author or his assignees, except in cases stipulated in the law. '
Third, in compliance with article four of the U.C.C., the 1961 Funda-
mentals were amended to provide for copyright duration to extend for the
life of the author plus twenty-five years.9'
Finally, in compliance with the U.C.C.'s established assignment
rights, the 1961 Fundamentals were amended to allow an author's assign-
ees to rightfully exercise rights under the author's copyright.95
86. Id. art. 5(2)(a).
87. Id. art. 17(1).
88. 1973 Decree of the Presidium, supra note 66.
89. 1961 Fundamentals, supra note 27.
90. See Michael A. Newcity, The Universal Copyright Convention as an Instrument of
Repression: The Soviet Experiment, 24 J. CoPR. Soc'Y 1, 9-15 (1980).
91. Article 102 as amended reads:
The translation of a work into a different language for the purpose of publica-
tion is permitted only with the consent of the author or his assignees. Compe-
tent U.S.S.R. agencies can, according to a procedure established by U.S.S.R.
legislation, authorize the translation of a work into a different language and
the publication of this translation, with the observance, where appropriate, of
the terms of international treaties or international agreements to which the
U.S.S.R. is a party.
92. UCC, supra note 78, art. 5.
93. 1961 Fundamentals, supra note 27, art. 101 (as amended 1973).
94. Id. art. 105 (as amended 1973).
95. Id. art. 97 (as amended 1973).
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3. Limitations of the Universal Copyright Convention
Soviet accession to the U.C.C. was a major step forward for the inter-
national protection of copyrighted materials. By stimulating multina-
tional trade, Soviet accession to the U.C.C. opened the way for an inter-
national exchange of information and culture. 6 The U.C.C., however, is
limited in its protective capacities.
In seeking the lowest common standards so as to attract the most
members, the control or effect of the U.C.C. is limited. Further, as aptly
demonstrated by the Soviets during the 1970's,97 few nations will allow
their domestic law to become subservient to a supranational body. The
U.C.C. only provides a general obligation of national treatment," and its
minimum protections are insufficient to establish a controlling document
for the international protection of copyrighted materials. When operating
under the U.C.C. one is forced to continually ask the question: Will the
target countries' laws protect my intellectual properties from the ravages
of piracy, expropriation, and infringement?
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIET UNION
A. Basic Provisions of the Berne Convention
Until recently neither the United States" nor the Soviet Union had
sought adherence to the Berne Convention. Yet, this Convention has ar-
guably played the single most important role in the development of inter-
national copyright protection.' In early 1886, ten signatory states"' be-
gan a new era in international copyright protection. An era had begun
96. See Levin, supra note 53, at 161.
97. On December 28, 1973, prior to VAAP's assumption of exclusive jurisdiction over
Soviet works, Nobel prize-winning author, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, published the book "The
Gulag Archipelago." Published by the YMCA press, Solzhenitsyn's work was granted an
international copyright.
. The Soviet response was quick, decisive and defiant. Relying on the power of their own
domestic copyright law, the Soviets arrested Solzhenitsyn, stripped his citizenship, and ex-
pelled him from the country. Significantly, the Soviets action was taken without any reli-
ance on newly founded U.C.C. international copyright protections.
98. U.C.C., supra note 78, art. 2.
99. On Oct. 20, 1988 the United States Congress ratified accession to the Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. See 134 CONG. Rac. S16939 (daily
ed. Oct. 20, 1988). Eleven days later President Reagan signed the Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988 into law. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). For an interesting comparison of Soviet and U.S. copyright
law prior to the United States acession to the Berne Convention see Adolf Dietz, United
States and Soviet Copyright Systems: An Essay in Comparison, 12 I.C.C., 153 (1981).
100. For a full and detailed discussion of the development of the Berne Convention and
the implication of U.S. adherence, see Comment, Development of the Berne International
Copyright Convention and Implications of United States Adherence, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L.
149 (1990) [hereinafter Development of the Berne].
101. Belgium, France, Germany, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, and
the United Kingdom.
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where individual nations were prepared to relinquish individual interests
for the good of international order."0 2
The Berne Convention contains thirty-eight articles which discuss
the substantive requirements of Convention members and the adminis-
trative structure of the Convention itself. The Convention charges mem-
ber nations with providing international copyright protection through do-
mestic laws. 10 3 Of vital importance to this Article are the substantive
requirements discussed in articles one through twenty of the Convention.
Among these rights are duration of the copyright, right of translation,
reproduction, public performance, broadcasting, adaptation, and
arrangement. 104
The Berne Convention, unlike the U.C.C., sets forth specific mini-
mum conditions to which each signatory must adhere. 1° 5 As a general
matter these conditions may be broken into five categories: 106 Primacy,
Coverage, Activation of Coverage, Exclusive Rights, and Term of
Protection.
PRIMACY - Each member nation is required to accord foreign au-
thors the same level of copyright protection it provides to its own citi-
zens.101 Signatory nations must grant protection at a level equal to or
above the minimum standards espoused by the Convention.0 8 Unless
otherwise provided in a given article, national discretion to rely on its
own domestic law1°9 is not permitted. Convention provisions maintain
primacy over national legislation."
COVERAGE - Coverage under the Convention extends to a broad va-
riety of subject matters. Coverage extends to "every production in the
literary, scientific, and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or
form of its expression .... "'" Expressly excluded, however, is "news of
the day or . . . miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of
press information.""' 2 Coverage also extends to an author's unpublished
102. See EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 25.
103. Development of the Berne, supra note 100, at 157.
104. See Berne Convention, supra note 11, art. VII (duration), art. VIII (right of trans-
lation), art. IX (right of reproduction), at art. XI (right of public performance), art. Xlbis
(right of broadcasting), art. XII (right of adaptation, arrangement, and other alteration).
105. For an excellent comparison of Berne and U.C.C. Convention characteristics, see
Note, Out of UNESCO and into Berne: Has United States Participation in the Berne Con-
vention for International Copyright Protection Become Essential, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L. J. 203, 216-26 (1985) (including text of speech made by Lewis Flacks, Policy Planning
Advisor for the U.S. Register of Copyright).
106. See generally Berne-ing the Soviet Copyright Codes, supra note 10, at 398 (dis-
cussing method of five category breakdown of Berne Convention's substantive articles).
107. Berne Convention, supra note 11, art. 5(3).
108. Id. art. 5(2) and art. 6(1).
109. Id. art. 19 and art. 20.
110. Id. art. 2(4); art. 2(7); art. 2bis(1-2); art. 7(4); art. 10(2); art. 10bis; art. 14bis(3);
art. 14ter(2); art. 16(3).
111. Id. art. 2(1).




ACTIVATION OF COVERAGE - The Berne Convention excludes all for-
malities that precondition the existence, scope and duration of copyright
protection. Once created, a work's entitlement to protection under the
Convention is not premised on any administrative formality.1 14 Exercise
of rights under the Convention is immediately available and independent
of any exercise of protection in the work's country of origin."'
EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS - The Berne Convention protects an author's
personal rights and the right created in his works. The Convention seeks
to maintain minimum protective standards which signatories deem essen-
tial to the success of international copyright.1" 6 Among these rights are
the right of translation, reproduction, public performance, broadcasting,
adaptation, and arrangement." 7 Any reproduction of an author's work
made in violation of any Convention exclusive right is subject to
seizure." 8
TERM OF COVERAGE - The Berne Convention establishes a minimum
term of copyright protection for life plus fifty years or an alternative term
of fifty years from the date of first publication." 9
B. Recent Developments in Soviet International Copyright Law
On April 19, 1989, Vladimir F. Petrovsky, the Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister, announced the Soviet Union's intention to join the Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,'2" "[I] can in-
form you that our country is finalizing the necessary preparatory work
which will soon enable us to accede to the Berne Copyright
Convention."''
On June 1, 1990, the Soviets made significant Berne preparations as
Soviet President Gorbachev signed an historic trade agreement 2 2 with
113. Id. art. 3(1) and 3(3).
114. Id. art. 5(2).
115. Id.
116. Development of the Berne, supra note 100, at 159.
117. See Berne Convention, supra note 11, art. VIII (right of translation), art. IX (right
of reproduction, art. XI (right of public performance), art. Xlbis (right of broadcasting), art.
XII (right of adaptation, arrangement, and other alteration).
118. Berne Convention, supra note 11, art. 16(1).
119. Id. art. 7(1-3).
120. Berne Convention, supra note 11; Soviet Union to Join Berne Convention,
REUTERS, Apr. 19, 1989; Soviets Will Join Berne Convention, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1989,
Part A, pg. 3, col. 1; The U.S.S.R to Join Berne Convention, Agency Chief Says, TASS,
August 30, 1989.
121. Clyde H. Farnsworth, CHINA CALLED Top COPYRIGHT PIRATES, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
1989, at D7, col. 4. Mr. Petrovsky's announcement was made at the London Information
Forum of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
122. Bush and Gorbachev Sign Trade Pact with Intellectual Property Provisions, 40
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 984, at 128 (June 7, 1990); For text of the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement relating to copyright provisions and accompanying Side Letter,
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the U.S., committing the two nations to provide for substantial intellec-
tual property protections. The agreement also bound the Soviet Union to
implement legislation necessary to carry out their commitment. 12 3 The
see Intellectual Property Provisions of U.S. - Soviet Trade Agreement, 40 PAT. TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 984, at 144 (June 7, 1990); see Schwartz, supra note 17, at 213-
218.
123. The agreement states the bilateral commitment of each nation to submit "to their
respective legislative bodies, the draft laws necessary to carry out the obligations of this
Article and to exert their best efforts to enact and implement these laws" to:
(1) Adhere to the Berne Convention (Paris Act, 1971);
(2) Provide copyright protection for computer programs and data bases as lit-
erary works;
(3) Provide sound recording protection including-
(a) national treatment (immediately after both parties, i.e., the Soviets,
have enacted domestic sound recording protection) for sound recordings first
fixed by their respective nationals or first published in their national territory;
and
(b) at a minimum, rights in producers of sound recordings shall include: a
right of reproduction, public distribution and importation, and exclusive com-
mercial rental and lending rights;
(4) After both are members of the Berne Union, "the protection of works in
existence prior to that date [of Berne relations] shall be determined in accor-
dance with Article 18 of the 1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention."; and
(5) To constitute a working group on intellectual property matters in accor-
dance with the Agreement and side letter.
The agreement also states that the legislative proposals of the parties shall be in accor-
dance with the principles enumerated in the side letter. The contents of the side letter may
be summarized as follows:
(1) The Soviet Government agreed that in keeping with the Resolution of the
Supreme Soviet of March 6, 1990, the "Law on Property in the U.S.S.R." the
Supreme Soviet had charged the Council of Ministers to introduce legislation
in 1990 to amend the copyright law in order to adhere to the Berne Conven-
tion; and
(2) "The Government of the U.S.S.R. will introduce in 1991 the draft laws
necessary to fulfill the obligations contained in Article VIII of the Agreement
and will undertake all possible measures to enact these laws during 1991. The
Government of the U.S.S.R. will seek prompt implementation of these laws."
(3) The Government of the U.S.S.R. will incorporate the following principles in
their legislative proposals:
(a) For computer software protection: to extend protection under copy-
right for computer programs, at the level and for the same duration as literary
works and any limitations on rights would be compatible to those applicable to
literary works under Berne-and to incorporate limitations on copying al-
lowing for a single back-up copy under conditions, similar to those provided
under United States copyright law;
(b) For sound recordings: to consider a term of protection for fifty years
from the date of first publication and to consider adherence to the Geneva
Phonograms Convention immediately upon enactment of sound recording pro-
tection in the U.S.S.R.
(4) The Government of the U.S.S.R. in cooperation with the United States
government will create a working group on intellectual property matters to ex-
change information and discuss the implementation of intellectual property
protection in the respective countries.
See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 158-59. The author of this paper extends full credit to Mr.
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U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement included commitments to: (1) adhere to the
Berne Convention, (2) protect computer programs and data bases, (3)
protect sound recordings, (4) product and process patent protections for
20 years from application date or at least 17 years from grant, and (5)
comprehensive trade secret protection. 24
Since the signing of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement, Soviet
lawmakers have formulated draft legislation that would amend Chapter
IV of the 1961 Fundamentals of Civil Legislation and bring Soviet copy-
right law into conformity with the Berne Convention's minimum stan-
dards." On May 31, 1991, in a special commission of the Supreme Soviet
of the U.S.S.R., amendments to the 1961 Fundamentals of Civil Legisla-
tion were adopted. Anatoly Lukyanov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
and highest ranking official in the Soviet Government's legislative branch,
stated, "We understand that the protection of intellectual property rights
is extremely important . . .I am strongly personally committed to this.
The law will fully conform to the Berne Convention and all established
international standards. It is not only important for you, it is equally im-
portant for us."
'"26
Shortly after adoption, the amended Fundamentals of Civil Legisla-
tion appeared in the June 26 issue of Izvestia. The Fundamentals, as
amended, contained 10 copyright law provisions, which were integrated
into the Soviet's Civil Code, Chapter IV. Among these provisions were the
following:
127
(1) The list of copyrighted items includes literary works such as fic-
tion, textbooks, etc., dramatic works, musical works, audiovisual
works such as cinema or television, radio productions, photography,
etc. Computer programs are listed separately but are not included as
literary works, as provided in the Trade Agreement."
8
(2) Registration of a work, or compliance with any other formalities, is
not required for copyright protection.
(3) The term of protection is the life of the author plus 50 years,
counting from the first day of the year following the author's death."19
(4) Authors will have exclusive rights to their works, including the
rights to authorship and integrity of the work, the rights to publish
and to use the work,"' and the right to remuneration."'
Schwartz for his excellent summaries of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement and accompa-
nying Side Letter. Mr. Schwartz's summaries, with limited alterations, were utilized in full.
124. Treaties, Soviet Union, 42 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1044, at 405 (Au-
gust 22, 1991).
125. See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 149.
126. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Pledges Commitment to Copyright Protection,
BUSINESS WIRE, July 15, 1991, Int'l desk.
127. The summaries of the new amendments as provided in Izvestia were taken from
New Copyright Law Enacted, But U.S. Groups are Skeptical, INT'L Bus. DAILY (BNA),
Aug. 28, 1991 [hereinafter New Copyright Law].
128. Id. art. 134.
129. Id. art. 137.
130. Id. art. 135(2).
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Significantly, the 1991 amendments to the Fundamentals of Civil
Legislation also added provisions to protect computer programs and data
bases under copyright law' 2 and established a right of public perform-
ance. The 1991 amendments were set to take effect on January 1, 1992.133
Many of the revisions were made in anticipation of Soviet adherence
to the Berne Convention. It remains a question of debate whether the
Soviet amendments do, in fact, bring it into conformity with Berne
Convention.""
C. Political Changes and the New Commonwealth of Independent
States
On December 8, 1991 one of the century's most dramatic events oc-
curred in the Soviet Union. The Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and By-
elorussia declared an end to the Soviet Union and the creation of a new
Commonwealth of Independent States.' 5 The preamble to the Common-
wealth Agreement stated: "We, as the founding states of the U.S.S.R. and
the co-signatories of the 1922 Union Treaty ... state that the U.S.S.R. is
ceasing its existence as a subject of international law and a geo-political
reality."' 6
New Commonwealth leaders immediately extended an open invita-
tion to all states interested in joining the Commonwealth.3 7 Prior Soviet
ties, however, were not made a prerequisite to enrollment.
In their initial meeting, Commonwealth leaders, Boris Yeltsin, Leo-
nid Krawczuk, and Stanislav Shushkevitch, agreed to "conduct coordi-
nated radical economic reforms aimed at the creation of full-blooded
market mechanisms, the transformation of attitudes to property, [and]
guarantees for freedom of enterprise."'3 " Resolutions were also passed to
create an inter-bank agreement, establish a coordinated budget policy, in-
stitute liberalized price standards, and abstain from acts harmful to mu-
131. Id. art. 135.
132. Id. art. 134(2) provides that "computer programs" are in the subject matter of
works protected under copyright.
Irina V. Savelyeva, Professor of Law, Moscow State University and deputy director of
Steptoe & Johnson Lex International in Moscow predicted that enactment of the computer
related provisions would allow the Soviet Union to join the Berne Convention and would
bring the Soviet law more closely in tune with Western protections. European Unification is
Focus of AIPLA Mid-Winter Meeting, 41 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No.
1018, at 333 (Feb. 14 1991).
133. Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R., Chap. IV, Fundamentals of
Copyright Law of 1961 (as amended May 31, 1991).
134. See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 157. For a list of complaints developed by the
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) see New Copyright Law, supra note 127.
135. Mark Trevelyan, Focus-Slav Republics Declare Soviet Union Dead, REUTERS, Dec.
9, 1991, § Money Report [hereinafter Trevelyan].
136. U.S.S.R. is Dead, supra note 18.
137. Id.




From a legal perspective, Soviet domestic law faced extinction. New
Commonwealth leaders openly declared all Soviet law null and void on
their territory and Soviet organs obsolete.1 40 Independent State legisla-
tion is to replace years of Soviet legal domination. 141 Commonwealth
leaders noted, however, that international treaty obligations signed by the
U.S.S.R. would continue to be honored.
1 4 2
The disintegration of the Soviet Union may have fatalistically inter-
fered with recent advancements in the international protection of copy-
righted materials. In Commonwealth territories, the January 1, 1992 en-
actment of the May 31, 1991 amendments to Soviet copyright legislation
will have no effect.1 43 As a result, Soviet copyright law will not come into
conformity with international copyright standards and Soviet intents of
accession to the Berne Convention will not reach fruition. The Common-
wealth's commitment to Soviet international treaty obligations inauspi-
ciously reveals that Soviet Commonwealth membership in the Berne Con-
vention was missed by only a few weeks.
IV. ADHERENCE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION BY THE NEW
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
A. A Matter of Survival for a Birthing Market Economy
Commonwealth States face a difficult period as they move toward
free-market economies. Critical economic conditions in each of the post-
Soviet States are pressuring new leadership to make the transition as
quickly and smoothly as possible. The expediency and ease of these tran-
sitions, however, are conditioned upon each State's ability to exist and
function in the global marketplace.
Today's global free-market economies are dependent upon informa-
tion-based technology and innovations.1 4 Computer-integrated-manufac-
turing systems control and monitor the production of materials.'45 Ad-
vanced telecommunication and electronic-data-interchange systems link
139. Id.
140. New Commonwealth May Create Favorable Environment for Legal Framework, 2
SOVIET Bus. L. REPT. No. 11, Dec. 13, 1991; Trevelyan, supra note 134. Compare Soviet
Union Still Alive, Constitutional Committee Says, TASS, Dec. 11, 1991 (positing that So-
viet Law still remains in order to preserve even minimum human rights and freedoms).
141. Trevor Fishlock, Baits Forced to Pay Heavy Price for New Freedom, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, January 12, 1992, § Int'l, at 15.
142. U.S.S.R. is Dead, supra note 18.
143. See Trevelyan, supra note 135.
144. See generally James E. Meadows, Software Protection in Transactions with the
Soviet Union, 12 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 133 (1986).
145. See Tom Peters, The Destruction of HIERARCHY: The Information Revolution
is Killing Traditional Corporate Hierarchy. When You Can No Longer Hoard Information,
Your Old Basis for Power is Gone, INDUSTRY WEEK, Aug. 15, 1988, § Features, at 33 [herein-
after Peters].
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suppliers, distributors and purchasers on a global scale.1"6 Information of
all types can be transmitted, exchanged, updated, or monitored from
points around the globe in milliseconds. " 7 These advanced systems as
well as the information that is transmitted through them are the subject
of careful protections under available international copyright codes.
A Commonwealth State's transition from state-owned to free-market
economy, therefore, will depend immensely on its ability to obtain estab-
lished Western information-based technologies, stimulate comparable in-
digenous technological developments, and integrate these technologies
into its economic system." 8 In light of existing critical economic condi-
tions in the Commonwealth States, Commonwealth leaders must seek to
attain the highest degree of access to these intellectual goods that the
international marketplace will allow.
Direct foreign investment is imperative to the integration of state-of-
the-art technology into the developing Commonwealth economies. 1 9 For-
eign nations, however, will be reluctant to engage in any form of direct
technological investment or exchange without assurances that its intellec-
tual goods will be adequately protected. 150 Moreover, domestic develop-
ment will progress equally as slow where copyright protections do not ex-
ist as an incentive to indigenous scientists, authors, and engineers."6 '
Lack of Berne Convention membership will work a significant disad-
vantage on each Commonwealth State's attempt to obtain information-
based technologies from foreign trade partners.'52 As the premier union
for the international protection of copyrights, the Berne Convention de-
fines "adequate" minimum standards of copyright protection. Fledgling
economies which are reluctant to assure these adequate protections will
not be readily trusted in the global marketplace.'5 3
Transition to and maintenance of a free-market economy depends on
the free and protected flow of information. Broad access to Western, in-
formation-based technology must be a matter of utmost concern for Com-
monwealth leaders. Accession to the Berne Convention is a necessary pre-
cursor to any such access.
B. The Necessities of Adherence
1. The Ravages of Piracy
The term "piracy" has no settled meaning in international law. In its
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Edward C. Runte, Transborder Data Flow-Planning for the Future, Sept.
21, 1982, § Int'l Data Networks, at 11 [hereinafter Runte].
149. See Leaffer, supra note 7, at 279-281.
150. See id.
151. See Sony, supra note 5, at 429.




broadest sense, piracy is the systematic and intentional reproduction or
use of someone else's copyrighted materials."" Pirates of copyrighted
materials enjoy low production costs and occupy the opportune locations
to satisfy the demands of developing economies. 55 As a result, piracy has
become an attractive short-term solution to the technological inadequa-
cies of developing nations.
In this age of technology, reports of the computer industry demon-
strate well the staggering impacts of piracy on domestic and international
economic conditions.15 Between 1981 and 1984 the U.S. software indus-
try lost 1.3 billion dollars. 57 Studies indicate that 1985 losses alone ex-
ceeded one billion dollars.5 " The increasing reliance of modern society on
computers lends to a breeding ground of software piracy.
Recent commercial and technological developments in the field of in-
formation-systems (compact disks, optical scanners, computer networks
and advanced software) will cause the piracy of information and informa-
tion-based technology to become even more acute. Strict adherence to do-
mestic and international copyright protections is the foremost means of
combating the illegal pirating of an another's works. Countries employing
inadequate domestic and international copyright protections will attract
these damaging pirating activities.
2. Impact of Domestic Economy
The damage piracy can cause to domestic economies is far reaching.
The losses of the copyright owner are three-fold. Copyright owners lose,
monies acquired by pirators, royalties potentially paid by pirating organi-
zations, and a product's goodwill where pirated imitations are of inferior
quality.'5 9 Consumers of. pirated products are also victimized by poor
quality goods that threaten the public health and welfare. Furthermore,
losses create a disincentive to disseminate works. Authors will selectively
begin releasing their works in an attempt to avoid the unfair competition
from cheaper, pirated works. 60
154. For a thorough discussion of the term, see J. H. Reichman, Intellectual Property
in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRAS-
NAT'L L. 747, 770-80 (1989).
155. See Leaffer, supra note 7, at 280.
156. For an extensive review of the economic impact on U.S. trade as a result of piracy
in the specific areas of: motion pictures, records and tapes, books, and computer software,
see Jon A. Baumgarten, International Matters, 222 PRAC. L. INST. 25, 47-51 (Apr. 17, 1986)
[hereinafter International Matters].
157. Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round - Negotiating
Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1326-27
(1990) [hereinafter Emmert], relying on 3 BUSINESS SOFTWARE PIRACY: REPORT ON FEDERAL
DATA SYSTEMS 4 (1985).
158. See id. at 1331-33.
159. Id. at 1321-21.
160. International Matters, supra note 156, at 25. Conservative estimates indicate that
2.2 million, or 2.2% of the U.S. civilian labor force were involved in copyright industries
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A State's disregard for intellectual property rights also inhibits the
development of indigenous technological and scientific advancements.
Scientists, authors, and engineers are reluctant to expend the labor of
creation when uncontrolled pirating, counterfeiting, and infringing will
impede a fair return on their labors.'61 The failure to protect domestic
incentives may actually result in the exodus of important minds to coun-
tries were strong copyright protections are happily afforded.'62
Indirect effects on the economy may also be felt. Where piracy is
widespread, research and development will be less profitable and conse-
quently decrease.' 63 Decreases in creative development will impact the
number of jobs available in the affected industries.6 Reduced creative
development will also affect those industries that supply the raw materi-
als or services involved in the manufacture, transportation or distribution
of the creative works. 6 5 At the governmental level, reduced industrial ac-
tivity will mean smaller tax resources for domestic governmental tasks."6 6
Much like a chemical dependence, a country with little regard for the
protection of intellectual property will develop an unhealthy technologi-
cal dependance on foreign economies.'6 7 As domestic creative elements
are eliminated, pirated products will become the countries sole window to
Western and advanced technology goods.
3. Impact on International Trade Relations
By operating without adequate copyright protections, a country dem-
onstrates its lack of regard for the international community of ideas.'68
Although this disregard for copyright protections may yield positive
short-term results, it will likely harm a country's development in the
long-term.1 69
Nations with strong copyright protections may forbid the importa-
tion of pirated, counterfeit, and infringing products. 70 Nations may re-
strict trade with a country that has a record of violating even minimum
during 1984.
161. See Sony, supra note 5.
162. J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to Intellectual Property Protection:
An Empirical Investigation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 209, 211 (1987) [hereinafter Frame].
163. See Emmert, supra note 157, at 1321-22.
164. Id. A 1982 estimate found 131,000 jobs in five industry sectors were lost due to
foreign product counterfeiting. See United States International Trade Commission, Pub.
No. 1479, XVII Effects of Foreign Product Counterfeiting on U.S. Industry 4-13 (1984).
165. See International Matters, supra note 156, at 25.
166. See Emmert, supra note 157, at 1321-22.
167. See Frame, supra note 162, at 211.
168. See International Matters, supra note 160, at 30.
169. See Frame, supra note 162, at 211.
170. Greeley, The United States Customs Service and Protection of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, 83 PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 5, 6 (1985) (discussing U.S. Customs Service prac-
tice of screening imports for counterfeit, pirated or patent-infringing goods).
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protective standards."' Fearing the loss of control over ground-breaking
developments, nations may grow reluctant to license new technologies.' 2
Production of intellectual property has become increasingly expen-
sive. As a result, research and development efforts demand large interna-
tional markets and firm copyright protections to maintain adequate re-
turns."' In light of these rising costs, nations can ill afford to eliminate
any possibility of fully operating in the international marketplace.
C. The Benefits of Berne Convention Membership
By joining the Berne Convention, Commonwealth States would re-
ceive international copyright protection in more than eighty nations.
1 74
Commonwealth authors would enjoy copyright protection in several coun-
tries, not members to the U.C.C. More significantly, new Commonwealth
authors would enjoy the protection of the highest international copyright
standards available today.
International copyright protection is imperative to ensure access to
the world's technology, and to ward off the ravages of piracy. Membership
in the Berne Convention will provide these protections and facilitate the
Commonwealth State's move into world markets.
1 5
1. Increased Domestic Creativity and Development
Most developing countries have an infrastructure supporting a cer-
tain level of research and development. 7  The full potential and growth
of that infrastructure can not be realized without adequate copyright pro-
tections. 7 7 As a foundation, strong copyright laws will ensure that indige-
171. See Frame, supra note 162, at 211, 226; see Moscowitz, Law Moves to Protect
Ideas, Not Just Goods, from Piracy, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1984, (Business Supp.), at 29, col.
1 (noting use of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to protect U.S. goods from
piracy).
For example, the GSP is being used by the United States Government to pressure coun-
tries with little regard for intellectual property rights to develop stronger intellectual prop-
erty laws. The degree of intellectual 'property protection a country offers affects the level
and type of GSP benefits it may receive. Consequently, countries with limited intellectual
property protections may receive GSP benefits (duty free tariffs).
Additionally, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (as amended in 1984), is another
weapon the United States government has come to rely on as a means of prompting nations
to adopt stronger intellectual property laws. Under this approach the inadequacy of a na-
tion's intellectual property laws is addressed as an unfair trade practice.
172. See Frame, supra note 162, at 211; see J. Davidson Frame, Political Risk in Inter-
national Technology Transfer, 10 J. TECH. TRANSFER 1 (1986).
173. See GILLES Y. BERTIN & SALLY WYATT, MULTINATIONALS AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY:
THE CONTROL OF THE WORLD'S TECHNOLOGY 127 (1988).
174. The United States became the eighty-first member-nation to the Berne Conven-
tion. See N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1989, at D7, col. 4.
175. See generally BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 39, at 216.
176. See Emmert, supra note 157, at 1349.
177. See id.
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nous creators remain at home.""8 Once a.State's creators are content, cre-
ative activity can flourish in a collected and confident environment.
The protection of copyrighted materials is the primary means by
which creators are ensured a fair return on their labor."7 9 Strong copy-
right protections will provide authors with the incentive to continue in
their creative endeavors. 8 0 The full and free dissemination of informa-
tion, methodologies, and innovations among indigenous scientists and en-
gineers raises the level of scientific consciousness. 8' As a result, incre-
mental and steady advances in technology enhance the standard of living
within domestic society.' 2
Authors in Commonwealth States will benefit from a large, previ-
ously unavailable, paying market.'83 Increased trade relations between
foreign nations and Commonwealth States will foster interest in the cus-
toms and lifestyles of people in the Commonwealth States.'8 Common-
wealth citizens, scientists, teachers, and officials, will experience the rich
heritage of foreign cultures and the true international marketplace of
ideas.'8 5
2. Enhanced Position in the Global-Marketplace
Universal or international copyright protections help ensure that a
creator's innovations will bring a profit in the global marketplace.'
8 6
Western economic models demonstrate that global creativity and devel-
opment increases when additional nations protect intellectual property
and thus make innovation more profitable. 8 7 The Commonwealth States
will serve important national interests of economic stability and techno-
logical growth by becoming Berne Convention members. 8 Membership
will provide Commonwealth States with a credible presence in the fast
growing, information-based, global economy. Membership will also estab-
lish negotiation mechanisms with many influential trade partners.8 8
Membership guarantees participation in the formulation and man-
agement of international copyright policy. 90 It will enhance the plausibil-
178. See id.
179. See Sony, supra note 5.
180. See id.
181. Dennis S. Karjala, United States Adherence to the Berne Convention and Copy-
right Protection of Information-Based Technologies, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 148 (1988).
182. Id.
183. See Radlauer, supra note 19, at 20.
184. Id.
185. See Levin, supra note 54, at 161.
186. Compare Carlos J. Moorhead, H.R. 2962. The Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1987, 3 J.L. & TECH. 187 (1988) [hereinafter Moorhead].
187. Emmert, supra note 157, at 1351.
188. See Moorhead, supra note 186.
189. Id. Berne members include nearly all free market countries. 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, app. 22 (1988).
190. "[T]he maintenance and development of the Union and the implementation of
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ity of a Commonwealth State's trade positions, 9 1 and provide the neces-
sary show of good-faith to cautious trade partners. Membership will
evidence that the Commonwealth State intends to hold the same respect
for intellectual property protections as the other economically and tech-
nologically advanced nations of the world.
3. Improved Access to Cutting-Edge Technology
Adequate protection of copyrighted materials is becoming increas-
ingly important to the decisions of foreign investors.192 Where a work may
be the subject of piracy, counterfeiting or infringement, inventors are un-
derstandably eager to seek out all available protections. Trade secrecy
and limited dissemination provide such potential protections.
Facing the potential of losing control over new innovations, copyright
owners tend to be reluctant in disclosing their innovations where copy-
right protections are inadequate.19" When the purchasing nation offers in-
adequate protections, inventors are content to send outdated and non-
competitive technology to these "dangerous" markets and maintain the
competitive integrity of their cutting edge technology."" Membership in
the Berne Convention would provide cautious trade partners with the
protective assurances they desire.
V. CONCLUSION
A major step in the development of the new Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States would be their immediate adherence to the Berne Con-
vention. Unquestionably, the Commonwealth's prospect for future devel-
opment is closely tied to its ability to acquire and nurture strong
technological capabilities. The doorway to these capabilities lies in each
State's indigenous creative resources and its ability to deal in the global
market for the acquisition of innovative technologies.
By necessity the Commonwealth States must begin at home, nurtur-
ing indigenous technological advancements. Internal growth and a clear
regard for copyright protections will-expand the much needed technologi-
cal base of these developing countries. Countries that are economically,
scientifically, and technologically successful (U.S., Sweden, France, Ger-
many, United Kingdom) have carefully maintained the protection of in-
this Convention" shall be governed by an Assembly comprised of one member from each of
the Governments that are a party to the Convention. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at
art. 22.
191. Important trade partners, (U.S., United Kingdom, Sweden, Japan) will not easily
forget the billions of dollars lost through copyright infringements in the past. Adherence to
the Berne Convention indicates a willingness and commitment to reform and correct years
of unacceptable piracy within the Soviet Union.
192. See generally Emmert, supra note 157, at 1351.
193. See id. at 1352.
194. See Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT:
A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989).
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tellectual property rights as part of their economic development strate-
gies. 195 To this end, Commonwealth States must strive to protect their
indigenous intellectual property in an attempt to encourage the develop-
ment of domestic creative capacities.
To follow the Soviet's historical disregard and animosity for interna-
tional copyright protections will only drive these budding nations into
technological isolationism and an unhealthy dependence on the piracy of
other nation's goods. Any disregard for international intellectual property
protections will only weaken domestic technological capacities and limit
foreign investment opportunities.
The new Commonwealth States, upon entering the international
trade markets, will have to abide by the rules of the medium. Intellectual
property rights must be respected. At this critical time, these States can-
not afford to have indigenous work force scientists and engineers leaving
the country in search of better protections or remaining at home with no
incentive to create.
Although Soviet Law has, arguably, been voided in Commonwealth
territories, new Commonwealth leaders must be cognizant of the impact
former Soviet positions on copyright protection may have on present pol-
icy decisions. Western distrust of Soviet copyright protections as a result
of extensive piracy and slow international legal development must be fac-
tored into initial Commonwealth trade decisions.
Commonwealth leaders, therefore, must move to develop strong in-
ternational copyright protections thus demonstrating their goodwill and
protective intents. The development of domestic legislation which estab-
lishes firm standards in keeping with Berne Convention requirements will
take time. However, without this goodwill firmly established, the door to
Western technology will slowly open - a phenomenon which Common-
wealth States cannot survive.
The Commonwealth States face an interesting alternative to the slow
development of domestic copyright legislation. Commonwealth leaders
must recognize that Soviet Law was poised for accession the Berne Con-
vention. In light of the time needed to create new domestic copyright leg-
islation, Commonwealth leaders must consider the possibility of relying
on Soviet law and adhering to the Berne on its foundations. Reliance on
Soviet law need only serve as a transitory body until conforming domestic
legislation can be constructed.
In either case, reliance on Soviet copyright law or new legislation, it
is important for the new State to begin its march into the global free-
market economy and international free marketplace of ideas with the
goodwill and protective tools necessary to deal with other Nations. Sur-
vival cannot be accomplished with short-term patch work solutions.










The securities markets of Europe are in a state of significant transi-
tion. The European Community (EEC or Community), essentially a
Western Europe institution at present,' has already passed significant
legislation designed to reduce regulatory barriers to the free flow of capi-
tal across national boundaries. When fully implemented, EEC directives
will allow companies to make stock offerings throughout the Community
on the basis of a single prospectus approved by the home state and banks
and brokerage firms to provide financial services throughout the Commu-
nity on the basis of a single license issued by the home state. The coun-
tries of Central Europe are undergoing an even greater transformation in
their conversion from centrally planned to free market economies, priva-
tization of state-owned enterprises and establishment of new securities
markets and systems of securities regulation. The Budapest Stock Ex-
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change, closed by the communists in 1948, re-opened for trading in June
1990 with a mission "to facilitate efficient capital flows." In 1990 the Re-
public of Hungary (Hungary) enacted legislation designed to regulate the
stock exchange and other aspects of the new securities market. Czechoslo-
vakia, or more precisely, the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic
(Czechoslovakia), enacted stock exchange legislation in April 1992 and
constituted stock exchanges in Prague and Bratislava although they are
not yet operational. This article is a case study of the securities markets
and regulation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but it should be noted
that similar changes are also occurring in Poland.2
Central European securities markets may best be understood in con-
text of the political and economic environment in which they exist. As
discussed more fully below, Hungary is politically stable and the regional
leader in the implementation of free market economic reforms. About
5,000 companies with some measure of foreign ownership were estab-
lished in Hungary in 1991.1 Czechoslovakia is in the process of splitting
into two independent republics, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Re-
public, although negotiations are still underway concerning details of the
Federal dissolution. Each Republic will establish its own central bank and
distinct national currency and is in the process of forming ministries that
will assume responsibilities once reserved for Federal authorities. The di-
vision of Czechoslovakia is likely to increase the pace of economic reform
in the Czech Republic and decrease it in the Slovak Republic. Approxi-
mately 4,500 companies with some degree of foreign ownership had been
registered in Czechoslovakia by the beginning of 1992," but presumably
foreign investment may moderate temporarily due to political uncertain-
ties facing the nation.
A study of the securities markets and laws of Central Europe is in-
structive from a number of points of view. First, U.S. and other foreign
investors purchasing interests in companies or engaging in joint ventures
in this region should be familiar with securities laws which may comple-
ment commercial, joint venture, foreign investment or privatization laws
applicable to their investment. Second, portfolio managers, institutional
investors and others investing globally for purposes of geographic or risk
diversification or for other reasons should also be aware of securities laws
that may directly apply to their purchases and subsequent resales. In-
deed, all investors should have a general understanding of the nature of
the securities markets that may provide liquidity for their investment.
2. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland are commonly associated as "Central Euro-
pean" rather than Eastern European countries. Poland enacted the Act on Public Trading
in Securities and Trust Funds and the Act on the Establishment of the Warsaw Stock Ex-
change in 1991, re-opening the Stock Exchange 52 years after its closure in 1939.
3. COOPERS & LYBRAND, CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE: HUNGARY 14 (1992) [hereinafter
HUNGARY INVESTMENT GUIDE]. "Total foreign investment over the past two years has ex-
ceeded US $2.5bn, of which 50 percent came from European companies." Id.
4. COOPERS & LYBRAND, CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN GUIDE: CZECHOSLOVAKIA 20
(1992) [hereinafter CZECHOSLOVAKIA INVESTMENT GUIDE].
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Third, foreign companies setting up operations and concomitantly selling
securities in the region obviously must be aware of applicable laws, al-
though market participants should, of course, consult with counsel in the
case of actual transactions.
From a more academic perspective, the emerging systems of securi-
ties regulation in Central Europe provide a useful vehicle for examining
many of the contemporary themes in the field of international securities
regulation: capital adequacy, universal banking, foreign stock exchange
membership, "transparency" (disclosure of trade information), off-ex-
change trading and direct bank access to stock exchanges. These issues,
currently under consideration by, among others, the Community and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), are
among the most important issues of the day in the field of international
securities regulation. They have arisen in Hungary and Czechoslovakia as
elsewhere but clearly transcend national boundaries due to the interna-
tionalization of the securities markets which proceeds apace.
Hungary and Czechoslovakia (as well as Poland) have entered into
association agreements with the EEC5 which, in the words of EC Com-
mission President Jacques Delors, mark "'the reconciliation of Europe
with itself.'" These agreements have an unlimited duration, ten-year
transition period and "may lead to future accession to the European
Community."7 The parties obligate themselves to take actions necessary
progressively to liberalize restrictions against the rendering of of cross-
border services. 8 The EEC, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia also en-
tered into interim agreements designed to facilitate on a more immediate
basis the objectives of the association agreements.9 Hungary and Czecho-
slovakia are clearly contemplating full EC membership in the not too dis-
tant future and their securities laws bear an indelible European mark.
They will be able to integrate themselves into the EEC system, at least as
far as their securities laws go, although both countries and especially
Hungary will clearly be required to amend their laws to bring them into
full compliance with EEC directives upon accession to the Treaty of
Rome.
A brief comparison of the laws of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the
EEC as they apply to several of the salient issues mentioned above pro-
vides a useful overview of Central European securities laws and their rela-
tion to the EEC system of regulation. The analysis begins with financial
5. EC and Eastern European States Conclude Association Agreements, 1 Doing Bus.
in E. Eur. (CCH) 1 (January 1992).
6. EC Agreements With Eastern Nations Seen as First Step to EC Membership, 1 E.
Eur. Rep. (BNA) 226 (Dec. 23, 1991).
7. EC and Eastern European States Conclude Association Agreements, supra note 5,
at 2.
8. See id.
9. EC-Eastern Europe Interim Agreements Approved in European Parliament, 2 Do-
ing Bus. in Eur. (CCH) 28 (February 1992).
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services. One of the most important contemporary issues in the interna-
tional market for financial services involves the question of universal
banking - the rendering of both commercial and investment banking
services by the same institution, prohibited at least in theory in the
United States by the Glass-Steagall Act. EEC law will allow banks to pro-
vide both commercial and investment banking services throughout the
European Community on the basis of a single license issued by the home
state, provided the license authorizes both types of activities. Czechoslo-
vakia, like the EEC, permits universal banking0 but Hungary only allows
banks to engage in securities activities through subsidiaries."
Capital adequacy for securities firms is another controversial issue
worldwide having recently been resolved, however, at least in principle,
by the EEC.'2 Under Hungarian legislation, an underwriter or dealer
must have at least Ft 50 million (about US $650,000) in capital while an
ordinary broker must have either Ft 10 million (about US $130,000) or Ft
5 million (about US $70,000) depending upon whether it is organized as a
limited liability company or joint stock company, respectively." These re-
quirements compare to capital adequacy requirements in the European
Community of ECU 730,000 (about US $970,000) for all firms that do not
fall within one of the following two categories; ECU 125,000 (about US
$170,000) for firms that hold client funds but do not trade for their own
account; and ECU 50,000 (about US $70,000) for firms that do not hold
customer funds or trade for their own account. " Legislation that would
establish capital requirements for brokers operating in Czechoslovakia
has not yet been enacted, but minimum bank capitalization requirements
in Czechoslovakia are Kes 300 million'5 (US $11 million) compared to Ft
2 billion (US $25 million) in Hungary" and ECU 5 million (US $6.7
million) in the EEC.
10. New Law Allows Foreign Branches, Sets Rules for New Banks, Subsidiaries, 2 E.
Eur. Rep. (BNA) 164 (March 2, 1992).
11. Parliament Adopts Statute Establishing Western Standards, 1 E. Eur. Rep.
(BNA) 110 (Nov. 25, 1991).
12. Progress on EC Capital Adequacy and Investment Services Directives, Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep. (Buraff) (Aug. 10, 1992).
13. See infra notes 202-211 and accompanying text.
14. EC Finance Ministers Reach Agreement on Investment Services, Capital Direc-
tives, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (Buraff) (July 14, 1992). The standards reflect a recent compro-
mise reached by the Council of Ministers and and are subject to final approval within the
EEC decision-making structure. Id. See also Fox, EC Faces "Messy" Capital Adjustment -
UK Sources, Reuters (June 24, 1992); Progress on EC Capital Adequacy and Investment
Services Directives, supra note 12.
15. New Law Allows Foreign Branches, Sets Rules for New Banks, Subsidiaries, supra
note 10, at 165.
16. HUNGARY INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3, at 12. Lesser capitalization requirements
apply in the case of certain types of specialized banking institutions.
17. Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 On the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the
Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1, art. 4.
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Hungary"8 and Czechoslovakia 9 allow foreign ownership of domestic
banks, with some restrictions, Czechoslovakia allows foreign banch brank-
ing2 and the EEC allows ownership, branch banking and direct provision
of services by foreign banks from member countries and from outside the
EEC in certain cases.2 An important issue recently resolved in the EEC
involves bank access to stock exchanges.22 The European Community re-
cently decided to permit direct bank access subject to transition rules,2"
Czechoslovakia followed suit but Hungary resisted the measure, stating
"'[n]aturally all these EC rules cannot be introduced immediately.' "2
Issues concerning listing and trading securities on national stock ex-
changes and trading securities off the exchanges have been the subject of
vigorous international debate. British and German exchanges permit off-
exchange trading while France, Italy and Spain prohibit it,2" such dispa-
rate treatment contributing heavily to a year-long impasse over the EEC's
Investment Services Directive.2 The EEC recently reached a compromise
pursuant to which member states may but are not obligated to require
18. New Banking Law Expected to Encourage Foreign Investment, 1 E. Eur. Rep.
(BNA) 152 (Dec. 9, 1991)("[f]oreign and domestic investors...will be limited to 25 percent
of a bank's equity under the law").
19. New Law Allows Foreign Branches, Sets Rules for New Banks, Subsidiaries, supra
note 10, at 164 (foreigners may open branch banks, bank subsidiaries or new banks subject
to regulatory approval).
20. Id.
21. See Samuel Wolff, Securities Regulation in the European Community, 20 DENY. J.
OF INT'L L. & POL. 99, 120-125 (Fall 1991).
22. Some EC member states, such as Germany, permit direct bank access to stock ex-
changes, while others, including France, Italy and Spain disallow it. Roberta S. Karmel, The
Stalled Investment Services Directive, N.Y.L.J. 3 (June 18, 1992), citing Huang & Stoll,
MAJOR WORLD EQUITY MARKETS: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 30
(1991).
23. Progress on EC Capital Adequacy and Investment Services Directives, supra note
12.
24. New Banking Law Expected to Encourage Foreign Investment, supra note 18, at
152. In the United States, banks may become stock exchange members but "the Glass-Stea-
gall Act continues to make this freedom of access a nugatory right." Karmel, supra note 22.
25. Karmel, supra note 22.
26. See id.; Finance Ministers Deadlocked On Off-Exchange Trading Regulations, Int'l
Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 6 (Dec. 1990); Off-Exchange Trade Compromise Unlikely to Succeed,
4 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 4 (January 14, 1991). Professor Karmel summarized the EC
debate as follows:
[French proposals concerning off-exchange trading, transparency and bank ac-
cess to stock exchanges] led to a North-South split, with the United Kingdom,
Germany and the Netherlands arguing for latitude in the publication of trade
information (to suit SEAQ International market makers); permission to engage
in off-exchange trading (urged by the London Stock Exchange and the univer-
sal banks), and bank access to stock exchanges (of great importance to German
banks). France, Italy and Spain, more interested in protecting their national
brokers and retail investors, fought for prompt public reporting of trade infor-
mation, the prohibition of off-exchange trading and the restrictioin of stock
exchange membership to securities firms (which could be bank subsidiaries).
supra note 22.
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that trading occur on the exchange or other regulated market unless the
customer instructs otherwise.17 In Hungary listed securities may not be
traded off the Exchange" and, while Czechoslovakia's Stock Exchange
Act permits listed securities to be traded off the exchange to the extent
allowed by the stock exchanges,2 9 the Bratislava Stock Exchange has de-
termined to disallow the practice.30 Czechoslovakia and Hungary thus
have followed the French model in prohibiting off-exchange trading.
Czechoslovakia and Hungary both permit foreign persons to become
shareholders of domestic stock exchanges, subject to certain limitations.3 '
A subsidiary of Credit Suisse First Boston based in Prague is one of
twenty shareholders of the Prague Stock Exchange and several other ap-
plications from foreigners are pending, 32 while subsidiaries of both Ci-
tibank and Credit Suisse First Boston are shareholders of the Budapest
Stock Exchange. Foreign securities may be traded on the Budapest Stock
Exchange if they are issued in accordance with foreign law and otherwise
meet applicable listing requirements. 3 Legislation in Czechoslovakia per-
mits listing of foreign shares only if accepted by the stock exchange, and
Bratislava has stated that at present foreign securities will not be listed.
§2. HUNGARY
§2.01 Overview
Hungary has, for the time being, avoided the political paralysis hin-
dering the process of economic reform that characterizes the political cli-
mates of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary should be regarded as the
most stable of the three nations as well as a leader in the implementation
of free market economic reforms. Hungary's success has much to do with
the presence of a functioning government that has been able to pursue its
objectives consistently since the parliamentary elections held in the
spring of 1990. There can be, however, no absolute assurance that the
process of reform will continue in light of the fragile political equilibrium
that currently exists, although the prospects for reform appear to be
much brighter than in any of the other former Council of Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (CMEA) nations.
Following the parliamentary elections in 1990, a coalition government
led by Jozsef Antall and dominated by the Hungarian Democratic Forum
was established.3 " This coalition, somewhat weak to begin with, became
27. Progress on EC Capital Adequacy and Investment Services Directive, supra note
12.
28. See infra note 66.
29. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 43, 234 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
33. Id.
34. Barnabas Racz, The Hungarian Parliament's Rise and Challenges, RFE-RL RE-
SEARCH REPORT, Feb. 14, 1992, at 22-23.
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increasingly ineffective as economic benefits from the reforms failed to
meet public expectations.3 Progress on economic reform slowed as parlia-
mentary activity became highly politicized and threatened to halt the
transitional steps completely.36
The coalition government did not disintegrate, however, and contin-
ued gradual progress has been made toward necessary market reforms.
The mere preservation of a fairly effective parliamentary process stands
in marked cohtrast to the situations in Czechoslovakia and Poland.3 7 As
long as an effective government with a coherent program can be main-
tained, economic development and reform will likely press forward.
There is reason for a certain degree of optimism in this regard. The
Hungarian economy, although still in transition, is by no means in as crit-
ical condition as the economies of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The 1991
inflation rate in Hungary was 35.2 percent, as compared to 46 percent in
Czechoslovakia and 70 percent in Poland.3 8 Hungary has compensated for
the fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting loss of trade among former
CMEA nations by focusing on expanding trade with western industrial-
ized nations, especially the members of the Community.3 ' Furthermore,
Hungary signed an association agreement with the EEC in December of
1991, demonstrating its commitment to continue the process of economic
reform in order to meet the criteria for EEC membership after an associa-
tion period of ten years.4 °
A faltering of the current coalition government is a distinct possibil-
ity. Public opinion has been trending negatively toward the government
and in the highly politicized environment of parliament, unpredictable
events could fragment the current structure and slow or halt economic
reform. Both internal and external pressures are at work; for example,
pressures from a discontented citizenry displeased with a lack of benefits
anticipated from the economic reforms may increase and disputes be-
tween Hungary and its neighbors concerning the fate of Hungarian mi-
norities in Romania and Slovakia may arise.4 ' In May and June, 1992
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 24. Despite the fragile foundations of the coalition government, it was able to
pass 104 major legislative acts in 1990, which demonstrates the degree to which the Hun-
garian situation, however shaky, surpasses the deadlocked parliaments in Czechoslovakia
and Poland. Id.
38. Karoly Okolicsanyi, Hungarian Foreign Trade Turns From East to West, RFE-RL
RESEARCH REPORT, April 10, 1992, at 35 [hereinafter Foreign Trade]; Jan B. de Weydenthal,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland Gain Associate Membership in the EC, RFE-RL RE-
SEARCH REPORT, Feb. 7, 1992, at 26 [hereinafter Associate Membership].
39. Foreign Trade, supra note 38, at 34-36. Trade with western industrialized nations
accounted for 70 percent of Hungarian trade in 1991, including a 48 percent increase in the
amount of trade with the EEC. See id.
40. Associate Membership, supra note 38, at 24.
41. Interview with Professor Grzegorz Ekiert, Center for European Studies, Harvard
University (Sept. 1992).
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elections, voters expressed their dissatisfaction by voting for candidates
of the main opposition party to the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the
Free Democrats."
Despite these obstacles Hungary has established a system of securi-
ties regulation and reestablished its stock exchange. The Act on Securi-
ties and the Stock Exchange (the Securities Act)4 was adopted in Janu-
ary 1990 and is the principal law in Hungary concerning the issuance and
trading of securities and establishment of the stock exchange. This law is
interpreted and supplemented by the Hungarian State Securities Super-
visory Board (the SSB)" and is soon to be amended. 5 Some of those
amendments have been foreshadowed by amendments to certain rules of
the Budapest Stock Exchange (the Exchange). In addition, the Hungarian
Parliament in November 1991 adopted a law regulating investment
funds."
Hungary moved swiftly to reestablish the Exchange and after a forty-
two year hiatus, the Exchange officially reopened on June 21, 1990."" In
adopting the Securities Act, the government stated that a stock exchange
was necessary in order "to facilitate efficient capital flows, asset valua-
tions and to share risks inherent in fluctuations of quotations."4
Performance on the Exchange has been mixed. At the end of 1991,
there were securities of twenty five issuers trading (six of which were
listed) on the Exchange" and a total of about 14,500 transactions were
executed in 1991.50 In 1991, there were 19 new issues with a par value of
42. HUNGARY INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3, at 2 (Sept. 24, 1992).
43. Act VI of 1990 on the Public Issue of and Trade in Securities as well as on the
Stock Exchange, official translation as Act on Securities and the Stock Exchange, Public
Finance in Hungary, vol. 64 (Ministry of Finance, 1990)[hereinafter Securities Act]. The
Securities Act is translated in the above source and also at 8 HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN
FORCE 447 (1990). The Ministry of Finance translation is relied upon here; however, the
authors have also considered the other translation for purposes of interpretation. The Hun-
garian text of the Securities Act should be consulted in the case of actual transactions.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 50-59.
45. See Likely Amendments to Securities Law, MTI ECONEWS, Aug. 6, 1992 [hereinaf-
ter Likely Amendments].
46. Act LXIII of 1991 on Investment Funds, unofficial translation, 1991 U.S. Dep't. of
Commerce - NTIS Central & Eastern Europe Legal Texts (Nov. 4, 1991) (LEXIS, Europe
Library, EELEG file).
47. Reuter Textline, Hungary: The Budapest Stock Exchange Re-Opens on June 21,
DIE PRESSE, June 19, 1990 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Reuter File). See also DAVID
E.BIRENBAUM & DIMITRI P. RACKLIN, 1 BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE
SOVIET UNION: THE EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT, ch. 3, n.54
(1990) [hereinafter Business Ventures] (describes the beginning of the Exchange in 1864, its
closure in 1948 and the rebuilding of Hungarian securities markets started in 1983).
48. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 42(1).
49. HUNGARIAN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3, at 3 (Sept. 24, 1992).
50. Memorandum from Julia Romhinyi, Public Relations, Budapest Stock Exchange,
to Daniel Nelson, Holme Roberts & Owen (Sept. 21, 1992) (regarding salient figures on the
performance of the Budapest Stock Exchange in 1991).
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approximately Ft 12.1 billion (about US $150 million).5 1 Average daily
trading volume was about Ft 40 million (about US $500,000) in 1991.52
For the first six months of 1992, there were a total of about 5,700 transac-
tions executed, four new issues with a par value of approximately Ft 165
million (about US $2 million) and an average daily trading volume of ap-
proximately Ft 111 million (about US $1.4 million).5 3
§2.02 Regulatory Authorities
As is the case in the United States and throughout Europe, regula-
tion of securities markets is accomplished both by governmental and self-
regulatory authorities.
[1] State Securities Supervisory Board
The SSB has the responsibility of administering, interpreting and en-
forcing the Securities Act and supervising the operations of the Ex-
change.5 4 The SSB is a governmental agency that operates under the su-
pervision of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance. 5 The head of the SSB is
appointed by the Hungarian Council of Ministers0 and the structure and
operations of the SSB are set by the Ministry of Finance.5 7 The principal
offices of the SSB are located in Budapest.
The SSB has broad rule-making authority enabling it to determine
those transactions subject to the Securities Act5" and to expand the dis-
closure requirements for prospectuses.5 In this capacity it is subject to
applicable administrative procedure rules ° and the oversight of the Min-
istry of Finance. The oversight authority of the Ministry of Finance, how-
ever, is limited in that it can neither annul nor revise rules adopted by
the SSB 1 Nevertheless, the final determinations of the SSB generally are
subject to judicial review.2 The exception to this general rule concerns
decisions by the SSB to suspend the trading of securities on the
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Memorandum from Jiflia Romhknyi, Public Relations, Budapest Stock Exchange,
to Daniel Nelson, Holme Roberts & Owen (Sept. 21, 1992) (regarding salient figures on the
performance of the Budapest Stock Exchange in the first half-year of 1992).
54. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 4(2)-(3). The scope of the SSB's authority may be
expanded to include the "Commodity Exchange." Likely Amendments, supra note 45.
55. Securities Act, supra note 43, §§ 4(1) and 6(1).
56. Currently the SSB is headed by Zoltan Pacsi. Likely Amendments, supra note 45.
57. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 6(2).
58. Id. § 4(3).
59. Id. § 8(4); id. at pmbl. § 8. The SSB has broadened the prospectus disclosure re-
quirements with regard to securities traded on the Exchange. See Listing Rules, infra note
66.
60. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 4(4).
61. Id. § 4(5).
62. Id. § 4(6). Determinations of the SSB may not be appealed within the public ad-
ministration system. Id. pmbl.to § 4.
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Exchange."3
[2] Budapest Stock Exchange
The Budapest Stock Exchange is a self-governing and self-regulatory
authority whose legal existence is authorized under the Securities Act.6"
Its activities, organization and functions are determined by its Charter6 5
and Rules.66 General parameters for the Charter and Rules of the Ex-
change are included under the Securities Act.6" The Exchange's governing
instruments must provide for, inter alia, a procedure for accepting, sus-
pending, excluding, terminating and disciplining members68 and a system
of administering and applying sanctions.6 9 Listing and quotation require-
ments must also be included.
7 0
The highest governing body of the Exchange is the General Meeting
of members of the Exchange, which meets at least annually.7 1 Only the
General Meeting may amend the Charter, elect and remove officers of the
Exchange, approve the budget and approve extraordinary matters such as
liquidation, reorganization or combination involving the Exchange. 2 Each
member is entitled to one vote;" however, a member may be denied its
vote if it fails to meet certain trading performance criteria.
7 4
63. See Securities Act, supra note 43, §§ 4(6), 69-71.
64. Id. § 42. It should be noted that the Securities Act does not prohibit the creation of
more than one stock exchange in Hungary; rather, the Securities Act sets forth certain con-
ditions that must be met for founding an exchange. Id. pmbl. to § 42. To date, the only
stock exchange existing in Hungary is the Budapest Stock Exchange.
65. Charter of the Budapest Stock Exchange (June 19, 1990) (as amended Nov. 16,
1990) [hereinafter Charter].
66. The rules of the Exchange include, inter alia, Rules Regarding the Transactions to
be Carried Out on the Stock Exchange and Trading on the Floor of the Stock Exchange
(Oct. 5, 1990) (as amended May 9, 1991, Sept. 6, 1991, Dec. 6, 1991) [hereinafter General
Rules]; Rules Regarding the Requirements of the Listing and Trading of Securities on the
Stock Exchange (Jan. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Listing Rules]; Rules of Settlement (May 24,
1991); Rules Regarding the Depository of the Budapest Stock Exchange (July 30, 1992)
[hereinafter, collectively, Rules]. The General Rules have been amended since December 6,
1991; however, they are not currently available in English translation. Letter from The Bu-
dapest Stock Exchange to Holme Roberts & Owen (Oct. 6, 1992). The Securities Act re-
quires that the Charter and Rules of the Exchange and foundation of the Exchange be ap-
proved by the Council of Ministers upon motion of the Ministry of Finance. Securities Act,
supra note 43, § 43(2)-(3). Approval of the Rules has been delegated to the SSB.
67. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 44.
68. Id. § 44(1).
69. Id. § 44(1). Although the Securities Act is not explicit on this point, presumably
such rules must provide a fair procedure. Cf. U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§
6(b)(6) and (7), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 4 (1975, § 15A(b)(6), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 12(2) (1975), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5) and (i)0o(b)(6).
70. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 44(2).
71. Charter of the Budapest Stock Exchange, supra note 65, § VII (A)(13).
72. Id. § VII(A)(2).
73. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 52(2); Charter, supra note 71, § VII(A)(13).
74. Charter, supra note 65, § VII(A)(14) (stating a member "who had traded less than
10 percent of the average trading volume or number of transactions per Member during the
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The Stock Exchange Council is the chief managing body of the Ex-
change, the members of which are elected by the General Meeting. 75
Members of the Stock Exchange Council represent many distinct constit-
uencies, including the members of the Exchange, issuers of listed securi-
ties, investors and stock exchange dealers.7 6 The Stock Exchange Council
is responsible for, inter alia, determining the Rules of the Exchange, ad-
mitting new members, supervising Exchange activities and suspending
trading on the Exchange. 7
The Exchange also has several other bodies within its organizational
structure. The Charter establishes a Supervisory Committee to oversee
the finances and operations of the Exchange.7 It establishes an Ethics
Committee to promote fairness in trading on the Exchange 79 and a Secur-
ities Trading Committee responsible for trading operations, information
collection and dissemination and registration procedures, among other
things."
§2.03 Securities Markets
The distribution market is the market in which companies first issue
securities to the public.8 1 The distribution or primary market is distinct
from the trading or secondary market in that special selling efforts, for
example, by the issuer or a licensed underwriter are made. Conditions for
sale in the distribution market under the Securities Act are discussed be-
low together with the requirements for becoming a licensed underwriter.
82
Securities traded in the secondary market on the Exchange may be
either listed or unlisted, but in either case must meet certain basic crite-
ria. The main distinction between listed and unlisted securities in this
regard is that the former must meet certain requirements over and above
the minimum ones.
The Listing Rules set forth several basic criteria for admission of se-
curities (listed or unlisted) to the Exchange, including: (1) the securities
must be issued in accordance with Hungarian law,8" (2) the issuer must
one year preceding the General Meeting, is not entitled to vote").
75. Id. § VII(B)(3.1). The number of its members may range from five to thirteen. Id. §
VII(B)(4).
76. Id. § VII(B)(3.1)-(3.3). The representative for issuers is nominated by the Hun-
garian Chamber of Commerce and the SSB nominates the representative for investors. Id. §
VII(B)(3.3).
77. Id. § VII(B)(2).
78. Id. § VII(C)(1).
79. Id. § VII(D)(1). The Securities Act contains provisions applicable to the Exchange
in order to promote fair trade in securities and prevent manipulative acts and practices. See
Securities Act, supra note 43, pmbl. to §45.
80. Charter, supra note 65, § VII(E).
81. Technically, the distribution market also includes "secondary distributions," i.e.,
public offerings by selling shareholders.
82. See infra notes 202-211.
83. Listing Rules, supra note 66, II(1.1)(a). Foreign securities may be traded on the
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apply to the Exchange for admission,"' (3) the issuer must meet the pro-
spectus delivery 5 and periodic reporting requirements under the Listing
Rules,"6 (4) the issuer must not have been subject to a bankruptcy or
insolvency proceeding within two years before listing,87 (5) the issuer
must hold a public offering permit from the SSB, ss (6) the admission
must be sponsored by a member of the Exchange whose role as a sponsor
must be indicated in the issuer's prospectus which such member must
sign and the member must act as a market maker in the securities for a
specified period" and (7) certain technical provisions must be satisfied."
In addition to the basic criteria, securities traded on the Exchange,
but not listed, must meet the following requirements: (1) the par value of
the issue must exceed Ft 100 million,91 (2) at least ten percent of the issue
or at least Ft 200 million in value (based on the market price of the secur-
ities) must be publicly owned, 9 2 (3) there must be at least twenty five
owners of the issue,9" (4) the issuer or its predecessor must have at least
one year end balance sheet audited by an auditor registered with the Ex-
change"' and (5) such securities may not be traded other than on the
Exchange. 5
-The stricter requirements for listing on the Exchange include the ba-
sic criteria and those requirements for securities traded on the Exchange
specified above, plus: (1) the total value of the issue must be at least Ft
200 million,96 (2) at least twenty percent of the issue or at least Ft 500
Exchange as well if such securities are issued in accordance with the law of the foreign
jurisdiction. Id.
84. Id. § 1(6). In the case of bonds issued by investment funds, the fund manager must
apply for admission. Id. t § II(1.1)(a).
85. In the case of an application for listing by an issuer of a traded but unlisted secur-
ity, a supplementary prospectus must be delivered to the Exchange. See id. § III(4).
86. Id. § II(1.1)(c) See infra notes 170-83 and accompanying text.
87. Listing Rules, supra note 66, § II(1.1)(d).
88. Id. § II(1.1)(f).
89. Id. § II(1.1)(g). If the security admitted to the Exchange is a new issue, the mem-
ber-sponsor must act as a market maker in the security during the first 15 days of trading
on the Exchange. During that period the member must offer to purchase or sell at least Ft
300,000 (at market value) of the securities each day. Id.
90. See id. § 11(1.2) (specifies that denominations and float should be set to facilitate
trading, among other things).
91. Id. § II(1.3)(a).
92. Id. § II(1.3)(b). For purposes of the Listing Rules, securities held by less than five
percent holders and those owned by public investment funds and securities in foreign cus-
tody are counted for determining the amount of securities publicly owned. Listing Rules
1(5). In addition, for an issuer relying on the 10 percent standard to meet the trading re-
quirements, the value of the securities publicly held must be at least Ft 50 million. See id. §
11(2.2).
93. Id. § II(1.3)(c).
94. Id. § II(1.3)(d). The Listing Rules specify only that a balance sheet be audited and
do not expressly require any other financial statements. Id.
95. Id. § II(1.3)(e). Cf. infra note 100. See also supra note 3, 25-31 and accompanying
text for a discussion of off-exchange trading.
96. Listing Rules II(1.4)(a). This requirement probably relates to the par value al-
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million in value (based on the market price of the securities) must be
publicly owned,91 (3) there must be at least fifty owners of the issue," (4)
the issuer or its predecessor must have been in business for at least three
years and the financial statements for such years must have been audited
by an auditor registered with the Exchange90 and (5) such securities may
not be traded other than on the Exchange. 0 If the issuer fails to meet
these requirements after becoming listed, after a six month period during
which the issuer may remedy any default, the Stock Exchange Council
may de-list the security but continue to allow it to trade on the
Exchange.10'
Generally certain fees must be paid for all securities upon admission
to the Exchange. For an unlisted security to be traded an admission fee of
Ft 400,000 (Ft 200,000 in the case of investment bonds) is required.' For
an unlisted or other security to be listed, a Ft 200,000 listing fee in the
case of investment bonds and Ft 400,000 listing fee in the case of other
securities must be paid to the Exchange.'0 In addition, a continuous
trading fee must be paid annually for securities whether listed or not.' 0 '
The primary exception to this general rule is for Hungarian government
securities which are not subject to any admission or listing fee. 10 5
§2.04 "Security" Defined
The Securities Act does not set forth a general definition of "securi-
ties" nor does it define what "transactions" are covered. Those provisions
are left to the general provisions of the Civil Code'06 and interpretations
of the SSB.' °7 Thus, Section 2 of the Securities Act provides:
though the translation does not expressly so state.
97. Id. § II(1.4)(a). In addition, for an issuer relying on the 20 percent standard to
meet the listing requirements, the value of the securities publicly held must be at least Ft
200 million. See id. § 11(2.3).
98. Id. § II(1.4)(c).
99. Id. § II(1.4)(d).
100. Id. § II(1.4)(e) The requirement as to compulsory trading of listed securities on
the Exchange differs from that concerning unlisted but traded securities in that the latter
may apparently be traded off the Exchange under certain defined circumstances. See id. §8
II(1.3)(e) and (1.4)(e).
101. See id. § III(1.4)(c). The issuer, on its motion, may also request that its securities
be de-listed. Id. § III(4)(d). Once de-listed, the security may not be listed again for one year
from the date of the Stock Exchange Council's de-listing resolution and the issuer forfeits
any listing fee. Id. §§ III(4)(e)-(f). There are also several conditions on which listing may be
canceled. See id. § IV.
102. Id. § V(2.1).
103. Id.
104. Id. § V(2.2). Bonds and investment fund securities are entitled to a 20 percent and
50 percent discount, respectively, from the otherwise applicable continuous trading fees. Id.
105. Id. at § 11(4.1). Government securities are exempt from the listing requirements
otherwise applicable to other securities. But certain data is required in the application for
admission. Id. at 11(4.2).
106. Securities Act, supra note 43, pmbl. pt.a.
107. The Listing Rules of the Exchange specify investment bonds issued by closed-end
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The public issue of, and the trading in the following securities are
governed by this Act:
a. bonds (unless transferability is constrained either by law or the
issuer),
b. shares, and
c. all other types of securities representing transferable rights and ob-
ligations arising from a legal relationship (lending or membership) be-
tween the issuer and the securities holder, issued in large series in
accordance with the provisions of Act IV:1959 on the Civil Code in
ways and forms as defined therein.'0 8
Under the Civil Code, securities include debt instruments such as
bonds'0 9 and shares representing interests in companies."' Certain instru-
ments that would otherwise fall within the definition of securities for pur-
poses of the Civil Code, however, are excluded from the purview of the
Securities Act. Thus, checks, deposit savings instruments, certificates of
deposits, credit notes, target credit notes of and business stakes in co-
operatives, and bills of exchange are excluded."'
§2.05 Public Offerings of Securities
[1] Prospectus Filing and Approval
If securities are publicly offered by an issuer in Hungary, the offering
will generally require the filing of a prospectus with and approval of the
prospectus by the SSB." 2 This filing and approval process has as its
objectives to create "a transparent and well-informed securities market"
and to provide investor protection."' SSB approval does not amount to
approval or endorsement of the issuer or the offered securities, but "only
investment funds, government securities and compensation notes (form of security issued by
the National Compensation Office) in addition to those specified in the Securities Act. See
Listing Rules, supra note 66, at §§ I(3)-(4).
108. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 2(1). The Securities Act defines "bonds" as a
credit relationship "in which the issuer (the debtor) acknowledges receipt of a certain
amount of money and binds himself to repay the amount received (principal) as well as the
interest or any other yield (hereinafter interest) calculated in a predetermined manner for
interest-bearing securities and to render other services to the securities holders (creditors)."
Id. § 3a. "Shares" are defined as a security "in which the issuer acknowledg[es] the receipt
for possession or use of a certain amount of money or other property, whose value has been
determined in terms of money and binds himself to assign certain proprietary or other
rights to the holders of such securities." Id. § 3b.
109. See Civil Code, ch. XXVIII/A, § 338/A(2) ("A document possessing the requisites
determined by statute and issue (drawing) of which is allowed by statute shall be considered
a security"). Shares, bonds, exchequers' bills, deposit savings bonds, property certificates,
bills of exchange and checks are referenced. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 2(2)(a).
110. See Civil Code, ch. XXVIII/A, § 338/C ("A security may be drawn - according to
separate legal rule - on ownership or another right concerning a thing or on an entitlement
originating from membership as well").
111. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 2(2)(b).
112. The term "prospectus" is not defined in the Securities Act.
113. Securities Act, supra note 43, pmbl. to §23.
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implies that the [p]rospectus includes the data and analyses as required
by the provisions of the [Securities] Act." ''
In Hungary, the issuer may publicly offer its securities directly or
enlist a licensed underwriter to act in its stead. 1 5 If the issuer enlists an
underwriter, the underwriter rather than the issuer must secure approval
of the SSB under the Securities Act; otherwise the issuer must obtain
such approval. 6 In either case, the prospectus must be approved before
its publication, which approval becomes stale thirty days from the date
upon which approval was granted. 7 The issuer or the underwriter as the
case may be is required to make "post-effective" amendments to the pro-
spectus after approval by the SSB but before the closing of the offer-
ing. 1 ' Such amendments, however, need only be made with respect to
"essential facts or circumstances." '9 Post-effective amendments may be
ordered by the SSB on its own motion.110 Failure to obtain approval of a
prospectus by the SSB makes the issuance and sale of securities on the
basis of such prospectus null and void. "
[2] Issuer-Specific Public Offering Preconditions
In addition to the prospectus approval requirements, the Securities
Act contains several conditions to the public issuance of securities. For
bonds and debentures, the issuer must have at least a twelve-month oper-
ating history.'22 Apparently an issuer may tack the operating history of
its predecessor to meet the operating history requirement. The purpose of
the operating history requirement is to provide potential investors with
historical information enabling them to appraise the investment risk asso-
ciated with the offered securities and the issuer's past results and per-
formance. 12 3 Public offerings of bonds and debentures generally must be
accomplished through a licensed underwriter.' 2' The Securities Act ex-
empts issuers of shares in an initial public offering from the operating
114. Id. pmbl. to §8.
115. In the case of a public offering of bonds or debentures, the issuer generally must
enlist a licensed underwriter. Id. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
116. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 8(2).
117. Id. §§ 8(1) and (5). It should be noted, however, that at the issuer's request, the
SSB may extend by sixty days the subscription period and presumably extend the date
upon which the prospectus becomes stale. In such event the SSB may require the issuer to
update the prospectus. Id. § 32(1).
118. Id. § 9(2). The term "post-effective" is used by analogy from the concept of a
registration statement being declared effective under the U.S. securities laws. There is no
procedure under the Hungarian Securities Act for the SSB to declare a prospectus effective.
119. Id.
120. Id. § 9(3).
121. Id. § 24(a).
122. Id. § 23(1)(a). This requirement does not apply with respect to securities issued by
the Hungarian government. Id.
123. Securities Act, supra note 43, pmbl. to § 23.
124. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 23(1)(c). and pmbl. to § 23. This rule does not
apply to financial institutions that issue their own bonds. Securities Act § 23(1)(c).
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history requirement; however, where the public offering of shares would
increase the issuer's registered capital, the operating history requirement
applies. 2 5 This exemption seems aimed at facilitating access to capital
markets by newly established issuers.
1 26
[3] Contents of the Prospectus
The contents of the prospectus are prescribed by the Securities Act
the requirements of which may be supplemented by the SSB.127 More
complete disclosure guidelines have been adopted with respect to securi-
ties that are admitted to trade on the Exchange."' The Securities Act
requires that a prospectus include: (1) a description of the issuer 29 and
its business,"' ° (2) current certified financial information, s ' (3) use of pro-
ceeds disclosure'13 2 (4) a description of the share capital of the issuer and
the securities to be issued,'3 3 (5) other information about the offering,"2
125. Securities Act, supra note 43, §§ 23(2) and (3). It is unclear under what circum-
stances a public offering would not increase registered capital; thus, this exception appears
inconsequential. Increases in registered capital are discussed in Act VI of 1988 on Economic
Associations, §§ 301-309. See also Securities Act § 27 (discussing use of prospective informa-
tion in the prospectus).
126. Securities Act, supra note 43, pmbl. to § 23.
127. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The disclosure required by the Securi-
ties Act should be compared to that required under Regulation S-K in the U.S. Some items
of disclosure are similar, although Regulation S-K is much more detailed. Nevertheless, the
drafters of the Securities Act seemed to have contemplated that capital markets would work
to cause issuers to follow international practice in preparing their prospectuses. Securities
Act, supra note 43, pmbl. to § 26. It was announced recently, however, that the SSB has
begun work on amendments to the Securities Act that will include more thorough disclosure
guidelines applicable to Prospectuses. See Likely Amendments, supra note 45.
128. See infra notes 129-131, 136-137.
129. Such description must include the name of the issuer, its address, date of founda-
tion, the scope of its activities, its duration (i.e., whether perpetual or limited), the amount
of its registered capital, number of employees and information concerning the experience
and qualifications of its senior management and directors. Securities Act, supra note 43, §
26a. The Listing Rules require that the prospectus specify the following additional informa-
tion about the issuer: (1) a breakdown of registered capital at formation and at the time of
drafting the prospectus, (2) the date of the issuer's contract of association, (3) its fiscal year
and (4) place where the issuer publishes announcements. Listing Rules, supra note 66, §
11(6.2.1). As to employees, the issuer also must disclose the average incomes of employees
comparing such current amounts with those applicable to prior years. Id. § 11(6.2.10).
130. The issuer's business must be described in depth and include "information about
production, sales, [research and development] and investments." Securities Act, supra note
43, § 26(b). Cf. Listing Rules, supra note 66, § 11(6.2.6).
131. Securities Act, supra note 43, §§ 25(2) and 26(c). The Listing Rules require both
summary and more detailed financial information. Listing Rules, supra note 66, §§ 11(6.2.3)
and 11(6.2.8). Some consolidation of financial information concerning the issuer's subsidiar-
ies may be required. See id. § 11(6.2.8).
132. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 26(d)(2).
133. Id. §§ 26(d)(3) and (4).
134. The Securities Act enumerates the following: (1) the governing body of issuer de-
ciding to make the offering and the date of that body's decision, (2) the amount of funds to
be raised, (3) the number of the series and serial numbers of securities to be offered, (4) the
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(6) a description of the procedures that will be followed in the event of
over- or under-subscription," 5 (7) a discussion of the history of prior of-
ferings of the issuer's securities,"' (8) disclosure as to the security hold-
ings of the issuer's senior management,"3 7 (9) disclosure of major risk fac-
tors concerning the issuer's business,1 3s (10) a statement that the issuer
and underwriters, if any, are jointly and severally liable for any damage
incurred by the holder of securities as a result of misleading information
in the offering materials' and (11) a statement of the role of the public
prosecutor and the SSB in protecting investors."1
0
If bonds or debentures are offered, the prospectus must include, in
addition to the disclosure described above, a description of the bonds or
debentures including their maturity, terms and conditions and any finan-
cial guarantees underlying such instruments."" In the event that a legal
entity is a guarantor of such instruments, information about such guaran-
tor must be included.1
42
The Listing Rules contain special rules with respect to disclosure for
investment fund securities. No such rules are included in the Securities
Act. Those rules require, inter alia, (1) the disclosure of the fund's invest-
ment and dividend policies, (2) a description of the fund's portfolio, (3)
the method of calculating the sales price of investment bonds, (4) a
description of fees, (5) rules regarding distribution or reinvestment of the
fund's assets, (6) a description of the fund manager and (7) risk factor
disclosure.1
3
[4] Delivery and Publication Requirements
The Securities Act contains no specific prospectus delivery require-
opening and closing date of the subscription and the place of subscription, (5) the opening
and closing date of the sale and place of sale, (6) a description of preemptive rights, (7) the
expected price at issuance and (8) the identity of the underwriter. Id. § 26(d).
135. Id. § 26.d.13. Cf. Act VI of 1988 on Economic Associations §§ 255 (describing over-
subscription in the case of the initial foundation of a joint-stock company) and 256 (describ-
ing under-subscription procedures).
136. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 26(e). The amount of funds raised in previous
offerings must be described. The Listing Rules require special emphasis on public offerings
within one year prior to admission on the Exchange and contain a detailed list of items that
must be covered in such disclosure. See Listing Rules, supra note 66, § 11(6.2.5).
137. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 26(f). The Listing Rules require a list of the "ma-
jor" owners of the issuer and their share ownership. Listing Rules, supra note 66, § 11(6.2.2)
("major" is not defined).
138. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 29(3). The drafters of the Securities Act contem-
plate highlighting the risk factors by printing them in red or other colors that differ from
the rest of the print used in the prospectus and using a prominent typeface. Id. pmbl. to
§29.
139. Id. §§ 29(4) and 83.
140. Id. §§ 29(4) and 84.
141. Id. § 28.
142. Id. § 29(2). See also Listing Rules, supra note 66, § 11(6.2.4).
143. Listing Rules, supra note 66, §§ II(6.3)(a)- (d).
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ment. An offer can be made by advertisement' but only after such ad-
vertisement and the prospectus are approved by the SSB. 145 The adver-
tisement must include a statement about the fact of the public offering,
the SSB approval number and the location, time and method of inspect-
ing the prospectus.'6 The advertisement must "be published in two na-
tional daily newspapers as well as the official gazette of the [Exchange] at
least seven days before subscription.
'14 7
The Securities Act does not deal specifically with the release of infor-
mation about an issuer after the issuer's determination to make a public
offering of its securities but before the prospectus is approved by the
SSB. As discussed above, however, clearly it would be impermissible for
an issuer to advertise the fact of a proposed public offering before such
approval. Moreover, any issuance or sale of securities will be null and
void if such issuance or sale precedes an approved prospectus.' In addi-
tion, the Securities Act provides that subscriptions may be accepted only
during the subscription period. 4 What is lacking then are the parame-
ters of what may be released by an issuer that may be tantamount to
"conditioning the market" for the proposed public offering. Clearly, the
Hungarian government and the SSB will have to consider clarifying or
adding rules applicable to "gun-jumping" by issuers and undcrwriters.
The Securities Act's treatment of issues such as the timing of sub-
scription and the issuance and sale of securities is unclear. The Securities
Act defines "subscription" as "the process whereby customers, intent
upon purchasing securities as a result of the public offering, sign the sub-
scription-sheet, undertaking in accordance with the said sheet to make
either a cash payment or pledge non-cash assets to be made available to
the issuer via" the underwriter.9 By operation of Section 30 of the Se-
curities Act, which contains the seven-day, pre-subscription advertise-
ment requirement, Section 23(4), which requires SSB approval prior to
advertisement, Section 8(5), which sets forth a thirty-day period after
which the prospectus becomes stale and Section 32(1), which contains the
sixty-day subscription period extension rule, it appears that the subscrip-
tion period may begin no earlier than seven days after SSB approval and
will close within thirty days after SSB approval unless extended for an
additional sixty-day period. The closing date for the offering, however,
may occur before the designated closing date if the offering is fully sub-
scribed and the option to have a sooner closing date was disclosed in the
prospectus.''
144. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 30.
145. Id. § 23(4).
146. Id. § 30.
147. Id.
148. Id. § 24.
149. Id. § 32(4).
150. Id. § 3(m).
151. Id. § 32(2). The results of the offering must be reported to the SSB within seven
days following the closing of the subscription period. Id. § 32(3).
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How the foregoing will work in the context of a managing under-
writer assembling an underwriting syndicate for a firm commitment un-
derwriting is unclear. In that context it is standard practice in the U.S.,
for example, for a managing underwriter to assemble an underwriting
syndicate after the filing of a registration statement but before the regis-
tration statement is declared effective. The commitments of the under-
writing and selected dealers groups then are memorialized in underwrit-
ing and selected dealer agreements that generally set the number of
shares agreed to be purchased, the public offering price, the underwriters'
discount and dealers' commissions. Presumably such activities by the un-
derwriters and selected dealers will not be deemed a part of the subscrip-
tion; otherwise the Securities Act would unnecessarily frustrate these im-
portant selling efforts.
[5) Filings Required by the Exchange
For a security that will be traded on the Exchange, in addition to the
advertisement required in the Exchange's official gazette, 52 the Listing
Rules of the Exchange require a prospectus to be delivered 5 3 and compli-
ance with certain periodic reporting requirements.15 4 The Listing Rules
specify the same type of information be included in a prospectus deliv-
ered to the Exchange as that prepared under the Securities Act; however,
the Listing Rules are more detailed than the Securities Act and in some
cases provide for disclosure necessary to analyze whether the issuer meets
the requirements for trading on the Exchange. The prospectus disclosure
requirements are discussed above. 5 The periodic reporting requirements
under the Listing Rules of the Exchange are much more detailed and
more extensive than those specified under the Securities Act.'5 6 An issuer
must publish a quarterly report and submit it to the Exchange for each
quarter including year end. 5 ' The annual report of the issuer prepared
under Law XVIII of 1991 on Accounting'5 8 (the Accounting Law) must be
submitted to the Exchange. 5 9 The Listing Rules to some extent also
track the Securities Act with regard to interim reporting of certain
events. 6 ' Matters that must be included in such periodic reports are dis-
152. See supra text accompanying note 144.
153. Listing Rules, supra note 66, § 11(6.1).
154. Id. §§ III(1)-(3).
155. See infra text accompanying notes 127-143.
156. See Listing Rules, supra note 66, § III and discussion infra § 2.07.
157. Listing Rules, supra note 66, § III(1.1). These reports are referred to as "quick"
reports and are similar to the Form 10-Q reports required under the U.S. securities laws.
Quick reports must contain financial information, changes in the issuer's structure, changes
in share ownership and an assessment of the quarter plus a summary of all extraordinary
interim reports. Id.
158. Law XVIII of 1991 on Accounting (May 14, 1991), unofficial translation, 11/15
HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE (Aug. 1, 1991).
159. Listing Rules, supra note 66, § 111(1.2.1).
160. Id. § 111(3) and discussion infra § 2.07.
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cussed below. 161
§2.06 Exempt Offerings
The Securities Act exempts from its coverage the non-public issue of
securities. '62 This exemption is similar to that available under Section
4(2) of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 for transactions not involving a
public offering. 6 ' The "public issue" of securities is defined as the sale of
securities by a public offering."6 For there to be a "public offering" two
conditions must be satisfied. First, a statement calling for the purchase of
or subscription for securities must be published either in the press or in
other media. 6 ' Second, the statement must be aimed at potential custom-
ers whose range has not been predetermined.'6 6
Although private placements are likely to be a significant part of the
Hungarian capital markets, the uncertainties regarding the scope of the
Securities Act and its application to such transactions will be determined
by practice over time. Obviously, the contours of a non-public offering are
not well defined by the Securities Act and will be interpreted by the SSB
and Hungarian courts and possibly future law. Until then one should, at a
minimum, rely on international standards concerning private placements,
i.e., deal with only sophisticated investors, limit the size and scope of the
offering, avoid anything which could be deemed a publication constituting
a solicitation of offerees and the like.1
67
§2.07 Periodic Reporting Requirements
The Securities Act requires issuers of securities to report periodically
to the SSB, the Exchange, security holders and the public.' 68 As de-
scribed above, the reporting requirements under the Listing Rules of the
Exchange differ in certain respects from the requirements of the Securi-
ties Act.6 9
[1] Annual Reports
An issuer's annual report must be prepared according to the provi-
sions of the Accounting Law, and include the issuer's financial statements
and a report on the issuer's business.'"" Issuers must file with the SSB
161. See accompanying text infra notes 172-176, 178, 180-82.
162. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 2(2)(a).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988).
164. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 3(n).
165. Id. § 31.
166. Id.
167. An issuer or other person contemplating an actual private placement or other
transaction in Hungary should consult with counsel prior to the transaction.
168. See Securities Act, supra note 43, §§ 33-4.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 154-160.
170. Listing Rules, supra note 66, § III(1.2.1). Under the Securities Act the annual re-
port must include: (1) a summary of events of the issuer for the year covered by the annual
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and deliver to security holders an annual report by May 31 following the
end of the year for which the annual report is prepared.""
The annual report must include: (1) general information about the
issuer;17 2 (2) a description of its share capital, including, inter alia, classes
of securities, their par values, their denominations (apparently for debt
securities), rights attaching to such securities and changes in such rights
during the past year;1 7 3 (3) disclosure about the issuer's management and
employees, such as share ownership of senior management, changes in
senior management and information concerning the number of employees
and wages;"7 4 (4) information about the business of the issuer and an
analysis of its financial position, including the prospects and plans of the
issuer for the current year and a "description of all... factors which are
necessary for the assessment of the Company;''171 and (5) an updated risk
factor disclosure.
76
[2] Quarterly "Quick" Reports
Issuers with securities listed on the Exchange, in addition to annual
reports, must publish and file quarterly reports (referred to as "Quick"
reports) with the Exchange.'7 7 Quick reports must be filed within 30 days
after the end of each quarter, presumably the calendar quarter. A Quick
report is required at the end of the year even though much of the infor-
mation contained in that report will otherwise be included in the issuer's
annual report.
Quick reports are required to include certain financial information
about the issuer, changes in the issuer, its management and employees
report, (2) certified financial statements for that year and an auditor's report, (3) material
information regarding new issuances of the issuer's securities during the year and (4) a
description of new senior management employed during the year. Securities Act, supra note
43, § 33(4). At the time of this writing, the SSB had begun work on amendments to the
Securities Act that would provide for fuller disclosure guidelines applicable to annual re-
ports. See Likely Amendments, supra note 45.
171. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 33(3). The annual report must also be delivered to
the Exchange by such date. Listing Rules § III(1.2.1). Investment funds must prepare a
biannual report in accordance with the Accounting Law and submit such report to the Ex-
change by August 29 of the applicable year. Id. § III(1.2.4). Investment funds must also
prepare and submit annual reports within 120 days after the end of their business year. Id. §
111(1.2.5).
172. Specifically, the general information must include, inter alia, the date of the is-
suer's foundation, the location of its headquarters, the date of its incorporation (or the
equivalent), the amount of the issuer's initial capital and current capital, the activities for
which it is registered to undertake, the identity of its auditors and a description of its own-
ership structure. Listing Rules, supra note 66, § III(1.2.3)(b).
173. Id. § III(1.2.3)(b).
174. Id. § III(1.2.3)(c).
175. Id. §§ III(1.2.3)(d)-(e). Apparently, the Listing Rules contemplate a discussion of
"material" factors.
176. In particular, the Listing Rules require that "[a]ny changes in risk factors occur-
ring in the course of the year" be disclosed. Id. § III (1.2.3)(f).
177. Id. § III(1.1).
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and the share ownership of its management, changes in ownership affect-
ing five percent or more of the issuer's share capital and an assessment of
the issuer during the reporting period including a summary of any in-
terim event reports issued during such period.7 8
[3] Interim Reporting of Extraordinary and Certain Other Events
Interim reporting is required with respect to certain extraordinary
events. To the extent the issuer has published previously any untrue
statement that may affect the value of the issuer's securities, the issuer
has an obligation to publish corrective information.'79 Examples of re-
portable events include: (1) proposed or actual changes in the rights of
security holders, (2) an issuance of new securities, (3) the declaration of
dividends, (4) conclusion of an agreement that includes securities transfer
restrictions, (5) a change in the issuer's business activities, (6) regulatory
and other changes in law that may affect the issuer's performance,, (7)
changes in senior management and other key personnel, (8) a significant
change in ownership of the issuer's share capital, (9) a merger, consolida-
tion, reorganization or other substantial change to the issuer's organiza-
tion,8 0 (10) the loss of ten percent or more ls" of the issuer's capital assets,
(11) material legal proceedings initiated against the issuer, (12) the loss of
material subsidies, (13) a material debt undertaking or issuance of securi-
ties by the issuer and (14) the announcement of a General Meeting of
security holders."8 2
At present the time for disclosure of such events differs under the
Listing Rules and the Securities Act. Issuers must report such events to
the Exchange within one business day and to the SSB and the public
within two days from the date of such event, provided that the event was
not previously referenced in the issuer's most recent periodic report. 8 3
§2.08 Insider Trading
Part VI of the Securities Act contains the provisions directed at trad-
178. Id. §§ III(1.1.a)-(d). There is no requirement that the financial information in-
cluded in such report be audited.
179. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 34(3). The correction must be published within
two working days. Id.; Listing Rules § 111(2.4). The Securities Act and the Listing Rules,
however, do not specify when the two-day publication requirement begins to run. The pe-
riod probably commences from the date the issuer discovers the untrue statement, although
arguably it could begin on the date the issuer should have discovered the untrue statement.
180. Stock splits are dealt with under separate regulation in the Listing Rules, however,
such events are reportable as extraordinary events requiring interim reporting. See Listing
Rules, supra note 66, § 111(2.1).
181. The Listing Rules set forth a 15 percent criterion. Id. § 111(2.1).
182. See Securities Act, supra note 43, § 33(2); Listing Rules, supra note 66, § 111(2.1).
183. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 34(1); Listing Rules, supra note 66, § 111(2.1).
Section 34 of the Securities Act contains a two day notification requirement with respect to
the Exchange, however, until amended, the rule, at least for issuers whose securities are
admitted for trading on the Exchange, is one day.
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ing on the basis of inside information. 184 The Securities Act prohibits the
entering into and payment of commissions with respect to securities
transactions if insiders are involved or if such transactions are based on
inside information. 8 5 The trading of securities in such transactions is re-
ferred to as "insider trading."186
The Securities Act defines inside information and enumerates certain
classes of persons that are insiders. Inside information includes certain
non-public information that "may materially influence either the value or
the quotation of the securities.' 8 7 For purposes of the Securities Act, in-
siders include "senior staff members or senior managers of the issuer,
traders in securities or the legal entity in which the issuer has a major
stake, or which has a major stake in the issuer ... as well as those of the
bank keeping the accounts of the issuer;" relatives of such persons; ten
percent holders and their relatives; and auditors, legal counsel and tax
consultants who within six months prior to the suspect transaction were
employed or had some other relationship with the issuer.188 In addition a
tippee may be an insider if he has been given inside information or could
have had access to such information and was aware that the information
acquired was inside inforination."8O
Liability runs not only to the insider undertaking a transaction for
his own benefit, but also vicariously for transactions undertaken for the
benefit of third parties.' Insider trading is presumed in the event of a
purchase and sale or a sale and purchase of securities by certain statutory
insiders' within a three-month period. 9 2 However, unlike Section 16(b)
liability under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which imposes
strict liability for certain transactions by specified insiders within a six-
month period, the Securities Act provides a defense in the event that the
insider can prove he had no inside information available to him.8 3 The
insider's burden of proof in such circumstances will probably be ex-
tremely difficult to satisfy and, thus, the availability of this defense
184. Securities Act, supra note 43, §§ 75-80.
185. Id. § 75(1).
186. Id.
187. Id. § 75(2). The Securities Act lists examples of the types of information that may
be material, including "information concerning the financial, economic or legal status of the
issuer, trader in securities, guarantor or the party providing surety or any change therein"
and "data on new security issuers, significant business deals, organizational changes, eco-
nomic rehabilitation or winding-up procedures." Id. The list is not exclusive. See id. pmbl.
to § 75.
188. Id. § 76(1).
189. Id. § 76(2).
190. Id. § 77.
191. This provision applies only to transactions by senior staff members or senior man-
agers of the issuer, traders in securities or the legal entity in which the issuer has a major
stake, or which has a major stake in the issuer as well as those of the bank keeping the
accounts of the issuer and relatives of such persons. Id. §§ 76(1)(a)-(b) and 78.
192. Id. § 78.
193. Id.
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should be limited.
Certain transactions are specifically excluded from those considered
insider trading. Thus, it is not insider trading if the insider "had to sell
the securities as a liquidator in order to satisfy creditors" or "has trans-
acted the deal with a person who also had the same insider information
available to him.'
'1 94
The SSB may exercise certain remedial action in the case of a viola-
tion of the insider trading provisions of the Securities Act. The SSB may
"call upon the observation of the terms and conditions" under Section 75
of the Securities Act, suspend the quotation, sales or trade of an issuer's
securities, constrain or suspend transactions within certain lines of activ-
ity, cause dismissal of senior management and staff, withdraw a previ-
ously granted license and investigate and initiate appropriate legal or ad-
ministrative action against violators.' 9 In addition, the public prosecutor
or the SSB may initiate suit against an issuer, underwriter or insider to
seek to make null and void the transaction conducted on the basis of in-
side information. 9
The Securities Act also sets forth a reporting requirement for trans-
actions conducted by insiders (but not tippees).' 97 Thus, a transaction
constituting insider trading must be reported to the SSB. A failure to
report may result in liability imposed by the SSB."9 ' The penalty may
range from 200 to 500 percent of the market value of the securities traded
in the insider transaction. 99
Despite its insider trading provisions, the Securities Act does not ex-
plicitly make insider trading unlawful as a manipulative or deceptive
practice.2 0 0 It also does not require the insider trading information re-
ported to the SSB be made publicly available.0 '
§2.09 Licensing of Broker-Dealers and Underwriters
A person must be licensed in order to "engage in the trading of se-
curities."20 2 This requirement parallels those in the U.S. and Europe. An
underwriter, broker or dealer may be licensed to engage in certain securi-
194. Id. § 79.
195. Id. § 17(1).
196. Id. § 84(l). The Municipal Court of Budapest has jurisdiction in such cases. Id. §
84(2).
197. Id. § 80.
198. Id. § 18(1)(e).
199. Id. § 19(2)(e). The Securities Act establishes a statute of limitations on the SSB's
ability to fine a reporting violator. Thus, "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on anyone by the
SS[B] after 6 months from the date it has first received information about the violation...
or after two years from such violation." Id. § 18(3).
200. See 1 Business Ventures, supra note 47, ch.3, n. 56, (indicating that this omission
has been criticized by Western commentators).
201. Beata Majer, Investors Protected, THE HUNGARIAN OBSERVER, June 1992.
202. Securities Act, supra note 43, § 10(1). The SSB is responsible for licensing broker-
dealers and underwriters. Id.
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ties transactions,0 3 provided that criteria enumerated in the Securities
Act are satisfied. The licensee must be organized in Hungary either as a
limited liability company or a joint stock company.
20 '
An underwriter or dealer must meet a higher standard for capitaliza-
tion than a broker; otherwise the licensing criteria are the same. An un-
derwriter or dealer must have at least Ft 50 million of issued and paid-up
capital and a broker must have either Ft 5 million or Ft 10 million of
issued and paid-up capital depending on whether the broker is organized
as a limited liability company or joint stock company, respectively. 0 5 The
standard licensing requirements that must be met regardless of whether
the proposed licensee is an underwriter, dealer or broker are that: (1) its
only business must be the underwriting of and trading in securities (if an
underwriter or dealer) or brokerage activities (if a broker),0 6 (2) it must
demonstrate the capability of conducting the activities sanctioned under
the license207 and (3) it must have its governing documents (i.e., articles
of association) approved by the SSB.
20 8
The Securities Act includes certain restrictions on licensed under-
writers, dealers and brokers designed to, inter alia, minimize the poten-
tial for market manipulation and promote market transparency vis-a-vis
the ownership structure of securities firms and their interests in issuers.
20 9
Thus, limits are imposed on the direct and indirect ownership by securi-
ties firms of shares of other securities firms.210 In addition, securities
firms are prohibited from trading in their own securities or the securities
of an issuer in which they have a direct or indirect in excess of certain
prescribed limits.
211
203. Id. § 11(1).
204. Id.
205. Id. §§ 11(1)(a) and 11(2)(a). In the event a license is granted to an underwriter (or
dealer) that will also be licensed as a broker, the higher capitalization requirement under
Section 11(1)(a) applies. Id. § 11(3).
206. Id. §§ 11(1)(b) and 11(2)(b). The Securities Act limits the application of these
restrictions somewhat. Thus, a licensed underwriter, broker or dealer is not prohibited from
engaging in "investment consultancy, securities deposit management and securities manage-
ment," for example, and transactions not subject to the Securities Act. Id. §§ 11(4)(a)-(b).
207. In this regard, the applicant must show that it has "all the facilities and technical
conditions required for such activities" and that it "employ[s] a specialist to manage the
activity and the transactions - or a limited liability company has a member providing such
ancillary services - who has a clean criminal record, at least two years of experience in secur-
ities transactions and has passed the examination required by the SS[B]." Id. §§ 11(1)(c)-
(d).
208. Id. § 11(1)(e).
209. See id. pmbl. to §12. These conditions apply to applicants as well. Id. § 12.
210. Securities Act, supra note 43, §§ 12(1)-(3).
211. Id. § 12(4).
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§3 CZECHOSLOVAKIA
§3.01 Overview
[1] Political and Economic System
The events leading to the separation of the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics render the future of economic reforms uncertain. Paralysis at the fed-
eral level and rapid movement toward the creation of two sovereign states
has signaled the demise of the Czechoslovak federation. The program de-
veloped for the transition to a market economy will meet with different
responses in each of the two newly constituted republics and it is likely
that reforms currently underway will be altered or reversed, especially by
the Slovak Republic, once the separation has been accomplished.
The current political situation in Czechoslovakia is one of stalemate
in the Federal Assembly juxtaposed with two republican parliaments hav-
ing majority parties. As a result of parliamentary elections held June 5
and 6, 1992, the Civic Democratic Party gained control of the Czech Na-
tional Council, while the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia attained a
majority position in the Slovak National Council." 2 These two ruling par-
ties "pursue widely disparate political and economic agendas"2 ' that pre-
vent them from arriving at a common policy which might provide for the
-continued existence of the Czechoslovak federation.
Vladimir Meciar, Slovak prime minister and head of the Movement
for a Democratic Slovakia, and his Czech counterpart Vaclav Klaus, of
the Civic Democratic Party, reached agreements on June 20, 1992, for the
proposed course of federal dissolution.2"" Part of these agreements stipu-
late that the reform measures enacted by the Czechoslovak federation
will remain effective until the separation is finalized," 5 but pragmatically
this accord is questionable in light of Meciar's plans articulated before
the elections to modify the course of Slovak economic reform. Specifi-
cally, Meciar proposed more state control of economic activity in the
Slovak Republic,2"' contrary to the "shock therapy" policies initiated in
1991.117 Such a drastic change in policy would entail "reversing or modi-
fying the reform policies of the previous Slovak and federal govern-
ments."2 '8 Presumably, this would require the eventual passage of new
212. See Jan Obrman, The Czechoslovak Elections, RFE-RL Research Rep., June 26,
1992, at 12 [hereinafter Elections].
213. Jiri Pehe, Scenarios for Disintegration, RFE-FL Research Rep., July 31, 1992, at
30, 32 [hereinafter Scenarios].
214. Id. at 30.
215. Jan Obrman, Czechoslovakia: Stage Set for Disintegration? RFE-RL Research
Rep., July 31, 1992, at 30 [hereinafter Czechoslovakia].
216. Jiri Pehe, The New Slovak Government and Parliament, RFE-RL Research Rep.,
July 10, 1992, at 33 [hereinafter New Slovak].
217. Peter Martin, Slovakia: Calculating the Cost of Independence, RFE-RL Research
Rep., Mar. 20, 1992, at 33. See also infra note 221.
218. New Slovak, supra note 216, at 36.
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legislation by the Slovak National Council to countermand the existing
federal laws. Since Meciar's party has the majority necessary to enact
such legislation, the continued applicability of federal economic reform
policies in the Slovak Republic seems extremely doubtful in long-term
perspective.
In the Czech Republic, the continuance of economic reform seems to
be much more certain. Klaus, in his negotiations with Meciar, sought to
postpone any changes in economic policy until after the separation of the
two republics was complete in order to preserve the integrity of the re-
form program currently being implemented by the federal government.21 9
It seems highly unlikely that the tenor of economic reform will change in
the Czech Republic; in fact, the prospect of accelerating such reform is
one of the principal reasons that Klaus and the Civic Democratic Party
are unwilling to perpetuate a federal impasse.
220
The principal reason for the differing attitudes toward reform held
by the Civic Democratic Party and the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia involves the dissimilar economic situation of the two republics.
The Slovak economy contains major components of heavy industry and
armaments manufacture, whereas the Czech economic structure is more
diversified. The transition pains caused by the "shock therapy" program
affected the Slovak economy to a much greater extent than the Czech. As
a result, Slovak public opinion is "more critical of the overall economic
situation ' '22 1 and is uncomfortable with the current pace of economic re-
form. This attitude, coupled with nationalist pressures, provides the main
impetus for the departure from the current path of economic transition
and the aversion to the federal structure.
Events subsequent to the June 1992 elections have demonstrated just
how irreparable the split between the Czech and Slovak republics has be-
come, underscoring the notion that Czechoslovakia actually "consists of
two societies." '222 A government program based on the assumption that
Czechoslovakia would dissolve was approved by the Czech National
Council on July 13, 1992, followed closely by a declaration of sovereignty
from the Slovak National Council on July 17.221 Meciar and Klaus
adopted a common position regarding the impending divorce and pro-
posed the drafting of a constitutional law pursuant to which the Federal
Assembly would divide Czechoslovakia into separate republics. 2 4 The
Slovak National Council signed the new constitution for the Slovak Re-
public into law on September 3,225 paving the way toward the establish-
219. Czechoslovakia, supra note 215, at 30.
220. Id.
221. Kamil Janacek, Survey of Major Trends in 1991, RFE-RL Research Rep., Mar. 20,
1992, at 32.
222. Elections, supra note 212, at 19.
223. Scenarios, supra note 213, at 30.
224. Id.
225. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 92 Daily Rep. E. Eur. (BNA) No. 179-5,
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ment of an autonomous republic on January 1, 1993.226 As of this writing,
negotiations were still underway concerning the details of the dissolution
agreements and the formal procedures for the partitioning of
Czechoslovakia.
The separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics will go beyond a
division in form alone. Each republic will establish its own central bank
and distinct national currency, 227and each is in the process of forming
ministries that will assume the tasks once reserved for federal bodies. For
example, the newly formed Czech Finance Ministry has a mandate to su-
pervise the development of the republic's capital markets.2 8 These indi-
cations suggest that, while existing federal legislation and institutions will
remain relevant for a time,2 29 new legislation implementing the specific
economic policies and institutions to be developed in the republics should
be expected once the separation has been achieved.
The division of state assets and the future of the privatization pro-
gram are two contentious issues that must be resolved in the separation
process. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia has drafted a constitu-
tional law based on the Meciar and Klaus accords that would divide fed-
eral property between Czech and Slovak parties at a ratio of 2:1.230 It is
quite likely that this agreement will be subject to intense rounds of nego-
tiations that may slow the divorce proceedings significantly. Furthermore,
the second round of mass privatization may be halted due to Slovak resis-
tance based on the widespread desire to curtail the ambitious reform pro-
gram being pursued by the federal government. These issues will be con-
sidered top priority items by the respective National Councils.
The disintegration of Czechoslovakia is underway, but the exact
timetable for the establishment of fully functioning Czech and Slovak re-
publics is still uncertain. In general, the process of division will likely
serve as an impetus to speed up economic reforms in the Czech Republic
and curtail such reforms in the Slovak Republic.23 The relevance of the
current regime of economic reforms will remain until new programs are
put forth by the respective National Councils. More significant changes in
economic orientation should be expected from the Slovak Republic, while
the Czech Republic will probably adopt a program quite similar to the
one currently being followed by the federal government. No major
changes are expected, however, until the two republics put their houses in
Sept. 15, 1992, at 1.
226. Boris Gomez, Common Currency-For Now, PRAGUE POST, Sept. 1-7, 1992, at 1.
227. World Wire, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at A8.
228. Bill Hangley, Jr., Czechs Lead Drive Toward Division, PRAGUE POST, Aug. 11-17,
1992, at 1.
229. See id. and accompanying text.
230. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, supra note 225, at 11.
231. Ales 'Capek, The Past and the Future of Czecho-Slovak Economic Relations
(March 1992) (on file with the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard
University) (Program on Central and Eastern Europe, Working Paper Series #22).
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order and address the central questions of legal and financial separation.
[2] Securities Market and Regulation
Against this backdrop it is evident that the development of a system
of securities regulation is not Czechoslovakia's highest priority. The na-
tion presently is consumed, first and foremost, with carrying out the plans
for disintegration described above and is not likely, in the near term, to
devote significant national resources to enacting and implementing com-
prehensive federal securities legislation. Secondly, even if securities regu-
lation were a top item on the national agenda, the unsettled state of the
country's law-making institutions undermines the status of new legisla-
tion. It is possible that the Federal Assembly will pass a new general se-
curities statute by the end of 1992, s32 but the utility and effect of such
legislation is unclear. Theoretically, upon finalization of a secession agree-
ment Federal legislation might no longer have any legal effect, so that
enactment of additional legislation at this time might be considered fruit-
less. On the other hand, the secession agreement may provide for the con-
tinuation of certain laws, or the independent republics may enact into
their laws all or part of previously enacted federal laws, so that the enact-
ment of new federal legislation, including securities legislation, during the
transition period may not be pointless. Presumably, the republics eventu-
ally will enact their own securities laws, but no significant legislative ef-
forts by the republics themselves in the securities area have been publi-
cized to date. All laws enacted by the post-communist Czechoslovakian
government, including the stock exchange legislation discussed below, will
reportedly remain in effect until the finalization of the secession agree-
ment between the Slovak and the Czech republics.2 3 The secession treaty
is "officially" expected in 1992, but progress has been slow and realisti-
cally is not anticipated until the first quarter of 1993. Understanding the
relevant Federal laws that have been enacted (principally, the Stock Ex-
change Act)23' is instructive not only due to the possibility that such laws
will somehow survive the political transformation through provisions in
the secession treaty or otherwise, but also because such laws serve as the
best available indicator of the shape of securities laws that eventually
may be enacted by the independent republics.
As mentioned, Czechoslovakia's Federal Assembly has passed the
Stock Exchange Act pursuant to which stock exchanges in Prague and
Bratislava will operate, but further securities legislation, including a gen-
232. Letter from Mitria KunikovA, asst. to the Chief Executive, the Bratislava Stock
Exchange, to Holme Roberts & Owen (Sept. 18, 1992).
233. Telephone conference between Holme Roberts & Owen and the Czechoslovakian
Embassy in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 23, 1992). But see supra note 215 and accompanying
text (discussing possibility that Slovakia may, as a pragmatic matter, modify the course of
Slovak economic reforms).
234. Legal Act of April 21, 1992, on Securities Stock Exchange [hereinafter Stock Ex-
change Act].
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eral securities statute, has not yet been able to transcend the political
impasse. Without a general securities law statute regulating public offer-
ings, fraud and the like an atmosphere of caveat emptor generally
prevails in the fledgling markets."' The stock exchanges in Prague and
Bratislava, described below, have been constituted but are not yet opera-
tional although it is anticipated that the exchanges will commence opera-
tions by the end of 1992 or in early 1993.236 Pending the commencement
of trading on the exchanges, a small amount of secondary market activity
is occurring privately among institutions.' 7
The privatization process, by creating a large supply of shares, will
increase the need for securities market structures in Czechoslovakia. Al-
though the supply of and demand for securities in Czechoslovakia are
currently low, both are expected to increase as the privatization process
unfolds. In the privatizations, Czech citizens will become shareholders en
masse; approximately 8.5 million of them bought vouchers in a mass
privatization program in 1992238 which will allow their holders to
purchase stock in companies being privatized"3 9 by participating in a
multi-part bidding process. The bidding process, which began in May
1992, is expected to result in the transfer of over fifty percent of Czecho-
slovakia's state-owned enterprises to the public.2" ' Stock exchanges are
considered necessary to increase liquidity for the shares that are pur-
chased in. the mass privatization.
Czechoslovakia signed an Association Agreement with the European
Community in December 1991 which calls for Czechoslovakia to imple-
ment a number of reforms as a prerequisite to membership in the Com-
235. CZECHOSLOVAKIA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 4 (Sept. 24, 1992)("a Securities
Act governing the regulatory environment has still not been finalised, despite the critical
importance of efficient securities markets to the privatisation programme"). But see Stock
Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 28 (duties of stock brokers) and § 31 (sanctions against
participants in trading and issuers of listed securities for violating provisions of Stock Ex-
change Act or stock exchange rules or purposefully disseminating false or misleading infor-
mation that affects the rates of securities).
236. See Philip Crawford, Equity Opportunities Multiply as Eastern Europe Goes to
Market, INT'L HERALD TEIB., Aug. 29, 1992 ("stock markets are already up and running in
Budapest and Warsaw, and the inaugural bell of the Prague bourse should ring before the
year's end").
237. IVAN SVITEK ET AL., CZECHOSLOVAK BUSINESS GUIDE: INVESTMENT 1992/93, 93 (1992)
[hereinafter GUIDE] states that "[b]ecause the volume of traded securities is still small, the
Czechoslovak State Bank in cooperation with other commercial banks has set up a provi-
sional secondary securities market. The State Bank is responsible for technical and organi-
zational aspects, accounting, rate setting, mediation, central evidence, and publishing
information."
238. Prague to Set Up New Stock Exchange, PRIVATISATION INT'L, Apr. 1992.
239. CSFR Plans Stock Exchanges, PRIVATISATION INT'L May 1992; see also Foreign
Investors' Access to Stock Markets Could Be Limited, FIN. E. EUR., May 8, 1992 (voucher
privatization system will turn 8.5 million Czechs and Slovaks into shareholders by the end
of 1992).
240. Open For Business, FIN. E. EUR., May 21, 1992.
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munity.2 s 1 Czechslovakia hopes to attain full membership by the year
2000, although it is unclear how this goal will be affected by the impend-
ing division. The objective of someday attaining EEC membership may
have influenced the shape of Czechoslovakia's securities laws and policies.
Indeed, the Czechoslovakian Stock Exchange Act seems to have been
shaped more by European than U.S. traditions.
§3.02 Regulatory Authorities
As mentioned above, a general securities law governing public offer-
ings of securities, fraud and related matters (Zakon o Cennych Papiteh)
has been under consideration in Czechoslovakia but has not been enacted.
Draft legislation reportedly would create independent regulatory authori-
ties, the Securities Commission of the Czech Republic and the Securities
Commission of the Slovak Republic.242
Securities exchanges in Czechoslovakia are presently supervised by
the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic or the Ministry of Finance
of the Slovak Republic 2 4 depending upon where the exchange is located.
The Ministries, in this regard, will act through a "Stock Exchange Com-
missioner" who is authorized, inter alia, to control trading and stock bro-
ker activities and countermand decisions of the stock exchange chamber
(defined below). 24 "4 Although the stock exchanges in Czechoslovakia are
private legal entities organized as joint stock companies, 245 they will have
certain supervisory responsibilities over market participants just as secur-
ities exchanges in the U.S. and most countries have self-regulatory
responsibilities.
The Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) was constituted in Prague on
July 9, 1992,46 subject to approval by the Ministry of Finance. 24 7 It is
anticipated that the Exchange may open for operations in the first quar-
ter of 1993.24s Rules of the Prague Stock Exchange are not available in
241. CZECHOSLOVAKIA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 4. See also James Doty, Capital
Market Developments in Central and Eastern Europe: The SEC Perspective, in INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 37 (1991).
242. CZECHOSLOVAKIA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 4. "Once the securities law is
passed... the exchanges will be regulated by independent supervisory bodies, the Securities
Commissions of the Czech and Slovak republics, which are to be set up under the act." Id.
at 18 (Apr./May ed.)
243. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 32.
244. Id. (control stock exchange trading, "revise" stock broker activities, countermand
decisions of the stock exchange chamber under certain circumstances, require reports from
stock exchange governing bodies, persons involved in clearance and settlement, and stock
brokers).
245. Id. § 1.
246. BCPP Set Up, EKONOMICKE ZPRAVODAJSTVI, July 9, 1992, at 8.
247. Czechoslovakia: Securities Market to Become Independent Company, HOSPODAR-
SKE NOVINY, July 15, 1992. See Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 2 (requiring approval
of Czech Ministry of Finance for foundation of stock exchange based in Czech Republic).
248. Cf. Czechoslovakia: Securities Market to Become Independent Company, supra
note 247.
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English as of September 1992. The Bratislava Stock Exchange (BSE)
formed on November 5, 1991,249 has issued Rules on Listing Securities
(BSE Listing Rules) and Rules on Trading on TBSE Floor and Types of
Transactions (BSE Trading Rules), discussed below. The Bratislava In-
ternational Commodities Exchange, created in November 1991,50 report-
edly trades bonds as well as commodities.
2 51
The Czechoslovak State Bank, the country's central bank, supervises
the country's banking system. Previously the State Bank functioned as
both central bank and a commercial bank but as of the beginning of 1990
divested itself of its commercial banking activities.2 52 The Commercial
Bank in Prague and the General Credit Bank in Bratislava succeeded to
the CSB's commercial banking activities,25" while long-term financing has
been taken over by the Investment Bank (Investicni Banka).
254
Other peritnent regulatory authorities include the Federal Ministry
of Finance, Federal Ministry of the Economy, Federal Agency for Foreign
Investment, Czech Ministry of Finance, Czech Ministry for Economic
Policy and Development, Czech Ministry of National Fund and Privatiza-
tion, Slovak Ministry of Finance, Slovak Ministry of the Economy, and
Agency for Foreign Investment of the Slovak Republic.
2 55
§3.03 Securities Laws and Related Laws
As indicated above, the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak
Federative Republic passed the Stock Exchange Act in April 1992.256 This
statute governs, among other things, stock exchange authorization, mem-
bership, and governance; listing and trading securities on the stock ex-
change; insider trading; periodic disclosure; sanctions; and dispute resolu-
tion. Czechoslovakia has not yet enacted general securities legislation
governing public offerings, fraud and the like 57 although additional legis-
lation may be passed by the end of 1992.58 The ultimate fate of the Stock
Exchange Act is unclear in view of the country's impending split. The
249. GUIDE, supra note 237, at 27.
250. Id. 94.
251. Id. 94. See also Stock Exchanges in Czechoslovakia, EKONOMICKE ZPRAVOD AJSTV,
July 9, 1992, at 8.
252. Czechoslovakia: Ambitious Plans are Underway to Create Capital, Money and
Foreign Exchange Markets, EUROWEEK March 23, 1990.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. GUIDE, supra note 237, at 129-138.
256. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234. The translation of the Stock Exchange Act
relied upon herein was obtained from the Bratislava Stock Exchange. It is believed to con-
stitute an official translation, although this is uncertain. Other translations exist and reflect
some differences in the statutory language. The text of the original statute should obviously
be consulted in the case of actual transactions.
257. CZECHOSLOVAKIA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 4.
258. Letter from Bratislava Stock Exchange to Holme Roberts & Owen, supra note 232.
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BSE has issued Listing Rules and Trading Rules " which are analyzed
below. The PSE apparently has formulated rules but as of this writing
are not available in English.
The Federal Assembly enacted an investment funds law (Zakon 0
Investicnich Spolecnostech a Investicnich Fondech) in April 1992 appli-
cable to both open- and closed-end funds.260 Among other things, the law
provides that an investment fund cannot own more than twenty percent
in any one company, 61 and regulates the amount of fees that may be
charged to customers.26 2
Banking legislation was enacted on December 20, 1990. Foreign
banks may engage in banking activities in Czechoslovakia through a rep-
resentative office, subsidiary or joint venture.26 3 According to one source,
"[u]nder the Banking Law, foreign banks are now able to use the licenses
granted in their home country to receive a license to operate in Czecho-
slovakia," '2 64 although foreign banks still must obtain regulatory approval
(from the Czechoslovak State Bank) to operate.2 5 As is the case under
European Community Directives, 2 66 the banking law permits universal
banking. 67 Under a universal banking system, banks may engage in both
commercial and investment banking activities.
The Commercial Code, 268 passed by the Federal Assembly in Novem-
ber 1991, regulates a wide range of commercial activities in Czechoslova-
kia.2 6 9 "The Code constitutes a comprehensive system of law that applies
to entrepreneurial activity in Czechoslovakia and replaces approximately
80 previous acts, decrees and regulations. 2 0 Under the Commercial
259. The Bratislava Stock Exchange Board passed the Trading Rules on July 25, 1991
[hereinafter TBSE Trading Rules]. Zakon c. 17/1991 Sb. The Board approved the Listing
Rules on July 25, 1991 [hereinafter TBSE Listing Rules]. Zakon c. 17/91 Sb., amended by
Zakon c. 35/1991 Sb. The Trading Rules and the Listing Rules were issued in Slovak and
English. "In case of any doubts [the] Slovak version controls." Zakon c. 17/1991 Sb.
260. See Foreign Investors' Access to Stock Markets Could Be Limited, supra note
239.
261. Id.
262. CSFR Plans Stock Exchanges, PRIVATISATION INT'L, May 1992.
263. GUIDE, supra note 237, at 90. "At the end of November 1991, 41 representative
offices of foreign banks and 38 banks had been established. Id.
264. Id.
265. CZECHOSLOVAKIA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 235. Persons desiring to carry on
the banking business in Czechoslovakia must apply to the State Bank, which acts on the
application in consultation with the appropriate Ministry of Finance, depending upon the
proposed location of the bank's headquarters. Id.
266. Council Directive 89/646, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1 (allowing banks authorized in an
EEC member state to provide commercial and investment banking services throughout the
Community, provided such activities are covered by the home state authorization).
267. GUIDE, supra note 237, at 90.
268. Zakon c. 513/1991 Sb.
269. See GUIDE, supra note 237, at 37.
270. CZEHOSLOVAKIAN INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 4. "The law is influenced by Ger-
man and Austrian legislation and reflects pre-1938 Czechoslovak civil and commercial law."
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Code, foreigners may acquire Czechoslovakian companies, form wholly
owned local subsidiaries or establish joint ventures with Czechoslovak
persons,"' subject in some but not all cases to governmental approval.
2 7
1
The so-called "Small Privatization Law" governs the transfer of
small businesses from the state to private citizens2 7 The "Large Priva-
tization Law''1 7 1 was enacted on February 26, 1991 and became effective
in April of that year. This law generally concerns the privatization of
state-owned property other than small businesses. 5
§3.04 Exchange Regulation
[1] Characteristics and Authorization
The Stock Exchange Act defines "Securities Stock Exchange" as a
legal entity authorized to "organize" at a certain place and time "a de-
mand for, and an offer of, securities."2 7 Shares and other securities
"bearing the rights of property and capital sharing in business, bonds, as
well as, dividend and interest coupons (warrants), are traded [on] the ex-
change." '277 Thus both debt and equity securities are authorized to trade
on regulated exchanges in Czechoslovakia. Permission to establish a stock
exchange is requested by filing an application with the Czech or Slovak
Ministry of Finance, depending upon the business residence of the ex-
change to be formed.2 78 The decision regarding the establishment of the
stock exchange must be made within sixty days of the filing date of the
application.7 " A stock exchange may not be established by means of a
public offering,' s° and shares of the exchange are transferable only with
the consent of the exchange.28 1
[2] Ownership; Foreign Ownership
The Stock Exchange Act makes the following provision concerning
foreign ownership of shares in a stock exchange governed by the Act:
The foreign nationals2 82 and the legal persons with foreign national's
capital share exceeding 50 % of the basic assets, residing on the terri-
tory of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, can acquire the
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Law on Transfers of State Property with regard to Some Objects to Other Legal or
Physical Persons, Oct. 25, 1990. BUSINESS VENTURES, supra note 47, at c-5.
274. Act on the Conditions of Transfer of State Property to Other Persons, February
26, 1991. Id. at c-4.
275. Czechoslovakia's "Large Privatization" Law, FIN. E. EUR., March 20, 1991.
276. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 1(1).
277. Id. § 1(2).
278. Id. § 3. The contents of the application are specified in § 3(1).
279. Id. § 3(5).
280. Id. § 1(5).
281. Id. § 4(1).
282. Id. § 4(3).
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stock exchange's shares, the total nominal value of which shall not
exceed one third of the basic assets.
2 8
3
Thus, foreign exchange ownership is permitted, but only to the extent
such ownership does not exceed "one third of the basic assets;" presuma-
bly, legal entities with less than fifty percent foreign ownership are not
counted against the one-third limitation. It is unclear exactly what is
meant by basic assets in this context; presumably, the reference is to cap-
ital of the exchange (which must be formed as a joint stock company).2 8
In order to become a shareholder of the exchange, a foreign national must
be a resident of Czechoslovakia. A subsidiary of Credit Suisse First Bos-
ton based in Prague is one of twenty owners of the Prague Stock Ex-
change285 and several other applications from foreigners are pending.
288
As indicated below, no owner of the exchange may vote more than twenty
percent of the shares of the exchange.2 87
[3] Governance
Three internal bodies are involved in the .governance of stock ex-
changes operating under the Stock Exchange Law: the General Assembly,
the' Chamber of the Stock Exchange ("Chamber") and the Supervisory
Board2 8 8 The General Assembly comprises all of the shareholders of the
exchange, each of whom votes according to the "nominal value" of his
shares subject to the caveat that no one shareholder may vote more than
twenty percent of the shares of the exchange.2 9 The General Assembly,
among other things, elects the members of the Chamber and the Supervi-
sory Board, approves stock exchange rules (subject to further approval by
the Chamber) and approves fees and commissions to be charged for the
services offered by the exchange. 29" The Chamber acts as the exchange's
chief administrative body with responsibility, inter alia, to supervise the
exchange's compliance with applicable law; establish bookkeeping and
computer systems; regulate exchange operations;291 authorize transfers of
exchange memberships; grant listing applications and trading licenses;
and supervise stock brokers.29 2 The Secretary-General of the stock ex-
283. Id. § 4(3).
284. "The exchange is a joint stock company, regulated by provisions of the Code of
Commercial Law [Zakon c. 513/1991 Sb.] with the exceptions specified in this Act." Id. §
1(3).
285. Foreign Investors' Access to Stock Markets Could Be Limited, supra note 239.
286. Id.
287. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 6(4). Cf. supra text accompanying n. 40
(describing the one vote per stock exchange member rule in Hungary).
288. Id. § 5.
289. Id. § 6(4). This provision does not prevent a shareholder from owning more than
twenty percent of the shares of the exchange, but rather prevents the shareholder from
voting more than such percentage.
290. Id. § 6.
291. The Stock Exchange Chamber "makes changes in the exchange's working days,
interrupts, holds up, partially or entirely, the stock exchange operations." Id. § 8(f).
292. Id. The Stock Exchange Chamber "performs other functions of a Board of Direc-
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change represents the Chamber. The BSE Trading Rules, discussed fur-
ther below, denominate different exchange authorities that will be in-
volved in supervising floor trading: the Commission for Trading,
Commissioner, and Speaker.
§3.05 Listing Securities on the Stock Exchange
[1] Stock Exchange Act
In many countries, provisions concerning listing of securities on a
stock exchange must generally be construed with regulations governing
public offerings of securities because the two processes are inextricably
linked. For example, "[i]f a company is able to meet the admission re-
quirements of The Stock Exchange and a member firm is prepared to act
as a sponsor and underwriter, the process of going public (or going to
market) in the United Kingdom and the process of listing on the Ex-
change are intertwined and basically the same." '9 3 Czechoslovakia's Stock
Exchange Act and the BSE Rules imply that Czechoslovakia will follow
the European model whereby stock exchange listing is an integral part of
the public offering process, 9" but this conclusion remains tentative in the
absence of a statute regulating public offerings.
The Chamber or an authorized committee of an exchange make deci-
sions on listing applications. " 5 As is typical with most modern exchanges,
the issuer must meet standards relating to operating history, assets, num-
ber of shareholders and float but the details of these matters are left to
the rules of the exchange. 90 It is contemplated that the exchanges will
have more than one market, as the Act vests the exchanges with the au-
thority to decide whether the subject securities will trade "on primary or
secondary securities market. '2 97 The Act provides as follows concerning
the listing of foreign securities:
Foreign securities are allowed for trading on the stock exchange, pro-
vided, they were issued in conformity with the legal regulations, valid
in the state of the issuer and were accepted/listed, for trading on the
tors of a joint stock company." Id. § 8(q).
293. HAROLD BLOOMENTHAL AND SAMUEL WOLFF, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAW
10-23 (1991). Although in the United States issuers often list on an exchange concurrently
with offering their securities to the public, in many cases they instead arrange to have their
securities quoted on non-exchange markets (e.g., NASDAQ) and even when their securities
are listed the exchanges do not play as significant a role in the disclosure and review process
as they do in many European countries.
294. See, e.g., Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 22(3) (listing application must
disclose "way of emission and place of sale of the securities"); TBSE Listing Rules, supra
note 259, 11 § 10 (use of proceeds from issuing new securities, volume of securities to be
offered to the public, plan of distribution).
295. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 21(1).
296. Id. § 21(3). Government bonds are listed on the stock exchange without an appli-
cation and prospectus.
297. Id. § 21(4).
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stock exchange, by the stock exchange chamber.2 98
In typical reciprocity provisions2 9" the condition of listing in one state is
listing in another. The provision of the Stock Exchange Act quoted above
requires valid issuance in the home state and acceptance for listing in
Czechoslovakia, as opposed to listing in the home state.'" 0 However,
under the Stock Exchange Act even if the securities have been validly
issued in the home country, they still must be accepted for trading by the
Chamber . 30  Thus the Stock Exchange Act does not contain a true reci-
procity provision. In any event, it is unlikely that large numbers of for-
eign issuers, at least U.S. issuers, will seek a listing on Czechoslovakian
exchanges in the near future.
The listing process is commenced by the issuer filing a listing appli-
cation with the exchange. "In the listing requirements the exchange
chamber determines, when a prospectus, verified by a bank, is to be, nec-
essarily attached to the application."3 0' 2 The disclosure requirements es-
tablished by the Act are minimal, but are supplemented by stock ex-
change rules.3 0 Under the Act, the disclosure document must contain
data on the issuer's activities and on the issue of securities, specifically: a)
the type of securities; b) the issuer's business prospects; c) the total vol-
ume of the issue and its "diversification by denominations;" and d) the
"way of emission and place of sale of the securities. '30 4 When the disclos-
ure document used in connection with a listing, which the EEC refers to
as "listing particulars," the U.S. refers to as a "listing application" and
Czechoslovakia refers to as a "prospectus," is required, it must be pub-
lished in accordance with stock exchange rules.3 "°
[2] BSE Listing Rules
Securities subject to preemptive rights or rights of first refusal may
not be listed on the BSE.3 0 The provision in the BSE Listing Rules ap-
plicable to foreign listings differs from that contained in the Stock Ex-
change Act: "[s]ecurities listed previously on another Stock Exchange
shall be listed on the BSE as follows:" (1) a BSE member must certify
that the security is listed on another exchange and provide a copy of the
298. Id. § 21(5).
299. Council Directive 87/345, 1987 O.J. (L 185) 81 (providing that when applications
are made to list securities on two or more exchanges located in the EC, listing particulars
prepared and approved in accordance with home state rules must be recognized by other
member states without additional information or approval requirements).
300. Cf. infra note 104 and accompanying text.
301. Under EEC directives, a listing in the home state in accordance with specified
requirements generally entitles the issuer to reciprocal listing privileges within the EEC as a
matter of right.
302. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 22(1).
303. See id. § 22(3).
304. Id.
305. Id. § 22(5).
306. TBSE Listing Rules, supra note 259, I. § 2.
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prospectus; (2) BSE will categorize the security as falling within the 1st,
2nd or 3rd market (described below); (3) "while listing a security [BSE]
shall respect at that time valid Czech-Slovak regulations regarding trad-
ing with securities issued abroad."30' The provision implies that securities
listed on another "Stock Exchange," an undefined term, may be listed on
the BSE as a matter of right, subject to existing Czechoslovakian regula-
tions concerning "trading with securities issued abroad." This is similar
to the EEC reciprocity provision, but goes beyond it in its seeming appli-
cation to issuers listed on any stock exchange in any country."0 The un-
defined term "Stock Exchange" is confusing and arguably refers only to
other stock exchanges in Czechoslovakia. The BSE has stated informally
that at present, foreign securities are not being accepted for listing on the
BSE.30 9
The BSE is divided into three separate markets. In order to qualify
for listing on the first market, the issuer must have "volume of the joint
stock company capital stock" of 500 million crowns.1 0 At least ten per-
cent of the issuer's capital stock must be held by the public, and the is-
suer must have a three-year operating history information as to which
must be presented in the "prospectus." ''1 The total "nominal" value of
the securities "to be listed, issued for selling to public" must be at least
ten million crowns. 12 Different requirements apply to issuers listed on
the second and third markets." 3 The BSE listing rules specify the infor-
mation that must be disclosed in the "prospectus" at the time of listing.
The "prospectus" must include, inter alia, information concerning the is-
suer's operating history, capital stock, number of employees, senior of-
ficers, managers and directors, business, and property; data concerning
use of proceeds, size of the proposed issuance of securities, yield, plan of
distribution; and audited financial information.' The procedural re-
quirements for obtaining a listing are contained in paragraphs VI of the
BSE Listing Rules.
§ 3.06 Trading Securities On and Off the Stock Exchange
[1] Stock Exchange Act
The Stock Exchange Act provides as follows:
307. Id. I. § 5.
308. The corresponding EEC directive allows countries that are members of the EEC to
restrict application of the reciprocity provision to issuers having their registered office in
another member state.
309. Letter from BSE to Holme Roberts & Owen (Sept. 18, 1992)("[listing of foreign
securities on [the BSE] is not being envisaged").
310. TBSE Listing Rules, supra note 259, II. § 6. This requirement appears to refer to







(1) Securities may be bought and sold on the stock exchange only by
persons, authorized (licensed) for trading in securities, according to
the specific legal act s1" and only by those, who are: (a) the stock ex-
change's shareholders or (b) the persons who, upon their request, were
granted, by the stock exchange chamber, permission (licence) to buy
and sell securities on the stock exchange market and who have paid
the admission fee. (2) the Czechoslovak State Bank is authorized to
trade in securities.
316
A trading license may not be granted to a legal entity whose property is
subject to "special bankruptcy and compounding proceedings"317 or to a
natural ("physical") person with "insufficient integrity." ' A natural per-
son "legally sentenced for any criminal act of material (property) nature,
or for any other purposesful criminal act, is not considered a person with
full integrity."3 1 9 The BSE has stated informally that "[o]nly firms resi-
dent in CSFR may apply for a [BSE] broker's license at present, 's2 0 and
that trading on the BSE "is limited to [BSE] members.
s3 1
A legal entity licensed to trade on the exchange designates one,
"eventually, more," natural persons actually to conduct trades."2 ' The leg-
islation refers to such authorized natural person as a "stock broker" and
requires the broker to possess "the necessary professional skills and per-
sonal integrity."3 3 Unless applicable stock exchange rules provide other-
wise, only stock brokers are authorized to act as intermediaries "in buy-
ing and selling securities between persons, licensed to buy and sell
securities. ' 324 A "stock broker" thus is a natural person who acts as inter-
mediary between persons who are licensed to buy and sell securities.
The Stock Exchange Act briefly addresses the question of the
method by which prices are set on the exchange. The Act provides that
the "[r]ate of a security, which is its market rate on an appropriate stock
exchange's working day, is set by a stock broker. '3 23 The Act provides
315. "For instance, § 1, section 3, of the Legal Act No. 21/1992 Sb., on Banks" (foot-
note in original).
316. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 14. The legislation provides that a person
not authorized to trade on the exchange may trade through qualifying exchange members or
licensed traders and "eventually" through the Czechoslovak State Bank. The reason for the
delay in trading through CSB is not clear.
317. See id. § 14(3).
318. Id. § 14(3).
319. Id.
320. Letter from BSE, supra note 309.
321. Id.
322. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 15(1). "The legal entity, licensed to buy
and sell securities, designates one, eventually, more physical persons, to buy and sell securi-
ties on its behalf. .." Id. Elsewhere, however, the Act indicates that stock brokers are ap-
pointed by the Chamber on the basis of a public tender. Id. § 28(2).
323. Id. § 15(2).
324. Id. § 17.
325. Id. § 25(1). The term "price" would seem to have been more appropriate in this
context than the term "rate."
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further that "[ilf only an automated trading system is used by the stock
exchange, the rate is computed in the above mentioned way."3 6 This for-
mulation is confusing in that it suggests that if an automated trading sys-
tem is used, the rate of a security is set by a stock broker. The Act con-
tinues, however, with the provision that the "[w]ay of setting rates of
securities is determined by the rules and regulations of the stock ex-
change.1217 "Rates" of securities are quoted in the "seat" of the exchange
headquarters and at the end of a working day are to be published in the
stock exchanges "rates list. '32 8 A person may file a "protest" against the
quoted rates with the Chamber within three days following the day the
rates were quoted,3 29 and the Chamber will rule on such protest within
another three days. BSE Trading Rules provide that "[m]arket rate is
[the] price of a security agreed in [a] transaction between agents on
TBSE Floor." 330
A stock broker is not an employee of the exchange, but is appointed
by the Chamber "on the basis of a public tender." '331 It is unclear exactly
how this provision relates to Section 15(1), which provides that a legal
entity licensed to buy and sell securities designates a stock broker to buy
and sell securities on its behalf; presumably, a licensee appoints a stock
broker subject to the approval of the Chamber. The broker "mediates"
trades of securities "allotted to him/her by the Chamber[,]" '32 and "sets
rates of the allotted securities."333 The stock broker must be present at
the exchange when it is open, "through all the working hours and...
participate personally, in the particular stock exchange trade[s]." 334 The
stock broker keeps a book of individual stock exchange transactions ap-
parently in a hard copy format, although the book "may be replaced by
output reports from an automated system, if such a record is confirmed
by a stock broker." 35 The broker issues a confirmation of the terms of a
trade after it is concluded, at which time the broker may receive a com-
mission. Thus, the stock broker (i) "mediates" trades of securities; (ii) is
"allotted" securities by the Chamber; (iii) sets rates of allotted securities;
(iv) participates personally in stock exchange trades; (v) keeps a record
book of trades; and (vi) issues confirmations. These provisions seem to
imply a role for the stock broker somewhat similar to that of a "special-
ist" on U.S. exchanges, except that the Czechoslovakian stock broker,
with certain exceptions, is not allowed to trade for his own account.36 It
326. Id.
327. Id. § 25(2).
328. Id. § 25(3).
329. Id. § 26(1).
330. TBSE Trading Rules, supra note 259, VII § 29.
331. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 28(2).
332. Id. § 28.
333. Id. § 28(3)(b).
334. Id. § 28(5).
335. Id. § 28(3)(c).
336. Id. § 28(3)(d). SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW, §12.02 (Harold S. Bloo-
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remains to be seen how the stock broker function will be defined in prac-
tice on Czechoslovakian exchanges.
33 7
The Stock Exchange Act establishes certain rights and responsibili-
ties applicable to "participants in trades on the stock exchange."338
Among other things, such "participants" must honor their commitments,
accept the exchange's clearance and settlement system, submit annual au-
dited financial statements and deposit "a bail (collateral) to ensure the
liabilities and risks, resulting from the stock exchange trading and its
clearing (settlement). '" 3 9 "Participants in trades" include licensed trad-
ers, stock exchange shareholders, and stock brokers.
3 4 0
The Act only briefly addresses the topic of clearance and settlement
which has been a major and controversial issue in international securities
markets.34 ' Settlement of individual trades "in a form of clearing, safe-
custody, delivery, eventually, overtaking the securities, is conducted by a
bank or by another legal person on the basis of a contract conducted with
the stock exchange chamber."342
Off-exchange trading of listed securities is also an extremely contro-
versial issue worldwide.3 43 The Stock Exchange Act provides as follows
menthal, ed.) contains the following description of the specialist on U.S. exchanges:
A specialist is an exchange member who has been designated to act in that
capacity as to a particular security or securities listed on the exchange. A rep-
resentative of the specialist stays continuously at one post and performs the
function of storing and executing limited price orders and otherwise upon re-
quest executes orders for other members .... A specialist also performs a
dealer function .... [Ilt is his function to give the market liquidity and con-
tinuity by quoting on a narrower spread at which he is expected to buy or sell
for his own account to the extent necessary in order to assure a fair and or-
derly market...
337. TBSE Rules do not expressly refer to "stock brokers" nor do they define a role
that is coterminous with that of the stock broker under the Act, although the role given to
the "Speaker" under TBSE rules overlaps to some degree. See infra note 323 and accompa-
nying text.
338. Id. § 18.
339. Id.
340. Id. § 13(3).
341. Clearance and settlement issues are currently being addressed by the European
Community, the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the Group of
Thirty, among others. See e.g., INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULA-
TION § 1.10[2][b] (Harold S. Bloomenthal and Samuel Wolff eds.); Clearing/Settlement Is-
sues Get IOSCO Recommendations, 2 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (Buraff) 10 (Sept. 27, 1989).
342. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 27(1).
343. Off-exchange trading is one of several issues that delayed the EEC's adoption of
the Investment Services Directive for over a year. Some European countries, such as France,
desire to limit trading to recognized securities exchanges, whereas others such as the United
Kingdom wish to preserve off-exchange markets, such as the Euromarket. See Samuel
Wolff, Securities Regulation in the European Community, 20 DENY. J. OF INT'L L. & POL.
126 (1991); Finance Ministers Deadlocked on Off-Exchange Trading Regulations, Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep. (Buraff) 6 (Dec. 1990). IOSCO has also hotly debated the topic of off-exchange
trading. See U.K. Will Ask Venice Meeting to Use British Rules as Model, 2 Int'l Sec. Reg.
Rep. (Buraff) 4 (Sept. 13, 1989).
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with respect to this issue and the related issue of "transparency" (disclos-
ure of trading information):
Participants in a stock exchange transaction may conclude over-the-
counter contracts on listed securities, however, only within the range,
allowed by the stock exchange chamber and they are obliged to inform
the stock exchange about it.
3 44
The limitation of off-exchange trading to transactions "within the range"
allowed by the exchange is not entirely clear. It is not apparent whether
this limitation applies to volume, price or both, nor is it clear how the
measure would be enforced.
[2] Bratislava Stock Exchange
The BSE Trading Rules supplement the trading provisions of the
Stock Exchange Act. A BSE transaction is defined as one carried out by a
BSE member in listed securities on the floor of the exchange during
working hours.3 4 5 The BSE member must be represented by an agent in
all floor operations.3 46 Only agents properly authorised by exchange mem-
bers are allowed to operate on the floor. 3 7 The Rules indicate that a BSE
member must accept any orders for listed securities "and can carry out
such orders only on [BSE] Floor; or can have the orders carried out by
other Member[s] of [BSE]. ' ' 348 Thus, the BSE Trading Rules prohibit off-
exchange trading of listed securities by BSE members. As explained
above, the Stock Exchange Act permits off-exchange trading "only within
the range, allowed for the stock exchange chamber" and the BSE exer-
cised its apparent discretion under this provision to prohibit off-exchange
trading altogether. The BSE Trading Rules at this time also prohibit
transactions in options and futures.
3 49
A critical role in the functioning of the BSE is played by the
"Speaker." Offers are made by BSE agents and are "repeated" by the
Speaker who also receives confirmations that a sales contract has been
made. "It is an obligation of the Speaker to repeat orally the offers and to
make sure that the data shall be registered by computer and records shall
be kept. ' 350 Generally, the Speaker's obligation is to follow the process of
trading; monitor compliance with BSE Rules by agents; conduct the
course of trading and "carry out decisions necessary for trading. 351 The
344. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 19. Cf. TBSE Trading Rules, supra note
259, X § 7, discussed infra note 348 and accompanying text.
345. TBSE Trading Rules, supra note 259, II § 2.
346. Id. II § 3. "Agent is an authorised proxy of [TBSE] Member who acts in all trans-
actions on behalf and responsibility of the Member." Id. X § 41.
347. Id. X § 42.
348. Id. X § 7.
349. Id. III § 8.
350. Id. XII § 51.
351. Id. XII § 51.
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Speaker also must "settle any dispute related to trading on the spot. ' 5 2
It appears to be contemplated that there will be only one "Speaker," but
presumably the "Speaker" will have a staff of his own.
[3] Prague Stock Exchange
As indicated above an English language translation of the rules of the
Prague Stock Exchange is not yet available. It is reported, however, that
the PSE will have both a trading floor and an electronic trading sys-
tem, 53 and that the PSE and BSE may be linked by computers but this
"'will depend on the political situation.' "5" The PSE will probably have
two, possibly three tiers, and it has been estimated that when the ex-
change begins operating about fifty listed companies will trade on the
first tier and 300-400 unlisted companies on the second tier,3 55 although
this estimate may be overly optimistic. The third market may be estab-
lished for thinly traded securities and may be limited to institutional
traders."' 6 Prague is reported to favor a modified version of the French
market based upon fixed price sessions,3 57 while Bratislava is inclined to-
ward an open outcry system similar to that of Switzerland's with "face-
to-face dealing between principals."' ' In. April 1992, the Prague Stock
Exchange Association signed a protocol with the Paris Stock Exchange
pursuant to which the latter will provide equipment and support. 5 9
§3.07 Insider Trading
The Stock Exchange Act has several provisions intended to regulate
insider trading and abusive trading practices generally, the most impor-
tant of which is contained in Section 20 of the Act, which provides:
352. Id. XII § 55.
353. CZECHOSLOVAKIA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 4. Cf. Czechoslovakia: Securities
Market to Become Independent Company, HOPODARSKE NOVINY, (Czechoslavakia), July 15,
1992 ("[i]ssues that remain unresolved include whether or not trading will be carried out on
a material or purely electronic basis").
354. Prague to Set Up New Stock Exchange, PRIVATISATION INT'L, April 1992 (quoting
Jan Erben of the Prague Stock Exchange Association); CSFR Plans Stock Exchanges,
PRIVATISATION INT'L, May 1992.
355. Prague Plods On Towards a Regulated Stock Market, FINANCIAL TIMES, (London),
May 15, 1992, Cf. supra text accompanying note 49, at 5 (the Budapest Stock Exchange had
twenty-five securities trading of which six were listed at the end of 1991).
356. Czechoslovakia: Securities Market to Become Independent Company, supra note
353.
357. Frances Societe des Bourses Francaises Wins Contract for Stock Exchanges,
EBRD WATCH, (Czech.), May 11, 1992. "The exchange is patterned on other European
bourses, based on advice from the European Community." See also Czechoslovakia: Stock
Exchange to be Opened in Prague, BRIT. BROADCASTING CORPORATION, SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, July 16, 1992; Czechoslovakia: Securities Market to Become Independent
Company, supra note 353 ("[t]he market will operate according to the French system, and
the decision has been taken to import French software...").
358. British Advice on Strategies, E. EUR. MARKETS, March 20, 1992.
359. Prague Stock Exchange with French Know How, TYDENIK OBCHODU A PODNIKANI,
(Czech.), April 29, 1992, at 3.
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The persons possessing, due to the current, or previous job, any infor-
mation about the facts, which may have an impact on rates of some
securities, and which are not possessed by other participants, are not
allowed to conclude trades in those securities, or to use such informa-
tion in favour of other persons until such information becomes known
to the general public.38 0
This provision may be under-inclusive in that the proscription only ap-
plies to persons possessing inside information "due to the current, or pre-
vious job. . .,131 However, the Chamber may determine by rule the "per-
sons (insiders), who due to their working positions, are not entitled to
conduct trades on the stock exchange in certain securities." '62 In addition,
the Act provides that participants in Chamber meetings, stock brokers,
exchange employees and "legal persons" conducting settlement of trades,
must "keep secret" information acquired from insiders, "i.e., information
that is important for the development of the financial market, or that
touches the interests of individual participants."3 63 The Stock Exchange
Act provides that for purposes of a civil or criminal action, the foregoing
persons may be granted an exemption from this obligation. The exemp-
tion is granted by chairman of the stock exchange chamber.364
§3.08 Periodic Reporting
In accordance with stock exchange rules, a listed issuer must publicly
disclose "during the year" information concerning its business results, an-
nual statements of accounts "verified by the auditor and comments on
the financial status."3' A listed issuer must also, "without any delay,"
notify the exchange (and the public, if required by the exchange) of
"changes in the financial position or other facts, that may result in a
change of a security rate, or in worsening of the issuer's ability to comply
with the obligations due to the issue of the security. '" 66 These provisions
do not apply "to the problems, related to government bonds, since they
are accepted for trading (listed) on the stock exchange without an appli-
cation and prospectus.
'367
BSE Listing Rules require quarterly reporting for first tier compa-
nies, semi-annual reporting for second tier companies and annual report-
ing for third tier companies.36s Issuers must periodically submit to the
BSE an "activity report" presenting certain information, including finan-
cial information, for the relevant period.6" Further, listed companies
360. Legal Act of April 21, 1992 on Securities Stock Exchange § 20(3).
361. Id.
362. Id. § 20(4).
363. Id. § 20(5).
364. Id.
365. Id. § 23(1).
366. Id. § 23(2).
367. Id. § 24.
368. TBSE Listing Rules, supra note 259, II § 8.
369. Id. IV § 15.
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must within two days disclose to the exchange information on changes in
the issuer's "economy influencing directly or indirectly the value or yields
of securities. . ." resulting from specified events."' 0 The activity reports
and material event disclosure must be made available to exchange mem-
bers on the trading floor, and summaries of such information must be
published in two newspapers by the issuer.
§3.09 Violations, Sanctions and Dispute Resolution
[1] Sanctions
The Chamber may sanction participants to an exchange transaction
and listed issuers who violate the Act; do not satisfy obligations estab-
lished by the stock exchange; or "purposefully, with the intention to
cause damage to the participants in the financial markets, disseminate
false or misleading information that had, or might have had, an impact
on rates of securities. '3 7 ' For these transgressions, the Chamber may issue
a public or private reprimand, levy a fine, revoke trading licenses, "recall"
stockbrokers or require delisting.3 7 2
The Ministry of Finance, in supervising the stock exchanges, acts
through a "Stock Exchange Commissioner," who is authorized, inter alia,
to control trading and stock broker activities and countermand decisions
of the Chamber. In fact, the Minister of Finance is authorized to with-
draw the powers of the Chamber under certain conditions,3 73 in which
case the Ministry would appoint an authorized representative to act on
behalf of the exchange until a new Chamber is elected by the General
Assembly. 74 The "Minister of Finance of the Czech Republic or the Min-
ister of Finance of the Slovak Republic have the power to suspend, tem-
porarily, a stock exchange trade, or trades, provided, there is no other
way of prevention of extensive economic damages." 7 5 The exchange has
some recourse against the power of the Ministry, however; it may lodge
an appeal against it in the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, or the
Slovak Republic, as the case may be. BSE Trading Rules empower ex-
change officials to order trading breaks, halts and suspensions. 7 6
[2] Dispute Resolution
Disputes involving stock exchange transactions are resolved in the
courts unless the parties agree by written contract to arbitrate disputes in
the "stock exchange arbitrary court. 37 7 The "arbitrary court" (possibly
370. Id. § 16.
371. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 31(1)(c).
372. Id. § 31(2).
373. Id. § 33(1).
374. Id.
375. Id. § 33(3).
376. TBSE Trading Rules, supra note 259, XIV, XV.
377. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 29(1). "In the disputes, arising from trad-
1992
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
an unfortunate choice of words) is established by the Chamber. By agree-
ing to arbitrate the parties forego a right to resolve their disputes in
court."' "The very cause itself is arbitrated by the stock exchange court
by means of arbitrary findings, which are final and enforceable." ' 9
ing on the stock exchange, whatever objection, explaining that a mere bet or game is in-
volved, is inadmissible." Id. § 2. In the United States, arbitration is now a widely used
method of resolving disputes between broker-dealers and their customers. See U.S. Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1970 & Supp. 1992).
378. Stock Exchange Act, supra note 234, § 30(2).




The Andean Trade Preference Act
Guy C. SMITH*
On December 4, 1991, President Bush signed into law the Andean
Trade Preference Act ("ATPA") which authorizes the President to grant
duty-free treatment for ten years to eligible imports from Peru, Colom-
bia, Bolivia, and Ecuador.1 The ATPA represents one of the chief ele-
ments of President Bush's efforts to create additional incentives to foster
trade in legitimate products in the four Andean countries currently fight-
ing the scourge of drug trafficking. The benefits bestowed under the
ATPA are in addition to the duty-free benefits these four countries al-
ready receive under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
("GSP").2 When compared with GSP, duty-free treatment under the
ATPA extends to a broader array of articles and creates more certainty
with respect to the continued eligibility of articles for duty-free treat-
ment. The ATPA also has symbolic importance in that it is a tangible
reflection of the U.S. government's commitment to the Andean region.
The purpose of this article is to provide readers with an overview of
the ATPA. Part I discusses the genesis of the ATPA. Part II explains the
substantive components of the ATPA. Finally, Part III discusses, in gen-
* B.A., Miami University; M.A., J.D., American University; Associate, Dewey Ballan-
tine. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
1. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3201-3206 (West Supp. 1992).
2. Under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"), imports of certain eligi-
ble products from designated developing countries may enter the U.S. duty-free. See 19
U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1988). Each year, annual reviews are conducted under GSP during
which interested parties may petition, inter alia, to have products be removed from the list
of eligible products with respect to a particular country, or to have a country be removed
from the list of designated GSP beneficiaries. The GSP program is currently due to expire
on July 4, 1993. See id. § 2465. The program is likely to be renewed, but may be modified in
scope. See GSP Renewal Holds $500 Million Price Tag Under Budget Accord Rules, 10
INSIDE U.S. TRADE 5 (Oct. 30, 1992). For a detailed description of the GSP program, see
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, A GUIDE TO THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREF-
ERENCES (1991).
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eral terms, the potential impact of the ATPA on the Andean region.
I. GENESIS OF THE ATPA
Support for the ATPA grew out of a variety of initiatives by the
Bush Administration geared toward Latin America, particularly the An-
dean region. These initiatives were aimed, either partially or wholly, at
fostering economic alternatives to drug trafficking for the Andean coun-
tries. The purpose of these initiatives was to substitute legitimate trade
for the drug trade by providing unilateral trade and investment
incentives.
The first initiative aimed at the Andean region consisted of a pack-
age of measures that is now called Andean Trade Initiative I ("ATI I")2
ATI I grew out of a visit by then-President Virgilio Barco of Colombia to
the United States during September 1989. During that visit President
Barco requested that the U.S. examine what it could do to enhance the
economic cooperation between Colombia and the United States as part of
the Bush Administration's war on drugs." As a result of that request,
President Bush announced ATI I, which consisted of, inter alia: (1) a
special review for the Andean countries under GSP for the purposes of
considering the addition of new products to the list of products eligible
for duty-free treatment; (2) additional technical assistance to assist the
Andean countries improve their trade performance in industrial as well as
agricultural products; and (3) a promise to explore the possibility of ex-
panding textile trade between the Andean countries and the United
States.5
Also, as part of his war on drugs, President Bush attended the "An-
dean Summit" held during February 1990 in Cartagena, Colombia, which
contributed to additional initiatives aimed at the Andean region.' During
the Andean Summit, the participants discussed a variety of measures
aimed at combatting the scourge of drug trafficking, including implemen-
tation of trade initiatives and incentives to promote exports and private
foreign investment in the Andean countries.7 The trade and investment
3. See Andean Trade Preference Act: Hearings on H.R. 661 Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter ATPA Hearings] (statement of Ambassador Carla A. Hills, United States Trade
Representative).
4. See Statement on Andean Region Trade Initiatives, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1659 (Nov. 1, 1989).
5. Id. Other components of ATI I included the following: (1) efforts to build a political
consensus to negotiate a new international coffee agreement; (2) efforts to accelerate negoti-
ations on tariff and non-tariff measures within the context of the Uruguay Round of negoti-
ations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"); (3) consultations with
other trading partners; and (4) additional support for multilateral development bank efforts
to promote meaningful trade policy reforms in Andean countries, see id.
6. Also attending the Andean Summit were the presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, and
Peru.
7. See Declaration of Cartagena, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 248-254 (Feb. 15, 1990).
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programs were intended to facilitate sustained economic growth and to
offset any economic dislocation caused by the fight against drug
trafficking.
The Andean Summit also generated the Declaration of Cartagena,
which contained several "Understandings" concerning joint efforts to
combat the illicit drug trade. As part of the "Understanding Regarding
Economic Aspects and Alternative Development," the parties agreed to
"work together to increase trade among the three Andean countries and
the United States, effectively facilitating access to the United States mar-
ket and strengthening export promotion, including identification, devel-
opment and marketing of new export products."8
In addition, the ATPA grew in part out of President Bush's Enter-
prise for the Americas Initiative ("EA"), which was announced on June
27, 1990. The EAI consists of a tripartite initiative addressing trade, in-
vestment, and debt reduction in Latin America.9 Part of the focus of EAI
is to encourage Latin American countries to engage in trade and invest-
ment liberalization efforts and to promote trade, not aid, between the
United States and that region.'0
On July 23, 1990, following his meeting with Ecuador's then-Presi-
dent Rodrigo Borja, President Bush announced an additional group of
trade measures, now formally called Andean Trade Initiative II ("ATI
II")," that was aimed specifically at the four Andean countries. 2 As de-
scribed in the press release regarding that announcement, the measures
were intended to build on the EAI as well as fulfill the President's com-
mitments made at the Andean Summit.' 3 As part of these measures, the
President announced that he would seek approval of a special tariff pref-
erence system for the Andean countries, modeled after the system estab-
lished in the Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI") for Caribbean coun-
tries,"' which would provide duty-free treatment for eligible articles from
8. Id. at 248-251. The "Understandings" in the Declaration of Cartagena also con-
tained a variety of other economic components and specific steps to combat drug trafficking
directly, as well as various diplomatic initiatives. These included specific initiatives aimed at
promoting alternative development and crop substitution and mitigating the social and eco-
nomic costs of the fight against illicit drug trafficking. In addition, the countries agreed to
attack all facets of drug trafficking with a variety of initiatives, which included, inter alia:
(1) efforts to prevent consumption and reduce demand; (2) efforts to increase interdiction;
(3) involvement of the armed forces in the antinarcotics enforcement; (4) information shar-
ing; (5) eradication of illicit crops; and (6) control of precursor chemicals.
9. See Bush Announces New Initiatives on Trade, Aid, and Debt Reduction for Latin
America, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. 983-984 (July 4, 1990).
10. See id.
11. See ATPA Hearings, supra note 3, at 38.
12. See Remarks Following Discussions with President Rodrigo Borga Cevallas of Ec-
uador, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1140 (Nov. 7, 1980)
13. Id. at 1141.
14. Under CBI, certain articles from designated Caribbean basin beneficiary countries
enter the United States duty-free. See 19 U.S.C.A., supra note 1, § 2701 et seq. Duty-free
treatment under CBI is permanent. In addition, CBI consists of various non-tariff benefits,
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certain designated beneficiary countries in the Andean region."8 On De-
cember 4, 1991 in fulfillment of this objective, President Bush signed into
law the ATPA, establishing by legislation a special tariff system for An-
dean countries.
II. SUBSTANTIVE COMPONENTS OF THE ATPA
Under the ATPA, for a period of ten years commencing on December
4, 1991 and ending December 4, 2001, certain eligible articles from desig-
nated Andean countries may receive duty-free treatment when imported
into the United States. This preferential tariff regime is essentially iden-
tical to the tariff regime established under the CBI, except that the CBI
regime has been made permanent.
Under the ATPA, only Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia are eli-
gible to be designated as beneficiary countries."6 On July 2, 1992, Presi-
dent Bush designated Colombia and Bolivia as beneficiary countries
under the ATPA. The designation became effective on July 22, 1992.17
Neither Ecuador nor Peru has yet been designated as a beneficiary
country."8
A. Country Eligibility
The ATPA has certain country practice standards which the Presi-
dent must take into account in his decision to designate a country as a
beneficiary country.19 The President is prohibited under the statute from
designating any country as a beneficiary if the country: (1) is a commu-
nist country; (2) has expropriated property of a U.S. citizen without pro-
viding prompt, adequate and effective compensation, or entering into
good faith negotiations to provide prompt, adequate and effective com-
pensation, or submitting the dispute to arbitration under the provisions
including, inter alia, a special financing mechanism, scholarship assistance, a pilot customs
pre-clearance program, and separate cumulation of imports from CBI beneficiary countries
in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. See Caribbean Basin Economic Re-
covery Expansion Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, 104 Stat. 629, 655. For a detailed
description of the CBI, see U.S. Department of Commerce, 1991 Guidebook - Caribbean
Basin Initiative (1991).
15. See 19 U.S.C.A., supra note 1, § 2701. Other components of ATI II included ex-
panded agricultural development assistance, the announcement of the results of the special
review for the Andean countries conducted under GSP, and reaffirmation of the President's
desire to continue encouraging the Andean countries to undertake long-term trade and in-
vestment liberalization efforts, see id.
16. See id. § 3202(b)(1).
17. See Proclamation No. 6455, 57 Fed. Reg. 30069 (July 7, 1992); Proclamation No.
6456, 57 Fed Reg. 30097 (July 7, 1992).
18. Designation of these two countries has been delayed because both countries have
not met the country practice criteria set forth in the ATPA. For a discussion of the ATPA's
country practice criteria, see ATPA Hearings, supra note 3, at 7-9.
19. These country practice standards are identical to the country practice criteria ap-




of the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes or another mutually agreed upon forum; (3) fails to act in good
faith in recognizing arbitral awards in favor of U.S. citizens; (4) affords
preferential treatment to the products of a developed country and such
preferential treatment is likely to have a significant adverse impact on
United States commerce; (5) engages in the broadcast of copyrighted ma-
terial without the express consent of the United States copyright owner
or the country fails to work toward the provision of adequate and effec-
tive protection of intellectual property rights; (6) is not a signatory to a
treaty or convention regarding extradition of U.S. citizens; and (7) has
not or is not taking steps to provide internationally-recognized worker
rights to its workers.20 Under the ATPA, the President can waive certain
of these requirements if he determines that waiver is in the economic or
national security interests of the United States and reports the reasons
for such determination to Congress.21
The ATPA also has certain additional factors which the President
must take into account in his decision to designate a country as a benefi-
ciary country. These criteria include: (1) the expression by such country
of its desire to be designated; (2) the economic conditions in the country,
including the living standards of its inhabitants and other economic fac-
tors; (3) the extent to which the country has assured the U.S. it will pro-
vide equitable and reasonable market access; (4) the degree to which the
country follows the rules of international trade as established under the
GATT and other trade agreements; (5) the degree to which the country
uses export subsidies or imposes export performance or local content re-
quirements; (6) the degree to which the trade policies of the country are
contributing to the revitalization of the region; (7) the degree to which
the country is undertaking self-help measures to promote its own eco-
nomic development; (8) whether the country has taken or is taking steps
to afford its workers internationally-recognized worker rights; (9) the ex-
tent to which the country provides adequate and effective means for for-
eign nationals to secure, exercise, and enforce intellectual property rights;
(10) the extent to which the country prohibits its nationals from engaging
in the broadcast of copyrighted material belonging to U.S. copyright own-
ers; (11) whether the country has met the narcotics cooperation certifica-
tion criteria contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;22 and (12)
20. See 19 U.S.C.A., supra note 1, § 3202(c)(1)-(7).
21. See id. The criteria that can be waived if in the national economic or security inter-
ests of the United States include whether the country: (1) is a communist country; (2) has
expropriated the property of a U.S. citizen without providing prompt adequate and effective
compensation; (3) fails to recognize or enforce arbitral award in favor of U.S. citizens; (4)
engages in the pirated broadcasts of copyrighted material owned by U.S. citizens or fails to
work toward providing adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights; and
(5) has not taken or is not taking steps to afford its workers internationally recognized
worker rights, see id.
22. Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, major drug producing coun-
tries may receive certain types of U.S. assistance, including duty-free benefits under GSP
1992
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the extent to which the country is prepared to cooperate .with the United
States in the administration of the provisions of the ATPA.2"
Under the ATPA, the President has authority to withdraw or sus-
pend the designation of any country as a beneficiary country, or the ap-
plication of duty-free treatment to any article from any country, if the
President determines that because of changed circumstances the country
should no longer be designated as a beneficiary country.24 Before the
President renders such a determination, the ATPA provides that written
comments from the public will be accepted and a public hearing will be
held regarding the proposed action.25 The President is also required to
submit to Congress, until the expiration of duty-free benefits under the
ATPA, triennial reports concerning the operation of the ATPA, including
the results of a general review of the ATPA beneficiary countries' adher-
ence to the ATPA's country practice criteria.
26
B. Product Eligibility
Under the ATPA, certain products are specifically excluded from eli-
gibility for duty-free treatment. Products specifically excluded are (1)
textile and apparel articles subject to textile agreements; (2) footwear ex-
cept certain disposable items of footwear; (3) canned tuna; (4) petroleum
and petroleum products; (5) watches and watch parts with any compo-
nent from a country not eligible for most-favored-nation tariff treatment;
(6) certain leather, rubber, and plastic gloves; (7) luggage, handbags, and
fiat goods; (8) certain leather wearing apparel; 27 (9) certain sugars, syrups
and CBI, only if the President certifies that they have cooperated fully with the U.S., or
taken adequate steps on their own, to control narcotics production, trafficking, and money
laundering. See 19 U.S.C.A., supra note 1, §§ 2491-2495. Countries that otherwise may not
meet the certification criteria may nevertheless be certified if certification is in the vital
national interests of the United States, see id.
23. See id. § 3202(d)(1)-(12).
24. See id. § 3202(e)(1)(A)-(B).
25. See id. § 3202(e)(2)(A)-(B).
26. See id. § 3202(f).
27. Although certain leather, rubber, and plastic gloves; certain leather wearing apparel;
and luggage, handbags, and flat goods, from designated beneficiary countries are excluded
from ATPA duty-free treatment, the ATPA nevertheless reduces the duty-rate for these
items when imported from ATPA beneficiary countries. This reduction is equal to 80 per-
cent of the duty rate applicable to the item as of December 31, 1991, except that the reduc-
tion may not exceed 2.5 percent ad valorem. See id. § 3203(c). This reduction is to be imple-
mented in five equal annual stages with the first reduction in the duty rate to apply to
entries after January 1, 1992, see id. The reduction is in addition to any reduction on duty
rates that may be proclaimed as the result of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations,
except that if the reduction proclaimed is less than 1.5 percent ad valorem, the aggregate of
the ATPA reduction and the Uruguay Round reduction may not exceed 3.5 percent ad
valorem. If the Uruguay Round reduction is 1.5 percent of ad valorem or greater, the aggre-
gate reduction may not exceed the Uruguay Round reduction plus one percent ad valorem,
see id. The specific Harmonized Tariff Schedule ("HTS") tariff classifications applicable to
these items are as follows: leather items - 4202.11.00, 4202.12.20, 4202.12.40, 4202.12.60,
4202.12.80, 4202.19.00, 4202.21.30, 4202.21.60, 4202.21.90, 4202.22.15, 4202.22.40, 4202.22.45,
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and molasses; and (10) rum and tafia.28
All other products from a designated beneficiary country are eligible
for duty-free treatment under the ATPA.
To qualify for duty-free treatment, an article must be the growth,
product, or manufacture of a beneficiary country and imported directly
from a beneficiary country into the United States. 29 In addition, the sum
of the cost or value of the materials produced in the beneficiary country
or two or more beneficiary countries, plus the direct cost of processing
operations performed in a beneficiary country or countries under the
ATPA, must not be less than thirty-five percent of the appraised value of
the article at the time it enters the U.S.30 Materials from and processing
performed in CBI beneficiary countries can be counted toward the thirty-
five percent value-added requirement."' For the purpose of determining
4202.22.60, 4202.22.80, 4202.29.00, 4202.31.60, 4202.32.40, 4202.32.95, 4202.91.00, 4202.92.15,
4202.92.20, 4202.92.30, 4202.92.45, 4202.92.60, 4202.92.90, 4202.99.00, 4203.10.40, 4203.29.08,
4203.29.18; straw and wickerware - 4602.10.21, 4602.10.22, 4602.10.25, 4602.10.29; and
gloves and mittens -- 6116.10.17, 6116.10.45, 6116.10.70, 6116.92.64, 6116.92.88, 6116.93.64,
6116.93.88, 6116.99.48, 6216.00:17, 6216.00.18, 6216.00.28, 6216.00.38, and 6216.00.54. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GUIDEBOOK TO THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT 36 (1992) (Appen-
dix B) (hereinafter "ATPA GUIDEBOOK").
28. See 19 U.S.C.A., supra note 1, § 3203(b). The HTS tariff classifications for items
not eligible for ATPA duty-free treatment, except for textile and apparel articles subject to
textile agreements, can be broken down as follows: canned tuna - 1604.14.10, 1604.14.20,
1604.14.30; sugar - 1701.11.03, 1701.12.02, 1701.99.02, 1702.90.32, 1806.10.42, 2106.90.12;
rum and tafia - 2208.40.00; petroleum and derivatives - 2709.00.10, 2709.00.20, 2710.00.05,
2710.00.10, 2710.00.15, 2710.00.18, 2710.00.20, 2710.00.25, 2710.00.30, 2710.00.35, 2710.00.40,
2710.00.45; floor coverings - 3921.90.15; footwear - 6401.10.00, 6401.91.00, 6401.92.30,
6401.92.60, 6401.92.90, 6401.99.30, 6401.99.60, 6401.99.80, 6401.99.90, 6402.11.00, 6402.19.10,
6402.19.30, 6402.19.50, 6402.19.70, 6402.19.90, 6402.30.30, 6402.30.50, 6402.30.60, 6402.30.70,
6402.30.80, 6402.30.90, 6402.91.40, 6402.91.50, 6402.91.60, 6402.91.70, 6402.91.80, 6402.91.90,
'6402.99.05, 6402.99.10, 6402.99.15, 6402.99.20, 6402.99.30, 6402.99.60, 6402.99.70, 6402.99.80,
6402.99.90, 6403.11.60, 6403.19.15, 6403.19.45, 6403.19.60, 6403.20.00, 6403.30.00, 6403.40.30,
6403.40.60, 6403.51.30, 6403.51.60, 6403.51.90, 6403.59.15, 6403.59.30, 6403.59.60, 6043.59.90,
6403.91.30, 6403.91.60, 6403.91.90, 6403.99.20, 6403.99.40, 6403.99.60, 6403.99.75, 6403.99.90,
6404.11.20, 6404.11.40, 6404.11.50, 6404.11.60, 6404.11.70, 6404.11.80, 6404.11.90, 6404.19.15,
6404.19.20, 6404.19.25, 6404.19.30, 6404.19.35, 6404.19.40, 6404.19.50, 6404.19.60, 6404.19.70,
6404.19.80, 6404.19.90, 6404.20.20, 6404.20.40, 6404.20.60, 6405.10.00, 6405.20.30, 6405.20.60,
6405.20.90, 6405.90.90, 6406.10.05, 6406.10.10, 6406.10.20, 6406.10.25, 6406.10.30, 6406.10.35,
6046.10.40, 6046.10.45, 6406.10.50, 6406.10.77, 6501.00.90, 6503.00.90, 6505.90.30, 6505.90.40,
6505.90.50, 6505.90.60, 6505.90.70, 6505.90.80; glass fibers - 7019.10.10, 7019.10.20,
7019.20.10, 7019.20.20, 7019.20.50; and bedding - 9404.90.10. See ATPA GUIDEBOOK, supra
note 27, at 31-36 (app.B).
Although the duty-free system in the ATPA is patterned after the duty-free regime in CBI,
rum and tafia are not statutorily excluded from duty-free treatment under CBI, while they
are statutorily excluded under the ATPA. See id.
29. See 19 U.S.C.A. supra note 1, § 3203(a)(1)(A). Also, if a product is substantially
transformed into a new and different article in a designated ATPA beneficiary country it
may be eligible for ATPA duty-free treatment if exported from the beneficiary country to
the U.S. See ATPA GUIDEBOOK, supra note 27, at 4.
30. See 19 U.S.C.A. supra note 1, § 3203(a)(1)(A)-(B).
31. See id.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the thirty-five percent value-added requirement, a "beneficiary country"
includes Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands."2 In addition, fifteen
percent of the appraised value attributed to U.S. materials may be ap-
plied toward the thirty five percent figure." The ATPA specifically ex-
cludes from eligibility for duty-free treatment articles that have merely
undergone simple combining or packaging operations, or mere dilution
that does not materially alter the article.8 4
Under the ATPA, the President may suspend duty-free treatment on
any eligible article if the action is proclaimed as import relief under Title
II of the Trade Act of 1974,8 or for national security reasons under Sec-
tion 232 of the Trade Expansion of 1962.36
The ATPA also requires that the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion prepare and submit to the U.S. Congress, after the ATPA's first
twenty four months and every calendar year thereafter until ATPA duty-
free treatment expires, a study regarding the economic impact of the
ATPA on United States industries and consumers, and, in conjunction
with other U.S. government agencies, an assessment of the ATPA's effec-
tiveness in promoting drug-related crop eradication and crop substitution
efforts of the ATPA beneficiary countries."7 In addition, the ATPA re-
quires the Secretary of Labor to, in consultation with other federal agen-
cies, undertake a continuing review and analysis of the effect of the
ATPA on U.S. labor and to provide Congress with annual reports regard-
ing the results of this review and analysis.3 8
III. IMPACT OF ATPA
The benefits provided to the designated beneficiary countries under
the ATPA are relatively narrow in scope, but are not necessarily insignifi-
cant. 9 The benefits are considerably broader than the benefits the An-
32. See id.
33. See id. The cost or value of materials from non-CBI or ATPA countries (excluding
the U.S., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) may count toward the 35 percent value-
added requirement if the materials are first substantially transformed in a CBI or ATPA
beneficiary country into a new and different article, and then substantially transformed a
second time upon incorporation into the exported article. See ATPA GUIDEBOOK, supra note
27, at pp. 4-5.
34. See 19 U.S.C.A., supra note 1, § 3203(a)(2)(A)-(B).
35. See id. §§ 2251-2253. Title II of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to
take action, which includes the imposition of duties or other import relief, for up to eight
years to allow domestic industries that are seriously injured by increasing imports to make a
positive adjustment to import competition, see id. The ATPA also contains provisions con-
cerning emergency relief for perishable products, see id. § 3203(e)(1)-(4).
36. See 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1988). Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 gives
the President authority to impose import restrictions, including additional duties, on im-
ports which threaten to impair national security, see id.
37. See 19 U.S.C.A., supra note 1, § 3204(a)-(c).
38. See id. § 3205.
39. Although frequently compared to the benefits provided to Caribbean countries
under CBI, the ATPA is, in fact, a more limited program. CBI is now a permanent program
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dean countries currently receive under GSP. Although a significant per-
centage of exports from these countries (approximately forty-three
percent) already receive GSP or most-favored nation duty-free treatment,
under the ATPA an additional $324 million or six percent of total im-
ports from the four countries based on 1990 figures are eligible for duty-
free treatment.4 0
Moreover, because the eligibility of certain articles for duty-free
treatment under the ATPA is not subject to the annual review process
under the GSP program, the ATPA provides greater certainty with re-
spect to continued receipt of duty-free benefits for those products that
are eligible for duty-free treatment under the ATPA.
The ATPA also offers certain advantages over GSP value-added re-
quirements. Under GSP, the thirty-five percent value-added requirement
must occur within the beneficiary country. Under the ATPA, the thirty-
five percent can include processing or materials from other ATPA benefi-
ciary countries, CBI beneficiary countries, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Vir-
gin Islands. In addition, U.S. materials can be counted toward the thirty-
five percent value-added requirement, up to fifteen percent of the ap-
praised value of the merchandise.
Because it provides broader benefits than GSP and institutionalizes
for ten years duty-free access to the U.S. market for certain products, it is
hoped that the ATPA will serve as an incentive for farmers in Latin
America to engage in legitimate agricultural activities as opposed to coca
production. The ATPA is also expected to contribute to further growth in
U.S. trade in goods and services with beneficiary countries. The theory is
that since the ATPA will contribute to the further growth and develop-
ment of the Andean countries' economies, demand for U.S. goods and ser-
vices in those countries will also increase. Moreover, it is anticipated that
the ATPA will contribute to increased U.S. investment in the Andean
region in light of the low labor costs and additional incentives it creates
for exporting to the United States.
Finally, the ATPA has symbolic importance. It is a concrete reflec-
tion of the U.S government's commitment to the Andean region, and its
willingness to provide incentives to encourage trade in legitimate prod-
ucts between the U.S. and the Andean countries.
CONCLUSION
Within the context of the Bush Administration's war on drugs, the
ATPA grew out of several initiatives and policies aimed at the Andean
that in addition to providing duty-free access for certain articles from the Caribbean, also
provides, various non-tariff benefits. See id. § 2701. By contrast, the benefits to the four
beneficiary countries under the ATPA, are limited to the provision of duty-free treatment
for certain exports to the United States, see id. § 3202.
40. See H.R. Rep. No. 337, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 820.
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region. Although perhaps narrow in scope, the ATPA is not necessarily
insignificant. A consideration of the substantive content of the ATPA
against the backdrop of the GSP regime reveals that the ATPA is broader
and more permanent. Moreover, because the ATPA is a concrete reflec-
tion of the Bush Administration's commitment to the Andean region by
virtue of the ATPA's geographic focus, the ATPA has symbolic impor-
tance. In short, the ATPA is likely to promote trade in legitimate prod-
ucts between the U.S. and the Andean countries and thereby have a posi-
tive impact on the Andean region.
STUDENT COMMENT
Environmental Law in Mexico*
Today, Mexico faces the challenge of economic growth and develop-
ment to satisfy its internal economic needs as well as to become an actor
in the international market. Accompanying this drive to develop are a
variety of environmental impacts. Developing solutions to address Mex-
ico's environmental issues is one of the major endeavors confronting the
Mexican government, both presently and prospectively. Aside from the
threat of natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes in the central and
southern regions, Mexico is troubled with scarce and polluted water re-
sources in the north, poor water quality in the central and lower south-
east regions, deforestation and widespread erosion.' Significant air pollu-
tion problems exist in major cities, such as Mexico City, as well as in
urban developments along the U.S./Mexico border.2 The future of the
Mexican economy and the welfare of the Mexican people, depends on de-
veloping solutions to Mexico's environmental problems.
This report provides a summary and analysis of the current environ-
mental regimes existing in Mexico. It also provides a discussion of some
* Author's Note: Since the completion of this report, the Mexican Congress, in May,
1992, passed new legislation reducing the role of the federal environmental authorities. The
legislation transformed the Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE) into
the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL). With the transformation of SEDUE
into SEDESOL under the new legislation, local authorities have greater discretion in
interpreting and applying Mexico's environmental regulations. In addition, the new
legislation created the National Institute of Ecology (INECO), which is directed to define
federal environmental policy, set national ecological norms and conduct research. The
Federal Attorney General for Environmental Protection is now charged with the
enforcement of federal standards. Technical norms interpreting and applying the new
environmental management and enforcement regime are pending. Environmental Law;
Building and Related Permits, Bus. INT'L; INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING, Oct. 5, 1992,
available in LEXIS, North/South America, Mexico; Mexico Localizes Environmental
Enforcement, Bus. INT'L; INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING, Oct. 5, 1992, available in
LEXIS, North/South America, Mexico; see SEDUE Re-Emerges Under SEDESOL,
BUSINESS MEXICO, Sept. 1992, available in LEXIS, North/South America, Mexico.
1. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK, MEXICO, July, 1991
[hereinafter THE WORLD FACT BOOK].
2. Id.
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of the major political efforts and legal instruments, which exist to help
further Mexico's environmental management scheme.
I. OVERVIEW
The Mexican legal system is a mixture of constitutional theory,
modeled after the United States, and civil law traditions.' The constitu-
tion dates back to February 16, 1917. In Mexico, both federal and state
governments promulgate laws that are subject to judicial review. Nation-
ally, there are sixty-eight district courts and a series of appellate courts
culminating with a supreme court. In the international arena, Mexico ac-




Mexico is a federal republic, operating under a centralized govern-
ment.' There are thirty-one states and one federal district.' Mexico has a
presidential form of government.7 The president is elected for six-year
terms and has the power to appoint a cabinet.' The presidential cabinet is
comprised of ministers who control various national ministries. The fol-
lowing ministries relate to environmental affairs: 1) agrarian reform, 2)
agriculture and hydraulic resources, 3) energy and mines industry, 4) fish-
eries, 5) health, and 6) urban development and ecology."
The national legislature is comprised of a bicameral Congress. 0 The
Senate is the upper chamber, while the lower chamber is known as the




6. Id. The names of the thirty-one states, along with the federal district are: Aguasca-
lientes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Co-
lima, Distrito Federal, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoa-
can, Morelos, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, Puebla, Queretaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis
Potosi, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Yucatan and Zacatecas.
7. Id.
8. Mexico Political Structure Table, Bus. INT'L; COUNTRY REPORT, Feb. 26, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw, North/South America, Mexico.
9. See id. The remaining ministries, some of which indirectly relate to environmental
concerns are: 1) commerce and industrial development, 2) communications and transport, 3)
comptroller general, 4) education, 5) finance and public credit, 6) foreign relations, 7) gov-
ernment, 8) labor and social welfare, 9) national defence, 10) navy, 11) programming and
budget and 12) tourism.
In May, 1992, the Mexican government transformed the Ministry of Urban Develop-
ment and Ecology (SEDUE) into the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL). Mex-
ico Political Structure Table, Bus. INT'L; INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING, Oct. 5, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw, North/South America, Mexico.
10. Id.
11. THE WORLD FACT BOOK, supra note 1.
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plus an additional two from the federal district, hold office for six years.12
The Chamber of Deputies is composed of five hundred members: three
hundred members are elected directly and two hundered are elected on
the basis of proportional representation.13
The same political party has been in control of the Mexican federal
government since the 1920's."' However, the influence of the dominating
party, known as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, has diminished
over the years.'5 The incumbent president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, a
member of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, received merely 50.4
percent of the vote in 1988.6
At the regional level, each state has a governor and a local legislature.
Governors are elected to serve six-year terms. Each state, acting through
its respective legislature, may impose and collect taxes.1
7
B. Treaties
In furtherance of its environmental goals and programs, Mexico has
entered into bilateral and multilateral international agreements relating
to environmental concerns. These agreements may be comprehensive, or
specifically targeted to address a particular environmental issue.
One such multilateral agreement, the Basel Convention on the Con-
trol of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Dispo-
sal,'" has been signed and ratified by Mexico. The Basel Convention re-
quires exporting countries to provide advance notice of proposed waste
shipments. Wastes can only be sent after the receiving country gives its
consent. The receiving country must assure that wastes will be disposed
of in an environmentally sound manner.'
Mexico is also a party to the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Ozone Layer2" and the Montreal Protocol On Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer. 2' Likewise, Mexico is a party to several conven-
tions relating to the prevention of marine pollution: the Convention for
the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the
12. Mexico Political - Feb., supra note 8.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Mexico Political Structure Table, Bus. INT'L; COUNTRY REPORT, June 21, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw, North/South America, Mexico.
16. Id. There are five major opposing political parties: the Partido de Accion Nacional,
the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica, the Partido Popular Socialista, the Partido
Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicana, Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstruccion
Nacional.
17. Id.
18. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, U.N.E.P. Doc. IG.80/3, March 22, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
649 (1989).
19. Id.
20. 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987).
21. 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987); 30 I.L.M. 537 (1991).
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Wider Caribbean Region;22 the International Convention for the Preven-
tion of Pollution from Ships,28 and the 1978 Protocol to that Convention
(MARPOL 73/78); ' the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of the
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London
Dumping Convention); 5 and the Third United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).2" The United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea is not yet in force, however it has been signed and ratified
by Mexico.
Mexico has also signed bilateral agreements with the United States
of America. The two major U.S./Mexico bilateral agreements concerning
environmental protection are the Treaty for the Utilization of Waters of
the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, known as the
Water Treaty of 1944,27 and the 1983 Agreement between the United
States and Mexico on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement
of the Environment in the Border Area 8 (the La Paz Agreement) and its
five annexes.29
The 1944 Water Treaty allocates the surface waters of the Rio
Grande/Rio Brave between Mexico and the United States."0 The 1944
Water Treaty replaced the International Boundary Commission (IBC),
originally established under the 1889 International Boundary Convention,
with the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC).3 ' The
present IBWC has greater powers to govern water usage, water quality,
wastewater treatment, and conservation.
The La Paz Agreement provides for the creation of technical "an-
nexes" concerning specific projects. Annex I addresses Tijuana/San Diego
wastewater treatment facilities.3 2 Annex II authorizes a joint emergency
response team to clean up accidental oil and hazardous substance spills
along the two hundred kilometer-wide joint inland international border.33
Annex III governs the transboundary shipment of hazardous wastes and
22. 22 I.L.M. 221 (1983).
23. 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973).
24. 17 I.L.M. 546 (1978).
25. 11 I.L.M. 1291 (1972).
26. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122 of Oct. 7, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
27. Water Treaty of 1944, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mexico, 28 U.S.T. 7399, w/supp. protocol
signed Nov. 14, 1944.
28. Aug. 14, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 10827, 22 I.L.M. 1025 (1983).
29. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND SECRETARIA-DE DESARROLLO URBANA
Y ECOLOGIA (SEDUE), INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER
AREA, (First Stage, 1992-1994) at A-8 (1992) [hereinafter INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL
PLAN].
30. Darcy Alan Frownfelter, Water as a Natural Resource - The Regulation of Water
by International Treaties, available in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, ST.
MARY'S L.J., INT'L L. SYMP. (March 6, 1992)(unpublished documents) [hereinafter Water as
a Natural Resource].
31. INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN, supra note 29, at A-6.
32. 26 I.L.M. 18 (1987)(signed Jul. 18, 1985).
33. 26 I.L.M. 19 (1987)(signed Jul. 18, 1985).
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substances between the United States and Mexico.s4 Annex IV addresses
copper smelters in specified border areas.3 5 Lastly, Annex V confronts the
problem of urban air pollution and allows for the identification and ap-
praisal of specific study areas in border cities within Mexico and the
United States."8
Some lesser known bilateral cooperative agreements entered between
Mexico and the United States include the Agreement between the Direc-
torate General of Natural Resources of the Ministry of Ecology and Ur-
ban Development and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for Cooperation
in the Conservation of Wildlife (1984); 87 and the Agreement between the
Forest Service of Mexico and the U.S. Forest Service on Cooperation
(1985).38
It is important to note that by becoming a signatory to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 9 Mexico displayed a commit-
ment to the pursuit of free trade. 0 The recent GATT panel ruling exem-
plifies the fact that the international dispute resolution process can also
have a substantial impact on environmental policy.4 Beyond treaties and
agreements dealing directly with environmental concerns, there are other
avenues by which customary international law may have a direct or indi-
rect effect on environmental issues in Mexico.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
General Concepts of Environmental Law in Mexico
The General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Pro-
tection, hereinafter referred to as the General Ecology Law, became effec-
tive March 1, 1988."1 The Ministry of Ecology and Urban Development of
34. 26 I.L.M. 25 (1987)(signed Nov. 12, 1987).
35. 26 I.L.M. 33 (1987)(signed Jan. 29, 1987).
36. 29 I.L.M. 29 (1990)(signed Oct. 3, 1989).
37. INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN, supra note 29, at A-6.
38. Id.
39. Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950)(entered into force Jan. 1,
1948).
40. Bruce Stokes, Greens Talk Trade, 23 NAT'L J. 862, 863 (Apr. 13, 1991).
41. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REVIEW OF U.S.-MEXICO
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Nov. 1991) 5, in NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: INFORMATION PACKET (1991)(unpublished documents), [hereinafter COM-
MENTS ON THE DRAFT REVIEW].
Based upon a complaint brought by Mexico against the United States, a GATT panel
held that the Marine Mammal Protection Act, (U.S. legislation), violated GATT. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Re-
strictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1623 (1991); The Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc., U.S. Embargo on Mexican Tuna Violations GATT Rules Panel Finds, 8 INT'L TRADE
REP. 1288 (1991); Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade, THE WASH. POST, Oc-
tober 18, 1991 at A21. The complaint was provoked by a tuna embargo imposed by the
United States against Mexico for indiscriminate dolphin kill.
42. General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection, art. 8(V)
(1988) [hereinafter General Ecology Law]. English translation found in, MEXICAN ENVIRON-
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Mexico,4 referred to as SEDUE, is responsible for the formulation and
direction of national ecological and environmental policy. SEDUE is the
major enforcement body of the General Ecology Law.
SEDUE creates and develops programs to preserve and restore the
ecological equilibrium and to achieve an integrated management of natu-
ral resources." To improve efficiency, the General Ecology Law encour-
ages cooperation among federal, state and local governments in Mexico.45
In addition, joint efforts between SEDUE and the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), exist to improve environmental condi-
tions in the border areas, as well as further within Mexico.
SEDUE enforces the General Ecology Law through the issuance of
Technical Ecological Norms, NTEs.46 NTEs are separately issued regula-
tions which establish ecological standards, including criteria, procedures,
tests, and facility requirements.4 7 Private or public activities which may
cause ecological imbalance, or those that may exceed the limitations pro-
vided for in the relevant NTE standards are subject to environmental
impact evaluation." Thus, the assessment of possible environmental ef-
fects must be provided for in the form of an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) prior to authorization by SEDUE, or by other appropriate
state or local agencies. 49 This EIS must provide risk assessments of pro-
posed or modified activities along with preventive and corrective mea-
sures to mitigate adverse environmental impacts.5
The proposed North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, will
likely attract more investment in the country of Mexico. Indeed that is
what is hoped for by some. The government of Mexico must therefore
MENTAL DOCUMENTS, August 1991, (unpublished documents), provided by the World Envi-
ronment Center [hereinafter MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL DOCUMENTS].
For a background analysis of environmental policy in Mexico, leading up to the present
regulatory regime, see Stephen P. Mumme, C. Richard Bath & Valerie J. Assetto, Political
Development and Environmental Policy in Mexico, 23 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 7 (1988).
43. Secretaria De Desarrollo Urbano Y Ecologia.
44. General Ecology Law, supra note 42, art. 8(V).
45. Id. art. 4. Because concurrent jurisdiction exists over most environmental and eco-
logical matters, federal, state and local governments are encouraged to cooperate.
46. Id. art. 8.
47. Id. arts. 36-37.
48. Id. arts. 28-35.
49. Id. art. 28. In addition to jurisdiction over environmental impact evaluations, the
evaluation of the following specific areas are reserved to SEDUE:
1) federal public works; 2) hydraulic works, general communication ways, oil
pipelines, gas pipelines, and coal chutes; 3) chemical, petrochemical, steel, pa-
per, sugar, liquor, cement, automotive, and electrical generation and transmis-
sion industries; 4) exploration, extraction, treatment and refining of mineral
and non-mineral substances reserved to the Federal Government; 5) federal
tourism development; 6) installations for treatment, storage, or elimination of
hazardous residues, and of radioactive residues; and 7) use of forests and tropi-
cal jungles and of species whose regeneration is difficult.
Id. art. 29(I-VII).
50. Id. art. 34.
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continue to establish and strengthen enforcement powers of the appropri-
ate environmental protection agencies. Increased economic activity will
place an increased burden on the environment. A sound and responsive
environmental regime must exist throughtout Mexico. The negative envi-
tronmental behavior patterns, exhibited by many "maquiladora" indus-
tries along the U.S.-Mexican border, must not spread to areas of Mexico
where environmental enforcement is weak or non-existent. 51
A. Air
The General Ecology Law announces that "[a]ir quality must be sat-
isfactory in all human settlements and in all regions of the nation; and..
. [e]missions of pollutants into the atmosphere ... must be reduced and
controlled to assure air quality satisfactory for the welfare of the popula-
tion and ecological equilibrium."52 SEDUE may issue NTEs to control,
reduce, or avoid air pollution. These standards should specify permissible
levels of emission by pollutant, require the installation of control equip-
ment, establish air quality monitoring systems, establish certification
standards, set vehicle emission standards, and establish vehicle testing
procedures."3
The General Ecology Law requires state and local governments to
create and implement procedures "to prevent and control air pollution on
property and zones within state jurisdiction."'I In addition, these authori-
ties shall apply general atmospheric protection criteria by enacting de-
crees and provisions which designate zones for polluting industries. The
installation of emission control equipment shall be required as
appropriate.
55
State and local governments are also required to inventory fixed
sources of pollution, establish auto emission verification systems, estab-
lish air quality monitoring systems, and regulate emissions from public
transportation, excluding federal transportation. In combination, these
provisions require authorities to take all preventive measures necessary to
avoid environmental risk due to air pollution. The General Ecology Law
authorizes states and local governments to enact measures for* the en-
forcement of state environmental laws, including the imposition of
sanctions.56
All emitters of pollutants into the atmosphere must observe these
state and local provisions, along with subsequent regulations. The release
of emissions containing hazardous residues or materials may only occur
51. See infra notes 184-202 and accompanying text for discussion of the Maquiladora
Program in Mexico.
52. General Ecology Law, supra note 42, art. 110(I) & (II). The prevention and control
of air pollution is addressed in articles 110-116.
53. Id. art 112.
54. Id. art. 112(I).
55. Id. art. 112(111).
56. Id.
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with prior authorization from SEDUE. In addition, the General Ecology
Law requires that authorities create zones where industrial uses are suita-
ble adjacent to residential areas. 7
The issuance of technical norms or standards for the control of air
pollution has occurred since 1988. This action was prompted as a result of
severe air pollution problems experienced by a number of cities within
Mexico.58 The essential information and standards contained in these
NTEs is provided in the following discussion.
1. Air Pollution Ecological Technical Norms5"
a. Initial automobile emission standards"0
Gasoline engines emit pollutants into the atmosphere by inefficient
or incomplete combustion of the air-gasoline mixtures in the cylinders.
Air quality is thereby reduced in the affected area. Maximum permissible
air emissions prevent significant changes in air quality.
This technical norm sets the maximum permissible levels of carbon
monoxide and hydrocarbons generated by internal combustion engines
using gasoline fuel. "The standards are issued by public order, in the in-
terest of society, and are to be observed by the users of automobiles.
6 1
These auto emissions standards are set as a function of the year the en-
gine was manufactured. 2
b. Emission standards for newly manufactured gas powered
vehicles6"
Auto emission standards for new gasoline powered vehicles have been
issued by the Secretary of Urban Development and Ecology. These stan-
57. Id. arts. 113 & 114.
58. See generally, Battling Pollution in Mexico City, 1991 International Reports - a
division of IBC USA (Publications) Inc. Mexico Service, June 5, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Intlaw, North/South America, Mexico 2.
59. Translations of Mexico's Air Pollution Ecological Technical Norms are available in
MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 42.
NOTE: The concentrations and units of measurement presented in the forthcoming
tables, correspond to the levels as presented in the above referenced documents.
60. NTE-CCAT-003/88.
61. Id. art. 2.
62. Id. art. 4.
Maximum Permissible Emission Levels
Year CO HC
(% volume) (ppm)
*1979 and before 6.0 700
1980 - 1986 4.0 500
1987 and later 3.0 400
* In areas located at 1500 meters above sea level, the maximum levels for care made before




dards do not apply to agricultural tractors, motorcycles, vehicles weighing
less than 400 kg or more than 3,000 kg.64 With regard to the application
of the standard, definitions are provided for the following terms: year,
model, automobile, basic chassis, line, engine, gross weight, manufactur-
ing plant, front platform, drive train, and commercial vehicle. A year
model is defined as "[t]he period between November 01 of one year, and
October 31 of the next year.""
Article Four of this technical norm provides tables setting the maxi-
mum auto exhaust emission levels for hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide
and nitrogen oxide. Table 1 establishes further emission standards for fu-
ture automobiles.6 Additional tables provide the standards for commer-
cial vehicles over 2,727 kg gross weight.
c. Automobile inspections
67
This standard establishes the equipment characteristics and testing
procedures for the inspection of gasoline powered motor vehicle emis-
sions. Federal, state and municipal authorities must verify that motor ve-
hicle emissions do not exceed the maximum permissible levels by estab-
lishing inspection centers.6 8
This ecological standard sets forth appropriate tests and specific pro-
cedures. The standard further provides that the present technical norm




This standard establishes "maximum permissible levels of emission
in the atmosphere of particulates, Carbon Monoxide [(CO)], Sulfur Diox-
ide [(S02)], and Nitrogen Oxides [(NOx)] generated by diesel stationary
sources, when the combustion gases are not in direct contact with the
process materials."7 1 Operating diesel stationary sources emit pollutants
such as CO, S02, NOx and particulates. These pollutants may then react




Year model Maximum Permissible Emission Levels (g/km)*
of vehicle HC CO NOx
1989 2.00 22.00 2.30
1990 1.80 18.00 2.00
1991-92 0.70 7.00 1.40
1993 and later 0.25 2.11 0.62
* g/km = grams of contaminant per kilometer.
67. NTE-CCAT-013/89
68. Id.
69. Id. art. 14.
70. NTE-CCAT-005/88.
71. Id. art. 1.
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with other chemicals at a site forming other contaminants with greater
toxic properties. Emissions then lead to a deterioration in the surround-
ing air quality.
Definitions of the following terms are listed: combustion, diesel, com-
bustion equipment, stationary source, combustion process, combustion
start-up operation, blow-out operation, and critical zone. In particular, a
stationary source is defined as "[a]n establishment, which is involved in
industrial, commercial, or service operations, or processes, or activities
which do, or may, generate contaminating emissions in the atmosphere."
A critical zone is defined as "[a]n atmospheric zone in which, because of
its topographic and meteorological characteristics, [a] high concentration
of pollutants are registered, or are difficult to disperse."7 2
This standard also governs daily start-up and blow-out operations. It
provides that the maximum permissible levels of emissions may be ex-
ceeded for a time period no greater than 15 minutes, 3 times a day for
each. Quantitative measurement procedures shall be established with the
corresponding Official Mexican Standards, or in particular cases, those
"issued by the competent authorities.
7 3
e. Emissions of solid particulates from stationary sources
74
Factors considered in setting the maximum emission levels of solid
particulates from stationary sources include: the location of the stationary
sources, technological developments which reduce pollution, the modifica-
tion of industrial processes technologies, and the installation of control
equipment.7 These standards exclude those solid particulates generated
by calcification furnaces of the cement industry, and by combustion
processes.71 In addition to the definitions of stationary source and critical
zone, gas flow is defined as "a quantity of gas, flowing through an area
during a certain time period." The standard provides the maximum per-
missible emissions levels of solid particles in the atmosphere, generated
72. Id. art. 3.
73. Id. art. 6.
Maximum Permissible Emission Levels*






* The maximum permissible levels from diesel combustion processes are expressed in "kilo-
grams of contaminants per cubic meter of diesel, consumed at 298 degrees K (25 degree C),"
referred to as Kg/m3.
** Nitrogen oxides are expressed as nitrogen dioxide.
74. NTE-CCAT-009/88.
75. Id.
76. Id. art. 1.
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by stationary sources, according to the flow of gases. 77
f. Emission levels from stationary sources using fuel oi
7 8
These standards were set in consideration of the following factors:
only fuel oil is used during combustion processes, the degree of optimiza-
tion of the processes, the actual control technologies, and possible alter-
native high quality fuels.7 1 The maximum emission levels were set for
particulate matter, CO, S02, and NOx, generated by stationary sources
solely utilizing fuel oil. The standards apply only "when combustion gases
are not in direct contact with process materials."8 0
Similar definitions to those given in the previously referenced NTE
for stationary sources are provided. Of relevance, fuel oil is defined as a
"[c]ombustible substance, obtained as a residual in crude oil refining, and
which satisfies the established quality control specs." 81
The maximum contaminant levels from oil combustion processes are
expressed in "kilograms of contaminants per cubic meter of diesel, con-
sumed at 298 degrees K (25 degree C)," s2 and are referred to as Kg/m3.
The maximum permissible levels may be exceeded during start-up and
blow-out, for a period of time not to exceed 15 minutes, 3 times a day.
83
A reference is made to equipment with combustion capacity in excess
of 106 x 10-9 joules/hr, and provides that the maximum levels may be
exceeded only during start-up operations, in periods no longer than 7
hours, and for no more than 2 times per year.
77. Id. art. 4.
Maximum Permissible Emission Levels
*Gas flow









* Please note that the above table only provides a selection of those particular gas flows
listed in NTE-CCAT-009/88. Please refer to the standard for a complete listing, and for the
extrapolation formula. A formula is provided to calculate the maximum levels for gas flows
but is not listed in the table.
78. NTE- CCAT-007/88.
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 1.
81. Id. art. 3.
82. Id. art. 4.
83.
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g. Maximum emissions from coal burning thermoelectric
stations 4
This standard establishes maximum emissions from coal burning
thermoelectric stations of particulates, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide,
and nitrogen oxides.8 5 Coal is defined as a "[s]olid combustible material,
which carbon content varies from 10 to 90% in weight.""s
h. Procedure for measuring carbon monoxide
8 7
This ecological standard provides for an official procedure for moni-
toring and detection of carbon monoxide in the atmosphere. The stan-
dard mandates that "federal, state, and municipal officials, responsible
for [the establishment] and operation of the manual systems for air qual-
ity monitoring and carbon monoxide concentration measurements" ob-
serve its requirements.88 Among its technical requirements, the standard
directs that designated stations use a "non-dispersive photometer"
method to measure the amounts of carbon monoxide in the atmosphere.89
i. Procedure for measuring suspended particulate mattero
This standard provides the official procedure for determining the
concentration of suspended air particles. Suspended particles are defined
as "any solid or liquid particles, dispersed in the atmosphere, with diame-
ter up to 100 [micrometers] in a form of dust, vapor, metal particles,








* Nitrogen oxides are expressed as nitrogen dioxide.
(i) For combustion capacity up to 106 x 10-9 joules/hr.
(ii) For combustion capacity greater than 106 x 10-9 joules/hr.
84. NTE-CCAT-006/88.
85.













* Kg/m3 = Kilograms of contaminants per cubic meter of coal, in dry form.
** NOx, expressed as nitrogen dioxide.
86. Id. art. 3.
87. NTE-CCAT-001/88.
88. Id. art. 5.




among others." 9' The procedure utilizes a high volume sample.9 2 The
standard is to be observed by federal, state and municipal officials, re-
sponsible for establishing and operating the air quality monitoring sys-
tems where suspended particles are found.
9 3
B. Water
Greater treatment of wastewater is needed for the maintenance of
the overall water quality within Mexico. The quantity of water is limited.
The border areas of northern Mexico are developing at a rate which far
exceeds the development of water resources and treatment facilities. Pol-
luted waters severely limit the "sustainability" of fresh and ground water
resources. In addition, depleted and polluted water resources have a nega-
tive impact on wildlife.
The water resources in the Rio Grande/Rio Brave basin area are
comprised of surface water and ground water. 4 The basin's water re-
sources are considered to be international or transboundary in nature.
The 1944 Water Treaty allocates the surface waters in the Rio Grande/
Rio Brave basin; however, there is no international agreement or treaty to
regulate transboundary groundwater supplies. Supplies for water on both
sides of the border are limited. In particular, medium range forecasts in-
dicate that demands will exceed the water supply in the Rio Grande/Rio
Brave basin.
The General Ecology Law encourages the rational use of water re-
sources in a manner that protects aquatic ecosystems and equilibrium.5
Article Eighty-nine of the General Ecology Law requires that a National
Hydraulic Program be formulated. It compels officials to create criteria
and standards for the protection of the physical environment, as well as
for the protection of human health and consumption. 6 The standard di-
rects that environmental impact studies shall be performed, and that res-
toration of aquatic ecosystems shall occur as is feasible.97
SEDUE, the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources, and
the Ministry of Fisheries manage and regulate water resources. SEDUE is
authorized, under the General Ecology Law, to issue technical norms for
the control of surface, groundwater and marine water pollution. 8
'The General Ecology Law contemplates a comprehensive water regu-
91. Id. art. 3.
92. Id. art. 5.
93. Id. art. 2.
94. Water as a Natural Resource, supra note 30, at 3.
95. General Ecology Law, supra note 42, art. 88.
96. Id.
97. Id. art. 95.
98. Id; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of General Counsel, Office of En-
forcement, Mexican Environmental Laws, Regulations and Standards - Preliminary Report
of EPA Findings, revised June 19, 1991, 13, 14, (unpublished document), [hereinafter Mexi-
can Environmental Laws].
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latory system, implemented by regulations.0 9 Although the system is not
fully developed, wastewater discharges should occur only when author-
ized. 100 Unpermitted discharges may lead to penalties or closures. 10 1
The National Water Commission is a decentralized agency of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources.102 It is charged with the
distribution, management, care, and conservation of water throughout
Mexico.108 Its responsibilities include the operation, maintenance and de-
velopment of the necessary infrastructure for the support of water re-
source systems."'
C. Natural Resources & Energy
1. Soil
The General Ecology Law promotes rational land and soil use.106 It
protects soil from degradation and erosion and mandates that land use
methods be modified to minimize deleterious effects on the environment.
Accordingly, the law supports farming methods which promote or restore
ecological equilibrium.106
The General Ecology Law provides ecological criteria and direction
for soil protection programs and authorizes the development of a national
land system. Tax incentives may be given for ecologically sensitive for-
estry activities, including the "establishment and expansion of forest
plantations, and works for the protection of forest soil.
'10 7
Title IV of the General Ecology Law discusses environmental protec-
tion and contains provisions regarding the protection and control of
soil.108 It provides criteria to prevent soil pollution, with specific regard to
the control and disposal of solid waste, the regulation of urban develop-
ment, as well as the use of pesticides, fertilizers and toxic substances in
the environment. These criteria authorize the issuance of technical norms
in these areas. 09
2. Mining
Mining has been an economically important activity in Mexico for
99. Mexican Environmental Laws, supra note 98, at 3, 14.
100. Id. at 14-16.
101. Id. at 15.
102. MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 623.
103. Id. at 623-25.
104. Id. at 625-28.
105. General Ecology Law, supra note 42, arts. 98-107.
106. Id. art. 99. Listings of registered pesticides is provided in MEXICAN ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 486.
107. General Ecology Law, supra note 42, art. 107.




centuries." In fact, metals were mined prior to the arrival of the Spanish
in the 16th century."' Mining activities are subject to federal jurisdiction
in Mexico. " 2 Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution establishes that all
mineral resources belong to the Mexican Nation.1' 3 Extraction may occur
only through federal concessions to Mexican individuals, to corporations
incorporated under Mexican laws, or to foreign individuals who agree not
to invoke the protection of their government with regard to their conces-
sions."" A subsequently enacted law, the Regulatory Law of Constitu-
tional Article 27 in Mining Matters, is more restrictive than the Constitu-
tion, and prohibits foreign individuals from holding mining concessions." 5
To prevent and control the harmful effects of exploration or extraction of
non-renewable natural resources, the General Ecology Law mandates the
issuance of technical standards by SEDUE."6 These standards should
provide for the protection of water, so that it may be put to other uses.
Additionally, these standards should provide for protection of the soil so
that reclamation may occur and for the protection of flora and fauna."'
Standards should designate the proper location for the placement of dis-
carded ore, ore sweepings and slag from mining operations." 8
3. The National Energy Modernization Plan of 1990-1994" 9
The Mexican Energy Plan is "integral, realistic and reaches beyond
the time horizon of the present administration."' 20 The plan serves as an
important guideline in the development and modernization of Mexico.'
It is national in scope and operates under the three major National Ac-
cords which form the framework of Mexico's modernization endeavors:
the Accord for Expansion of Democratic Life, the Accord for Economic
Recovery with Price Stability, and the Accord for Productive Improve-
ment of the Standard of Living.
22
The Energy Plan is the responsibility of the Federal Public Adminis-
tration, yet requires the participation of state and municipal govern-
ments, coordinated with private sectors.2 2 The plan considers the devel-
opment of all of Mexico's energy resources, both primary and secondary.
110. Rodrigo Sanchez-Mejorada Velasco, Foreign Investment in Mining in Mexico, 23
ST. MARY'S L.J. 821 (1992).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 823.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 823-824.
115. Id. at 824.
116. General Ecology Law, supra note 42, arts. 108-109.
117. See id.
118. Id. art. 108(111).
119. MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 197.
120. Id. at 200.
121. See id. at 199.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 201.
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The program sets forth five guiding priorities: productivity, conservation
and efficient energy use, the financing of development and expansion of
supply, diversification of resources, and increased participation in the
world market. 24
4. Oil
The National Energy Plan states that the hydrocarbon reserves
within the Mexican Energy Sector rank eighth in the world."' With re-
gard to the production of petroleum and derivative products, Mexico is
sixth in the world. 2 6 Foreign investors seek direct access to these
reserves, although Mexican legislation precludes them. Therefore, invest-
ment in the development of the Mexican oil industry must be done with
caution. Accident mitigation and safety standards should be designed to
minimize damage to the environment and health, both on-shore and off-
shore. Factories that process petrochemical derivatives directly from raw




With respect to nuclear energy, the General Ecology Law demands
that government authorities monitor the exploration, and exploitation of
the use of nuclear minerals, nuclear fuels, and nuclear energy. 12 8 The nu-
clear industry, and activities related thereto, should be managed and con-
ducted in accordance with appropriate standards for nuclear and radioac-
tive installations. These standards should assure physical safety in and
around nuclear or radioactive installations, so that risks to human health
are avoided and preservation of ecological equilibrium is maintained. Ac-
cordingly, environmental impact assessments are required with respect to
nuclear energy development. 12 9
D. Preservation
Title III, Chapter 1 of the General Ecology Law recognizes the need
for endangered species identification and range protection, especially
along the developing border regions.
Areas within Mexican territory may be designated as protected natu-
124. Id. at 203.
125. Id. at 199. A National Wildlife Federation report ranks Mexico's petroleum depos-
its as second only to Saudi Arabia's. National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Concerns
Related to a United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement, (Nov. 27, 1990), at 9, in
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: INFORMATION PACKET
(1991)(unpublished documents) [hereinafter Environmental Concerns].
126. MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 199.
127. Id. at 632.




ral areas under the General Ecology Law. 130 Protected natural areas,
under federal jurisdiction, are classified as biosphere preserves, special bi-
osphere preserves, national parks, national marine parks, natural monu-
ments, areas for the protection of natural resources, areas for the protec-
tion of flora and fauna, urban parks, and zones subject to ecological
conservation.' The latter two classifications are subject to state and/or
municipal jurisdiction." 2 This section also provides for a degree of public
participation: "[iun the establishment, administration and development of
protected natural areas ... the residents thereof shall participate ... in
order to encourage integrated development of the community and assure
protection of the ecosystems."' 33
Biosphere preserves are areas greater than 10,000 hectares which: 1)
contain at least one or more ecosystems that have not been significantly
altered by human activity; and 2) contain at least one unaltered zone and
inhabited by endemic, threatened, or endangered species.' 3 ' Activities to
preserve the ecosystems, such as scientific and ecological educational re-
search, may be authorized. 135 Uses which may alter the ecosystem may be
limited or prohibited. The creation of new population centers is prohib-
ited within a biosphere preserve, however buffer zones can be established
for communities located within the preserve area at the time of its
establishment.' 36
Chapter 1 also establishes "special biosphere preserves" which are
similar to biosphere preserves, yet contain fewer numbers of endemic,
threatened or endangered species. As a result, such areas are inappropri-
ate for consideration as biosphere preserves. 1
7
The General Ecology Law and the Forestry Law govern the creation
of national parks.'38 Factors considered in designating a park area are
scenic beauty, the scientific, educational or recreational values of an area,
the existence of nationally important flora or fauna, and the suitability
for tourism development. These parks may be utilized by the public for
research, education, recreation, tourism, and activities related to preser-
vation of the natural resources and ecosystems contained therein. For-
estry uses may also be allowed when SEDUE determines that the area in
question is ecologically suitable.3 9
National marine parks are established in marine zones and may in-
130. Id. art. 44. (The articles relating to protection of natural areas are located in the
General Ecology Law, Title 2.)
131. Id. art. 46.
132. Id. arts. 55-56.
133. Id. art. 47.
134. Id. art. 48.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Id. art 49.
138. Id. art. 50.
139. Id.
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clude beaches and federal maritime land contiguous zones. 140 Within
these areas, activities related to preservation, education, research, and
recreation are allowed. The General Ecology Law, the Federal Fisheries
Law, the Federal Sea Law, international legal standards and other appli-
cable laws may authorize the use of natural resources in these areas. 141
The General Ecology Law and the Forestry Law direct the establish-
ment of natural monuments. 4" Natural monuments contain one or more
natural elements of national significance which are deemed worthy of pro-
tection. These elements may be of historical, aesthetic, scientific or
unique value.
148
E. Hazardous Activities and Hazardous Waste
SEDUE seeks to ensure that hazardous activities occur only in desig-
nated zones. 144 Highly hazardous activities are listed in the federal Diario
Official. 1" Those engaging in highly hazardous activities must submit ac-
cident prevention plans corresponding to the applicable regulations, in
order to receive approval by federal regulatory authorities. State and local
governments shall regulate those activities not designated as highly
hazardous. 1
46
Mexico's listing of hazardous wastes is similar to the procedure es-
tablished in the United States. 1 47 Standards for the regulation of hazard-
ous materials are found in Articles 150 to 153 of the General Ecology
Law. Like hazardous activities, hazardous materials are identified and
listed in the federal Diario Official. Testing procedures for the identifica-
tion and characterization of such wastes are similar to those of the United
States.
The use and disposal of hazardous materials and hazardous residues
must comply with the technical standards established by SEDUE.148 Im-
ports and exports of these substances are to be tracked, regulated and
subjected to compliance guarantees. Furthermore, hazardous substances
generated from primary materials brought into Mexico for industrial use,
under the temporary import system, are to be returned to the country of
origin.149 Thus, these standards, including limited disposal and recycling
methods, require maquiladora industries to transport hazardous wastes
140. Id. art. 52.
141. Id.
142. Id. art. 51.
143. Id.
144. General Ecology Law, supra note 42, arts. 145-49.
145. Id. art. 146.
146. Id.
147. A detailed description of Mexico's hazardous waste management program may be
found in, MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, section V, at 282-485.
148. General Ecology Law, supra note 42, art. 152.
149. Id. art. 153.
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and residues over the border to the United States.'8 0
Sadly, only a small portion of hazardous waste generated on the
Mexican side of the border is actually being transported back over to the
United States for proper disposal;'8 ' instead, illegal dumping of hazard-
ous wastes occurs. Despite the existence of a cradle-to-grave tracking sys-
tem, this policy is not being effectively implemented in Mexico. Illegal
dumping of hazardous waste is controversial in Mexico. Poor manage-
ment techniques in and around maquiladora industries are having a se-
vere and irreversible impact on health and the surrounding environment.
According to existing laws, generators of hazardous waste must sub-
mit reports on all movement of hazardous wastes to SEDUE every 6
months. Specifically, a generator must notify SEDUE when the generator
is unable to send the appropriate forms documenting a treatment, storage
or disposal facility. All facilities must reduce the volume of hazardous
waste which they generate, and apply physical, chemical or biological
treatment.'5 2 Violators of hazardous materials regulations are subject to
sanctions.
F. Miscellaneous
In addition to those areas discussed above, the General Ecology Law
authorizes the issuance of standards for the prevention and control of
pollution by noise, vibrations, thermal energy, lighting, odors and visual
pollution."' Emission limits are set by SEDUE, in consideration of the
health standards as determined by the Secretariat of Health.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Enforcement mechanisms and procedures
Mexico's environmental laws are enforced through the use of inspec-
tion and oversight procedures." Non-compliance can result in adminis-
trative or criminal charges.'55 Administrative violations are infractions,
and are subject to sanctions ranging from fines, varying degrees of clo-
sure, to an administrative arrest of up to 36 hours.' 6 Appeals may be
made through appropriate procedures.' 5 7
Criminal charges, sentences and fines may be imposed for prior viola-
150. See infra notes 184-202 and accompanying text for discussion of the Maquiladora
Program in Mexico.
151. Hazardous Waste from U.S.-Owned Plants in Mexico Dumped Illegally, Panel
Told, 14 INT'L ENV'T REP. CURRENT REP. (BNA) 656, Dec. 4, 1991.
152. Mexican Environmental Laws, supra note 98, at 17.
153. General Ecology Law, supra note 42, arts. 155-56.
154. Id. arts. 161-169.
155. Id. art. 160.
156. Id. arts. 171-75.
157. Id. arts. 176-81.
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tions or flagrant criminal behavior.158 The imposition of state and local
penalties is also authorized. 1 9 In addition to these enforcement measures,
"denunciations" may be brought by any member of the public before fed-
eral or local authorities, pursuant to approved procedures. 160 The authori-
ties are directed to investigate these allegations.
Overall, SEDUE's enforcement mechanisms have stiffened. In 1991,
SEDUE began requiring bonds for firms not in compliance with environ-
mental regulations." 1 The bond must equal the cost of installing pollu-
tion abatement equipment.162 Subsequent findings of non-compliance can
lead to forfeiture of the bond.'6 3
Mexican environmental review is still lacking. Procedures for mean-
ingful public participation in the development of environmental policies
should be formulated. Furthermore, community "right-to-know" laws do
not exist in Mexico.16' In the United States, such laws require industry
disclosure of hazardous substances and toxic emissions on an annual ba-"
sis. 6 5 Public awareness of known or potential hazards should be en-
couraged by the Mexican government.
The National Program for Environmental Protection (1990-1994),
broadly sets out basic environmental programs to be accomplished within
Mexico during the 1990s.111 Under this decree, ecological and environ-
mental efficiency is established as a national priority. 167 The program pro-
vides objectives, strategies, goals, and announces guidelines, in the form
of stages, for execution. 68
B. Border Plan
The Mexico-U.S. Border has been identified as an area warranting
special study and cooperative efforts. Through the joint efforts of the U.S.
EPA and the SEDUE of Mexico, a plan has been formulated for the pro-
tection of human health and environmental ecosystems. The binational
International Boundary and Water Commission, has contributed to the
158. Id. arts. 182-87.
159. Id. art. 188.
160. Id. arts. 189-94.
161. Companies Face New Environmental Scrutiny, Bus. INT'L; Bus. LATIN AM., Nov.
4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Intlaw, North/South America, Mexico, [hereinafter New Envi-
ronmental Scrutiny]; Environmental Law; Building and Related Permits, Bus. INT'L; IN-




164. Andres Ochoa-Bunsow, (of the law firm of Baker & McKenzie Abogados, S.C.),
Brief Summary of Mexico's Environmental Laws and Regulations, in MEXICAN ENVIRON-
MENTAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 910.
165. Id.
166. MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 44, at 674.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 685-86.
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formulation and development of the plan known as the Integrated Envi-
ronmental Plan for the Mexico-U.S. Border Area."s '
The border plan was developed as the result of a joint Presidential
directive. The directive was issued in the form of a communique by Presi-
dent Carlos Salinas de Gortari, of the United Mexican States, and Presi-
dent George Bush, of the United States of America. 170 The plan is based
upon the foundation laid out by the 1983 Agreement between the United
States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the
Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area,
(often referred to as the La Paz Agreement).'
The border plan recognizes that environmentally based sustainable
development is necessary for continued growth in the border area. '7 ' This
development must include the participation of industry and border area
communities. The border plan is part of an active environmental plan-
ning process that is not intended to become stagnant. It is a "dynamic,
binational document that will be revised and expanded as new informa-
tion is developed, as implementation of solutions evolves, and as further
experience is gained in working together to achieve common goals.' ' 7 3
The next review and revision of the plan is scheduled to occur in 1994.17
The border area is defined as an area 100 kilometers (62 miles) on
each side of the U.S./Mexico border. Targeted areas include 15 pairs of
"sister cities," located within the Mexican states of Baja California, So-
nora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas; and California,
Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, in the United States. Border Plan
Facts' 75 provides a brief synopsis of the proposed plans for these sister
cities, including cooperative enforcement strategies, new initiatives, coop-
erative planning, training, and education and proposals to increase citizen
and state/local government participation.
169. INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN, supra note 29.
170. The communique stated:
The Presidents emphasized the need for ongoing cooperation in the area of
environmental protection. Both Presidents instructed the authorities responsi-
ble for environmental affairs of their countries to prepare a comprehensive
plan designed to periodically examine ways and means to reinforce border co-
operation in this regard, based on the 1983 Bilateral Agreement. Such a mech-
anism should seek ways to improve coordination and cooperation, with a view
to solving the problems of air, soil, and water quality and of hazardous wastes.
State and municipal authorities of both governments and private organizations
in both countries should participate in such tasks as appropriate.
Id. at I-1.
171. See supra note 28.
172. INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN, supra note 29, at 1-2.
173. Id. at 1-4.
174. Id.
175. Border Plan Facts, available as a composite brochure from the U.S. EPA and
SEDUE (Feb. 1992).
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C. State and Local Environmental Law - Chihuahua (an example)
Mexican states are encouraged to develop and enforce their own en-
vironmental legislation."'6 Mexico has received $88 million from the
World Bank to assist in the decentralization of SEDUE. 77 Decentraliza-
tion will help reduce the amount of federal bureaucratic "red tape."
As an example of local environmental legislation, the Ecological Law
for the State of Chihuahua1 78 mirrors the General Ecology Law, promul-
gated at the federal level. The objective of the Chihuahuan law is to pre-
serve and restore ecological equilibrium and environmental protection.
Chihuahua's environmental statute provides for concurrent jurisdic-
tion at the state and municipal levels. It also provides for the creation of
a State Ecology Commission (La Comision Estatal de Ecologia). At the
local level, the law requires each municipality to have a Municipal Ecol-
ogy Committee (Un Comite Municipal de Ecologia) for local coordination
and implementation. Public participation is encouraged through the pro-
motion of educational programs, special interest groups, and the dissemi-
nation of information.
79
Title III of the state law announces principles of ecological policy,
and the instruments or standards for implementation. This section of the
law essentially parallels the federal law, absent provisions for the issuance
of ecological technical standards.
Title IV addresses the preservation and restoration of ecological
equilibrium and natural resource conservation. Therein are provisions for
the determination, registry, and management of protected natural areas
within the local jurisdiction; guidelines for preservation and restoration of
ecological equilibrium; and provisions for the rational use of water re-
sources. Title V discusses the subject of environmental protection. It pro-
vides for the regulation of air pollution; water pollution and pollution of
aquatic ecosystems; noise, vibrations, thermal energy and lighting; visual
pollution and protection of the atmosphere.
Title VI governs the regulation of activities capable of noxious ef-
fects. The areas specifically addressed for regulation are hazardous activi-
ties, mineral extraction, municipal services, and non-hazardous solid
wastes.
Title VII is unique to state law. It addresses the protection of non-
176. Plan to Decentralize Enforcement of Environmental Law Described by Chirinos,
14 INT'L ENV'T REP. CURRENT REP. 624 (Nov. 20, 1991).
177. Id.
178. Ley Ecologica Para El Estado De Chihuahua, contained in Folleto Anexo Peri-
odico Oficial No. 86, October 26, 1991, provided by the law firm of Bryan, Gonzalez Vargas y
Gonzalez Baz, S.C. (document in Spanish). At the time of this writing, four of the six Mexi-
can border states have enacted state environmental laws. INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN,
supra note 29, at A-13. These laws have not yet resulted in the promulgation of regulations
pursuant to them.
179. Id. art. 16.
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smokers from cigarette smoke. It establishes blanket prohibitions in spec-
ified places, and the designation of non-smoking areas in certain estab-
lishments. Finally, Title VIII authorizes measures for control and sanc-
tions. The mechanisms parallel those of the federal legislation, with the
exception of the order of criminal activities.
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Trade and the Environment
Linking economic growth to environmental protection in Mexico is a
means to ensure that protection measures are implemented."' 0 Theoreti-
cally, increased trade can lead to increased investment within Mexico,
thereby bolstering the economy. Economic growth, in turn, can lead to
greater means by which to promote environmental enforcement.18 1 Eco-
nomic growth can also foster increased environmental efficiency in
industry.182
Some advocates call for the integration of trade and environmental
issues for the promotion of sustainable development.8 3 These advocates
do not view the promotion of trade measures as anti-environment. In-
stead, they view trade as a means to develop and implement environmen-
tal protection.
This position is not a cure-all to Mexico's environmental problems.
The intersection of economic activities with that of environmental con-
cerns, may be viewed as a measure of checks and balances. Sustainable
development and a healthy global economy are considered interrelated.
Therefore, expenditures for pollution prevention in Mexico must exceed
funds allocated for pollution clean-up.
B. Maquiladora Program
The environmental and social problems of Mexico are exacerbated
within the "maquiladora" zones or regions.1 8 " The maquiladora zones are
predominantly located along the U.S.-Mexican border where thousands of
maquiladora industries thrive. 85 Historically, environmental regulation
within the areas has been lax. " Precisely how the maquiladora industries
180. COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 41, at 3.
181. Questions and Answers about the North American Free Trade Area, 1991 Na-
tional Trade Data Bank, available in LEXIS, Intlaw, AM [hereinafter Questions and
Answers].
182. Id.
183. COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REVIEW, supra note 41, at 1; see also Stewart Hudson,
Trade, Environment, and the Pursuit of Sustainable Development, (Nov. 1991) 1, available
in NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: INFORMATION PACKET
(1991) (unpublished documents).
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will be transformed by the advent of free trade is still uncertain.18 7
A maquiladora is a Mexican corporation operating under an ap-
proved Maquila Program."'8 Maquila programs are approved by the Mex-
ican Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI). ss
Maquiladoras benefit from foreign investment and relaxed customs
treatment.'90
Maquiladoras are export-oriented. 19' Production at a maquiladora
plant varies from the simple assembly of goods, to the manufacture of a
product from start to finish using imported raw materials. 92 Only under
special conditions, may the end products remain in Mexico. '
There is generally no limitation in choosing the location of a maqui-
ladora.'1 The only exceptions are that no new facilities may be estab-
lished in the urban areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara, or Monterrey.'9 5
These restrictions exist due to the already overburdening industrializa-
tion and congestion in these areas.' Any other existing state restrictions
are imposed due to environmental concerns based on the type of
industry.'97
Maquiladoras must comply with strict environmental laws and regu-
lations.' 8 All industrial companies must have operating licenses from
SEDUE.' 99 New maquiladora plants and expanding facilities must file an
environmental impact statement with SEDUE for the implementation of
new processes or new construction.00 Permits for the discharge of waste
water and air emissions are required.20' As mentioned previously, compa-
nies that use hazardous materials must obtain "special manifests" for the
handling of these materials and wastes.202
187. For a general discussion of the maquiladora program from an economic and histor-
ical perspective, see Cheryl Schechter & David Brill, Jr., Maquiladoras: Will The Program
Continue?, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 697 (1992).
188. Bryan, Gonzalez Vargas y Gonzalez Baz, S.C., Manufacturing in Mexico, The
Mexican In-Bond (Maquila) Program: The Most Commonly Asked Questions, (January,
1992), in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS, ST. MARY'S L.J., INT'L L. SYMP. (March 6,
1992) (unpublished documents), provided by St. Mary's University School of Law, [herein-
after Manufacturing in Mexico].
189. Id.
190. Questions and Answers, supra note 181.
191. Id.
192. Manufacturing in Mexico, supra note 188, at 1.
193. Id. at 8; see Questions and Answers, supra note 181.
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The infrastructure of the border area is inadequate for water treat-
ment and distribution.'" Before the border area can survive the on-
slaught of economic development resulting from the proposed Free Trade
Agreement, a water treatment and distribution infrastructure must be de-
veloped. Similarly, the infrastructure for the disposal of solid and hazard-
ous wastes must be developed. Landfills such as hazardous waste contain-
ment areas and recycling plants do not exist in many areas of Mexico. 04
Technology that works well in the United States, e.g., wet scrubbers, may
not be practical in Mexico where water resources are scarce.20 5 Pollution
control and abatement technologies must always be adapted or suited to
the local environment and economy. 0 6
V. THE FUTURE
The government of Mexico has resolved to strengthen the enforce-
ment of environmental law within its borders. Such a position is meant to
send a strong message to investors and developers already operating
within the country, and to those who would venture to start up new busi-
nesses. The overall business climate in Mexico has already improved as a
result of President Salinas' economic modernization program.
The proposed Free Trade Agreement, expected to come into effect on
January 1, 1994, will assuredly bring economic growth to Mexico. Yet,
environmental destruction and neglect will not be condoned. Future in-
vestors will have to respond to what the Mexican government hopes will
become a stronger environmental regime.
This report has furnished an overview of the environmental law that
already exists in Mexico. The promulgated regulations provide the teeth
for enforcement of both general and specific laws. The detail and strength
of these new laws as seen in the air pollution and hazardous waste fields
are indicators of the future. The Mexican government intends to
strengthen and develop environmental regulations in Mexico, including
improvement of pollutant monitoring and tracking systems.
Although historically environmental enforcement in Mexico has been
lax, manufacturers and businesses should anticipate stricter environmen-
tal protection and enforcement. Would-be entrepreneurs are encouraged
to consult the federal Diario Official and with local Mexican governmen-
tal authorities for recently promulgated laws and regulations affecting
their current or prospective businesses within a particular locality.
As it presently stands, with the recent changes in environmental en-
forcement, businesses operating within the U.S.-Mexico border areas and
203. U.S., Mexico Take On Border Pollution, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1992, at B1.
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Mexico City are under the heaviest scrutiny for compliance with environ-
mental law and regulations.
Terzah N. Lewis
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Petition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka
Deprived of Their Internationally Protected
Human Rights For A Grant of United
Nations Effective Remedy and Declaratory
Relief
IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY




NEW YORK, NEW YORK
UNITED NATIONS, ex. rel.
GLOBAL ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE
OF INDIAN ORIGIN, FRIENDS OF
INDIA SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL,
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDIAN
AMERICAN ASSOCIATIONS, on behalf of
the Tamils in Sri Lanka,
PETITIONERS,
VS.
THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA,
RESPONDENTS
TO: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
THE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE ECO-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
The PETITIONERS herein invoke the jurisdiction of the United Na-
tions and its organs by virtue of the provisions of the United Nations
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Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Optional Protocol thereto, the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Sri Lankan constitution,
and file this petition on behalf of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, praying for
peace in the country, institution of recognized judicial procedures, and
cessation of torture, extrajudicial killings of civilians and attempted
genocide.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION1
1. There are a number of circumstances surrounding the civil and
political conflict in Sri Lanka. The following information discusses the
main factors which contribute to the unrest.
2. First, the population consists of 74% Sinhalese speaking and 26%
Tamil speaking. Because the Sinhalese fear economic and political chal-
lenge by Tamils, although the Tamils are so clear a minority, the
Sinhalese have discriminated against the Tamils in politics, language, ed-
ucation, and employment.
3. In the 1920s, the British turned over greater political authority to
the people of Sri Lanka causing friction between the Sinhalese and the
Tamils. With the introduction of the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931,
the system of representation in the State Council abolished the propor-
tional communal electorals which were replaced by a territorial election
procedure creating a Sinhalese-dominated State Council.
4. After Sri Lanka obtained independence in 1948, the Sinhalese poli-
ticians used their majority status to reduce Tamil representation in the
legislation by over 40% by disenfranchising nearly a million plantation
Tamils. On June 5, 1956, the Sinhala Only Act, making Sinhalese the only
official language of the country, was enacted. Tamil was not even recog-
nized as the language of a national minority. The 1972 Sri Lankan Con-
stitution changed the name of the country from Ceylon to Sri Lanka,
made it a republic, gave Buddhism pride of place, and removed safe-
guards provided for minorities in section 29 of the 1949 constitution
which had granted independence.
5. The Tamils objected to several provisions of the new constitution
which was adopted in their absence. In order to be promoted, minorities
must show proficiency in the Sinhalese language. This has severely lim-
ited education and job opportunities for those who do not speak
Sinhalese.
1. Background information obtained from: Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri
Lanka, by Chelvaduri Manogaran; The Breakup of Sri Lanka, by A. Jeyaratnam Wilson;
and Hearing Before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations
and on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Represent-
atives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session.
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6. In 1971, the university entrance requirements were changed to the
disadvantage of the Tamil students. The minimum grade average was
raised for Tamil students, and students from predominantly Sinhalese ar-
eas were to receive preference for acceptance.
7. The 1980 unemployment rate for Tamils was 41% compared to
20% for Sinhalese. Labor-intensive industries have been promoted in
Sinhalese-dominated areas; the language requirement has excluded many
Tamils from public sector jobs and, as yet another obstacle for the Tamil
minority, the Tamils who lived in other areas (other than Colombo) came
under repeated communal attacks and, due to fear for their safety, had to
move to the North and East parts of the country which were neglected in
regard to development, siting of industries and infrastructure.
8. In order to resist oppression, parties representing the Tamil people
united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the main par-
liamentary opposition party after the elections held in 1977. Subse-
quently, after the communal pogrom of 1983, Tamil parliamentarians
were expelled from parliament and went into exile in India. TULF goals
include a nonviolent resolution to the conflict and the peaceful establish-
ment of a separate Tamil state (Eelam) in the Northeast part of Sri
Lanka.
9. The Tamil youth formed several militant groups, including the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which is the only group fight-
ing the Government now, and resorted to violence to gain greater auton-
omy and independence for Tamils. These groups have taken violent ac-
tion against the Sinhalese army and police, Tamils suspected of
informing, and moderate Tamil politicians.
10. In response, the Government curbed important legal safeguards,
permitting detention without charge or trial for up to eighteen months for
all Tamils, and permitted the disposal of bodies without inquiry. Conse-
quently, the government condemned all Tamils for the actions of the few
militants.
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
11. The Associated Press (AP) reported on August 10, 1987, that the
Sri Lankan Government had freed 667 Tamils from a prison in southern
Sri Lanka. Many of the men released claimed they were tortured and
abused while in detention in various camps. "Our fingernails were pulled
out and we were beaten with pipes and barbed wire," said one. Vyvyan
Tenorio, Sri Lanka's freeing of Tamils: step toward redressing rights
abuses, CHRIS. ScI. MON., Aug. 11, 1987, at 7. He claimed soldiers beat
nine Tamils to death when the Tamils went to help three friends, pur-
portedly shot by soldiers when the prisoners were late for meals. Id.
12. In September 1991, Amnesty International reported on a person
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who had been detained at Plantain Point army base in Trincomalee and
then released. The person described the fate of fellow-detainees to a jour-
nalist: "I was kept blindfolded for two days and beaten with iron bars. I
saw some of my friends being beaten to death. Then their corpses were
heaped together with tires and burnt inside the camp." AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, SRI LANKA - THE NORTHEAST: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN A
CONTEXT OF ARMED CONFLICT, Sept. 1991, at 20.
13. Government security officials acknowledge that security forces
have used torture to elicit information and cooperation from suspected
members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Police have
also detained suspects on suspicion and used torture to elicit information
in criminal investigations. 1990 Human Rights Report, U.S. Dep't. of
State Dispatch, Feb. 1, 1991 [hereinafter Human Rights Report].
B. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings
14. The U.S. State Department reports that political and other extra-
judicial killings carried out by government forces, police, and vigilante-
squads have resulted in large scale human rights abuses in Sri Lanka
since 1983. The killings have included members of the Tamils, opposition
parties, and civilians. Many of the civilian political killings have been vig-
ilante-style deaths, often characterized by leaving the burned or muti-
lated bodies in public areas to serve as warnings. In 1990, an estimated
2,600 noncombatant deaths were caused by both government and anti-
government forces. Human Rights Report.
15. In 1991, Amnesty International reported that thousands of de-
fenseless civilians were extrajudicially executed in the northeast by Gov-
ernment forces; executions continued to be committed by government
forces and "death squads" in the south as well. Many of the victims were
stabbed, hacked to death, or burned alive. Amnesty International alleges
at least 3,000 Tamils were killed or "disappeared" in the Amparai district
between June and October of 1991. Many of these people were believed to
have been victims of extrajudicial execution. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SRI
LANKA REPORT, 1991, at 210.
16. For example, on February 17, 1991, after the LTTE ambushed
soldiers from the Vijayabahu regiment at Kondaichchi, near Mannar,
army personnel from the same regiment were reported to have killed four
Tamil school teachers who were traveling from Mannar. Their bodies
were found dumped in a well at Vankalai. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SRI
LANKA - THE NORTHEAST: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN A CONTEXT OF
ARMED CONFLICT, Sept. 1991, at 18 [hereinafter NORTHEAST REPORT].
17. According to the U.S. Department of State, the Sri Lankan Gov-
ernment in 1989 announced that it would establish an independent com-
mission to investigate vigilante groups, but no members were ever ap-
pointed. Charges were brought against security force members in two
vigilante cases and legal proceedings were initiated in 20 other cases in
which security force personnel allegedly murdered civilians between 1988
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and 1990. None of these cases, however, had been resolved by the end of
the year, partly due to a large backlog in the judicial system and partly
due to killings and intimidation of witnesses. Human Rights Report.
18. For example, on February 18, 1990, Richard de Zoysa, a well-
known journalist and actor who documented death squad killings in the
south, was abducted from his home in the middle of the night. The fol-
lowing morning, his body washed ashore on a beach near Colombo. He
had been shot in the head at close range. Steve Coll, The Mothers Who
Won't Disappear; In Sri Lanka, a Maternal Cry Against the Death
Squad, WASH. POST, March 3, 1991, at Fl. His mother claimed the abduc-
tors included police officers, two of whom she identified. The Attorney
General found insufficient evidence to warrant an indictment against the
accused police officers and instructed the police to continue their investi-
gation. Human Rights Report. Although motives for the murder are not
clear, speculation revolves around de Zoysa's reporting on human rights
matters, his alleged ties to leftist organizations and his reputed author-
ship of a satirical play aimed at President Premadasa. Id.
19. Reports indicate that members of the regular security forces (i.e.,
the army, the police and the Special Task Force (STF)) were responsible
for many of the reported extrajudicial executions and "disappearances."
NORTHEAST REPORT at 21.
C. Disappearances
20. The United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances (the "Working Group") reported to the Commission on
Human Rights in January 1991 that, during the period under review, the
Working Group transmitted 246 newly reported cases of disappearances
to the Government of Sri Lanka, of which 44 were reported to have oc-
curred in 1990. Forty-two of those cases were transmitted by cable under
the urgent action procedure. Report of the Working Group on Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances, U.N., Economic and Social Council,
Commission on Human Rights, 47th. Sess., Jan. 17, 1991, at 69.
21. The Working Group's visit to Sri Lanka in October 1991 revealed
that killings and other violations had resulted in a huge number of disap-
pearances between 1983 and 1991, "by far the highest number ever re-
corded by the Working Group for any single country." In its report of
May 31, 1992, "Human Rights Accountability in Sri Lanka," Asia Watch
observed that "a common estimate by human rights groups of the total
number of reported disappearances of suspects after arrest by the secur-
ity forces or abduction by vigilante groups linked to the security forces is
40,000 since 1983." Human Rights Accountability in Sri-Lanka, ASIA
WATCH, May 31, 1992, at 5.
22. According to Amnesty International, over 3,000 Tamil people are
reported to have "disappeared" in the custody of government forces in
the east since June 1990. That such serious abuses have continued well
into 1991 is confirmed by recent reports in the Sri Lankan and interna-
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tional press, as well as from other sources' NORTHEAST REPORT, at 17. In
Batticaloa town, over 1,500 people were reported to the Local Peace Com-
mittee as "disappeared" between June and December 1990. Id. Simi-
larly, large number of "disappearances" have also been reported from
Trincomalee, Vavuniya, Mannar and Kayts. Id.
23. In September 1990, over 100 Tamils disappeared after being re-
moved from a refugee camp in the east, according to credible sources.
Human Rights Report. While the Government lifted the Emergency Reg-
ulations (ER) authorization granted to security forces to dispose of bodies
without inquest, others (55b-f) still restrict full public inquiries into the
causes and circumstances of deaths. Id.
D. Arbitrary Arrests and Detention
24. The Sri Lankan Constitution provides that no person "shall be
arrested except according to procedure established by law." An arrested
person must be informed of the reason for his/her arrest and brought
within 24 hours before a magistrate who may authorize bail or, for serious
crimes, order continued detention. Detainees are generally brought before
a magistrate within a few days of arrest, but there are reports of detainees
who are never informed of the reason for their arrest. Id.
25. Persons may challenge the legality of their detention either by
filing a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Courts of Appeal or by charging the
Government before the Supreme Court with violating fundamental con-
stitutional rights. There are cases, however, in which these provisions did
not provide effective means of redress to persons alleging arbitrary deten-
tion. Id.
26. In September 1991, Amnesty International reported the estab-
lishment of the Human Rights Task Force (the "Task Force") under the
chairmanship of a former judge of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka,
J.F.A. Soza. The Amnesty International delegation met with Justice Soza
and discussed with him in detail the terms of reference of the newly-es-
tablished body. NORTHEAST REPORT at 33. The Task Force, which is a
permanent body, has six parts to its mandate, which is generally de-
scribed as "to monitor the observance of fundamental rights of detain-
ees." Id. at 34.
27. Amnesty International was assured that a register of all people
detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and Emergency
Regulations (ER). would be kept centrally, regularly updated and made
accessible to members of the public. Amnesty International was also as-
sured that the authority of the Task Force would extend to all places of
detention, including army camps and possible unofficial "safe houses." Id.
These assurances have not been fully implemented, for, as Amnesty In-
ternational reported, Government security forces often refuse to acknowl-
edge individual detentions, and the authorities, despite widespread deten-
tions, did not disclose how many political prisoners were held in the
northeast nor whether any had been charged. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
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E. Violations of Geneva Conventions
28. The following are a few examples:
On 11 July 1990, government forces ordered aerial bombings on civil-
ian targets.
On 20 July 1990, Vibriocholarae, the causative organism of cholera,
was found in the shells of bombs dropped by Sri Lankan forces on
Jaffna.
On 10 September 1990, chemical weapons were used by government
forces.
F. Destruction of Essential Services and Institutions
29. As of 15 August 1990, the following essential services and institu-
tions have been bombed: Jaffna General Hospital; Manipay Green Memo-
rial Hospital; Phillips Hospital; Killinochi Base Hospital; Mullaitivu Base
Hospital; over 13 private medical clinics, laboratories and pharmacies;
thermal power station at Chunnakam; Jaffna Petroleum Corporation;
telephone links to Trincomalee and Jaffna; train service in the North and
East; Jaffna Old and New Markets; Thinnevely and Chavakachcheri mar-
kets; over 14 places of worship. Postal services are at a standstill.
G. Refugees
30. There are about 50,000 Tamil refugees in Canada, 210,000 in In-
dia (an additional 150,000 unofficially), 100,000 in Europe, and over one-
half million displaced persons in Sri Lanka who are internal refugees.
UNHCR's official position is that "it is not safe for a Tamil refugee to
return to Sri Lanka unless the person is manifestly a refugee". Report of
the Canadian Human Rights Mission to Sri Lanka, January 1992, at 30.
H. Lack of Accountability
31. Recent reports by Asia Watch (Human Rights Accountability in
Sri-Lanka, ASIA WATCH, May 31, 1992.) and the Canadian Human Rights
Mission to Sri Lanka (Report of the Canadian Human Rights Mission to
Sri Lanka, January 1992) confirm that the vast majority of cases of abuse
of power by the security forces are never brought to justice. Officers in
the police and army seem to operate with almost total impunity. The new
agencies established by the Government of Sri Lanka since 1990 to re-
spond to international criticism of the government's continuing human
rights abuses have not been effective. To illustrate, the Special Task
Force on Human Rights was established on November 30, 1990 "to for-
mulate and implement a strategy to meet charges of human rights viola-
tions." Asia Watch reports that "by May 1992 it had little to show in
terms of concrete results." Human Rights Accountability in Sri-Lanka,
ASIA WATCH, May 31, 1992. at 15.
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32. Similarly, the Human Rights Task Force the Government estab-
lished in August 1991 suffers from "a number of shortcomings," according
to the Asia Watch Report. The Report notes that as of April 1992, the
officials of the Task Force "had not yet attempted to visit detainees in
police stations and detention centers run by the police or in army camps
in the Northeast, nor had they begun keeping records on persons de-
tained at interrogation centers or other temporary holding facilities. This
is a serious shortcoming since, as a rule these are the facilities where the
most serious violations occur." Id. at 16.
33. The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Involuntary Re-
moval of Persons was appointed in January 1991 for one year and in Jan-
uary 1992 its mandate was extended for another year. The Commission is,
however, not allowed to inquire into disappearances occurring before Jan-
uary 1990. The pace of its investigation is extremely slow, which will pre-
vent it from fulfilling its task. Neither have other special commissions
appointed to investigate specific cases of retaliatory killings by govern-
ment troops and military attacks on relief workers fulfilled their tasks. Id.
at 20-22.
III. JURISDICTION
34. The organs and agencies of the United Nations, including the
SECRETARY GENERAL, the GENERAL ASSEMBLY, the HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION, and the SUBCOMMISSION ON THE PRE-
VENTION OF DISCRIMINATION and the PROTECTION OF MI-
NORITIES, have the jurisdiction to receive and hear this petition and to
provide the relief requested.
35. The organs of the U.N. are endowed with explicit and inherent
powers to assume jurisdiction of the cases of the kind presented in this
petition as reflected in the UN CHARTER. Chapter 1, article 1(3), of the
U.N. CHARTER obligates the U.N. and member states to encourage "re-
spect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms." It is clear that
torture, abductions, killings, and attempted genocide are violations of not
only the letter, but the very spirit of international law as evidenced in
instruments such as the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/180 (1948)) and the
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS (G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 22,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
36. The GENERAL ASSEMBLY is authorized to act under Chapter
IV, article 22 of the U.N. Charter to establish an AD HOC TRIBUNAL
empowered to grant the relief requested. For instance, in 1950 the GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY established a special tribunal to deal with various
claims arising in the former Italian colony of Libya. Given the circum-
stances detailed in this petition, such a tribunal is equally justified and
necessary to carry out the very principles and purposes for which the
United Nations was established: to ensure international peace and secur-
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ity, and to guarantee the protection of fundamental human rights.
37. All members of the United Nations have pledged themselves
under the UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, articles 55 and 56, to take
action to ensure respect for human rights. Article 55 states in part,
with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
(c) universal respect for, and deservance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion.
Article 56 states:
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the pur-
poses set forth in article 55.
38. Such pledge indicates that under the Charter,. Member States
must be prepared to take action to assist in enforcing human rights. If an
organ of the United Nations determines that the rights of petitioners (or
those they represent) were violated by the respondent, Members must act
according to their pledge to cooperate with the United Nations in taking
necessary steps under the Charter to promote "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights."
39. The respondent, SRI LANKA, is a member of the United Nations
and, as such, is obligated to act in compliance with any determinations of
the U.N. organs concerning this matter.
40. The GENERAL ASSEMBLY has the inherent power to establish
methods and instruments to carry out the objects and purposes of the
U.N. CHARTER, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS and other instruments of international law. The SECRETARY
GENERAL, acting as an agent of the GENERAL ASSEMBLY, also pos-
sesses inherent powers to carry out these principles.
IV. COMPETENCE
41. Under the human rights provisions of the UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER, the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, the CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, and the CON-
VENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
CRIME OF GENOCIDE, the petitioners, the Tamils, are proper parties
to invoke the jurisdiction of the United Nations in requesting a United
Nations investigation on their behalf in order to find redress for the dep-
rivation of their basic human rights. Further, the petitioners are proper
party petitioners in requesting a United Nations investigation in order to
obtain release of those being held under arbitrary arrest and detention, to
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restrain the carrying out of extrajudicial executions, and to order the re-
lease of said individual petitioners who may so desire to leave respon-
dent's said detention centers and clandestine prisons.
42. The respondent, Sri Lanka, has willfully and definitely violated
obligations undertaken as a member of the United Nations and as a
member of the international community by denying and violating the
human rights of its nationals who reside within its confines.
43. The respondent, Sri Lanka, as a signatory to the UNITED NA-
TIONS CHARTER, the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND PO-
LITICAL RIGHTS, the CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, and the CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION
AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, is accordingly
thereby obligated to comply with the terms of these instruments.
44. The oppression of the Tamils, the petitioner minority, in the ar-
eas of education, employment, politics, language, and security of person is
specifically recognized as a violation of international law pursuant to the
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS and the INTER-
NATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. The
respondent, Sri Lanka, as a member of the international community of
nations, is obligated to comply with accepted norms of international law.
45. The actions of the respondent merit the creation of an AD HOC
TRIBUNAL to investigate and punish those responsible for the arbitrary
arrests, detention, extrajudicial killings and torture of the said petition-
ers, individually and as a class.
46. The actions of the respondent in violating the petitioners' rights
in the areas of education, employment, politics, language, and security of
person, violate international law and internationally prescribed standards
of conduct. These violations warrant sanctions against Sri Lanka.
V. CONTENTIONS
47. That the oppressed minorities are all legal residents of the state
of Sri Lanka.
48. That the victims have been neither charged with nor found guilty
of any crime or violation of international or domestic law.
49. That the victims have not been allowed hearings or any of the
other requirements of due process guaranteed under international human
rights law. The victims have been denied communication with their fami-
lies or others. The families of abducted persons have been denied either
communication with the victims or acknowledgement of their wherea-
bouts by the Government of Sri Lanka.
50. That the victims have been denied their human rights to be free
from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, torture, and other inhumane
treatment. The Tamil society has been denied its collective right to be
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free from genocide. Specifically, those rights guaranteed under the UNI-
VERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS that are violated in-
clude all rights set forth to be assured without distinctions of any kind,
including race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth, or other status (art. 2), the right to
life liberty and security of person (art. 3), the right not to be tortured or
treated to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 5),
the right to equal protection against discrimination (art. 7), the right to
an effective remedy by competent national tribunals for acts violating
fundamental human rights (art. 8), the right to be free from arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile (art. 9), the right to a fair and public hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal (art. 10), the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of the state (art. 13), the
right to take part in government, access to public service, and universal
and equal suffrage (art. 21), the right to free choice of employment (art.
23), the right to education equally accessible to all on the basis of merit
(art. 26), the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the commu-
nity (art. 27), and the right to be free from activity aimed at the destruc-
tion of any of the rights set forth (art. 30).
51. That similar rights are protected under the INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, in articles 6(1), 7,
9(1), 9(3), 12(1), 14(1), 25, 26, and 27. Other internationally protected
rights and freedoms include: that the death penalty shall only be imposed
for the most serious of crimes (art. 6(2)), freedom from state-caused geno-
cide (art 6(3)), freedom from the death penalty for persons below 18 years
of age (art. 6(5)), the right to be promptly informed of the reasons for
arrest (art. 9(2)), the right of detained persons to be treated with human-
ity and respect for dignity (art. 10(1)), and the right to be presumed inno-
cent until proven guilty (art. 14(2).
52. The CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
FORMS OF CRUEL, UNUSUAL AND DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT imposes upon the parties to the agreement to "take
effective legislative, administrative, judicial, or other means to prevent
acts of torture."
53. That the respondent is a member of the United Nations and sig-
natory to the UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, the UNIVERSAL DEC-
LARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, the CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE, and OTHER CRUEL, UNUSUAL AND DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, the INTERNATIONAL COVE-
NANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, and the CONVENTION
ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF
GENOCIDE, and is therefore obligated to uphold the provisions of these
documents. The respondent is also obligated to cooperate with other na-
tions and the UNITED NATIONS in securing respect for human rights
in Sri Lanka.
54. That the respondent has been directly involved in acts of arbi-
trary arrest, torture, inhumane treatment, abduction and killing.
1992
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
55. That the victims and their families have no available remedy to
secure justice. The oppressed population has no available remedy to guar-
antee their protection from arbitrary arrest, torture, inhumane treatment,
abduction and annihiliation.
56. The oppressed population's only available remedy is through an
AD HOC COMMISSION-TRIBUNAL of the UNITED NATIONS pur-
suant to a RESOLUTION by the HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
calling upon the GENERAL ASSEMBLY to adopt WORLD HABEAS
CORPUS as the only effective way to implement INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW as embodied in the UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER, the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, the CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, UNUSUAL AND DEGRADING PUNISHMENT, and the
CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE. Alternatively the SECRETARY-GEN-
ERAL may either appoint such an AD HOC COMMISSION authorized
to make findings or the SECURITY GENERAL may convene the SE-
CURITY COUNCIL to order the establishment of an AD HOC COM-
MISSION, which may report back to the SECURITY COUNCIL, and
which may then act through a SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION or
provide for other remedial and declaratory action.
57. That such a tribunal is requested to determine that the respon-
dent has violated its obligations under the UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER.
58. That the UNITED NATIONS should support the establishment
of an appropriate government which will recognize the right of all Sri
Lankans to be adequately and effectively represented in the government.
An appropriate government is one which will meet the legitimate aspira-
tions of the minorities to be treated equally with the Sinhalese majority,
in particular, a federal or confederate government of two states.
VI. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
59. Have the Government of Sri Lanka and its Special Task Force, or
other instruments within its control, subjected Tamil and other popula-
tions to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment in violation of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights?
60. Have the Government of Sri Lanka and its Special Task Force, or
other instruments within its control, carried out extrajudicial and arbi-
trary killings of civilians and non-combatant Tamil and other populations
in violation of Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights?
61. Have the Government of Sri Lanka and its Special Task Force, or
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other instruments in its control, carried out extrajudicial and arbitrary
arrests and detention of civilians and non-combatant Tamil and other
populations, many resulting in the disappearance of those arrested or de-
tained in violation of Articles 3, 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of




62. In response to the first question, the Government of Sri Lanka
and its Special Task Force, or other instruments in its control, have vio-
lated the Government's obligations under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (the "Declaration") and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (the "Covenant") by committing documented
acts of torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment of people in its custody.
63. Sri Lanka ratified the Covenant without reservations in 1980 and
has recognized the competence of the Human Rights Committee to hear
interstate complaints under Article 41. The Government of Sri Lanka, as
a member of the United Nations, is also held accountable under the Dec-
laration and has embodied freedom from torture in its own constitution.
64. In Article 7, the Covenant states: "No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
Likewise, the Declaration and Sri Lanka's constitution both use this same
language in Articles 5 and 11, respectively. As a party to these agree-
ments, and by its own constitution, Sri Lanka has assumed an obligation
to respect the rights enumerated in these documents and to ensure the
protection of such rights through its laws and institutions.
65. Those cited as responsible for committing human rights violations
under the authority of the Government include members of the military,
the police, and the Special Task Force (STF) (a police commando unit).
In some areas of the east, members of unidentified groups who wear plain
clothes and use unmarked vehicles have also been cited. These people
operate in much the same manner as the plain-clothes "death squads"
linked to Government forces which were a feature of the recent counter-
insurgency drive in the south. NORTHEAST REPORT, at 14.
66. Other forces opposed to the LTTE have also been cited as re-
sponsible for committing abuses. The Government has assisted in the cre-
ation of armed groups within the civilian population, such as the Muslim
home guards, and has also mobilized the armed cadres of anti-LTTE mil-
itant Tamil groups to assist in its campaign against the LTTE. Some-
times, members of these groups appear to be used as proxies for the regu-
lar security forces, committing abuses which the security forces ignore
and for which members of the security forces cannot be held directly re-
sponsible. Id.
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67. The documentation of these abuses and their link to the Govern-
ment have been reported by several organizations:
68. The U.S. Department of State Dispatch reports "some govern-
ment security officials acknowledge that security forces have used torture
to elicit information and cooperation from suspected members of the JVP
and LTTE." Human Rights Report.
69. Amnesty International published a comprehensive report on the
human rights situation in Sri Lanka. This report was the result of a visit
by an Amnesty International investigation team sent to the country in
June 1991. The delegation conducted detailed discussions with Govern-
ment officials, political leaders, and individuals active in the field of
human rights. They interviewed dozens of victims and relatives of victims
of human rights violations allegedly committed by the Sri Lankan secur-
ity forces and paramilitary groups associated with them. NORTHEAST RE-
PORT, at 1. While this report concentrates on the more serious violations
of extrajudicial executions and "disappearances," it also highlights some
of the abuses which constituted torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
70. For example, one person who had been detained at Plantain
Point army base in Trincomalee and then released, reported to a journal-
ist that he had been blindfolded and beaten with iron bars. He saw some
of his friends beaten to death, their corpses then heaped together and
burned. Id. at 20
71. Amnesty International places responsibility for abuses such as
these with the Government forces and elements under its control. It ob-
serves that the arming of civilian groups by the Government appears to
repeat the practice which occurred in the south, when it distributed
weapons for self-defense to home guards and to politicians for their body-
guards. Id. at 15. Muslim home guards are also reported to have detained
Tamil people and then handed them over to the police. Id. at 16
72. Petitioners contend that regardless of how the abuses are carried
out - directly by Government forces or indirectly through elements
under its control - this link places responsibility for the abuses of tor-
ture and mistreatment of Tamils on the Government of Sri Lanka.
73. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be interpreted in accor-
dance with the dominant purpose of both documents; that is, to promote
human rights. Therefore, the right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment must be interpreted broadly
because there are no permissible limitations allowed under international
law.
74. Although Article 4(1) of the Covenant allows certain derogations
in times of public emergency which threaten the life of the nation, Article
4(2) specifically states there may be no derogation from Article 7. Thus,
even if the Government claims a public emergency due to armed conflict,




75. Even though Article 4(2) prohibits any derogation from Article 7,
the Government has claimed a public emergency through the Prevention
of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979. This Act was initially a temporary mea-
sure, but an amendment in 1982 made the PTA a permanent part of Sri
Lankan law. The Human Rights Crisis in Sri Lanka: Its Background
and Possible Solutions, 15 DEN. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y. 173, 370. The PTA
undermines the inalienable human rights of certain citizens of Sri Lanka,
both on its face and in its application. It is argued that the Government
has no valid interest in its continued application, since after eight years it
has proven itself to be ineffective as a tool to curb terrorist activity. Id. at
369.
76. Part IV of the PTA permits trial under special procedures which
curtail normal legal safeguards. Id. at 370. Section 16(1), for example,
provides extremely liberal rules on the admissibility of certain statements
made to the police. Section 7(3)(a) of the PTA gives police the authority
to take any suspect "to any place for the purpose of interrogation and
from place to place for the purpose of investigation." Id.
77. Although Sri Lanka has not adopted the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
(CAT), its Constitution forbids torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment, while the Emergency Regulations (ER) allow
the use in court of confessions made to police officers and place the bur-
den of proof on defendants to show that a confession was exacted under
duress. Human Rights Report.
78. Additionally, Sections 22, 23 and 31(i) of the PTA attempt to
make that document and its provisions retroactive. The definition of "un-
lawful activity" under Section 31 expressly includes "any act committed
prior to the date of passing of this Act, which act would, if committed
after such date, constitute an offense under this Act." Provisions of retro-
activity such as this are specifically prohibited by the Covenant and the
Declaration. Article 15 of the Covenant states that "no one shall be held
guilty of any criminal offense on account of any act or omission which did
not constitute a criminal offense under national or international law, at
the time when it was committed." Article 11(2) of the Declaration also
expressly prohibits retroactive imposition of criminal sanctions on actions
that were not criminal when committed. Thus, the retroactive language of
the PTA is invalid under international law and contravenes the historic
principle that no ex post facto law should be passed.
79. The Declaration also prohibits derogation from the inalienable
rights set forth in that document. Article 29(2) states:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the pur-
pose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and free-
doms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, pub-
lic order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
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Article 29(3) adds:
These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
80. Thus, any limitations on the rights declared in the Declaration
must be to promote, and not hinder, human rights. That is, the purposes
and principles of the United Nations as stated in the preamble to the
Declaration include "promoting respect for these rights and freedoms and
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their uni-
versal and effective recognition and observance. . . ." The actions of the
Sri Lankan Government in torturing and mistreating people in its cus-
tody is directly contrary to these stated purposes and is contrary to the
aspiration of Article 29.
81. Consequently, since the Covenant, the Declaration and Sri
Lanka's constitution declare that no one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or torture or to cruel, inhuman
degrading treatment or punishment, and as it is the express desire of the
United Nations to prohibit derogation from freedom from torture, the ac-
tions of the Government clearly violate international law.
B. Extrajudicial Killings and Disappearances
82. In response to the second question, the Government of Sri Lanka
has been linked to extradjudicial and arbitrary killings of civilians and
non-combatant Tamils and other populations and has thus violated Arti-
cle 3 of the Declaration and Article 6(1) of the Covenant.
83. As a party to the Covenant and the Declaration, and by its own
constitution, Sri Lanka must ensure protection of the right to life. The
Government may only restrict this right to the extent permitted by the
Covenant and the Declaration.
84. Sri Lanka has ratified the Covenant without reservations and, in
addition, has recognized the competence of the Human Rights Committee
to hear inter-state complaints under Article 41. Moreover, Sri Lanka is
bound by the Declaration and by the prohibition on extrajudicial and ar-
bitrary killings in its own constitution.
85. Article 6(1) of the Covenant states: "Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by the law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." The Declaration secures that "ev-
eryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" in Article 3.
Sri Lanka's own constitution (Article 1394) provides: "No person shall be
punished with death or imprisonment except by order of a competent
court, made in accordance with procedure established by law." As a party
to these instruments, and by its own constitution, Sri Lanka has assumed
an obligation to respect the rights enumerated in these documents and to
ensure the protection of such rights through its own laws and institutions.
86. Reports indicate that members of the regular security forces-the
army, the police and the Special Task Force (STF)-were responsible for
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many of the reported extrajudicial executions and "disappearances."
Others were reportedly perpetrated by home guards who launched retali-
atory attacks on Tamil civilians, with the apparent acquiescence of the
security forces.
87. The documentation of these abuses linked to the Government has
been gathered by several organizations:
88. The U.S. Department of State. The report by the State Depart-
ment indicates that political killings have been carried out by the govern-
ment's security forces, police and vigilante squads. It is argued through
strong circumstantial evidence and a wide range of observers, including
human rights groups, opposition politicians, individual government offi-
cials, and members of the security forces themselves, that there is a link
between the government security forces and these vigilante groups. It is
likely that vigilantes often commit extrajudicial killings with the knowl-
edge and acquiescence of some government officials.
89. Although charges were brought against security force members in
two vigilante cases and legal proceedings were initiated in 20 other cases
in which security force personnel allegedly murdered civilians between
1988 and 1990, none of these cases had been resolved by the end of 1990.
In one case in which police officers were accused of shooting a teenager, a
number of witnesses received death threats; three witnesses and an attor-
ney for the deceased's family were killed, one witness disappeared after
being abducted from his office by armed men, and two lawyers connected
with the case went into hiding. Human Rights Report.
90. Amnesty International. Amnesty International documents
human rights violations in Sri Lanka in its September 1991 report. Pris-
oners taken by the security forces have not been the only victims of ex-
trajudicial execution. Reports indicate such killings have been conducted
by home guards and other instruments of the government. NORTHEAST
REPORT, at 18. Even when they are not directly involved, there is evidence
indicating the acquiescence or collaboration of the security forces in such
attacks in some cases by other parties.
91. In an incident reported to Amnesty International, for example, a
convoy of Tamil civilians travelling to Batticaloa from Colombo and
Valachchenai on February 20, 1991 were attacked by Muslim home
guards outside Eravur. Six passengers on the buses were killed. Others
were injured, and some are unaccounted for. Witnesses said that home
guards in uniform were responsible and it is reported that the military
neither did anything to prevent this attack nor to intervene once it had
begun. NORTHEAST REPORT, at 19.
92. Moreover, reports indicate that members of the regular security
forces were responsible for many of the reported extrajudicial executions
and "disappearances." For example, extrajudicial executions, burning of
bodies and "disappearances" started in several towns in the east within
days of government forces moving in. Father Eugene Hebert, an Ameri-
can Jesuit priest who has lived in Sri Lanka for 42 years, described the
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outbreak of killings in Batticaloa as follows in a letter to his brother-in-
law:
When the army first came in on June 25 no shot was fired as the
Tamil Tigers had withdrawn to fight first in Jaffna. But then began
arrests of innocent citizens, looting, killings, and burning of bodies on
public roads to terrorize the people. I had to supervise the burial of
two, a man and woman, who had been killed, put into a sack and
thrown off the bridge into the lagoon just in front of St. Sebastian's
Church. They had been in the water three days before we were able to
get the army to let us bury them.
NORTHEAST REPORT, at 22.
Disappearances and extrajudicial executions continued to be commit-
ted in large numbers in the Batticaloa area after this date, and Father
Hebert himself apparently disappeared on August 15, 1990 while travel-
ling along a road reportedly deserted except for army check posts. Id.
93. Report of the Canadian Human Rights Mission to Sri Lanka,
January 1992.
A team of distinguished Canadians from academia, political parties,
the Canadian Bar Association, and community and human rights groups
visited Sri Lanka from January 22 to 29, 1992, and following their visit
reported that the human rights abuses in Sri Lanka were "shocking to the
conscience and. . . . unacceptable in any civilized society." Report of the
Canadian Human Rights Mission .to Sri Lanka, January 1992, at 15.
They added: "Extensive and reliable evidence was presented to the Cana-
dian team from a variety of sources, detailing the widespread abuse of
human rights by the security forces and by paramilitary groups co-oper-
ating with the Government." Id. They found that in Sri Lanka "today,
people live under the threat of extra-judicial killing, disappearance, tor
ture, and arbitrary arrest and detention at the hands of the state security
forces. . . ." Id. They found governmental coverup of "abusive acts per-
petrated in its name," Id. at 17 and concluded that "the government has
not yet demonstrated a serious commitment to stop the human rights vio-
lations being committed by members of the security forces and allied
groups." Id. at 18.
94. Amnesty International and the U.N. Working Group have re-
ported numerous arbitrary arrests and detentions by the Government of
Sri Lanka. These reports confirm that many of those arrested and de-
tained pose little or no threat to national security. For example, in 1991,
Amnesty International reported that according to Sri Lankan governmen-
tal information, 7,619 people were in detention in the south as of June
1991. Of those, approximately 500 were Tamils. The government would
not disclose why these people were being detained or what the charges
were against them.
95. Report of Asia Watch, Entitled "Human Rights Accountability
in Sri Lanka," May 1, 1991.




96. The Report of the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involun-
tary Disappearances, January 1992.
The Report found that by far the highest number of disappearances
ever recorded for any country had occurred in Sri Lanka.
97. Memorandum Prepared on Behalf of the European NGO Forum
on Sri Lanka by the Country Working Group on Sri Lanka (Geneva),
and submitted at the Forty-eighth Session of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights in February 1992.
The Memorandum details the enormity of human rights violations in
Sri Lanka. It states:
The record of human rights violations including arbitrary arrests,
detentions without trial, deaths in custody, 'disappearances,' arbitrary
killings and disregard for the norms set by international human rights
and humanitarian law continue to be matters of grave concern deserv-
ing serious attention by all those who are concerned about the situa-
tion in Sri Lanka. Id. at p. 1.
98. ICCPR's Examination of Sri Lanka's Second Periodic Report in
April 1991.
Members of the UN Human Rights Committee stressed that emer-
gency measures taken by the Government in addressing the difficult situ-
ation it faced in dealing with violence must be within the framework of
the law, and that some of these provisions, including indefinite detention
without charge or trial and retroactive application of criminal laws, are in
violation of Sri Lanka's international legal obligations. See, e.g., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/SR 1095, 16, 17.
99. Forty-eighth Session of U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
The Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
made a statement on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka on Febru-
ary 27, 1992, which reads in part:
The Commission calls upon the government of Sri Lanka to fur-
ther intensify its efforts to ensure the full protection of human rights
and further calls upon all parties to respect fully the universally ac-
cepted rules of humanitarian law.
The Commission urges the government of Sri Lanka to continue
to pursue a negotiated political solution with all parties, based on
principles of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
leading to a durable peace in the north and the east of the country.
The Commission urges the government of Sri Lanka to imple-
ment the recommendations of the Working Group, and expresses its
satisfaction at the willingness of the government of Sri Lanka to take
the necessary steps to implement the recommendations of the Work-
ing Group.
100. These reports of disappearances and extrajudicial killings by the
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Government and elements under its control are only a few of the many
examples of such abuses. Extrajudicial killings are widespread against the
Tamil population, continue to occur under the direction of the Sri
Lankan Government and are in direct violation of Article 6(1) of the Cov-
enant and Article 3 of the Declaration.
101. The Covenant and the Declaration must be interpreted in accor-
dance with the dominant purpose of both documents (i.e., promoting
human rights). Therefore, the right to life must be interpreted broadly
and the permissible limitations must be interpreted strictly and narrowly.
102. In situations of armed conflict, fundamental human rights can-
not be ignored. "Disappearances" and the deliberate killing of prisoners
and other defenseless individuals cannot be justified under any circum-
stances. International human rights law clearly maintains that certain
fundamental rights, particularly the right to life and the right not be sub-
jected to torture, must be protected by governments at all times and
under all circumstances. Killings by members of the armed opposition do
not provide justification for government forces to deliberately kill de-
fenseless people. Nor is there any justification for enforced "disappear-
ance" or torture of prisoners in the custody of government forces.
103. Article 4(1) of the Covenant states:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties
to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their ob-
ligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and
do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex,
language, religion or social origin.
104. Although Sri Lanka has officially declared a public emergency
through its Emergency Regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act,
Article 4(2) of the Covenant specifically states that no derogation from
certain articles, including 6 and 7, may be made under this provision.
Thus, even in the context of an armed conflict, the Covenant provides:
"Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." (Article
6(1).)
105. In order for the government to invoke the death penalty, the
accused person must be charged and given a trial before a competent
court which gives its final judgment. Moreover, under Article 4 of the
Covenant, there may be no derogation from the duty to uphold the right
to life even in "time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation."
106. According to Article 6(2) of the Covenant, in countries such as
Sri Lanka which have not abolished the death penalty, the death sen-
tence "may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance
with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not
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contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This pen-
alty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court."
107. Further limitations on the death penalty in Article 6 solidify the
right to life. The United Nations Human Rights Committee states that
the right to life "should not be interpreted narrowly." The Human Rights
Committee has described the protection against arbitrary deprivation of
life in Article 6 as being "of paramount importance." It has stressed the
need for governments to "take measures not only to prevent and punish
deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing
by their own security forces." In addition, the public emergency limita-
tion in Article 4(1) of the Covenant, allowing derogation from certain arti-
cles, specifically prohibits derogation based on discrimination against
race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin. Since the Sri Lankan
Government's acts of repression are directed specifically at the Tamils,
who have their own ethnic, religious, and linguistic traditions which are
distinct from the Sinhalese, repression constitutes the prohibited discrim-
ination in Article 4(1). Again, any derogation by the Sri Lankan Govern-
ment for public emergency reasons is contrary to its obligations under the
above-mentioned international prescriptions.
108. The Sri Lankan constitution, in Article 15(1), provides that "the
exercise and operation of the fundamental rights declared and recognized
by Articles 13(5) and 13(6) shall be subject only to such restrictions as
may be prescribed by law in the interests of national security." Also, Arti-
cle 15(7) states that the fundamental rights declared and recognized by
Articles 12, 13(1), 13(2) and 14 "shall be subject to such restrictions as
may be prescribed by law in the interests of national security, public or-
der and the protection of public health or morality. . . ." While these
Articles allow derogation from the stated provisions, they clearly do not
allow derogation from the freedom from torture in Article 11, nor deroga-
tion from the freedom from being "punished by death or imprisonment
except by order of a competent court" in Article 13(4). Thus, the stated
restrictions on fundamental rights delineated in the constitution apply
only to those listed provisions. As torture and killings are not listed, there
are no restrictions which may impinge upon these rights.
109. Because the Covenant, the Declaration and the Sri Lankan con-
stitution all protect the right to life and because there may be no deroga-
tion from this right, even for public emergencies, the Government's ac-
tions of arbitrary killings and extrajudicial executions violate
international law.
C. Arbitrary Arrests and Detention
110. In response to the third question regarding arbitrary arrests and
detention, the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka (the "constitution"), Article 13 provides:
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13(1). No person shall be arrested except according to procedure
established by law. Any person arrested shall be informed of the rea-
son for his arrest.
13(2). Every person held in custody, detained or otherwise de-
prived of personal liberty shall be brought before the judge of the
nearest competent court according to procedures established by law,
and shall not be further held in custody, detained or deprived of per-
sonal liberty except. . . .in terms. . . .made in accordance with pro-
cedures established by law." The Constitution of the Democratic So-
cialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Chapter III, Article 13 (1979).
111. The constitution, however, limits these provisions for freedom
from arbitrary arrest, detention and punishment in Article 15(7) which
states:
15(7). The exercise and operation of all the fundamental rights
declared and recognized by Articles 12, 13 (1) and 13 (2) and 14 shall
be subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the in-
terests of national security, public order and the protection of public
health or morality ...
112. Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles
3, 9 and 10) provides:
Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.
Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention
or exile.
Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and pub-
lic hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determi-
nation of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against
him. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, Dec. 10, 1948.
113. According to Article 29 (2) of the Declaration, however, "In the
exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society." Thus, this provision also allows member
states to limit fundamental rights in the interest of national security.
114. Under customary international law, Sri Lanka is bound by the
provisions of the Declaration. While Articles 3, 9 and 10 may be limited
by state governments in the interest of national security, the facts show
the Government of Sri Lanka has exploited this limitation beyond its in-
tended use. Amnesty International, Asia Watch, the Canadian Human
Rights Mission, the United Nations Working Group and the U.S. State
Department have all reported such violations. For example, over 3,000
Tamil people have disappeared in the custody of government forces since
June of 1990 and government security forces have refused to acknowledge
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individual detentions. It is unlikely these Tamils have all disappeared
voluntarily, yet the government refuses to acknowledge they are being de-
tained. It is also unlikely the government is detaining all of these Tamils
for national security reasons.
115. Finally, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights provides:
19(1). Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedures as are established by law. International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly of the United Nations,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966.
116. Sri Lanka has ratified the Covenant and is bound by its provi-
sions under Article 2, which states:
2(1). Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to re-
spect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,. .."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assem-
bly of the United Nations, adopted Dec. 16, 1966
117. The facts clearly show the Government of Sri Lanka has sub-
jected Tamil people to arbitrary arrests and detention. Government se-
curity forces have taken people from their homes and detained them
without explanation. Many of these people have either disappeared or
have been found dead. Rarely are the detainees or their actions shown by
the government to be a threat to national security.
118. The Sri Lankan people deserve to live their lives in peace, free
from the threat of arbitrary arrests, detentions and exile. It is the respon-
sibility of the Government of Sri Lanka to protect and ensure these rights
protected by the Declaration, the Covenant, and Sri Lanka's own consti-
tution; not to participate in violating them.
III. PRAYER
119. Pursuant to the U.N. Charter, Article 22, Petitioners pray for
the formation of an AD HOC COMMISSION to function as an AD HOC
TRIBUNAL to be convened by a resolution of the HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, the GENERAL ASSEMBLY, the SECURITY COUN-
CIL, and the SUBCOMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DIS-
CRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, to hear the
complaint of the petitioners for the victims and the Tamils of Sri Lanka,
and to investigate the allegations of torture, arbitrary arrest, disappear-
ances, killings, and attempted genocide.
120. Petitioners also pray for the establishment of a truly representa-
tive government in Sri Lanka which will prevent future violations of
human rights and assure the protection and nondiscrimination of the mi-
nority people of Sri Lanka.
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121. Petitioners also pray that the AD HOC TRIBUNAL be author-
ized to function as an INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL to
try officers and agents of the respondent under international criminal law.
122. Petitioners also pray that proper sanctions be taken against the
respondent Government of SRI LANKA for any refusal to comply with
any of the orders or decisions that the tribunal or any other organ of the
UNITED NATIONS makes in relation to this matter.
123. Petitioners also pray that the UNITED NATIONS authorize a
full investigation of the matters presented in this petition and subse-
quently authorize a complete and public disclosure of all evidence and
findings of fact at the conclusion of such investigation.
124. Petitioners also pray that the U.N. establish an ad hoc tribunal
for Writ of World Habeas Corpus to ventilate and adjudicate all cases of
deprivation of human liberty.
Respectfully submitted,
Luis Kutner,
Chairman, Commission for International
Due Process of Law
105 W. Adams Street
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FALKOWSKI, JAMES E., INDIAN LAW/RACE LAW: A FIVE-HUN-
DRED YEAR HISTORY; Praeger Publishers, New York, NY (1992);
ISBN 0-275-94318-6; 170 pp. (hardcover).
James Falkowski has been studying Indian law for about twenty
years. The reader must go no further than the first paragraph of the pref-
ace in Indian Law/Race Law: A Five-Hundred Year History to know the
author has a strong opinion on the subject. He theorizes that human
rights violations toward indigenous peoples of the Western hemisphere
have been institutionalized, and continually justified, through a dual sys-
tem of international laws: those that apply to "civilized" peoples and
those that apply to "uncivilized" peoples.
In arriving at this conclusion, the text first traces the early develop-
ment of international law toward indigenous populations, beginning with
the European "discovery" of North America. These foreign conquests
brought a right to conquer, purchase and colonize land, depriving the In-
dians of their human rights in the process. Both the Spanish and English
perspectives toward the Indians are examined, and the roots of the
prejudices toward these native peoples is discussed.
It is not until after World War I that Woodrow Wilson attempts to
secure Indian rights through the Native Inhabitants clause of the League
of Nations Covenant. This covenant was expanded under the United Na-
tions Charter. Falkowski argues that the UN continually ignored the
problems faced by indigenous peoples, however, until the UN Decade to
Combat Racism commenced in the 1970s. Subsequently, the UN pro-
duced several important studies on worldwide indigenous populations.
The author also argues the International Court of Justice and other
international tribunals have continually failed to recognize the rights of
indigenous peoples. Several cases are examined, such as Island of Palmas
and Western Sahara. Specifically, the United States' policy of self-deter-
mination is discussed in several Supreme Court cases. Theories justifying
colonial expansion by the French and the U.S. are also explored.
The author concludes from his examination of relevant caselaw and
covenants that current international law is a compromise between at-
tempts to apply law to all peoples and the bias favoring Christian-Euro-
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pean peoples. Although international attempts to recognize the rights of
indigenous people should be lauded, the next step by the international
legal system should be taken: a Universal Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Nations and Peoples.
Lisa Berkowitz
BOOK NoTEs
EMERGING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE AFRICAN POLITICAL ECON-
OMY CONTEXT; Edited by George W. Shepherd, Jr. and Mark O.C.
Anikpo; Consortium ori Human Rights Development; Greenwood Press,
Westport, Connecticut (1990); ISBN 0-313-26853-3; 244pp. (hardcover)
Index.
The political economy approach to human rights contemplates that
political decisions control the allocation of resources in society, and in
turn, those political choices are dependent on economic choices. On a
global scale, political economists contend that new states, their citizens
and political decision-makers, are dependent on the international econ-
omy. This has led to the realization that the distribution of wealth and
basic human rights are closely related to the international political sys-
tem. It is from this theoretical basis that George W. Shepard and Mark
O.C. Anikpo guide this collection of essays recognizing the African contri-
bution to the emergence of new human rights in the global political
economy.
The book was initiated by conferences conducted at the Port Har-
court University in Nigeria (June 7-11, 1987) and at the University of
Denver (November 9-10, 1984). The intention of the conferences and the
book, as indicated in the book's Acknowledgments, is to contribute to a
better understanding and respect for the individual and collective rights
of African peoples. The essayists in this collection advocate change within
the global structure to provide for "redistributive justice in an unjust and
unequal world." Africa, in the minds of these authors, is the proper forum
of the twentieth century in which to apply and test political economy
notions to effectuate this change.
The first five essays of the collection are concerned with the theoreti-
cal framework from which "new human rights" derive. These essays dis-
cuss topics such as the morality and justice in an existing inequitable
global system, the historical formulation of basic human rights and their
modern application, in the theological origins of human rights, and the
African struggle in the postcolonial era for development to meet social,
economic and psychological needs. Although the focus of these writings is
theoretical, the authors provide concrete details of the African politics,
economics and societies to illustrate the need for change.
The remaining essays in the collection illuminate myriad issues and
violations of human rights in Africa. From the plight of South Africa to
refugee movements to Nigerian militarism, these authors paint a vivid
picture of a continent crippled by social inequalities, exploitation by
Western capitalist countries, sickness and starvation, and political tur-
moil. From these images, the essayists propose their solutions, couched in
the political economy context, to achieve justice and a global human
rights consciousness.
As with any book which strives to address the problems of an entire
continent, the essays contained in this collection tend to be brief and cur-
sory, highlighting the issues and facts most useful for the conveyance of a
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particular author's message. The essays range from sixteen to twenty-four
pages in length, including endnotes for further research assistance. The
text includes a selected bibliography, as well as an index. Although the
index is short on topical headings to direct readers to particular areas of
interest, it does contain many references to individuals; international and
African scholars, world leaders, and most importantly, actors in the Afri-
can political economy. Finally, the book ends with a summary of the es-
say contributors, which includes: S.O. Alubo, MArk O.C. ANikpo, Zdenek
Cervenka, Osita Eze, Julious 0. Ihonvbere, Stanlie James, Obed 0. Mai-
lafia, Okwudibia Nnoli, Mokwugo Okoye, Nienanya Onwu, Michael J.
Schultheis, and George W. Shepherd, Jr.
Patricia Thatcher
BOOK NOTES
THE AUSTRALIAN YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; Ed-
ited by D.W. Creig and Philip Alston; Australian National University
Publication, Canberra, Australia (1992); $120.00; ISBN 07315 1407 6;
555pp. (hardcover).
The Australian Year Book of International Law contains a collection
of speeches given at a conference held at the Australian National Univer-
sity in August of 1990. The speeches revolve around the two themes of
the conference: the consent and acceptance of international law as bind-
ing, and gender bias in the writing and interpretation of international
laws.
The book represents a survey of current developments in interna-
tional law. The atmosphere of the conference, gleaned through the vari-
ous speeches, is an intense appreciation for the importance of interna-
tional law. Yet, one may also sense a vagueness as to what constitutes
international law expressed by the constant need to define the interna-
tional field. The speakers seems to be looking to self-actualize themselves
as a legal field separate from other legal specialties. The speech by Pro-
fessor Douglas Johnston of the University of Victoria concerning a cross-
disciplinary perspective of consent in international law highlights this
dilemma.
Although the two themes of the conference are presented in interest-
ing ways by speakers from several countries, the absence of representa-
tives from South America, Africa or the former communist countries ap-
pears blatant. The presence of these countries could have transformed an
extensive survey of current international law issues into a more complete
presentation.
Most interesting among the speeches are those concerning gender.
Whether the sterotypically slow response of the legal world to social con-
cerns, or the realization that many problems still await solution, the deci-
sion to place gender as one of the themes of the conference is refreshing.
In her article, "Gender and International Law: Women and the Right to
Development," Professor Marilyn Waring of the University of Waikato
suggests that international law, and laws in general, are gender biased.
For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that
human beings "should act towards one another in a spirit of brother-
hood." A more common example appears in the "reasonable man" stan-
dard applied by the courts in the United States.
This compilation not only constitutes a current discussion of two top-
ical academic international law issues, but offers valuable insight on how
to approach these issues in the future.
Geraldine J. Cummings
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